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Introduction
Explosive Encounters
In just two years, the 23rd of January had acquired widespread signification 
as a day of political action. It marks the funeral of assassinated Hrant Dink, a 
prominent Turkish-Armenian journalist and intellectual, who was shot dead 
in front of the office of Agos, a newspaper that he had served as an editor-in-
chief from its beginning in 1996. Now it was a grey Friday afternoon in 2009 
and large crowds were moving towards the site of murder, mostly from the 
direction of Istanbul’s iconic Taksim Square. The ambience consisted of 
nervous expectation of the turn of the events and a sense of fulfilling one’s 
responsibility, of following the script that had already been laid out. 
 The demonstration brought together a diverse crowd: groups carrying 
flags and banderols of political parties were outnumbered by people who did 
not fit into the neat political divides; the scene resembled a typical 
congestion in Istiklal Street, the famous boulevard in the Beyoğlu district, 
attracting multitude of people as a place to enjoy its specifically urban 
atmosphere. Most of the participants were in their twenties and thirties but 
there were also families and older people, especially groups of old men 
dressed in suits. The occasion had also attracted business opportunities; in 
addition to food-carts selling simple dishes, the most popular article seemed to 
be a scarf with a checkered pattern, with diverse significations alternating 
between political protest and a fashion statement.
 I met several friends in the crowd and was struck by their observations 
of details that could easily go unnoticed; the huge police presence was 
broken down into different factions, from the elite troops situated at the 
roofs of the surrounding buildings, ostensibly allowed to shoot without a 
warning, to the indiscernible snipers behind the windows and the officers of 
different ranks in the street with shields, helmets and batons. All the scarf-
sellers were allegedly Kurds from the Mardin region in the Southeast and my 
friends identified several politicians, intellectuals and activists among 
participants. This was shared knowledge of Istanbul’s urbanity; rumours, 
ideas and stories as ways to classify its complex character and reorganize it 
into comprehensible narratives.
 I moved closer to the stage where the memorial speeches would be 
held and encountered another group of friends who will have the most 
crucial role in this study, Kurdish migrants living in the dilapidated inner-
city neighbourhood of Tarlabaşı, just around the corner from Taksim Square. 
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The ongoing discussion dealt with our security: we were supposedly safe 
because there were so many people filming the event – an antidote for the 
excessive use of force by the police. On the downside, the state would 
assumedly film the participants and have their activities archived. Someone 
nearby said that demonstrations in Turkey are showcases of the state power, 
rituals repeated at different locations throughout the year.
 The organizers announced a moment of silence but the chanting 
continued: “We are all Hrant, we are all Armenians!” (“Hepimiz Hrant’ız, 
hepimiz Ermeni’yiz!”). Many also raised their hands; proponents of Kurdish 
rights showing a victory sign and the leftist factions raising their left fist 
while the atmosphere began to turn agitated. A young man next to me 
started to cry, demanded silence for the memory of Dink and suddenly had a 
violent seizure and fell on the ground flat on his face. Someone said that he 
must have been Armenian to experience the occasion so intensely. At the 
same time, a group of leftist activists, all wearing similar colours, released 
several white doves into the air and were greeted with massive applause. It 
felt like everyone was drawing a deep breath before the hell broke loose. 
Most of the people knew of the plans to march to Taksim Square after the 
commemoration and that this had been prohibited. In what seemed like a 
rehearsed act, a large number of the participants dispersed from the scene 
and the remaining ones begun their march towards the square.
 The chants got louder, the shopkeepers pulled their shutters down and 
the police began to pull on gas masks. The protesters began determined 
approach into the direction of Taksim and shots of teargas filled the air. The 
police formed a tight cordon across the street and managed to prevent 
anyone from crossing the line. There were just a few isolated attempts to 
break through and in a couple of minutes the incident was reminded only by 
the presence of the police and the smell of teargas lingering in the air. My 
friends were comparing the demonstration to the previous ones and agreed 
that it had not been as violent as they had expected.
 This incident brings together the most central themes of my study. It 
illuminates the grand schemes of social and political organization 
intersecting with the realities of the everyday, the complex organization of 
historical consciousness with the spatial order of the city. On closer 
observation, many ambiguities are revealed: What brings a heterogeneous 
group of people, often antagonistic in other circumstances, together under a 
common cause, in this case memory of a Turkish-Armenian journalist many 
did not know about before his assassination? Why do they want to march to 
Taksim Square and why are they prevented from doing that? The 
circumstances escape the conventional classifications characteristic to 
modern Turkey; this was not an encounter between left-wing and right-wing 
politics, nor conflict between the elites and the masses, even less between 
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religious and secularist actors – it contained traces of historically established 
patterns but could not be reduced to them. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This is an ethnographic study of urban life in Istanbul, an exploration of 
encounters between people from very different backgrounds; how they relate 
to the complex history of a rapidly transforming megacity and especially to 
the reproduction of its spaces and boundaries – how significant places in 
Istanbul carry different meanings for people, how certain elements, such as 
streets and bridges, have come to act as symbolic boundaries within the city 
and how the notions of public space and the spatial makeup of the city are 
rapidly changing, motivated by negotiations of appropriate values, 
appearances and practices. The specific focus is on the dynamics between the 
effective urban centre around Istiklal Street and the impoverished 
neighbourhoods of Tarlabaşı and Tophane in its close proximity. 
 These questions have a powerful moral dimension. In the context of a 
fragmented yet interdependent network of localities, I am interested in how 
everyday moral questions are intertwined with urban spaces and their 
shifting boundaries. How are moral rules or terms of sociocultural practices 
negotiated in the urban environment of Istanbul? What kind of moral 
environments do neighbourhoods and city centres constitute and how they 
are changing? I consider ethnographic study of urban experiences as a 
vehicle to understand the specific characteristics of transformation in the 
rapidly urbanizing world. My aim is to examine how these understandings of 
Istanbul’s cityscape reflect on quotidian practices that potentially result in 
concrete interventions. Methodologically, I focus on how moral qualities are 
attached to different spaces and how boundaries between them signify 
senses of belonging and exclusion. 
 I argue that morally appropriate behaviour in different spaces and 
contexts requires constant reflection with internalized, albeit often 
contradictory notions of the proper rules of conduct. My ethnographic data 
concentrates on how people reproduce their historical consciousness of 
significant spaces and boundaries, how moral frameworks operate 
contextually, and how changes in understandings of public space and 
neighbourhoods are related to complex, historically established notions of 
living moral lives. In Istanbul, there are countless struggles over locality, 
fractured along crosscutting lines of social difference: class, ethnicity, 
urbanity, gender and religion among others. These derive from urban 
encounters and assessment of moral conduct. Thus, the transformations 
within the city can be studied as both material and embodied, while 
acknowledging their historical specificities. In my research, I wish to build 
on these actions a culturally sensitive approach that connects the practices 
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with memory and place and examines the phenomena across different scales 
– from street corners to mass events and from the underemployed precariat 
to groups of professionals, treating the city as an everyday lived and living 
environment. 
 This is also a study of Turkish modernity that works toward rethinking 
the dynamic framed as an encounter between informal multiplicity of 
alternative modernities and an imposed, top-down modernity. The symbolic 
boundaries within Istanbul are constantly shifting with concrete processes of 
urban renewal, competing approaches to historical legitimization and 
mobility of people, goods and ideas, transnationally and translocally. They 
do not follow the teleological idea of universal modernization nor the 
determinist models of global geographical flows. Rather, I consider the city 
as shaped by socioculturally specific flows, complex patterns realized in 
encounters, that constantly reproduce moral frameworks, groups and their 
boundaries. They are often rather vaguely understood but nevertheless 
reproduced in different contexts, related to the official histories and, in turn, 
reshaping them. There are three central theoretical themes: spatiality and 
morality, formation of historical consciousness and dynamics of modernity – 
approaching the research questions from differently framed but interrelated 
perspectives – that run throughout the study. 
Spatial Divisions and Appropriate Moral Frameworks
Istanbul’s quintessential centre of modernity, the district of Beyoğlu, has 
acted for centuries as a space of intricate boundaries. Home to the non-
Muslim minorities of the Ottoman Empire and the celebrated pinnacle of 
urbanity during the formative decades of the Turkish Republic, it is 
nowadays a space where many of the fault lines of urbanity are realized and 
negotiated. Characterized by abundance of boundaries and internal 
divisions, from skyrocketing rent values in Istiklal Street to impoverished but 
rapidly gentrifying inner-city quarters just a few minutes walk away, the area 
portrays historically developed spatial arrangements in myriad ways. The 
questions of its history are also conceptualized at different spatial scales, 
from “global hierarchy of value,” a system of worldwide evaluation extending 
over boundaries of the nation-state (Herzfeld 2007:316) to the cultural 
intimacy of a neighbourhood (mahalle),1  a differently ordered space with 
distinct moral qualities. Furthermore, the boundary dynamics of Beyoğlu are 
experienced very differently by its inhabitants, a fact that quickly became 
clear when observing the constant navigation across sociospatial boundaries 
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1 I use the Turkish word “mahalle” for “neighbourhood” throughout the study to evoke its diverse 
connotations, from an administrative unit to qualities of social relations and distinct mentality that 
it captures better than the English term.
by my informants living in the poverty-stricken mahalles, in comparison to 
those, who restricted their life-worlds into a remarkably few spaces.
 The overriding guiding principle of my work is to understand how 
people struggle to live in accordance with moral standards (cf. Duneier 
1999:341) and accomplish a positive sense of belonging in an environment 
that demands constant adjustment of behaviour and awareness of diverse 
and frequently conflicting sociocultural norms. This does not, however, 
imply outlining the rules of the proper conduct but detailed study of 
differently ordered spaces and contexts, some tied to deeply held culturally 
intimate relationships, others defined by exclusion or even danger. This 
brings embodied knowledge together with detailed reflection of the moral 
environment; not so much about what its norms are, but whether they can 
be violated only so often or if some norms are more violable than others 
(Faubion 1993:xiii). I do not approach the moral appropriateness as sets of 
rules but as context-dependent moral frameworks of everyday life.
 By moral frameworks, I refer to sense of respect and obligations to 
others, questions of what makes life worth living and notions concerned 
with dignity (Taylor 1989:15), standards not “wired in” or totally imposed by 
society, but the implicit notions that are brought to fore when challenged 
(Taylor 1995:168, 1989:9). However, I wish to stress the spatial aspect of 
moral frameworks and consider them as coexisting in space, organizing 
social communication and influencing how people act in particular 
situations of everyday life (Dahlgren 2010:267, 313). They are not common 
frameworks shared by everyone but embrace several, mutually contesting 
ideas the agents need to recognize and adjust their practices accordingly, to 
enact successfully within the social dynamics (Dahlgren 2008:65). Following 
Susanne Dahlgren’s work on coexisting moral frameworks in Aden, I focus 
on “how social processes that manifest a diversity of social norms are 
constituted in the dialectical relationship between structures and 
agency” (2010:7). In many cases, this involves conscious effort to locate the 
sources of power and to find cracks in the system, to search for 
transformative potential while remaining comprehensible to others. I argue 
that these issues are intimately related to the most crucial categories of 
identification, the often overlapping notions of kinship, nation, religion and 
person. In the dense urbanity of Istanbul, the outcomes of these processes 
are often experimental and surprising: in an inner-city mahalle Islamic faith 
becomes an integral component of modernity and the act of strolling back 
and forth Istiklal Street a powerful expression of freedom and independence.
 Moreover, I consider moral frameworks as a basis for belonging, 
whether in the most deeply held senses or in the ephemeral encounters 
characteristic to urban life. They also act as guides for physical environment, 
practical ability unfolding in exercise, consisting of ways to treat different 
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people and situations in appropriate ways, rather than a maps inside our 
heads that simultaneously relate all points to one another without 
discrimination (Taylor 1995:176, 1992:217). I see within them the power to 
create social relations between individuals and groups, to organize potential 
encounters between people, largely reliant on moral qualities of spaces and 
their variable boundaries. Not restricted to linear separation of spaces from 
one another, I employ the concept of boundary in a variety of fields, marking 
movement and creating motivation for what lies beyond them, enabling the 
creation of contrasts and expressions (Bashkow 2004:444, 451). Yet, I also 
consider boundaries as concrete elements that alter the course of daily life in 
significant ways: some separate the egalitarian urbanity from mahalles, 
others designate the public space of the squares and the boulevards, some are 
enforced by encounters with the authorities, still others convey a sense of 
danger and are rarely crossed by large segments of the population.
 In the first two chapters, I focus on social hierarchies and their 
relationship to spatial orders of the mahalle and the urban sphere, with an 
emphasis on their reorganization under present-day conditions. I argue, 
influenced by theories of Timothy Mitchell (1988, 2002), that the modern 
arrangement of space is largely a question of the world divided in two, into 
an abstract structure and a material realm – institutional architecture apart 
from life itself and the occurrence and reoccurrence of practices (1988:14, 
59). In a similar vein, Charles Taylor acknowledges the division between a 
frozen representation and an embodied experience and suggests an 
analytical shift into “a spatially ordered idea of sociality, consisting of the 
embodied knowledge to treat different people in different contexts in 
appropriate ways” (1992:217–218). My approach towards the spatial orders 
of Istanbul is based on this tension, of relating the embodied practices of 
self-making into reflections of the multiplicity of divergent pasts and 
differently bounded spaces.
Historical Consciousness – Between the Grand Narratives and 
Cultural Intimacy
In my study, history is realized in movement within the city, mostly 
concentrated on just a few quarters in Beyoğlu, but stretching in imagination 
to distant periods and spaces immensely larger than the experienced 
physical environment. Beyoğlu’s spatial arrangement also encapsulates many 
crucial twists and turns of the modern history of Istanbul; from the gradual 
repositioning of the central institutions of education and business – even the 
sultanic palaces – to its confines during the late Ottoman era, all the way to 
the Gezi Park protests in 2013. I approach the relationship to changes as a 
development of historical consciousness that cannot be formalized perfectly; 
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rather than following a set of rules, it must be embodied (Faubion 1994:62). 
It is not based on careful and balanced considerations of the historical 
trajectories but reifies epochs with rich sociocultural variety and radical 
transformations into static wholes and makes use of anecdotes, stereotypes 
and clichés that cut across the urban mosaic and make its complexity easier 
to absorb. It rests on the ambivalence between the official and culturally 
intimate narratives, social perfection and imperfection, and reflects on the 
power relations within society (Herzfeld 1987, 1997, 2005; Stokes 2010). 
Michael Herzfeld describes this dynamic in a following way:
Social perfection, then, is not absolute but relative; the rhetoric of absolute 
perfection is a ploy for power. This is the rhetoric of definition, grammar, 
precision, legal control, formal clothing, sexual chastity. And conversely, in 
the logic of disemia [cultural intimacy],2 imperfection is the mark of a shared 
sociability: tacit understanding, good fellowship, daring exploits, casual wear 
and behaviour, procreation. (Herzfeld 1987:182–183)
In practice, the categories become blurred and consist of sophisticated 
strategies combined with the vernacular tactics of the everyday, the order 
imposed by dominant actors slipping into cluttered improvisations, space as 
practiced place (de Certeau 1988:91–93, 117). Furthermore, the encounters 
between people in Beyoğlu are characterized by historically founded 
expectations. The degree of involvement in the unpredictable urban bustle, 
the knowledge of the codes of appropriate behaviour in particular spaces, the 
experience of crossing geographic and symbolic boundaries and the skill to 
both follow and challenge the expectations, define the reproduction of 
historical consciousness. 
 In Turkey, the everyday understandings of history deviate considerably 
from the official propositions. For instance, the grand historical narratives of 
the authentic origins of the Turks and the long-standing opposition between 
the essentialized Republican and Ottoman currents – tied to spaces, 
solidarities and senses of morality – contain different punctuations that 
become entangled, often deliberately, when related to current conditions. 
The ubiquity of historical layers in the urban environment demands a 
constant stance-taking towards ideologically laden trajectories that, 
nevertheless, requires human intervention to transform sociocultural 
realities. These historical references are not construed around a coherent 
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2  In his later works, Herzfeld uses the concept of cultural intimacy instead of the neologism 
disemia. He justifies the choice in the following way: “It expresses in more directly political terms 
the dynamic that I had earlier sought to clarify through the more formalistic notion of disemia, the 
formal or coded tension between official self-presentation and what goes on in the privacy of 
collective introspection. While the official aspect is a legitimate (and indeed necessary) object of 
ethnographic analysis, the intimacy it masks is the subject of a deep sense of cultural and political 
vulnerability” (1997:14, italics in the original).
point of view; instead, they depend on divergent positions and modalities, 
ranging from quotidian evaluations of appearance and behaviour into deeply 
held conceptions of personhood and morality, realized through the 
potentially explosive dynamics of the urban sphere, distinctive in its capacity 
to encompass a varied constellation of disparate positions.
 Consequently, anthropological approaches to history are closely linked 
to the question of the constructed nature of social realities. I consider this an 
integral aspect of historical consciousness, consisting of “various modalities of 
historically grounded ethical and moral and intellectual practice” (Faubion 
1993:13), a dimension of personhood that shapes the encounters and 
sociocultural realities. I follow Bruce Kapferer’s proposition that the 
acknowledgement of the fact that human realities are constructed, does not 
deny the reality of their construction but rather that the goal of 
anthropology should be to penetrate into the heart of the constructional 
processes (in Smedal and Kapferer 2001–2002). This study aims at a nuanced 
description of historical consciousness in present-day Istanbul that rests on 
“the embeddedness of specific cultural orientations in the development and 
historical production of practices” (Kapferer 2002:5), observed ethnographically 
in reflections and narratives connecting the different streams of history to 
lived realities. While most of the daily encounters rest on enforcing and 
normalizing the historically dominant conceptualizations, they are always 
subject to alterations and shifts in the point of view. I consider the very act of 
reflecting upon the constructedness of historical consciousness as an 
essential activity to ensure a sense of coherence in everyday life. 
 My ethnographic material illustrates the ways to encounter the 
historical trajectories of the city and its inhabitants through various registers; 
the powerful sensations of becoming an Istanbulite, of learning to enjoy the 
fast-paced life of the metropolitan multitude, of finding geographic and 
linguistic kinship from previously unknown essences, of reconfiguring one’s 
relationship to tradition and religion; or, on a more negative note, of facing 
excluding practices on the basis of one’s origins, of the necessity to find new 
routes to avoid the ID checks by the police, and, of becoming disappointed 
in politicians throughout the political spectrum are some of the themes I 
discuss in detail to illuminate these complex relationships.
Dynamics of Modernity and Urban Transformation
The topic of modernity is strongly present throughout the study and ties 
together several approaches to spatial and historical classifications. In 
Turkey, modern is one of the most powerful classificatory categories that 
integrates the specifically Turkish experience into issues with global reach, 
from the concrete transformation of a country, remaining unequally divided 
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according to the classic indicators of modernization, to the condition of 
modernity, a new sense of awareness, and a qualitatively different approach to 
life. I address the Turkish encounter with modernity from two interrelated 
perspectives; firstly, as a distinctive way to organize history and conceptualize 
selfhood and, secondly, as a widely shared periodization in the Turkish 
context; from its emergence in the late Ottoman era, to the rupture of the 
Republican revolution in 1923, further, to the shift to an increasingly liberal 
country with a multiparty system after 1950, and, finally to a period after the 
1980 military coup, characterized by neoliberal politics and post-Kemalist 
ideologies. In the course of my fieldwork, I noticed almost obsessive 
attentiveness to modernity, especially among my friends living in 
impoverished mahalles. It became particularly apparent in the movement 
between different spaces; the world of the mahalle, organized along a 
complex sets of loyalties, was distinguished from the space of freedom in the 
area surrounding Istiklal Street, just around the corner. The idea of a modern 
self, capable of sophisticated reflection and appropriate behaviour in 
different contexts, was at the heart of the matter.
 By modern self I do not mean a neutral configuration of a punctual 
object but rather something that exists “in a certain space of questions, 
through certain constitutive concerns” (Taylor 1989:50). Its connection to 
modernity represents a novel manner of relating to the world:
A new, unprecedentedly radical form of self-objectification. The 
disengagement both from the activities of thought and from our unreflecting 
desires and tastes allows us to see ourselves as objects of far-reaching 
reformation. Rational control can extend to the re-creation of our habits, and 
hence of ourselves. (Taylor 1989:171)
Yet this self-reflection is not solely based on abstract principles but closely 
related to the historical consciousness of modernity in its different, often 
contradictory forms. Nor is it restricted to individual action but takes place 
“in the nexus of reflective self-making, collective identities, and political 
economies” (Dahlgren and Schielke 2013:11). This sense of the modern self 
also reflects a specific orientation to history and spatiality: it disciplines 
thought towards disengagement from embodied agency and social 
embedding (Taylor 1995:169).
 In my discussion of modernity characteristic to different periods, I 
bring individual understandings together with collective ones by analyzing 
metaleptic acts that express divergent orientations towards history (Faubion 
1993). These consist of the evaluation of different periods, incorporation of 
breaks and continuities, establishment of new beginnings and discarded 
pasts, as well as selective appropriation of principles and materials, in 
relation to desired modernity. I argue that many of the dynamics originating 
from the past are still very much alive in the everyday practices and moral 
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evaluations of today. Analytically, I distinguish between introjective 
metalepsis, the trope of the cultural classicists referring to the past as an 
exemplary standard, and projective metalepsis, a basis for historical 
constructivism and creative utilization of the concreta of the past (Faubion 
1993:xxi–xxiii). I challenge the uniform notions of the past and offer 
historical and ethnographic illustrations of how attributes of modernity from 
different eras have created powerful senses of belonging and morality in the 
present. Furthermore, I propose that the maintenance of traditions, retrieval 
of the old and establishment of the new do not constitute playful 
arrangements of identity politics but have become vital issues with far-
reaching consequences concerning selfhood and dignity.
 In addition to reorganization of historical trajectories, the contested 
modernity of contemporary Turkey is powerfully related to novel 
arrangements of its urban spaces, especially through questions of public 
space and urban transformation as the most pressing and divisive issues in 
present-day Istanbul. I approach the notion of public space in a manner 
similar to modernity: rather than taking an influential model, such as Jürgen 
Habermas’ notion of public sphere (1989), as a starting point, I wish to focus 
on how different aspects of publicness become central in the urban sphere 
(see Low 2000, Navaro-Yashin 2002a), how they are connected to the spatial 
makeup of the city and how they can be challenged by different means. My 
focus on the qualities of space aims to locate “positive opportunities for 
group life” (Stokes 2010:5 fn.9), new solidarities and processes to appropriate 
urban space. These issues are interrelated with the rapid urban transformation 
of Beyoğlu that is radically redrawing the boundaries between its mahalles and 
urban sphere and transforming the moral qualities of space into new 
configurations that have been challenged on several grounds.
The Structure of the Thesis
My exploration of everyday life brings together the spatial orders and 
contested historical trajectories of Istanbul to illustrate its specific condition 
of modernity in the present day. Methodologically, the study is divided into 
two parts. Its first half focusses on the central questions thematically: 
Chapters 1 and 2 examine qualities of different spaces and boundaries, 
Chapter 3 shifts attention to the operations of the historical consciousness 
and Chapter 4 concentrates on the questions of modernity. The second half 
of the study integrates these themes to different periods of Turkish history; 
from the emergence of Turkish modernity in the late Ottoman period to the 
most recent developments in the twenty-first century. However, the aim is 
not to study history as linear progression but to locate significant events and 
developments and analyze how they are related to different spaces and moral 
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concerns of today. In order to study the moral ambiguities of Istanbul’s 
inhabitants, I show how even the most distant epochs are effortlessly brought 
into the present and influence life in the city. Throughout the study, the 
emphasis is on the quest for dignified life in an urban environment 
characterized by contextual moral frameworks and shifting solidarities. 
 I begin my analysis with an ethnographic account of how different 
spaces in the city are experienced, balancing between the grand narratives 
and culturally intimate significations. In Chapter 1, I highlight the 
perceptual and sociocultural characteristics of neighbourhoods, the 
impoverished mahalles in Beyoğlu, in contrast to the urban sphere of 
Istanbul around Istiklal Street, the famous pedestrianized boulevard of the 
area, that has been central to debates of Istanbul’s urbanity for centuries. I 
connect the qualities of these spaces with their historical development and 
questions of morality, especially dealing with the notions of community, 
freedom and tolerance.
 Chapter 2 examines spatial orientation in the form of concrete and 
symbolic boundaries crisscrossing the city. I start with an analysis of their 
historical formation and show ethnographically how their current 
understandings are often confused but reveal interesting constitutive 
principles of movement across both concrete and symbolic boundaries. I 
move on to analyze how boundaries are connected to moral frameworks 
guiding the senses of appropriate behaviour in different spaces and how they 
define access and safe passage in the lived realities of the inhabitants.
 After establishing this framework of spatially ordered idea of sociality, 
a city consisting of differently bounded spaces with distinct senses of 
individuality, community and morality, I move on to analyze the shared 
historical understandings and the culturally intimate individual experiences 
that shape the awareness of qualities of urban spaces. While the first two 
chapters focussed on the most significant juxtapositions between different 
districts and neighbourhoods and the reproduction of their boundaries, I 
continue with a discussion of how historical narratives transform the 
fragmented city into a coherent whole, shape the mental maps of its 
inhabitants and establish a sense of belonging into its urbanity.
 Chapter 3 investigates the formation of historical consciousness of 
different spaces and their moral qualities. I begin with accounts of urbanity 
and experiences of becoming an Istanbulite among my informants, 
signifying a shift to a new environment with radically different norms and 
possibilities, and explore how historical dynamics shaping the urbanity of 
Istanbul are brought into the present with metaleptic operations 
reorganizing different historical currents. Towards the end of the chapter, I 
discuss the cultivation of a modern self, a reflective orientation defining a 
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sense of desired modernity that had become central to the lives of my 
informants.
 The first three chapters identify several characteristics of the “modern” 
as a qualitatively different spatial arrangement, mentality and sense of 
selfhood that shapes the life-worlds of Istanbul’s inhabitants fundamentally. 
Moving up in scale, I first examine them on the level of the neighbourhood, 
proceed to how they are understood as historically distinct trajectories 
influencing the Historical Peninsula and the district of Beyoğlu and how 
they relate to the whole city and contain potentially explosive powers in its 
extremely contested sites such as Taksim Square. In Chapter 4, I shift my 
focus to an even larger scale, to diverse conceptualizations of modernity in 
Turkey, in relation to its emergence and development globally. I examine 
concrete changes in the living conditions together with the abstract 
principles associated with the “modern” and outline how the dynamics of 
modernity, its spread and reach, as well as its hierarchies of value, have been 
applied with regard to Turkey. Put together, the first four chapters address 
the different dimensions of contextual moral frameworks in Istanbul: how 
spatial orders, historical consciousness and modernity are intertwined in the 
pursuit of feeling at home in the urban environment, crossing boundaries 
designating different standards of morality and acting appropriately in 
different situations.
 Chapters 5, 6 and 7 take the themes discussed in the earlier chapters into 
a historically periodized framework. My aim is to relate the formal and 
informal understandings of Turkey’s modern history to the realities of the 
present day and to study how classifications and narratives integral to them 
have influenced the questions of belonging and moral life in contemporary 
Istanbul. In Chapter 5, I start with a brief sketch of the threshold of modernity 
in the late Ottoman era, a period often covered in haze and subject to 
reifications and confused interpretations outside the expert circles. After that, I 
move on to the radical modernity of early Republican Turkey with an 
emphasis on the reorganization of history and categories of belonging. I look 
especially into how the changing notions of nation, ethnicity, secularism, 
religion and civilization have shaped the understanding of modernity with far-
reaching consequences.
 In Chapter 6, I explore the era between the years 1950 and 1980, 
labelled as “populist modernity,” characterized by large-scale migration from 
the countryside to the cities and hybrid cultural formations, exemplified by 
the emergence of arabesk urbanity that has reshuffled the categories of 
imposed top-down modernity with vernacular and culturally intimate 
understandings. I show how many of these debates are far from being 
forgotten and how they still influence encounters between people from 
different backgrounds. 
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 Chapter 7 deals with the modernity of the most recent times, from the 
liberal opening of the country after the 1980 military coup. I begin with a 
discussion on how the new political climate of the country has created 
polarizations influenced by the earlier divides between the masses and the 
elites, arabesk and high culture, rural migrants and urbanites and how my 
informants experienced discrimination and exclusion in this new social 
order that rests on another reconfiguration of history and modernity. In 
addition to the neoliberal reforms and populist politics of the new political 
elites, I study how the parallel and often complementary ideas of Islamic 
values and neo-Ottomanism are related to the political and sociocultural 
climate of today. These three chapters represent the diverse currents of 
Turkish modernity and move between the grand historical narratives and 
their tactical utilization in everyday life. My ethnographic analysis covers a 
wide spectrum of situations that reveal how the disputed notions of the past 
eras are revitalized and reinterpreted, often with surprising consequences. 
 The last chapter of the study takes the contradictory modernity of 
present-day Turkey to illustrate the current spatial rearrangements in 
Beyoğlu. While the first chapter provided an introduction to the spatial 
orders in Beyoğlu, the last one returns to their present-day realities with a 
focus on how the mahalle and the urban sphere are changing in 
unpredictable ways. I explore the transformation of public space through 
case studies of police interventions, the commodification of spaces in 
Beyoğlu and, especially, how town squares have become central arenas for 
political expression, designating claims for access, rights, control and 
ownership of public space. I conclude with speculation about the future of 
rapidly gentrifying city, where the coexistence of different moral frameworks 
has become increasingly volatile and the boundaries between the mahalles 
and the urban sphere subject to radical alterations at different scales.
Fieldwork and Methodology
I collected most of the ethnographic data during my ten-month fieldwork in 
Istanbul in 2008–2009. However, many of the findings are supported by my 
earlier and subsequent visits to Turkey: from travelling around the country 
extensively from the year 2002 on, conducting three months of fieldwork for 
my Master’s thesis in 2005, and returning to Turkey several times for 
conferences, summer schools and to work as a visiting scholar. I have also 
been paying close attention to developments in Istanbul and the whole 
country throughout the period: first, mostly following mass media, but 
increasingly by means of different social media platforms. I have kept in 
touch with most of my informants after my fieldwork and had a possibility to 
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discuss the almost final version of the work with them when working at the 
Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul for the first three months of 2015. 
 My analysis is grounded in participant observation throughout the 
doctoral fieldwork, systematic collection of impressions, characterizations 
and memories of spaces and traces of history, especially in the Beyoğlu 
district. After the initial period of engaging with my informants, my data 
collection consisted of series of semi-structured interviews, dealing with 
spatial characteristics and historical understandings of particular events or 
locations, sometimes recorded over a few quick glasses of tea, at others 
extending into hours of informal discussion covering a wide range of topics. 
Whenever possible, I would write down my notes immediately and extend 
and comment on them preferably on the same day. The number of short 
audio recordings exceeded one hundred; some proved to be very useful and 
found their place in the final text; many others remained at the background, 
designating the range of interpretative possibilities.
 Gradually my attention turned increasingly towards an interrelated set 
of issues, constantly present in the lives of my informants. The emphasis on 
detailed historical consciousness and especially on the contextual moral 
frameworks of differently bounded spaces began to attract even more of my 
interest. I developed a method I called “virtual walks” and began to exercise 
it with my key informants. We would sit down over tea and talk our way 
through the city: beginning at one site, I would inquire into the 
characteristics of spaces and places in Beyoğlu, moving across the streets and 
squares, recording narratives of significant sites, encounters and boundaries. 
This method3 proved to be very successful (and hugely popular); there was a 
clear sense of enjoyment for all of us in describing the cityscape, correcting 
supposed misunderstandings and debating the developments and 
transformations. I used this methodology with eight of my central 
informants,4  three of them depending on low-income jobs and living in 
Tarlabaşı, and five representing other segments of Turkish society, either 
living in Beyoğlu or frequenting the area regularly. I repeated many of these 
sessions, especially the ones conducted with those living in Tarlabaşı, and 
added new details on an informal basis. I transcribed all of my recordings 
and compared commentaries on the most significant spaces and themes to 
identify shared patterns of thought. Towards the end of my fieldwork I 
scrutinized the central themes further in semi-structured interviews, 
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3 After my fieldwork, I came across Kevin Lynch’s study The image of the City (1960) that utilizes 
research method of abstract mapping similar to mine. However, Lynch follows a much more 
structured set of questions, concentrating on forms rather than social meanings of spatial 
attributes (46) and his study does not involve long-term participant observation.
4 Şivan, Ridvan, Ahmet, Veli, Osman, Volkan, Didem and Nazlı.
focussing on issues such as social inequality and the imagined future of 
Beyoğlu.
 My anthropological approach could be summarized as “comparative 
study of common sense, both in its cultural forms and its social 
effects” (Herzfeld 2001:x), that is based on both practices of everyday life and 
their detailed reflections. For an ethnographic study, my aim, following 
David Graeber, is to tease out “the hidden symbolic, moral, or pragmatic 
logics that underlie certain types of social action; how people’s habits and 
actions make sense in ways that they are not themselves completely aware 
of ” (2007:305). Often the most interesting features became apparent when 
the practices were challenged on different grounds or turned ambiguous and 
contested. Many of the accounts of my informants combined stereotypical 
characterizations, recited almost by rote, with distinctive personal stories of 
meaningful experiences. The local culture of verbal expression had an 
interesting role in this dynamic, especially in the beginning of my fieldwork: 
if there was even a hint of a formality in the interview setting, the replies 
extended easily to solemn and ceremonial recitations of one’s deepest 
feelings. It was sometimes difficult to distinguish the ritual expressions from 
the immediate concerns; at the same time, I have always been attracted to 
the ease many Turks have when talking about their innermost feelings only 
after a short period of acquaintance.
 I discuss examples from literature, films, magazines and newspapers to 
illustrate wider linkages to my arguments and I have been fortunate to take 
part in countless discussions of everything between heaven and earth during 
my time in Turkey. This familiarity with the contextual life-worlds of people 
has helped me to identify modalities of different practices and to trace out 
their implications and uses (Henkel 2007:64, Houston 2013:334). However, I 
have chosen to refer to media discussions sparingly and use them mostly to 
complement my ethnographic examples. In order to make discussions in the 
media more accessible, I mostly refer to English-language sources for the 
news that has captured wider attention and use Turkish sources for the local 
news.
INFORMANTS
A substantial part of the study consists of the depiction of the lives of 
underemployed men, between 25 and 30 years of age, working in the area 
around Istiklal Street and living in Tarlabaşı. Especially two of them, Şivan 
and Ridvan,5  have very central role and their experiences are referred to 
throughout the text. Of the many others involved, some might appear in the 
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5  All the names have been changed to protect the privacy of my informants. I have also altered 
some other sensitive details of locations and situations on the same grounds.
text only shortly, in the form of a particularly telling anecdote, while others 
occupy more central positions, demonstrating the range and potential of the 
social imagination. They also serve as a background against which the 
references to other ways to experience Istanbul become more comprehensible. 
There are five people, three living in Tarlabaşı and two representing other 
societal positions, whose stories and experiences I use recurrently to 
illustrate my argument. 
At the time of my fieldwork, Şivan was a 29-year old Kurd who had moved 
to Istanbul ten years ago from a now abandoned village near Mardin in the 
Southeast of Turkey. I first met him through a friend who had a real estate 
agency in Tarlabaşı. Running errands for the office, he possessed an 
incredible skill to find whatever materials or help needed in just a few 
minutes, often based on his extensive networks in the neighbourhood. 
Despite his lack of formal education, he possessed intricate knowledge of the 
area and was very interested in its history. Contemplative and slightly 
reserved, he nevertheless had an appearance of a streetwise urbanite, 
balancing his life between the mahalle in Tarlabaşı and the urbanity of the 
Istiklal area. He had his mother and seven brothers living together in 
Tarlabaşı, with the brothers frequently moving around the country in their 
search for employment. He had very pragmatic relationship towards being a 
Kurd and a Sunni6  Muslim but liked to deliberate over matters concerning 
religion and politics. At the time of my fieldwork, Şivan was also very 
determined in advancing his career and later managed to enrol in private 
business school for an evening course. He met his future wife Birgül during 
the time of my fieldwork and they live nowadays in a rented flat in Tarlabaşı. 
Ridvan knew Şivan by name but they moved in different groups of friends 
and would not keep in touch. He was 30 years old and had had a very 
troubled past. His home village, also near Mardin, had been bulldozed 
during the civil war in the 1990s, both of his parents were dead and he had 
moved to Istanbul, after living in Mardin and Diyarbakır for few years, in 
2000. He shared a small room in Tarlabaşı with his older brother who 
alternated between different jobs. Unlike Şivan’s very close ties with his 
relatives, he mostly spent his free time with a circle of friends of 
approximately the same age, usually around Taksim Square. Against all the 
odds, Ridvan had been successful in his undertakings. He operated a small 
grocery store (bakkal) together with a friend, ordering nuts and dried fruit 
from Eastern Turkey and keeping a wide variety of other products available. 
In addition to these chores, he worked as a waiter in a teahouse nearby and 
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6  All of my central informants were, at least nominally, Sunni Muslims of Hanafi school of 
jurisprudence.
had detailed of plans to expand his business in the future. He had very strong 
political opinions and his high-temperedness had led him into trouble with the 
authorities several times. At the same time, he had a great sense of humour 
and would often take joking stance towards misunderstandings of his past.
Ahmet often emphasized that he was a newcomer to Istanbul and had not 
really become familiar with the city in his first two years. His family was 
originally from Diyarbakır, also in the Southeast, but had moved together to 
Istanbul and settled in Tarlabaşı in the search for better life. He was 25 years 
old, slightly younger than Şivan and Ridvan, very pious and would have 
wanted to carry on with Islamic education. His family lived a tiny flat in a 
run-down building with lots of relatives coming and going. He was working 
in a modest family-run teahouse neighbouring his home and spent most of 
his time in the vicinity. Ahmet often stressed the significance of being 
Kurdish and Muslim; he felt isolated from Turkish society and often depicted 
his life as a constant struggle in a hostile environment. Despite the anxiety 
and confusion, he had no plans to return into quieter life in a more 
religiously oriented neighbourhood and would come up very quickly with 
ingenious solutions to issues disturbing him.
Veli, 30, was living in the neighbourhood of Tophane, down the hill towards 
the Bosporus from Istiklal Street, and worked as an artist and art instructor. 
He was originally from a small town close to the Syrian border and had 
background in Islamic medrese education, in addition to the state-run 
primary school. From very early on, he had wanted to move to Istanbul and, 
despite the opposition from his family, had enrolled into an art school and 
later continued his studies in the university. We became friends and later 
flatmates after a random encounter in one of the teahouses of Beyoğlu. Veli 
was a self-confessed urbanite and cosmopolite with a wide circle of friends 
but would often relate his current situation with his roots at the periphery of 
the country. He also proved to be incomparable help to me in explaining the 
complex dynamics of Turkish society and Istanbul’s urban transformation.
Didem, 27, had been living half of her life in an upper-middle-class 
neighbourhood of Ataköy, some 15 kilometres from Beyoğlu, near the 
Atatürk airport. She was working in a production company and rapidly 
moving towards international career path, already spending a fair amount of 
her time in Germany and England. At the same time, she was proud to be 
Turkish and Istanbulite and often saw her work as a way to promote the 
country and correct misconceptions associated with it. Knowledgeable about 
history of Turkey and closely following the political developments, she 
would be very eager to engage in lengthy discussions of the future course of 
Introduction
17
the country. Didem also participated actively in feminist politics and would 
often emphasize issues facing Turkey from this perspective, often based on 
her own experiences.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
While supported by extended observations of Turkish society and social 
engagement with wide variety of actors, this study revolves around the lives 
of a relatively few people. It is also centred on the urban sphere in Beyoğlu; I 
discuss how the dynamics I study are perceived differently in other spatial 
contexts but I have not conducted long-term fieldwork in other locations. 
Naturally, the group of people I focus on is not representative of whole city, 
nor the spaces where my research has been situated. The advantage of 
concentrating on the life-worlds of a fairly few individuals lies in the 
possibility to tie complex phenomena of seemingly different orders together 
in a detailed way that acknowledges the role of individual histories. My aim 
has been to include a variety of voices to give insight into my argument while 
focussing mostly on the thoughts and practices of men in their twenties and 
thirties. I have been discussing the themes of my study extensively with their 
families, relatives, friends and partners, whose thoughts play a considerable 
role in the background. The gender dynamics have also had an effect on the 
study; as a male researcher I faced no problems in communicating with the 
women in the mahalles of Tarlabaşı and Tophane, usually girlfriends or wives 
of people that I knew, but lengthy interviews, sometimes consisting of 
several sessions, did not seem an appropriate way to conduct research. I 
organized interviews with couples and had possibility to reflect on my 
findings on the light of experiences of women from other parts of Istanbul in 
extensive interviews. While there is a relatively good grasp on the most 
pronounced themes such as publicness and security, the extended narratives 
of individual histories of females living in these mahalles are outside the 
scope of this study.
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NOTE ON THE USE OF LANGUAGE
My aim has been to make the text as readable as possible for people with no 
knowledge of the Turkish language. I have used the English transliteration 
when it has become established (Istanbul instead of İstanbul and Istiklal 
instead of İstiklal or İstiklâl) but used the Turkish spelling in other cases 
(Tarlabaşı, Şişli). I have also translated names of the well-known locations 
into English (İstiklal Caddesi – Istiklal Street, Taksim Meydanı – Taksim 
Square, Tarlabaşı Bulvarı – Tarlabaşı Boulevard). When mentioned for the 
first time, I have designated the Turkish name for places where the 
connection between English and Turkish name is not obvious (the Golden 
Horn – Haliç, the Bosporus – Boğaz) but not when it corresponds closely to 
the English name (Bilgi University – Bilgi Üniversitesi). 
Turkish words that cannot be captured fully in English translation are 
written in italics (e.g. mahalle, gecekondu), also when the Turkish word is 
similar to English but with different connotations (modern – modern). The 
Turkish terms are defined in the glossary at the end of the book (p.218). For 
these words, I have not rendered the plurals according to the Turkish system 
of pluralization (mahalle – mahalleler, çapulcu – çapulcular), but given them 
in English (mahalles, çapulcus).
Turkish alphabet has seven letters, modified from the Latin alphabet, but not 
found in the modern English alphabet (in addition to three vowels that 
sometimes appear with circumflex: â, î and û). The orthography is highly 
regular.
Ç  – as ch in chain
Ğ  – “the soft g” lengthens the vowel before it
I  – as -er in letter or speaker
İ  – as ee in keep
Ö  – as vowel in bird or her but shorter
Ş  – as sh in show
Ü  – as e in new
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Chapter 1:
The Mahalle and 
the Urban Sphere
Istanbul is a country, not a city.
— Istanbul Mayor Kadir Topbaş7
I had just moved into my first address in Tarlabaşı and waited for Şivan to 
show me around. I had been wandering aimlessly in the area on my previous 
visits to Istanbul but now it felt different because I had a specific aim: to 
learn to understand the spatial divisions of the city. From my window, I 
could see Tarlabaşı Boulevard (Tarlabaşı Bulvarı), a six-lane thoroughfare, 
built in 1986–1988 after the demolition of over three hundred buildings, 
which has arguably become the most significant boundary constructed in 
twentieth-century Istanbul. On its other side rose the thick stone walls of the 
British Consulate General and it was almost possible to see all the way to 
Galatasaray Square, marking the approximate halfway point of Istiklal Street. 
On my side there were no visible landmarks; the maze of winding streets and 
alleys, lined mostly by dilapidated Levantine townhouses with four or five 
floors, began at my front door and I had yet to learn how to navigate around 
the labyrinth. On a closer look, the facades had interesting details reminding 
of the Greek and Armenian residential history, but most of the them were 
covered in black soot and some of the buildings had deteriorated into empty 
shells waiting to collapse in the yearly floods or snowstorms. Şivan had told 
me earlier that in case I was about to receive visitors, I should tell them that I 
live just around the corner from the pro-Kurdish BDP party headquarters: 
nobody will know the names of the streets in the mahalle but they can 
always ask around for the office. For foreigners coming to visit me late in the 
evening, he suggested that I escort them from Galatasaray Square. 
 In first couple of days I had already become familiar face in the few 
establishments near my home. In addition to some carpentry and metal 
workshops, a real estate agent and numerous car-repair stores lining 
Tarlabaşı Boulevard, there was Mardin Çay Evi, run by Ahmet’s family, a 
simple snack bar serving mostly tea and sandwiches; Ibrahim Market, a busy 
grocery store that had the best selection in the area, frequented by large 
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7  Finkel, Andrew. Guardian 2.1.2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/02/dispatch-
istanbul-most-dynamic-city
families who came shopping together and bought the essential household 
goods in large quantities; Star Tekel Bayii, a corner shop that did most of its 
business selling beer and cigarettes and attracted a group of men to chat over 
a drink by the benches in its front, and Özdemir Kıraathanesi, a nondescript 
but very popular teahouse for reading newspapers and playing board games, 
with sturdy tables covered with dark green tablecloths. These  also represent 
the most typical businesses in an impoverished mahalle in Istanbul. It was as 
if variety of corner shops (bakkal) and teahouses (çay evi), stood for the 
public life of the place: some operated mainly as greengrocers or displayed a 
selection of nuts and dried fruit, others sold alcohol; some doubled as 
teahouses and prepared simple meals, others specialized as bakeries or 
confectionaries, either with one or two tables inside or just simple benches in 
the front. The shopkeepers might expand their selection if they came across 
a new business idea or happened to find a cheap bargain. Serkan, the burly 
owner of Star Tekel Bayii, had somehow acquired dozens of pairs of women’s 
shoes – all of them identical and decorated all over with gold paint – and 
decided to prepare a display next to the store window. The shoes were sold in 
a less than a week and he reminded me several times of his good business 
instincts. Another innovation of his was to sell shots of vodka, whisky and 
gin from plastic cups together with sausage sandwiches as a good package 
deal. This kind of informality and sense of close-knit community marked its 
difference from the district across the boundary – typified by public space, 
presence of the state control and large profits to be made. 
 On a street level view, the picture was of a quintessential Istanbul 
mahalle. There was laundry hanging across the narrow streets, packs of 
children roaming around, and the streets were punctuated by corner stores 
and teahouses, or small workspaces either manufacturing or repairing goods. 
Tarlabaşı was, however, different from Istanbul’s stereotypical clusters of 
neighbourhoods in several ways. Unlike the recently built areas, its 
cosmopolitan past was brought to life in surprising ways: sometimes a 
peculiar architectural element captured one’s attention on walls covered with 
graffiti, at others the change of atmosphere was truly astonishing. There were 
several churches of different orders; Greek Orthodox and Syriac Orthodox, 
even an impressive German Protestant church with a tiny congregation just 
around the corner from where I had moved in. The non-Muslim minorities 
of the Ottoman Empire are nowadays mostly gone but their presence came 
to light at unexpected moments; my first landlady was an old Greek woman 
who owned the whole building but preferred to live in an area that she 
described more modern, namely the upper-class district of Nişantaşı a few 
kilometres up north. A more famous character was “Istanbul’s last pork 
butcher,” a Greek man whose store in Dolapdere, a short walk from my 
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home, had attracted even international attention.8  These were, however, 
somewhat mysterious, even ghost-like encounters: the landlady would visit 
the building very rarely, have someone to drive her to the front door and 
leave straight after her business; the butcher, very welcoming to his 
customers, would not have a sign outside his shop because selling pork in 
Istanbul could be perceived as a provocation among some elements of the 
society. It sometimes felt that it was possible to encounter the multicultural 
past in an uncomplicated manner only in Asır Meyhanesi, one of the last 
Greek-owned traditional taverns in Istanbul, at the time the only respectable 
restaurant serving starters, mains and rakı9 in Tarlabaşı.
 The contradictory qualities of the area are sketched best by walking 
around its streets. I was fortunate to have Şivan to show me around, a task 
that he clearly enjoyed and that we would repeat numerous times during my 
fieldwork. He knew that I would have only a couple of weeks to stay in this 
address before the principal tenant would return and we had decided to 
combine my introductory tour to Tarlabaşı with visits to its real estate agents. 
When he arrived, he had thought carefully which streets would be suitable 
for me to live and was intrigued by my expectations. He recognized the 
notorious reputation of Tarlabaşı and reflected on that, especially now when 
he needed to accommodate a foreigner (yabancı) into its social mosaic.
 He had already decided that the area where I was currently staying, 
referred to as Aynalı Çeşme in vernacular, would be best choice for me 
because it was mostly Kurdish territory and not as rough as the areas 
towards Taksim Square. In Tarlabaşı, the earlier multiculturalism of Greeks, 
Armenians and Assyrians had been replaced with another order of Roma, 
Kurds and increasing numbers of African immigrants, most of them on their 
way to Western Europe. “For a foreigner,” Şivan stated, “it is crucial to find 
the best possible surroundings – you should look for a place where you have 
friendly neighbours, in the street that is not involved in prostitution or drug 
trade. I have a lot of relatives living in Aynalı Çeşme and they know how to 
take care of the mahalle. In fact, I would rather live on this side of Tarlabaşı 
but the apartments are too expensive for the whole family.”
 It felt that Şivan was already living here. He seemed to know everyone 
and we would stop to exchange the latest gossip every few minutes on a way 
to a real estate agent that he considered trustworthy. At last we entered the 
office and came across Reşit, an elderly man with a long grey beard and 
light-blue Islamic attire: loose shirt, baggy şalvar trousers and a skullcap. He 
had already talked with Şivan and said that he had found a perfect place for 
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8 Kayakiran, Firat. Bloomberg 9.4.2008 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=newsarchive&sid=aC4.f2m9HcDg , BBC News 26.4.2008 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/7368020.stm
9 Popular aniseed-flavoured alcoholic drink.
me. To my surprise, we went into the courtyard of a modest neighbourhood 
mosque (mahalle camii) nearby and Reşit opened a door in a building next 
to the minaret. “This is a perfect place for you to stay, there are just good 
Muslims coming here, people will make sure there are no thieves or other 
problems. There is also my brother living in the house next to yours, he will 
help you to get settled.” Şivan interrupted the introduction in a polite but 
slightly nervous way and told Reşit that we have another appointment but will 
think about this possibility. When we left he burst out laughing. “Reşit had 
really planned to make you part of the community,” he whispered, interrupted 
by gushes of laughter, “he wants to make you a pious Muslim as well, not that 
there is anything wrong with that, but he has no idea what the foreigners here 
are up to. Let’s go to another place to see what they have in mind.”
 His next manoeuvre was to show me how to get completely lost in the 
winding streets with several cul-de-sacs. In Tarlabaşı, the main thoroughfares 
are easy to distinguish from the backstreets for they represent the public life 
of the mahalle, the world of corner shops and mostly all-male teahouses. The 
backstreets reveal its space of intimacy; women in floral scarves gossiping on 
the stairs, children playing football, interrupted by itinerant vendors selling 
cleaning equipment or foodstuffs. It took me a long time to learn to relax 
with the feeling of the watchful eyes and I could sense how Şivan also 
lowered his voice slightly when we turned to this semi-private sphere. He 
wanted to share with me his streetwise attitude towards orientation in the 
city: “You will have no use for a map in this city, except to understand its 
sheer size. For places like Tarlabaşı they do not even bother to draw all the 
streets.” I understood that he was referring to the tourist maps that had been 
placed near the most famous sights and designated merely the historical 
monuments, public transport connections and the biggest streets. “If you 
rely on a map you will just end up walking Istiklal Street from one end to 
another, perhaps having a sneak peek of its side-streets and end up in the 
tourist area across the Galata Bridge. We are not on the map here and we do 
not need to be.”
 His pride over the informality of the mahalle led conveniently to what 
Tarlabaşı signifies to most of the Istanbulites. The area is associated with 
squalor and danger, a district dangerously close to the entertainment centre 
around Istiklal Street. It is equated with crime and political unrest, a space 
infested with drugs, prostitution and seedy nightclubs, many of them visible 
from the other side of Tarlabaşı Boulevard. Şivan had stressed to me 
repeatedly that I will have to know what is happening in different streets and 
that for me it would be crazy to live close to where the criminal activities are 
located. He stopped and pointed at me a bar with its shutters down. There 
had been a nightclub (gece külübü), he said, the only one of its kind in the 
area, that would resemble the music clubs around Istiklal, not making its 
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money out of prostitution or give an impression of a simple drinking-den for 
the old mustached men. He had been working there briefly but the owner 
had had to close the place down. Firstly, there were complaints from the 
residents, who did not want another bar selling alcohol in the 
neighbourhood and who, in this case, could do something to prevent it, 
because the place was not run by the mafia that everyone was afraid of. 
Secondly, there had been groups of ultra-nationalist youth who came to look 
for fights in the Kurdish-run place and, thirdly, the police did not want to 
have anything to do with the situation. I later asked about the place from a 
shopkeeper nearby who just said calmly that those kinds of establishments 
belong to the other side of Tarlabaşı Boulevard and that the idea was 
doomed from the start.
 Our detour ended close where we had begun, at another real estate 
agency that had recently opened a new office in Tarlabaşı. Its owner, Murat, 
corresponded more closely to the agents I had met earlier and had prepared 
a thorough presentation of his vision for Tarlabaşı. Dressed in a very smart 
suit and welcoming me in English, he ordered us tea and baklava10  from the 
nearby confectionary and started with a story of the new branch. Like Şivan, 
he was a Kurd from the Mardin region but had lived in the city centre and 
had a business degree. He had great plans for what he described as urban 
renewal (kentsel dönüşüm), a concept that I would hear numerous times in 
the future, more often with negative undertones. For him, Tarlabaşı signified 
waste of potential and would soon come to resemble the area on the other 
side of the road. Principally, his business consisted of renovating flats in run-
down buildings and putting them up to let or selling them for a hefty profit. 
He emphasized that he had experience of working with foreigners and knew 
what their expectations were. He proceeded to show me pictures of his most 
recent acquisitions, mostly two-bedroom apartments that were way over my 
budget. Şivan told him that I was a student looking for something more 
modest and Murat looked surprised, also slightly disappointed. He decided 
that we should rather walk to see another option.
 “There is one place nearby,” he hesitated slightly, “ but it is in one of the 
backstreets (arka sokak), would that be OK?” Again, he looked at Şivan first, 
received a shrug and we strolled along. The shift to a more private world of 
the mahalle was again very sudden as we turned to a very narrow alley with 
the sun almost blocked by the hanging laundry. Şivan read my thoughts and 
joked: “This is as much of a mahalle as you can expect.” My presence 
intrigued the children on the corner who followed us up the stairs. These 
were clearly homes for large families: the doors were open, perhaps out of 
practicality of people coming and going constantly and dozens of pairs of 
shoes and slippers in front of them, and we could see a family having a meal 
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10 Filo-based pastry sweetened and held together with syrup or honey.
sitting on the floor, with bowls of dishes spread on a white tablecloth. The 
apartment, especially with no furniture, looked ridiculously big for someone 
who would move in with just a few bags – Murat understood the absurdity 
of the situation and said that he will keep me updated.
 The sun was already setting and I asked Şivan to share dinner with me. 
I also needed to buy a new charger for my laptop so I suggested that we cross 
Tarlabaşı Boulevard go somewhere close to Istiklal Street. He hesitated and 
muttered that he is not dressed properly and that we could just buy wraps 
(dürüm) from somewhere nearby. This served to me as an introduction to 
one of the dynamics between the areas: how the informality of the inner-city 
mahalle is contrasted to the expectations of appearance across the boundary. 
The iPhone promotion T-shirt, simple cardigan and slightly worn-out jeans 
were not good enough for Şivan to dine, however casually, in the urban 
centre. We settled on a compromise, to buy the charger first, avoid the trendy 
quarters and have a no-frills dinner on our way back.
 We crossed Tarlabaşı Boulevard through an underpass and could 
immediately perceive the change in the atmosphere. The streets were 
teeming with people from different nationalities and social classes and their 
chatter filled the air. I could sense Şivan’s pace quickening and the his eye-
contact to the passers-by becoming cursory as we blended into the urban 
anonymity. In an interesting way, Georg Simmel’s classic idea of 
metropolitan blasé and indifference coupled with extremely detailed 
knowledge of differences (1976 [1903]) corresponds closely to conditions in 
contemporary Istanbul. The seemingly detached movement in the midst of 
the multitude involves careful reading of its signs, many of them 
decipherable only to those accustomed to the city. Many of the signs referred 
to the unique history of the area. It can be traced back to the essentialized 
compartmentalization of the city: the historical Ottoman centre and the 
areas north of the Golden Horn,11  previously occupied mostly by the non-
Muslim minorities – Greeks, Armenians, Jews and Levantines12  – who have 
left their mark in the surroundings. However, Istiklal Street and its side-
streets portray a vivid mix of representations associated with different eras. 
In rudimentary terms, discussed in detail in the following chapters, the 
Ottoman past of the old embassy buildings and churches lining the streets 
represents one historical layer, distinct from the classic urbanity of the early 
twentieth century – scenes of gentlemen dressed in suits and ladies in elegant 
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11  The hillside of Galata, now officially called Karaköy, was primarily inhabited by the Genoese 
already present in Byzantine times. The area of Istiklal Street was mostly covered by vineyards, 
before the construction of the embassies, beginning in the eighteenth century (Sumner-Boyd & 
Freely 2000:427–428).
12  I use Levantine as an all-around term for the Euro-Mediterranean minorities of the Ottoman 
Empire.
costumes promenading the streets or sitting in its Parisian-style cafes – a 
period now visible only in books, postcards and posters sold in souvenir stalls. 
The palimpsest is complemented with contemporary designs of the twenty-
first century, depicting a hip party capital competing with Berlin, London 
and New York. The Islamic Ottoman imagery around Istiklal Street is mostly 
limited to posters, books and music associated with Mevlevi dervishes, 
especially in the souvenir shops near the Galata Mevlevi Lodge (Galata 
Mevlevihanesi), converted into a museum with regular performances of 
sema, the ritual better known as “whirling ceremony.” The immediate 
perception of the historical layers is so vivid and striking that it is difficult to 
comprehend that there was no clear boundary separating the Istiklal area 
from Tarlabaşı before the construction of Tarlabaşı Boulevard in the late 
1980s. Nowadays, they seem like separate worlds, demanding different 
appearances, senses of sociality and standards of appropriate behaviour. 
Defining Urban Spaces
Istanbul consists of diverse neighbourhoods; some extend over vast areas in 
a porous fashion and merge with others seamlessly, while others are sharply 
delineated with unmistakable geographic and/or symbolic boundaries. I 
argue that rather than geographic locations, the classification of the spatial 
orders of the mahalle and the urban sphere, with their corresponding moral 
frameworks, is crucial in understanding the societal dynamics of Istanbul. 
By spatial order I refer to historically grounded spatial arrangement, 
ordering of social relations and a sense of moral appropriateness that is both 
abstract and embodied and can be applied to very different environments. 
Often some characteristics of the mahalle and the urban sphere coexist in the 
same space, often contradicted with other features and connected to the 
historical master narratives of modernity and tradition, individual and 
community, authenticity and cultural corruption. Spatial orders can also be 
employed as pure abstractions. Çağlar Keyder argues that there is a genre in 
Turkish literature and cinema that maps the neighbourhoods onto attitudes 
and emotional charges of separation organized along lines of Westernizers 
and defenders of cultural authenticity (2008:507). I argue that these 
categories are still available but the divisions have transformed considerably 
– they have become more complex and incorporated novel configurations of 
modernity, authenticity and selfhood, sometimes bearing only slight 
resemblance to their earlier forms.
 In Istanbul, the qualities of space are routinely evaluated with emphasis 
on their aesthetic features, residential patterns and appropriate practices 
linked to moral principles. The term mahalle, an Arabic loanword denoting 
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the smallest administrative unit in the city,13  extends its meaning to 
institutions within a neighbourhood. “Neighbourhood mosque” (mahalle 
camii) and “neighbourhood school” (mahalle mektebi) are common examples 
but the term can also be used with connotations to “neighbourhood 
mentality” (mahalle baskısı), morality and atmosphere. In these cases, the term 
mahalle is used as an adjective, widely recognized but also ambiguous with 
regard to its positive and negative qualities.
 The concrete living conditions in the mahalle reflect the turbulent 
relations of the past, present and future. Atatürk’s Republican reforms 
employed the dichotomy between the city and village as the quintessential 
dynamic of the civilizational dialogue but they also targeted mahalles as 
obstacles to development. While the reformers favoured the syncretic Alevi14 
traditions of Anatolian villages, discussed in Chapter 5, as traces of the 
authentic Turkish essence, the religiously conservative dimension of the 
urban mahalle was seen as a hindrance. Şerif Mardin describes how the 
reformers were on a quest “to establish a ‘new collective identity’ where 
religion was no longer of any determining power, and were intended to 
liberate the individual from the ‘idiocy of traditional, community-oriented 
life.’ The secularisation of daily social life and the independence of the 
individuals could only be realised by breaking the traditional social 
relationships and destroying the power of the imam at the local level of the 
mahalle” (in Gül 2006:79). Here, the mahalle represents an enclosed world, 
an entity binding the lives of the inhabitants together with specific spaces. 
Murat Gül highlights its importance to the life of an average inhabitant who 
would “undertake his primary education, obtain his professional or 
occupational skills, arrange his marriage, celebrate the birth of his children 
and receive a funeral ceremony on his death” (2006:79) within the confines 
of the same mahalle. The modernist ideas of urbanity challenged this way of 
life forcefully: they emphasized cities organized rationally as egalitarian 
spaces for citizens who were expected to abandon voluntarily their earlier 
senses of community.
 According to this view, the life-world situated in a bounded space of a 
mahalle is related to distinct kind of sociality, expressed in networks that 
cannot realize their full potential because of their traditional and 
hierarchical character. It is opposed to the independence of individuals, 
citizens of the emerging Republic, who would gradually escape the 
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13  This, of course, means that the whole city can be divided into mahalles, also its urban sphere. 
For example, Asmalı Mescit Mahallesi in Beyoğlu has Istiklal Street as its boundary all the way from 
Tünel Square to Galatasaray Square. My use of the term acknowledges the administrative functions 
– mahalle as a unit governed by an elected muhtar – but emphasizes its sociocultural definition.
14  Alevism is a heterodox branch of Islam, with elements from Twelver Shia Islam and Bektaşi 
order. There are approximately 10 million Alevis in Turkey.
domination associated with the stagnant past. Nowadays, I argue, the focus 
on the debates has shifted from the ideal of producing citizens loyal to the 
Republican ethos to the questions of liberal mindset and democracy, defined 
in opposition to corruption and majoritarian rule.15  The earlier ethos of 
social engineering to improve national well-being has transformed into a 
more abstract conception, associated with the capability of independent 
thought. Elizabeth Özdalga, a Swedish sociologist who has been living in 
Turkey since the middle of the 1970s, gives an excellent definition of mahalle 
mentality in opposition to liberal modernity:
“Mahalle baskısı,” or small-town (or neighborhood) mentality, is the kind of 
pressure any dominating majority population may exert on individuals who 
want to take their destiny into their own hands, i.e., who object to following in 
the tracks of mainstream society. The social setting for such pressure is usually 
a closed, communitarian community where personal control may be highly 
affected. It goes without saying that this kind of pressure belongs to milieus 
where a liberal and democratic spirit is weak or lacking.16
Yet, people like Şivan felt that they had a more democratic and just 
community within the boundaries of their mahalle. He took pride of 
mastering both of the environments but did not see the promise of freedom 
around Istiklal Street as unproblematic. For him, the question did not 
resonate only with the earlier dichotomy between Islam and secularism but 
the sum total of being from the countryside, Kurdish, poor and religious in 
an environment where these distinctions were noted and had far-reaching 
consequences. The stares, rude behaviour and police harassment in the 
supposedly equal and anonymous urbanity created tensions that were linked 
to historically developed standards of the secular urban sphere (see also 
Houston 2013:345). The attacks towards women who chose not take their 
veils off in the early Republican years (see Özyürek 2007a:4) were still alive 
in the stories of today and captured the much greater malaise of a divided 
and unequal society. “On a good day,” Şivan told me, “I can balance the two 
lives that I have, to feel at home in Tarlabaşı and go to Istiklal to enjoy the 
freedom (özgürlük). On a bad day, I feel that I am not welcome here and that 
I have nowhere else to go – I cannot stand the hopelessness of the buildings 
of Tarlabaşı slowly crumbling down and the neighbours following my every 
step, but even less the people who look down on me and make clear that I 
should be somewhere else.” Especially for those lacking the right credentials, 
balancing between the two spatial orders is serious work, constant 
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15  Criticisms of majoritarian conception of democracy were widespread already during my 
fieldwork. It has been interesting to notice how the significance of these issues has escalated in the 
Gezi Park protests and played a remarkable role in the ideology of the resistance.
16  Özdalga, Elisabeth. Today’s Zaman 25.9.2007 http://www.todayszaman.com/news-122997-
mahalle-baskisi-small-town-mentality-by-elisabeth-ozdalga-.html
deliberation of spatial attributes and moral qualities that can have profound 
consequences for their lives.
ORIENTATION AND TERRITORIALITY IN THE DISTRICTS OF ISTANBUL
A quick look on what different areas look like on a map, despite Şivan’s 
criticism of its usefulness, gives an idea of Istanbul’s spatial arrangements.17 
The following examples are based on recurring typifications of urban space; 
stories of the inaccessible labyrinth of Tarlabaşı, the co-existence of the 
mahalle-like and modernist principles in the proximity of Istiklal Street and 
the recently established pattern of gigantic construction projects at the 
outskirts of the city, in this example Kayaşehir, where many inner-city 
dwellers who cannot afford the rising rents have been relocated. I talked 
about the differences with three of my key informants living in Tarlabaşı – 
Şivan, Ridvan and Ahmet – and found out they shared very similar views. 
Their comments employed descriptions bordering stereotypes but 
nevertheless illustrated significant organizational principles that help to 
understand the composition of the city.
In Tarlabaşı you have to know your way. There are some places that should be 
avoided, especially after dark. Nobody knows the names of the streets, we use 
names of teahouses, shops and mosques everybody knows. (Ridvan)
Map 3. The labyrinthine structure of Tarlabaşı.
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17  LSE Cities publication Istanbul: City of Intersections (Burdett 2009) also features an analysis of 
the typological variation within the city. Interestingly, it identifies a grid pattern in Pangaltı, 
formerly a mixed neighbourhood of Muslims and non-Muslims, that still has a pervasive sense of 
mahalle with the current residents (34–35).
Most of the people who visit Beyoğlu only know Tünel Square, Istiklal Street and 
Taksim Square. They are afraid to go into the side-streets and have not learned the 
shortcuts. (Şivan)
Map 4. Istiklal Street and its subsidiary streets where cars are allowed.
Of course, there are recently built areas for tens of thousands of people, far away 
from the centre. I don’t know what is happening there – often the poor people are 
forced to move in there when the rents become too high near the centre. (Ahmet)
Map 5. Models of urban planning in Kayaşehir.
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The map does not capture the embodied experience of walking in the city 
but provides a selective abstraction of the foregrounded elements. The 
tourist map Şivan referred to earlier concentrated on significant sights but 
had nothing to tell about their relationships. In the following two sections, I 
will discuss how the relational and context-dependent dynamics of Istanbul’s 
mahalles are different from the spatial order of the urban sphere.
Social Organization and Spatial Order of the 
Mahalle
Timothy Mitchell (1988), following Roberto Berardi, demonstrates the 
dynamic between the mahalle and the urban sphere brilliantly in his analysis 
of Cairo’s encounter with modernity. I consider many of the same issues 
integral to Istanbul’s spatial orders. He raises accessibility as an essential quality 
of urbanity and approaches the city as “a network made up of enclosures, of 
prohibitions and accorded rights” (1988:55). In this view, the emphasis is on the 
context; everyday life consists of the sliding between these principles, 
degrees of accessibility and exclusion determined by the persons involved, 
temporal attributes as well as other circumstances (56). Often the informality 
of the mahalles means the lack of regulation and control by the state. My 
walk with Şivan around Tarlabaşı illustrated several of these features: many 
of the buildings would be considered unfit for living in other districts but in 
Tarlabaşı they are accommodated on an informal basis, the shops can extend 
to the sidewalks and double as bars without permits, the drug trade is 
relatively open on some of the backstreets and the watchful eyes of the 
neighbours observe the space around the clock. While Istiklal Street has a 
very visible police presence, accompanied by a large number of undercover 
security officials, in the mahalles the police are rarely to be seen – some spots 
in Tarlabaşı, visible from certain points at Istiklal Street, have questionable 
reputation as areas that the police enter only in large groups. However, their 
boundary zones are heavily policed. This signifies the antagonistic 
relationship between the state and the community, but also neglect: disputes 
within the boundaries of the mahalle are private matters, better left to be 
dealt with by the community. 
 This does not necessarily mean that the state is absent in all 
impoverished mahalles. The famous Roma neighbourhood of Sulukule, 
situated by the Theodosian Walls up the Golden Horn, a popular destination 
for tourists seeking for an authentic encounter with the cultural 
performances of the residents, had a notable police presence with patrols and 
checkpoints clustering the landscape. This was, however, to ensure the safety 
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of the outsiders rather than the inhabitants and should be seen as increasing 
the sense of separation rather than reducing it. Now Sulukule has largely 
been bulldozed to the ground, to make way for middle-class housing, and 
similar security concerns were at the heart the urban renewal of Tarlabaşı. 
Moreover, the deliberation concerning degrees of access and exclusion is 
linked into a long historical continuum. It played a significant role already in 
the legal deliberation over public and private spheres in the Ottoman times 
(Murphey 1990), was at the heart of the concerns of the Gezi Park protests 
and is a constant source for discussion wherever Istanbulites meet. I will 
discuss the changing notions of public space and urban transformation in 
the last chapter of the study and concentrate here on the contrasts between 
the spatial orders.
DEGREES OF ACCESS WITHIN A MAHALLE
The relationship between the individual and the community plays a 
significant role in defining the limits of access. In the semi-private space of 
the mahalle the life of the residents extends from their homes into the streets 
and individual buildings – even whole streets – are often inhabited by people 
who originate from the same region in Turkey; itinerant vendors and 
handymen provide their services within specific areas and inhabitants are 
protecting their boundaries. In contrast, Istiklal Street is an embodiment of 
the modernist urban sphere; a linear arrangement cutting across districts 
that provides a supposedly egalitarian space for citizens to promenade at all 
times of the day. The accessibility of mahalles is also tied to temporality and 
requires intimate knowledge of their rhythms: they can welcome visitors 
during street markets, often assigned to specific weekdays, or organize 
cultural events that temporarily allow unrestricted access. Following a 
shorter cycle, their boundaries are unguarded to a degree in the daytime but 
visitors are not expected in their vicinity after the dark. It is important to 
note that many of the spaces in the city exhibit combination of mahalle-like 
and modernist urbanity, not as exhaustively defined qualities but something 
that arises through negotiation and dialogue.
 On moral grounds, mahalles are strongly associated with questions of 
honour,18  linked with a self-governed system of communitarian control 
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18  There are several conceptualizations of honour with different Turkish terms. Jenny White 
interprets their complexities and different usages with the following example of a message by the 
military in the Southeast: “soldiers had used stones to outline a message on the ground: Hudut 
namustur, “The frontier/boundary is honor.” The term namus is also used to refer to women’s 
sexual honor and chastity. – Attacks against ırz [chastity, purity, honor], namus [good name, 
honor], iffet [chastity, innocence], haysiyet [personal dignity, honor], and şeref [honor, distinction] 
[…] We have a debt of loyalty and honor [namus] to those who put this motherland [vatan] under 
our protection [emanet, in our care]” (White 2009:14).
assuring the observation of Islamic norms and protection of women and 
family life within their boundaries (e.g. Gül 2006; Kandiyoti 2002:121–125; 
Özyürek 2006:76), a strong ambience of observing eyes surveying the space 
together with anticipation of bodies that can be quickly mobilized to action 
when needed. These actions can manifest in several ways, mostly quotidian 
and unremarkable, but essential in guaranteeing the steady flow of everyday 
life. When Şivan referred to neighbours following his every step, he meant 
that the sense of control was not limited to the outsiders but an all-
encompassing fact of life that he occasionally needed to escape to the 
freedom of Istiklal Street. Furthermore, some aspects of his life were 
compartmentalized according to these spaces and their morally appropriate 
practices. The neighbourhood mosque we visited with the real estate agent 
was one of the significant spaces. There was another mosque closer to his 
home but he preferred this one, mainly for its community of Kurds from his 
home region. He was not very observant but did his best to attend the Friday 
prayers and had periods when he prayed more regularly. At other times he 
felt seduced by the other side of the boundary and its bars. He also jeered at 
the people of his age drinking beer in Tarlabaşı and questioned the point of 
that. The delights of Istikal’s urbanity awaited just across the street but some 
limited themselves to the familiar circles where nothing new ever happened.
THE MORALLY AMBIGUOUS SPACE OF TOPHANE
In the following discussion, I explore the range morally appropriate practices 
of an ambiguous space, just a few blocks away from Istiklal Street but 
situated between the environments of the mahalle and the urban sphere. 
Unlike Tarlabaşı, separated from the apex of Istiklal’s urbanity by a wide and 
busy road, the boundary on the other side was of a porous kind. The 
ambience in Tophane, consisting of several neighbourhoods between Istiklal 
Street and the shore of the Bosporus, changed gradually when rolling down 
the hill towards the sea. Veli, an artist and art teacher who later became my 
flatmate, lived in the area and expressed his views of its qualities frequently, 
often using examples of the everyday practices in the street outside his 
window.  Originally from a small town in the Southeast, he had pursued a 
career as an artist against all the odds. His father had died when he was very 
young and as the oldest of the children he had adopted the position as the 
head of the family. “It might be difficult for you to understand,” he began the 
story that he had told to many others, “but this country follows still the old 
traditions, what you see in Istiklal Street is just a surface. For many, the 
biggest fear is to become sahipsiz (without a guardian or protector), an 
independent individual. I struggle against all kinds of currents in my artistic 
work and question the traditions, but at the same time I am part of them.” 
He continued with a concrete example: “There is a reason why Turks always 
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ask “nerelisiniz?” (“where are you from?”) when they meet a new person. The 
jobs go to people from the same region and many people want to live 
surrounded by their kin, or at least people from the same region. I can tell 
you where people running businesses in this street are from; the corner shop 
(bakkal) is operated by a Laz19  family and the religious guy in the store up 
the road is from Kayseri. In the Nike store up the road it might be different 
but here these things really matter. We are close to Istiklal Street but things 
already work differently here.”
 To illustrate the sense of self-sufficient community, he pointed at a 
feature I had not paid much attention to, but noticed later also in many other 
locations. The people working at the bakkal had taken responsibility to direct 
traffic when the street was jammed. They would indicate to cars when it was 
their time to turn, who can stop where and directed cars as close to the curb 
as possible for others to overtake. For Veli, this was the positive side of self-
governance, without which the traffic chaos would have become unbearable. 
Unlike police, with legal credentials to command traffic, these men had 
taken the task themselves – there was a clear sense that the drivers had to 
obey the signs for they were in space operated according to these regulations. 
I later asked about this from the shopkeepers who did not seem to grasp the 
question but just told me that this is the only way to make traffic work at this 
trouble spot.
 On a more negative note, Veli complained of the neighbourhood 
pressure in a way that demonstrated sensitivity to the contextual norms. He 
told me first that the pressure in this place was nothing compared to 
conservativeness of the Fatih district in the Historical Peninsula20  where he 
could not imagine himself living in. In Tophane, the vigilance of the 
neighbourhood caused annoyance and frustration rather than concrete 
interference or danger that he associated with the extremely conservative 
mahalles. At the same time, as he pointed out, not all mahalles share the 
same rules nor they enforce them in uniform ways. For example, unlike 
conservative Sunni Muslim neighbourhoods, Alevi or Roma neighbourhoods 
have no problem with the sale of alcohol but can have a very tight sense of 
community and social control; in some mahalles the shared regional origin 
(hemşehri) of the families can be the uniting factor, while in others the 
emphasis on religious observance unites them. Veli felt that his daily conduct 
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19  Laz are a minority group native to northeastern Black Sea coast with their own language 
(Lazca).
20  Several terms with different connotations are used to refer to different areas in Istanbul. The 
peninsula can also be referred to as the “old city” or the “historical centre.” I have decided to use 
mostly the term “Historical Peninsula” as a neutral descriptive term for the area within the 
Theodosian Walls. However, wider connotations cannot be completely avoided; Michael Herzfeld 
comments on the term “Historic Peninsula” as evoking the Italian term centro storico or historic 
center, but with a “geographical twist that also emphasizes what makes Istanbul different” (2010:318).
challenged some of the norms of this particular mahalle. The most pressing 
issue had to do with people visiting his home.
 Veli had a very wide circle of friends, Turks and foreigners, many of 
whom paid regular visits to this conveniently located apartment. This had 
made the mahalle suspicious. There were several students, male and female, 
some of them only teenagers, who came to his apartment for lessons in 
painting. Sometimes he organized informal gatherings, lectures dealing with 
art or social issues, discussions over dinner and small parties. He said that 
the shopkeepers were staring at him in condemning way if he walked down 
the street accompanied by different women and that the people around had 
already invented nicknames to some of his frequent visitors. There had been 
no threats but he could sense the pressure. When I later moved in to share 
the apartment with him, my initial interpretation of the attention was 
curiosity; many were just eager to know of the different ways of life, some 
suspicious of foreigners’ weird manners, a handful afraid that these people 
would invade the mahalle by buying their rental flats. I quickly developed an 
easy-going relationship with the people around me, very similar to the area I 
lived in Tarlabaşı for the first months of my fieldwork. However, the 
negotiation does not always follow these subtle approaches and the self-
governance occasionally shows its menacing side with serious consequences. 
People can be driven out from their homes on the basis of the honour of the 
mahalle. I will next discuss an occasion that shows the potential of mahalle 
to mobilize on shared notions of morality.
EVICTED BY THE MAHALLE
The chain of events unfolded when I was conducting fieldwork for my 
Master’s thesis in 2005. A Turkish artist, whom I had met only very briefly, 
had sublet his apartment, incidentally also situated in Tophane, to foreign 
visitors for a couple of months. The tenants were very pleased with the 
magnificent view of the Bosporus and spent a lot of time at the roof terrace. 
The problems begun when they started sunbathing. Some of the buildings 
next to this one were taller and it was possible see to the roof terrace from 
their windows. One day a relaxed afternoon in the sun was interrupted by a 
woman, dressed in black full-body veil (çarşaf), who told the new tenants 
angrily something that they, not speaking Turkish, did not understand. Next 
day, there was a man at their door, who told them politely in English that 
sunbathing on roof was not appropriate in this neighbourhood and that they 
had to do it in some other place. I visited them a few days later, not knowing 
about the episode. They had not taken the warning seriously and the woman 
appeared again, furious with both the beer bottles on the table and the 
skimpy clothing the foreign tenants wore. She told them to go away very 
angrily and used the word kâfir (infidel), a very strong and rarely used 
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pejorative term in Turkey. I, encountering the situation for the first time, felt 
that this was something very different from the routine quarrels between 
neighbours.
 The news arrived the next day. The people of the mahalle had contacted 
the owner of the apartment and told him that the new tenants, as well as the 
one who had sublet the apartment, had to go immediately. They also 
presented a stern warning that if they did not obey, their safety cannot be 
guaranteed. Their Turkish friends told the guests to take the issue seriously, 
pack their backs on the same day and stay the next night at the hotel for 
there was no solution after this line had been crossed. The former tenant also 
had to move away as soon as he returned to Turkey.
 These stories illustrate a strong tendency to link the mahalle 
environment with static notions of tradition, where “communality is limited to 
the immediate neighbourhood, communitarian organisations based on 
primordial and religious identities (such as associations based on place of 
origin) shape everyday life, and relations with the political authorities are 
largely mediated through patron-client ties” (Ayata 2002:25). From a common 
derogatory and patronizing view, the uniformity equates with the 
communitarian ethos, a lack of both self-autonomy and rational critical 
thinking, accompanied by a lack of self-restraint and a judgement of people 
being guided by instincts and emotions (38). They indicate a primitive 
mindset, inability to escape the tradition and to reflect upon the world 
critically. While mostly analyzing the importance of deeply held relationships 
and moral dilemmas in Turkish society in a calm and balanced manner, Veli 
would sometimes become agitated: “I just can’t stand the way the shopkeeper 
positions his chair outside the shop and keeps staring at my room! If I look 
back from the window he will not even blink. I do not want to keep the 
curtains closed all the time like people do in mahalles, I need sunlight when I 
am painting. It is impossible to explain these things to them – they think I 
am running a brothel here and there is nothing I can do!” Şivan reflected on 
the same issue as an object of discrimination: “I have gotten so tired of 
people genuinely thinking that daily life in Tarlabaşı consists of honour 
killings and blood feuds – it is as if we are sheep herded into one place and 
expected to kill ourselves one by one.” These criticisms were real, both in the 
everyday discussions and in the sensationalist media accounts. Again, on a 
closer examination, the critics would acknowledge the diversity of values 
held by Kurdish people but would regularly resort to the widely spread 
stereotype of uncivilized villagers as “unwitting automata, guided by 
structures that we share with them but that we are, through our conscious 
wit, to transcend” (cf. Herzfeld 1987:60). 
 Şivan and his friends would see the desirable environment of the 
mahalle as emphasizing communal ties, Islamic values and self-governance. 
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They contrasted this with the soulless existence of urbanites, often 
characterized as sahipsiz and terbiyesiz (unmannerly, badly brought up), 
unable to act according to community norms, not showing proper respect 
and being outside the networks of solidarity and obligations (see Mango 
2004:126). They were not characteristics of individual freedom but rather 
equated with exclusion and isolation. In order to understand this dynamic, it 
is essential to examine how the spatial arrangement of the urban sphere 
relates to the mahalles.
The Boulevard and Egalitarian Urbanity
In Beyoğlu, the dichotomy between mahalle and a distinctively urban 
environment was exaggerated in the course of everyday life. Throughout my 
fieldwork, I casually asked my informants to describe their movement in the 
city, comment on different spaces and apply different classificatory principles 
for their spatial qualities. I would often accompany them on their daily 
errands and we would elaborate on the topics over a glass of tea. As I noted 
above, there was a general consensus of the most typical features of the 
mahalle and the urban sphere but no single exemplary model that would 
epitomize all of their characteristics. Both the age-old neighbourhoods in the 
Historical Peninsula and the more recent squatter settlements (gecekondu)21 
at the fringes of the city would fit into the framework of archetypal mahalles 
and, on the other hand, the long-rooted cosmopolitanism of Beyoğlu and the 
skyscrapers of the financial district in Maslak would symbolize the urban 
sphere despite their huge differences with one another. I want to ask here, 
what is at the heart of the classification that makes the difference worthy of 
attention and why has this distinction become so significant. I have already 
discussed the intimate contextual solidarities and their spatial attributes in 
the context of the mahalle. Now I wish to turn my attention to the urban 
sphere, characterized by egalitarian space. I will argue that this opposition is 
not unique to Istanbul but revolves around the encounter with modernity: its 
leading principles have been realized in contexts as geographically distinct as 
nineteenth-century St. Petersburg and Paris (Berman 1982) as well as 
colonial Egypt around the same time (Mitchell 1988, 2002) but it has 
produced historically unique outcomes in Beyoğlu.
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21  Gecekondu refers to informal housing built by the migrants without official permissions. The 
term could be translated as “built overnight” to indicate their rapid construction.
ISTIKLAL STREET – MODERN SPATIAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE BOULEVARD
It can be a striking experience to leave the labyrinthine alleys of Tarlabaşı or 
Tophane and enter into a wide and straight boulevard. There is more air and 
light and it is possible to see further than the next corner with no need to 
carefully survey the loose cobblestones. The mass of people brings with it a 
promise of surprise, the possibility to see something new and attractive on 
every visit, contrary to mahalles, where novelty is the exception from the 
routines of the everyday. Yet, the properties of urban space are not restricted 
to sensory stimuli but are constantly related to historical formations and 
senses of sociality. Istiklal Street is based on the model of a wide Parisian 
boulevard rather than the spatial arrangements associated with the pre-
modern Ottoman times. In the most general terms, the historical dynamic 
lies in the difference between individual and community: Istiklal Street has a 
historical foundation as an egalitarian urban space, a site of self-expression, 
self-realization and tolerance in contrast to the surrounding neighbourhoods 
where people have been defined by their similarity and uniform ways of life 
as a part of community (Özyürek 2006:76; Robins and Aksoy 1995:229). 
Moreover, in Turkey there is a significant difference that sets Istiklal Street 
out on the basis of its uniqueness:
Neither a street, nor a neighbourhood [...] For at least two centuries it has 
been the most significant space where Turks who want to make an individual 
cultural preferences have expressed their choice. (Özgüven 2008:156)
In concrete terms, Istiklal Street (İstiklâl Caddesi), formerly called Grande 
Rue de Péra by the Europeans or Cadde-i Kebir (Grand Street) by the 
Ottoman Turks, is a boulevard of 1,4 kilometres, pedestrianized in 1988, that 
connects Tünel Square, on the top of the hill rising from the Galata Bridge, 
with Taksim Square. Extremely crowded almost around the clock, it brings 
together people from different backgrounds more than any other place in 
Istanbul. It is also a place that most of the Turkish tourists add to their 
itineraries when visiting Istanbul.
 It is a platitude to say that Istiklal Street represents the culmination of 
Turkish modernity. Even so, an ethnographic project that takes seriously the 
everyday interaction cannot ignore the fatigued metaphors: one’s relationship 
with modernity, its reach, range or misappropriation is explored relentlessly by 
people who essentialize its meaning and stretch the boundaries of the concept, 
sometimes with specific aims in their mind. The centrality of the street is 
expressed in sociospatial terms, relating it to other spaces, and as a historical 
construction, reflecting on the abundance of  its historical sediments and 
layers. Commentaries on Istiklal’s modernity consist of rearrangements of the 
palimpsest, shifts in the frame of reference and reflection on its different 
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attributes. They emphasize the internalized experience and embodied 
knowledge of the city, recognize the generalizations and stereotypes and often 
focus on the informal characteristics and unexpected transformations in the 
lived environment rather than the uniform trajectory of developmentalist 
modernity.
 The immediate perception of Istiklal Street is relatively ordered and 
uniform. Along its course, the ground floor establishments consist 
predominantly of large international chain-stores such as Nike or Levi’s, 
alongside coffee houses and restaurants of both multinational and Turkish 
varieties. This is Istiklal Street in its quintessential form, attracting all kinds 
of people to spend money or just to stroll around, back and forth, along the 
street. The extreme crowdedness is one of its principal features; the stock 
photographs of the street come across as either depicting this multitude or 
its absence: the deserted street during a snow storm or heavy rain. For Turks 
not familiar with Istanbul, the word Beyoğlu has connotations only with 
Istiklal Street, Taksim Square, and perhaps the nostalgic representations of 
the early Republican past. The organization of its more detailed contours gets 
easily lost amidst the dominant currents.
 On closer look, the urban space of Beyoğlu does not fit neatly into a 
framework of equal units of measurable space. The area consists of 
intersecting and differently valued domains; divided into individual streets, 
bounded neighbourhoods or larger wholes with their different 
characteristics. The ways people classify and evaluate different spaces at 
variable scales and embody their differences in their daily practices is 
directly connected to the formation of groups and solidarities in Beyoğlu. In 
the work of defining spatial orders, the abstract notions operate together 
with the lived realities. Some of the frameworks resemble the established 
distinctions between the widely shared fault lines, others are significant for 
smaller segments of the population and many of the most crucial ones are 
based on the individual experiences of the city.
SPACES OF FREEDOM AND LIMITS OF TOLERANCE
Şivan often mentioned that he was addicted to the urbanity of Istiklal Street, 
but this had not always been the case. At first, after moving to Istanbul ten 
years ago, he had been afraid of the masses of people and did not know how 
to behave. He had spoken only elementary Turkish and was nervous of 
people approaching him: “I could not relax when I had all these weird people 
around me. I just did not know how to relate to them and was scared that 
something bad would happen,” he said and pointed at one of the familiar 
characters, a small man with watery eyes, who wandered around the area 
everyday with a scale to weigh people for small change, a common substitute 
for begging in Istanbul. “It is not that someone like him would look scary but 
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everything here felt unpredictable. Now I have learned to enjoy the surprises 
and feel myself at home. It is rather the normal-looking people who think 
that I should not be here that bother me.” This sense of freedom pointed to 
the area as an experimental site, a kind of laboratory for prototyping 
representations, expressions and solidarities. 
 Alternatively, the two years Ahmet had lived in Istanbul had nurtured 
his expectation of urbanity and freedom but he still found it difficult to go to 
Istiklal Street, especially alone or in the evenings. For most of the days, he 
was preoccupied with running the family teahouse in Tarlabaşı but was very 
curious of what happened across the boundary. For him, generally, the 
biggest problem was to consolidate his pious Muslim identity with the 
urbanity of Istanbul and he was suspicious of the secular Turks with whom 
he felt he had very little in common. However, the distinction was not 
unambiguous and Istiklal Street also represented a tolerant space for him:
It is a different thing for a woman to be veiled in Istiklal Street and in some of 
the conservative mahalles. I don’t like the pressure there is in some places [to 
veil] and how the rules are enforced by intimidation. In Istiklal it is a matter of 
choice, people respect each other and take responsibility of their actions. I would 
not like Turks to wear burqa22 but I do not get disturbed by seeing Arab tourists 
wearing them in Istiklal Street. In some other place it could lead into a conflict 
and have some people to pressure the women to take them off.
This was not the only time that the pervasive presence of veiled Arab women 
was brought up. In addition to the self-confessed urbanites that Istiklal Street 
was famous for, it received its fair share of tourists, casual visitors and people 
working in the area, not always out of their own preference. The recurring 
joke that Istiklal Street had the highest ratio of full-body veils in Istanbul was 
widely shared and referred to the numerous veiled Arab tourists 
promenading the street. Especially during the national holidays, there was 
also a steady stream of Turkish tourists who take a walk from Tünel Square 
to Taksim along Istiklal Street as part of their sight-seeing itinerary. Out of 
this mix it was nevertheless easy to single out a shared sense of reality that 
was more than the sum of its parts. The elements that contradicted the 
liberal atmosphere of urban Istanbul only seemed to enforce the specific 
moral framework of tolerance.
 The tolerance associated with the urban sphere united appearances and 
moral principles into a distinct mode of being, vastly different from the 
mahalles. It was not wholly specific to Istanbul but relied on the possibilities 
of social control and the expectations of the nature of the encounters, at the 
heart of what boulevards have signified historically (Berman 1982; Mitchell 
1988, 2002; Scott 1998). I discussed above how Şivan felt at times welcome 
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22 Referring to both niqab and burqa, both leaving very little of the face visible.
and at others an unwanted visitor in the area, on the edge of inclusive 
urbanity and powerful practices of exclusion – he felt that those who defined 
the limits of tolerance and could resort to tactics of intimidation to degrade 
others who deviated from their norms of its urbanity. Ahmet had adopted 
the idea of boulevard as a tolerant melting pot, but Aygül, Ridvan’s wife who 
had moved to Istanbul just a year ago, was very outspoken in her criticism of 
the shallow morals of urban Istanbul.
 We were waiting for Ridvan to return from his errands and decided to 
have a quick glass of tea near Galatasaray Square. Aygül decided that we go 
to one of local hamburger joints because she did not like the atmosphere of 
the more upmarket establishments. She wanted to explain the complexities 
she encountered when visiting the area: “To a certain extent it is true that 
Istiklal represents freedom (özgürlük) and attracts all kinds of people. 
However, not everyone is happy here, especially the women who choose to 
veil. Nobody is going to tear a veil off a woman but there are particular kinds 
of stares towards people who dress piously. It is not visible to you but many 
of my friends never feel completely at ease.” She stopped for a moment and 
chose her words very carefully: “I do not veil myself – partly because of this 
– but for those who choose to veil it is something that they think about all 
the time. They do not want to restrict their movement but they do not feel 
welcome. It is not always that the observant Muslims are the intolerant ones.” 
For her, the moral ambiguity was not just divided into the different moral 
frameworks in Tarlabaşı and the Istiklal area but extended to constant 
adjustment to different spaces. “I do not want to go to the fancier cafes here 
because I feel out of place. It often happens that the waiters are also living in 
the poor areas but the management tells them to treat their kind badly. 
Maybe some of them do it to hide where they themselves come from.”
THE BOULEVARD AND THE HIGHWAY
Boulevards have long historical roots of bringing potentially explosive 
elements together. Marshall Berman argues that pacifying the masses by 
employing them in large numbers for the construction and creating long and 
broad corridors for the troops and artillery to move against the popular 
insurrections, were the factors that introduced boulevards in nineteenth-
century France (1982:150; also Scott 1998:61). Their societal impact was, 
however, much more far-reaching. Tearing down the medieval slums 
enabled the urban poor to walk out of their neighbourhoods to explore the 
life in other districts (Berman 1982:153). On the other hand, the public 
space of the boulevard, connecting urban areas, also helped the wealthier 
segments of society to see the very different social realities of the poor, 
otherwise not accessible to them. Berman notes the inherent paradox within 
modern boulevards as a perfect symbol of capitalism’s inner contradictions: 
Mahalle and the Urban Sphere
41
“rationality in each individual capitalist unit, leading to anarchic irrationality 
in the social system that brings all these units together” (159). 
 Berman continues with an argument of how roads with different 
characteristics can have remarkable social effects. Interestingly, his analysis 
mirrors the development at my primary field site, albeit in a different 
timescale than proposed here:
The distinctive sign of nineteenth-century urbanism was the boulevard, a 
medium of bringing explosive material and human forces together; the 
hallmark of twentieth-century urbanism has been the highway, a means for 
putting them asunder. (1982:165)
What Berman defines as the attributes of the highway, are in Istanbul located 
just around the corner from Istiklal Street. Busy Tarlabaşı Boulevard, the 
boundary that most of my informants living in Tarlabaşı crossed several 
times a day, possessed the characteristics of the classic boulevard only in its 
name.23  With only a few traffic lights and underpasses, it sliced between the 
impoverished inner-city neighbourhood and the world-famous urban 
centre. Thus, both varieties of prototypically modern roads, connecting and 
separating districts, were running parallel with just a few blocks distance, 
with wide-ranging consequences to the sociospatial makeup of the city.
 It is telling of the spatial orders of the mahalle and the urban sphere 
how, in the case of Tarlabaşı, the demolition of the turn-of-century 
Levantine houses to make way for the wide road was justified as a moral 
project. In the 1980s, the demolition officer Fevzi Aydin claimed: “We want 
to clean up Beyoğlu. We are going to clean out the vermin from their 
nests.”24  These same tones were echoed approximately twenty years later with 
regard to the huge urban renewal project of Tarlabaşı, discussed in detail in 
the last chapter of the study. A police officer commented the situation to the 
press: “After years of swatting at mosquitoes, the swamp will now be 
drained.”25  The battles over moral appropriateness, entangled with the spatial 
orders, have been fought in these locations with different labels over 
centuries and they still spark fresh confrontations over desired forms of 
urban life.
 The streets, roads and pathways are never just enablers of transport but 
lend themselves to culturally intimate categories. As a spatial arrangement, 
Istiklal Street forms a relatively straight line of roughly equal width, that, 
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23 In contemporary usage, the term boulevard often refers to wide thoroughfares with busy traffic. 
I follow Berman’s (1982, 2006) use of the term as a site of gathering and social interaction.
24 Wrigley, Patrck. Guernica 27.6.2013 https://www.guernicamag.com/daily/patrick-wrigley-
menace-to-society/
25  Watson, Ivan. NPR 15.7.2007 http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11965693 
(also discussed in Tuominen 2013:47)
according to the modernist logic of egalitarian urbanity, should connect 
individuals as equal units sharing the space. However, it would be 
insufficient to think about this space as solely revealing “in material form the 
determining presence of a non-material plan or meaning” (Mitchell 
1988:54–55). More than a spatial arrangement, Istiklal Street is filled with 
intersecting and contradictory representations and narratives, subject to 
reinterpretations, and occupies a unique position as a space to make a 
statement on what Turkish modernity and urbanity mean. What for people 
like Şivan, Ahmet and Aygül was an ambivalent and precarious space, 
seductive in its unrealized promises, was the most secure space for Volkan, a 
professional photographer who considered it as the only space in Istanbul, or 
in Turkey for that matter, where he could be among his own kind, the liberal 
(liberal) and urban (şehirli) Turks. Furthermore, he considered his presence 
in the area as a way of maintaining relationships, close to a political 
statement: “We have to retain Istiklal Street and especially its backstreets as 
spaces where the subcultures (altkültür) thrive. Otherwise Istanbul will be 
lost. It is crucial to just have these people around you – otherwise you would 
feel miserable in this city.” 
 In the egalitarian urban sphere, the sense of equality does not mean 
sameness, but rather a promise of freedom, very different to other spaces of 
the city. The dichotomy between the mahalle and the urban sphere often 
parallels the reified historical patterns of the Ottoman city and its 
Republican modernist counterpart. However, their qualities do not conform 
to a specific historical period but to an entanglement of different principles 
of ordering space and history. Often essentialized and simplified to the 
extreme, they become embodied moral frameworks as well as abstract 
principles guiding orientation, movement, sense of belonging and solidarity. 
Their moral frameworks can be related to communities providing mutual 
assistance and security over their areas, or, by crossing the boundary, to the 
sense of escaping the suffocating atmosphere of watchful eyes of the mahalle 
into the space of freedom, realized and experienced even in the act of 
walking the boulevard from one end to another. The contemporary spatial 
orders are formed in integrating the cosmopolitan city of the Ottoman times 
into the Republican modernity of the Turkish nation, and further, into the 
neoliberal realities of the present day. These connections are rarely effortless 
or uniformly understood but play a major role in the hard work of everyday 
life, consisting of movement and adjustment between different spaces. On 
the analytical level, the challenge, to simplify a bit, is to connect the 
modernist logic of the abstract space with lived reality of maintaining the 
“proper relationship between directions, forces and movements” (Mitchell 
1988:54).
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 Despite their frequent polarization in the course of daily life, the 
question is not about wholly belonging into one spatial order but of 
successfully uniting them. Their distinctive existence provides ways for 
integrating different life-worlds into the capricious flow of life. Berman uses 
Nevsky Prospekt, another boulevard associated with the promise of freedom 
in the Russian nineteenth-century modernity as an example of the forces 
that simultaneously tear apart and unite social life in myriad ways:
The Nevsky can enrich Peterburgers’ lives spectacularly, so long as they know 
how to take the trips it offers and then come back, to step back and forth 
between their own century and the next. But those who cannot integrate the 
city’s two worlds are likely to lose their hold on both, and hence on life itself. 
(1982:203)
***
After a quick dinner with Şivan, we returned to Tarlabaşı, crossing the 
boundary between two worlds and received very pleasant news. The director 
of the real estate company where Şivan worked had left me a note: they had 
acquired a property just around the corner and I could move in whenever I 
wanted to. It was Kadir Gecesi (Night of Power), the holiest night of 
Ramadan (Ramazan) month, when the first verses of the Quran were 
revealed to Prophet Muhammad. It was dark in Tarlabaşı and just a few 
people around but the loudspeakers of the neighbourhood mosques were 
blaring out sermons. Şivan looked at me and explained: “The celebration will 
go on the whole night. In Istanbul it is forbidden to use the mosque 
loudspeakers outside set times but here we crank them up to the maximum 
volume. We are Muslims and these things are important to us. No one can 
stop us.” There was a certain sense of pride over the control of the area, the 
possibility to extend it over the soundscapes. In the next chapter, I will 
concentrate on this contextual nature of boundaries and moral frameworks 
to show how crisscrossing spatial divisions produce a shared sense of reality.
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Chapter 2:
Qualities of Boundaries 
and Moral Frameworks 
of Istanbul
At a quick glance, Istanbul’s geography gives an impression corresponding 
closely to the archetypal divisions of the cityscape. The sea acts as a natural 
boundary; the Bosporus Strait separates Europe from Asia and the Golden 
Horn forms another boundary between the Historical Peninsula, with its 
rich Byzantine and Ottoman history, and the district of Beyoğlu, on the 
north of the Golden Horn, famous for its cosmopolitan past and currently 
representing the apex of urban modernity of Turkey. The topography of 
several hills and waterways makes it possible to discern these principal 
features from different locations and to build up detailed orientation for the 
classifications. Istanbul stretches constantly, expanding to both east and west, 
but its expansion is hindered by the Black Sea in the north and the Sea of 
Marmara in the south. As in many other big cities, even the most recent 
newcomers know the names of the central areas, but further from the centre, 
the names of the districts are familiar mostly from the signs of end stations 
of busses and dolmuş.26  On the shores of the Bosporus, districts and villages 
have familiar names associated with their long histories, more memorable 
than recently built areas that lack historical content. Istanbul is also famous 
as a city of bridges; often evoked as bridge between the East and the West, a 
metaphor that for many has become a wearisome cliché, it is nevertheless 
revived frequently when commenting the great geographic divisions in 
symbolic terms (see Mandel 2008:1–2, Navaro-Yashin 2002a).
 Again, while the principles of the divisions and boundaries are 
generally agreed upon as historically based idealizations, their uniformity 
and accuracy is compromised in the actual movement within the city. Their 
significance is context-dependent and stretches to very different usages 
associated with a variety of moral undercurrents. Many of the age-old 
juxtapositions are relentlessly criticized and even ridiculed but resurface 
from time to time in discussions to bring order to seemingly chaotic 
urbanity. A brief look at how the imperial centre of the Ottomans differs 
from another centre across the bridge in Beyoğlu provides an introduction 
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to how intersecting histories connect and contrast elements from different 
eras in the course of everyday life. In this chapter, I will discuss how history 
is perceived in the cityscape and how the most significant boundaries within 
Istanbul are related to historical developments, how boundary-crossing 
influences the orientation to moral frameworks and how everyday 
movement is compromized with regard to access and safety. In my 
ethnographic examples, I will discuss experiences of people from different 
backgrounds to show how their understandings often become confused but, 
nevertheless, rest on the sense of shared moral topography.
Ambiguous Historical Divides – The Historical 
Peninsula and Beyoğlu
Even before the Ottoman conquest, the Golden Horn has acted as a 
boundary between the Byzantine seat of power and the Genoese and 
Venetian trading colonies on the northern side of the water. After the 
conquest of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottomans settled into the Byzantine 
centre, converted Hagia Sophia church (Aya Sofia) into an imperial mosque 
and constructed Topkapı Palace as their seat of power.27  Many of the Byzantine 
structures still exist and create a rich mosaic of historical layers of the bygone 
civilizations with the more recent constructions often replicating the 
Ottoman and Byzantine styles more or less successfully.
 In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the city was divided 
between Muslims predominating the Historical Peninsula and foreigners and 
the newly wealthy Christians who had moved to the northern side of the 
Golden Horn (Keyder 2008:506). While the old city remained the centre of 
the imperial power, there occurred a gradual shift that could be perceived in 
various spheres of life. Between 1839 and 1847, the period associated with 
the Tanzimat reforms, the land values in Beyoğlu saw an increase of about 75 
percent whereas rents in the Grand Bazaar of the old city fell by about 90 
percent and fewer and fewer of the merchants and bankers located their 
businesses within the old city (Gül 2006:36). The future seemed to be in the 
side of Beyoğlu – the existing polarization acquired new dimension when 
the Ottoman elites began to establish their offices and acquire education in 
the area (Findley 2008; Tokatli and Boyaci 1999). The tendency of the 
Ottoman nobles to spend more of their time in the villas and palaces along 
the Bosporus culminated in the assignment of Dolmabahçe Palace, downhill 
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27 There is, of course, an abundance of detailed studies of the Ottoman History, covered here very 
briefly. For readable introductions, I recommend Findley (2005), Goodwin (1998) and Finkel 
(2005); for a concise history of the monuments, the classic study by Sumner-Boyd and Freely 
(2000).
towards the Bosporus from Taksim Square, as an Ottoman administrative 
centre and home of the sultan Abdülmecit I in 1856. 
 The division is also apparent in the aesthetic qualities: while the 
silhouettes of the monumental sultanic mosques dominate the skyline of the 
Historical Peninsula, palaces and residences along the Bosporus were 
designed by European or Christian Ottoman architects who began to 
monopolize the profession (Gül 2006:35). Up to this day, people moving to 
Istanbul develop quickly an acute sense of the visual signs referring to 
distinct epochs with different connotations. However, these are never purely 
aesthetic observations; Byzantine, Ottoman and Republican architectures 
also refer to particular groups and reflect their social orders. They also reveal 
a hierarchical dimension; new Ottoman Palaces were designed by the 
minority subjects of the Empire, often its noteworthy and respected 
members, whose distinct styles had become desirable for the Ottoman 
nobility. Their architectural mixture of Turkish and European features has 
been labelled as the European style, perhaps to separate it from indisputably 
Ottoman-style buildings. Of course, the criteria for comparison is tied to its 
historical context and many of the present-day classifications would not have 
been relevant, or even made sense, in the Ottoman times. Similarly, some of 
the most crucial distinctions of the Ottoman society would nowadays be 
difficult to comprehend, often downright impossible to apply to the life 
today. In everyday life, they have also become essentialized: the regime and 
empire spanning many centuries with several complex transformations of 
aesthetic sensibilities and sociocultural orders has been reduced to a label 
that can be applied to wide range of phenomena at different scales. 
 In addition to the classic divisions that have crystallized in the minds 
of the inhabitants, there are more or less ambiguous boundaries, not 
necessarily based on visible geographic markers. During my time in Istanbul, 
I have met a very few people who know the proper administrative 
boundaries between districts and municipalities (ilçe / belediye), 
neighbourhoods and quarters (mahalle / semt), or have even heard the 
official names of many of the neighbourhoods in their district. Nevertheless, 
many other kinds of divisions are deeply internalized and significant when 
navigating the city. I emphasize the classification of neighbourhoods and 
districts in relation to social standing throughout the study. In comparison 
to the global trends of urban composition, Istanbul corresponds neither 
exclusively to what Mike Davis defines as the model of “donut”-shaped 
American city, with the urban poor in derelict cores and inner suburbs, nor 
to “saucer”-shaped European urban model, with immigrants and 
unemployed in the high-rise housing on the urban outskirts (2006:31): both 
models are found in the structure of the city and one can add to the mix the 
ever-expanding squatter settlements that still grow into its furthermost 
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peripheries. Another feature typical to Istanbul is its compartmentalized 
geography: the vast majority of Istanbulites never make the crossing between 
the continents but 10 percent make it every day, amounting to clearly over 
one million people (Sudjic 2009:4).
THE HISTORICAL PENINSULA – THE OTTOMAN CENTRE OF ISTANBUL
Istanbul has several different centres, distinguished by their historically 
developed qualities and functions. If the Sultanahmet district in the 
Historical Peninsula is the archetypal Ottoman centre with its world-famous 
monuments and bazaars, it is also home to a massive tourist industry that 
utilizes the Ottoman aesthetics by turning them into commodities for the 
short-term visitors. For someone not familiar with the area, the initial 
impression is of hotels and restaurants coming from a same mold – the 
heterogeneity becomes visible only at a closer investigation. Some streets are 
dominated by modest hostels catering for the backpacker market, others 
form pockets offering luxurious Ottoman-style accommodation for another 
kind of clientele. Just around the corner from hotel-cluttered streets are the 
run-down quarters of Ahırkapi and Cankurtaran, inhabited largely by Roma, 
but rapidly transforming for the needs of tourism. Towards the west from the 
most-visited historical sights, the atmosphere can change within almost 
every block; straight after the Grand Bazaar (Kapalı Çarsı) the massive 
buildings of Istanbul University fill the space; in the narrow side-streets of 
the area one can feel the alternation between conservative mahalles, grand 
historical monuments and pockets of the tourism industry; further to the 
west comes a discernible change in the character of tourism – there, most of 
the hotels cater for tourists and traders from Eastern Europe and the Central 
Asian states. A bit further, but barely a twenty-minute walk from Hagia Sofia 
museum is Aksaray, the great transport hub of the area with a sinister 
reputation for prostitution and trafficking.
 Officially, all these spaces belong to the Fatih District (Fatih İlçesi), 
consisting of 57 different neighbourhoods (mahalle) such as Sultanahmet, 
Cankurtaran and Aksaray mentioned above. However, only a few of the 
other names have acquired widespread significance, even fewer are used as 
adjectives with intricate connotations to be contrasted with one another. In 
its everyday usage, the word “Fatih” refers to the general mindset and 
atmosphere associated with the area, not to the more inclusive picture that 
acknowledges the different shades and stark boundaries. The power of these 
stereotypical expressions became obvious in an informal chat that I had in a 
barbershop in Beyoğlu:
Mehmet: You would probably not believe that I am from Fatih; born in Fatih 
and still living there with my family…
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Mehmet’s customer: He does not even have a long beard and a Koran in his 
hand [laughs].
Me: Well, Fatih is quite large area. You have everything from the nightclubs of 
Aksaray to the Four Seasons Hotel in Sultanahmet…
Mehmet: No, no. I am talking of the real Fatih. Not the tourist areas. On those 
there is nothing to me anymore.
Mehmet could anticipate that I was surprised of him living in Fatih. He told 
me laughing that it is not always good to mention the fact to people 
frequenting the barbershop because they want to come to a cool (cool) place 
for a haircut, not to a barber living in Fatih. Interestingly, he credited living 
in Fatih for what he had become: “Me and my friends would hang out in the 
tourist areas of Sultanahmet when we were young. Later, we would go to 
work in its restaurants and hotels and also travel to Marmaris and Fethiye to 
work during the high season. When I was younger, Beyoğlu was a scary 
place for all of us. Of course, the area has changed but I have changed as well. 
I would have been frightened by Beyoğlu of today had I only spent my time 
in Fatih.” After hearing his story, I noticed that I also saw at him in a 
different way. I had studied people working in the tourist trade in my 
Master’s thesis (Tuominen 2006) and noticed many of the same elements in 
his appearance. Lacoste shirt, jeans with gradient colouring and shiny 
details, as well as spiky hair with a generous amount of styling products were 
all outward signs of the style I encountered back then, but I had not paid 
attention to them in the barber shop across the boundary. Mehmet had 
learned to be at home in Beyoğlu and could conceal his origins in Fatih if he 
wanted to. However, this was rarely the case. The stereotypical definitions of 
spaces and their inhabitants had not lost their power and only a few 
managed to challenge them and balance between the expectations 
successfully; even the most recent migrants to Istanbul were acutely aware of 
them – despite the fact that many had never visited the areas they claimed to 
understand in a detailed way. In these cases, the historical palimpsest could 
became misinterpreted in interesting ways.
EMBRACING THE HISTORY – OTTOMAN MINORITIES OF THE PRESENT DAY
Ahmet had never visited the Historical Peninsula, except for a yearly 
Ramadan market located at the Hippodrome, a big attraction with countless 
food carts and portable teahouses serving people after the sunset. I often ate 
breakfast at his family’s teahouse and we would discuss the news and gossip 
of Tarlabaşı. Lately, he had become interested in the history of Istanbul and 
wanted to share his thoughts of how the city had changed to him. He had 
watched a TV documentary of Ottoman Istanbul and had become fascinated 
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with the social mosaic of the times, especially the people living in the old 
quarters across the Golden Horn. We discussed these issues further and I 
realized that many things he had seen in the program, the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate of Constantinople and the old churches and synagogues in the 
neighbourhoods of Fener and Balat, famous for their Greek and Jewish 
communities dating to early Ottoman times, were still very much alive to 
him. Seen from the Beyoğlu side of the Golden Horn, the silhouette is 
dominated by the Ottoman mosques but between them is tucked, for 
example, the massive Phanar Greek Orthodox College, a late nineteenth-
century building with its distinctive redbrick construction, architecturally 
very different from the surrounding ones. On this basis, he thought, quite 
consistently with the abundance of representations of the minorities of 
Ottoman Istanbul, that the Jewish and Greek communities, of which only 
tiny fragments remain, would still inhabit those quarters. The iconic 
landmarks remind of their historical existence, also supported by a profusion 
of books and documentaries of the cosmopolitan history of Istanbul. Fener 
and Balat are situated across Atatürk Bridge, just a half an hour’s walk from 
his home, but signified a completely alien world, occupied by the timeless 
communities of the Empire in his understanding of the historically 
established boundaries.
 The powerful notion of the boundary between the city centres did not 
have impact on just newcomers who had not yet visited the areas in person. 
The impossibility to stay informed of all the changes in a rapidly 
transforming city could also lead to frustration and enforce different 
stereotypes. Didem, who had just found a new job in a production company 
specializing in branding urban events, said that she would be interested in 
documenting the conservation of the old neighbourhoods, especially the 
aforementioned Fener and Balat, and considered them as an integral part of 
the city, something to be proud of. However, she had visited them only once 
or twice. She had moved to Istanbul with her family in her early teens and 
said that she did not frequent other areas than Beyoğlu – the window to 
global modernity – and Ataköy, an upper-middle-class28  neighbourhood, 
where she had lived all her time in Istanbul with her family. She told me that 
she was enjoying the best that Istanbul could offer her, that she knew 
perfectly well the topography of Istanbul but wanted to limit her everyday 
life to spaces where she felt safe and at home. She would like to connect to 
the Ottoman past of the city and establish links to its cosmopolitan 
character, but thought that the historical Jewish and Greek quarters were 
ruined by of the influx of Anatolian migrants. She declared that she does not 
need to confirm their contemporary realities herself: their connection to the 
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28  It is obviously problematic to assign strict labels to heterogeneous areas. This designation is 
based on characterizations of the area in my ethnographic data.
past had been severed by the new demographic and could not be 
reestablished. What was left were the stories of the old buildings, valuable as 
such but resembling empty shells without the social fabric of the past.
 This familiar manner to classify Istanbul’s topography was also present 
in the narrative of Volkan, a professional photographer who spent most of 
his time in the subcultural bustle of Beyoğlu and cherished its liberal 
atmosphere, but had developed a new relationship to the rest of the city quite 
recently. Earlier, he had visited the Byzantine and Ottoman monuments on a 
school trips but had felt no reason to go to see them alone or with friends. 
He knew the history of the great mosques, churches and synagogues as 
examples of the peaceful coexistence of the Ottoman order and had enjoyed 
visiting the sacred site of Eyüp, with masses of religious pilgrims and a 
beautiful cemetery on a hillside. He was also familiar with the areas north 
from Taksim Square; the wealthy quarter of Nişantaşı, its streets lined with 
French-style cafes and the financial centres dotted with skyscrapers even 
further up north. According to him, all of those had been superficial 
encounters that corresponded only to widely shared ideas and the most 
typical representations. Only after he had started to photograph them, he 
had found out how inaccurate his impressions had been. The conventional 
image of the city had started to crack, its boundaries were redrawn in myriad 
ways and contrasting features of different spaces had started to abound. 
Nothing looked the same in Istanbul anymore; for him, this total 
transformation was simultaneously fascinating but also frustrating and 
tiresome. The lived spaces had become fragmented and new surprises 
followed after each trip. He also found it difficult to communicate his 
thoughts on the aspects that did not fit neatly into the deeply internalized 
qualities associated with particular locations. Even the familiar places in 
Beyoğlu revealed new sides after each subsequent trip.
BEYOĞLU – THE NEW CENTRE
Not restricted to the urban bustle of Istiklal Street, the whole district of 
Beyoğlu29  is connected with Turkey’s encounter with modernity more than 
any other space in Istanbul (e.g. Navaro-Yashin 2002a; Özyürek 2006; 
Sumner-Boyd & Freely 2000:427–447). Its grand themes, as well as 
ephemeral peculiarities, are aesthetically present in the environment and 
subject to endless debates and reinterpretations, often contrasted with the 
Historical Peninsula. They are reflected in contemporary Turkish literature, 
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29  Beyoğlu municipality covers Tophane and Tarlabaşı and stretches into a very wide area. 
However, the word Beyoğlu is also used to refer to the urban core around Istiklal Street. Sometimes 
Taksim (referring to either the square at the end of Istiklal Street or a slightly larger area), Istiklal 
(referring also to its side-streets) or even the old Greek name Pera (when referring to the nostalgic 
character of the area) are used.
cinema and fine arts, and find more quotidian expressions in the homes, 
street corners and at the tables of the tea and coffee houses. Yet, they refer 
simultaneously to political ideologies, individual desires and senses of 
communal affiliations with very differently grounded connotations. In 
Beyoğlu’s lived environment, nostalgia for the cosmopolitan past or for the 
early Republican modernity coexists with traits from different eras; early 
Republican taverns (meyhane) serving fish with rakı, Türkü Evi clubs 
showcasing Turkish folk music often accompanied by synthesizers, and the 
hypermodern cinema multiplexes that have sprung to the area. Perhaps the 
past of Beyoğlu is uncomplicated only in the souvenir stalls, representing 
reflective nostalgia that thrives in longing itself, without any serious attempt 
to restore the past conditions (Boym 2001:xviii, see also Navaro-Yashin 2009).
 The pre-Ottoman history of Beyoğlu is scattered around the area as 
ruins of the old city walls and a few buildings, most notably the Galata Tower 
(Galata Kulesi), built by the Genoese colony of the area in 1348, and still the 
most famous landmark in the area (Sumner-Boyd and Freely 2000:438–440). 
Throughout the Ottoman times, the area was mostly called Pera30  and home 
to the Empire’s non-Muslim minorities; nowadays only fragments of the 
populations remain but their historical presence is evoked by the numerous 
churches of different denominations and the historical embassies of various 
European nations, now reduced to consulates, as the embassy status is 
transferred to offices in Ankara. The distinctiveness of the area, rooted in the 
presence of its minority populations in both the Ottoman and the Byzantine 
periods, has evolved throughout history with a help of various contrasts 
between spaces. Edmondo de Amicis, who wrote a famous memoir 
Constantinople of his visit to the city in 1874, describes vividly the vastly 
different character of the area. He notes that in Pera:
The Europeans talk and laugh more loudly here than elsewhere, cracking 
jokes in the middle of the street, while the Turks, feeling themselves, as it 
were, foreigners, carry their heads less high than in the streets of Istanbul. (in 
Freely and Freely 2006:16)
For the whole of its history, Beyoğlu has been a space of experimentation 
with alien elements. There are stories of Sultans visiting its taverns in a 
disguise (Boyar and Fleet 2010:40), Atatürk and the other Republican 
revolutionaries immersing themselves to the cosmopolitan atmosphere of its 
establishments (Mango 2002:52–53) – even nowadays, it would be difficult 
to imagine the Gezi Park protests, uniting people from very different 
backgrounds, occurring in any other part of the city. Having said that, the 
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30  While the origin of the name Galata is not clear, Pera, interestingly for a study focussing on 
space and boundaries, means “beyond,” “on the other side” in Greek (Sumner-Boyd and Freely 
2000:427).
extreme density of urban modernity of Beyoğlu is contrasted with its strict 
boundaries and accounts of inaccessibility and danger within its confines. 
There are several widely shared dividing lines, some corresponding to the 
officially marked boundaries and others to vernacular terms. Out of its 45 
neighbourhoods, the names of only a few are instantly recognizable; those 
that are, derive from the names of renowned streets or buildings within 
neighbourhood.31  Further along the shores of the Golden Horn, the 
neighbourhoods become less familiar and rarely frequented by the general 
populace.
 Nowadays, Beyoğlu, especially Istiklal Street with its side-streets, 
represents “Cool Istanbul.” The phrase was largely coined by a Newsweek 
cover story in 2005 that celebrated the cultural life of Istanbul at the time. Its 
first paragraph is worth quoting in its entirety to give an example of the 
popular ideas of cosmopolitanism in contemporary Istanbul: 
Spend a summer night strolling down Istanbul's Istiklal Caddesi [Istiklal Street], 
the pedestrian thoroughfare in the city's old Christian [sic] quarter of Beyoglu, 
and you'll hear something surprising. Amid the crowds of nocturnal revelers, a 
young Uzbek-looking girl plays haunting songs from Central Asia on an ancient 
Turkic flute [sic] called a saz.32 Nearby, bluesy Greek rembetiko blares from a 
CD store. Downhill toward the slums of Tarlabasi you hear the wild Balkan 
rhythms of a Gypsy wedding, while at 360, an ultratrendy rooftop restaurant, 
the sound is Sufi electronica – cutting-edge beats laced with dervish ritual. 
And then there are the clubs – Mojo, say, or Babylon – where the young and 
beautiful rise spontaneously from their tables to link arms and perform a 
complicated Black Sea line dance, the  horon. The wonder is that each and 
every one of these styles is absolutely native to the city, which for much of its 
history was the capital of half the known world.33
Again, for many of the subcultural aficionados frequenting the area, this 
would be a superficial account of the worn-out cliches of the district. Just as 
the Historical Peninsula was conceptualized above in very different ways by 
Mehmet, Ahmet, Didem and Volkan, Beyoğlu lends itself to a variety of 
interpretations. Everyday life in Istanbul, even when restricted to a small 
area, consists of movement across differently defined spaces: the complex 
polarities, some dating from ancient times and others referring to recent 
cultural cleavages, have to be encountered on a regular basis. However, the 
shared sense of reality or the cultural map of the city among inhabitants has 
not disappeared (see Öncü 2002:187). The ways to relate into rapidly changing 
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31  e.g. Asmalı Mescit Mahallesi is used as a general name for the quarter famous for its bars and 
meyhanes and Arap Camii Mahallesi (Neighbourhood of the Arab Mosque) is named after a 
renowned mosque, probably given to the Arab refugees who settled into the area after escaping the 
Spanish Inquisition (Sumner-Boyd and Freely 2000:441)
32 Saz is a long-necked lute, best-known for its central role in Anatolian folk music.
33 Foroohar, Rana. Newsweek 29.8.2005. http://www.newsweek.com/turkish-delight-117821
phenomena are not aleatory but founded on historical developments that 
correspond to communicated realities, shared in encounters. In practice, the 
firsthand impression of shared imagination appears as the “quotidian mental 
work of ordinary people,” dealing with the plurality of possible worlds 
(Appadurai 1996:5), as well as the contradictory modernity that alternates 
between the joyous abundance of possibilities and a “multitude of fragments, 
speaking incommensurable private languages” (Berman 1992:17, 22). Volkan 
concluded his account of the image of the city with detailed contemplation: for 
him, satisfactory life in Istanbul consisted of the ability to act fluently with 
very different people and in very different situations, but also, to understand 
the dynamics that drive the city forward and to explore their seemingly 
random constellations. He was determined to study them carefully and 
reveal them through his work.
Boundaries and Lived Realities
The mental map of the city34  is subject to radical transformations when its 
hollow spots are filled with new information, either via direct experience or 
mediated knowledge. In the examples above, Mehmet and Volkan had 
prioritized the accumulation of first-hand experiences and their careful 
reflection, and, on the other hand, Ahmet and Didem had developed far-
reaching conclusions on the basis of historical representations brought into the 
present. By crossing the boundaries people encounter the city from different 
angles and are often forced to readjust their views of its other spaces. It is this 
coexistence of detailed reflection and embodied knowledge that captures my 
attention here. I will concentrate on boundaries as lived realities, fashioning 
everyday practices into observable patterns; how their qualities are 
communicated and how they are linked to moral concerns. I argue that the 
most crucial boundaries are connected to moral ambiguities, hard to define in 
exact terms, but arising as matters of concern in particular contexts. They have 
evolved into powerful social constructions, where the spatial terms refer to 
qualitative, rather than quantitative and measurable spaces.
FLEXIBLE BOUNDARIES AND IMAGEABLE CITY – SHIFTING EMPHASES OF 
THE EVERYDAY
During my fieldwork I observed how bounded spaces were connected 
historically with their former inhabitants – especially if traces of their past 
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34 By mental map I refer to the everyday orientation to the city, a perception that “is not sustained, 
but rather partial, fragmentary, mixed with other concerns. Nearly every sense is in operation, and 
the image is the composite of them all” (Lynch 1960:2).
remained; they were representing the specific norms of appropriate 
behaviour that had a significant impact on contemporary understandings. 
Sometimes, spaces could be associated with possibilities – even abstract 
ideas like success could be characteristic of a specific space, such as Istanbul’s 
streets lined with gold, a conventional image of the nearly limitless 
possibilities offered by the city. While recognizing the nuanced distinctions 
was hard work and their constellations subject to sudden changes, their 
identification was simultaneously a source of pride, for both newcomers and 
born Istanbulites. Nonetheless, the endless list of facts about spaces in 
Istanbul did not arouse interest in itself, except in the monomaniacal 
tendencies of some of the inhabitants (see p.78–79), but they had to be 
connected into more encompassing moral frameworks. In these processes, 
the facts became entangled with cultural intimacy, the informal and in many 
cases exclusive knowledge that could create solidarities, often celebrating the 
deficiencies of life. Through repeated encounters, various commentaries 
enhanced the mutuality of everyday relationships and carved out inclusive 
spaces for people to meet and interact. Especially for newcomers, the city 
became more familiar when there were certain recurring ways of referring to 
its composition. Some spaces were tightly and uniformly bounded, others 
more fluid and flexible. In the reproduction of these formations, mental 
mapping, spatial awareness, historical consciousness, and embodied moral 
frameworks came together while moving in the city.
 While Istiklal Street was regularly considered as a space for 
sociocultural experimentation and the pride of living in Tarlabaşı was 
expressed as participation in the communal self-governance, these principles 
were not taken-for-granted but had to be upheld and reproduced in 
encounters and interaction. A city built upon layers of ruins, some 
discovered after being long forgotten and others widely shared in the 
collective memory, offered distinct modes of understanding and expressing 
its spatial makeup. Kevin Lynch, in his influential work The Image of the City 
(1960), introduces the concept of imageability to the study of spatial 
attributes. According to him, an imageable city is “well formed, distinct, 
remarkable; it would invite the eye and the ear to greater attention and 
participation. The sensuous grasp upon such surroundings would not merely 
be simplified, but also extended and deepened” (10). At the same time, 
imageability does not necessarily mean preciseness or regular order which 
can easily become obvious and boring (10). Lynch acknowledges the 
influence of “the social meaning of an area, its function, its history, or even 
its name” (46) but takes as his objective to study the form and uncover its 
role in the urban environment. He identifies five types of elements, namely 
paths, edges, districts, nodes and landmarks as a foundation for his analysis 
(46–48). My approach, inspired by his comparative take on American cities, 
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stresses the imageability but emphasizes what he has decided to leave out; 
social relations, moral codes, functions of use and formations of historical 
consciousness. In conceptual terms, my analysis concentrates on boundaries, 
not as limited to separating spaces but as flexible constructs reorganizing 
space in multiple ways.
 I argue that rather than a complex set of forms, the concept of 
boundary has proven to be a useful analytical tool to work with. In the 
previous chapter, my walk with Şivan centred around the act of comparison 
between the different moral universes set apart by the powerful boundary of 
Tarlabaşı Boulevard, and everyday life of Veli was influenced by ambiguous 
boundary dynamics delineating the moral appropriateness in Tophane. One 
of the advantages of the concept is its variability; not limited to a simple 
geographic notion, understood in a linear fashion, boundaries can operate 
according to very different principles, bringing together abstract qualities of 
spaces with social practices and arrangements. Furthermore, bounded spaces 
can be contrasted on the basis of their constitutive elements: Lynch’s use of 
the concept of imageability, the sensuous grasp of the surroundings that calls 
for extending and deepening their interpretative possibilities, attention and 
participation (1960:10), balances between semantic structure and lived 
reality, in a manner that Roland Barthes summarizes excellently:
He [Lynch] has a sense of discrete units: he has attempted to identify in urban 
space the discontinuous units which, mutatis mutandis, would bear some 
resemblance to phonemes and semantemes. These units he calls paths, edges, 
districts, nodes, landmarks. These are categories of units that would easily 
become semantic categories. But on the other hand, in spite of this 
vocabulary, Lynch has a conception of the city that remains more Gestalt than 
structural. (Barthes 1997:160, italics in the original)
I wish to move away from an analysis based on an idea of a map as a frozen 
representation, into a spatially ordered idea of sociality, consisting of the 
embodied knowledge to treat different people in different contexts in 
appropriate ways (Taylor 1992:217–218). My focus on contextual moral 
frameworks recognizes the city as more than the sum of its parts and joins 
the immediate spatial awareness with the reflection of its historical narratives 
and abstract qualities. Yet, history is also flexible and allows creative uses: 
different questions can become more pronounced at particular moments and 
even rise to the most central image of the whole city at a point in time, like 
the Gezi Park protests have recently proved. Nonetheless, the less 
pronounced collisions of spatial orders, reorganizations of boundaries and 
reactions to their novel outcomes, formed a significant part of the daily lives 
of the inhabitants. 
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MOVEMENT AND MORALITY – TWO ATTEMPTS TO CARVE URBAN SPACE
During my fieldwork, I spent most of my time in a relatively small area of 
just a couple of square kilometres. This rarely led to boredom; I would 
seldom prearrange meetings but would just go to places where I would 
expect to meet particular people, move in Beyoğlu with them and 
sometimes, albeit rarely, do excursions to other areas. In my experience, this 
kind loyalty to space is characteristic of many urban areas – not just in 
Turkey – coupled with reluctance to leave the familiar surroundings, even 
pride in not frequenting the other quarters. Nevertheless, the other spaces of 
Istanbul were constantly present as they were referred, contrasted and 
juxtaposed to the specific urbanity of Beyoğlu. Even if the discussions were 
not referring to boundaries per se, their contrastive functions were exercised 
in detailed ways, acknowledging the movement across them and indicating 
their relationship to history. It is important to note that, particularly among 
people with very little formal education, the history of Istanbul did not form 
a clear continuum but often included partially understood features; 
abundant Ottoman-era tombs with writing in indecipherable Arabic script, 
traces of radically diminished Armenian, Jewish and Greek communities in 
Beyoğlu, foreign-sounding names like Casa Garibaldi, Neve Shalom or Surp 
Yerrortutyun.35 
 What interested me the most, was how dignified life was achieved in 
these conditions, especially among people who were struggling for their 
livelihoods. Differently bounded spaces, related to contrastive moral 
frameworks, had a substantial effect in the practices of navigating within the 
city and making it feel more like home. The following account illustrates the 
role of boundaries in the lives of two Istanbulites who experienced them in 
very different ways: in their everyday lives Ridvan and Nazlı contrasted 
Beyoğlu constantly to other spaces in Istanbul and contemplated on the 
nature of boundaries and different moral landscapes located around them.
RİDVAN – EXCLUSION AND MORAL WORTH
Compared to Şivan’s mastery of navigating between different spaces, Ridvan 
always seemed to attract trouble. He was perhaps even more knowledgeable 
about internal divisions in Istanbul but wanted to challenge the conventions 
and see how far he can bend the rules. His friends would alternate between 
admiring his courage and condemning him as crazy (manyak); I noticed that 
I was always slightly on guard when spending time with him. He 
acknowledged this quality in him and offered a pragmatic explanation: “I 
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35  A fraternal association by Italian workers, dating to 1863, a Sephardic synagogue from the late 
1930s, and an Armenian sixteenth-century church, all situated close to Istiklal Street.
have learned everything in my life by doing, always struggling against people 
who are more powerful than me. When I was just sixteen and living in 
Diyarbakır,36  I was arrested for taking part in a demonstration – we were just 
hanging out at the square, killing time and the police approached us. My 
friends managed to slip away but I was stupid to stay and was taken for 
questioning. I was in jail for several weeks for nothing. After that I 
understood that I will have to learn their rules if I want to stay alive. You get 
nothing in this world for free.” From Ridvan’s account, I understood the 
principles that were driving him. There was the unrelenting quest for justice 
by someone who always felt that he needs to do more than others to prove 
his worth, coupled with the tactical mastery of the street-wise urbanite who 
would test his limits to learn new ways to succeed. There were, however, 
boundaries that he did not feel comfortable crossing, not thought as total 
prohibitions but reflecting degrees of access with very different criteria.
 Ridvan and his friends visited the skyscraper-surrounded shopping 
malls of Levent or the upmarket quarters of Maçka and Nişantaşı just north 
of Beyoğlu very rarely; they were imageable only in the simplest terms, 
housing the rich of Istanbul but not arousing curiosity. There were also more 
pragmatic reasons. Once we walked up Cumhuriyet Street from Taksim 
Square up north and Ridvan told me bluntly that he does not feel 
comfortable in this area, that we can continue if I really want to, but he 
would rather not, simply because it is not for him. This was at the early 
stages of my fieldwork and I thought that the problem was the street, a rather 
uninviting thoroughfare without a curve or bend, with extremely noisy high-
speed traffic. The real reason became obvious, not from Ridvan himself, but 
from a friend of his, Ali, some time later. For some reason, I had not thought 
of the security controls further up the street. On one otherwise 
unmemorable evening, we were discussing everyday matters when Ali stated 
boldly: “I know that they do not want me to enter Nişantaşı and wish to 
intimidate me with ID checks – I could not care less, there is nothing for me 
anyway. Just as long as those jerks stay out of Tarlabaşı, I think we are even.” 
In my company, Ridvan’s encounter with the security would have been even 
more embarrassing, for the attention of the police would be most definitely 
directed at him. As a foreigner, it is very rare to be stopped at the 
checkpoints – the few instances when this has happened to me have seemed 
to reflect the boredom of the officers, willing to check if the foreigner speaks 
any Turkish or a prospect to try some English phrases with him. I later asked 
Ridvan about this and his justice-seeking side surfaced – he was ready to go 
to try his luck immediately at the checkpoint as a Turkish citizen who just 
wants to have a walk in the city. He told me later that he had visited Nişantaşı 
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36  Diyarbakır, Amed in Kurdish, has almost one million inhabitants and is the capital of the 
Diyarbakır province in the Southeast of Turkey. It is often dubbed as the Kurdish capital of Turkey.
with a friend but could not find any reason to go back there. It sounded that 
the purpose of the visit had been to cross the boundary established by the 
police rather than actual interest in the area. In a similar way, Ali’s criticism 
showed another moral property of the boundary: despite the problems in 
impoverished Tarlabaşı, he cherished the pride over spatially bounded 
community. Here, the contextual boundary arose as a result of agitation; the 
usual tone of all the visitors being welcome to visit Tarlabaşı transformed 
into claim of access and right over a particular space.
 Towards the end of my fieldwork, I became more and more intrigued 
to visit other districts with Ridvan. He would often suggest that we go for a 
Bosporus cruise or even to the Black Sea coast when he has time but always 
cancelled at the last minute. His immediate circle of friends rarely set foot 
outside Beyoğlu; some would leave occasionally for construction work or 
even travel to other parts of Turkey for work or to meet relatives but 
otherwise their lives were bound to a few squares, street corners and 
teahouses. Even the work trips were mostly arranged with a company van 
picking them up and driving them back to Tarlabaşı at the end of the shift. 
Yet, Ridvan was very curious of what was happening in different parts of 
Istanbul and followed the news actively. 
 I lowered the stakes slightly and suggested that we visit the famous 
sights of the Historical Peninsula, just a thirty-minute walk from Istiklal 
Street, but, however, rarely visited by most of the Istanbulites. Ridvan was 
not an exception. He claimed that he had been there already several times 
and seen all the sights. What was the point of going again? A couple of days 
later, he agreed and we set off. We crossed the Galata Bridge and he told me 
how the fish restaurants, teahouses and pubs at its lower level often serve as 
the first, very badly paid workplaces for people moving to Istanbul from the 
Southeast. This lead him to elaborate the significance of the boundary on the 
basis of tourism: “The bridge and the markets down the hill on the other side 
are fine. After that the tourist area begins. Sultanahmet is full of young 
country folk who follow their friends from the same village to make a quick 
buck in the tourism industry. I might be from a village near Mardin myself, 
but I can see their country manners from miles away. They also recognize 
me as an outsider and see me as a threat. When I am with you they think 
that I am taking advantage of a stupid tourist – when I am alone they think 
that I am going to steal something. Their eyes are everywhere and sometimes 
they start to follow people they consider outsiders in groups to force them 
out.” I could feel his uneasiness of the of rigid practices of social control 
waiting in the Sultanahmet area, this time not in the form of police patrols 
checking the ID cards, but of the informal variety of neighbourhood 
policing. At the same time, he looked down on the people he saw as villagers 
who did not know how to behave in the big city. We decided to sit down for 
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a glass of tea after crossing the bridge and not to venture further to the 
tourist areas. Even there, Ridvan was slightly nervous and observed the 
passers-by very closely.
 He separated himself as an urbanite from people working in 
Sultanahmet, but also detested what for many would be the definitive forms of 
urbanity. These included the images of aristocratic modernity of the early 
Republic, associated with the wealthy quarters north from Taksim, as well as 
the contemporary cosmopolitanism of Beyoğlu’s self-confessed urbanites. For 
him, the movement between Tarlabaşı and the Istiklal area, between the 
marginalized inner-city quarter with a strong sense of community and the 
space of freedom to escape its constricting norms, had begun to represent a 
space that enabled highly valued urbanity but did not compromise senses of 
authenticity or modernity. Ridvan’s reflections stressed the qualitative 
difference between spaces with different moral frameworks and practical 
realities. He had cultivated his skill to distinguish the manners of the others 
and to analyze the situations in nuanced manner. After separating himself 
from those working in tourism, he specifically criticized Sultanahmet’s 
consumerism as representing all the bad sides of contemporary Turkey. The 
resulting mapping portrays an uneven picture of the cityscape in Istanbul’s 
central areas – pockets of communities distinguished by moral frameworks 
defining standards of appropriate behaviour. This, however, applies mostly to 
the central districts that are, in the terms of Lynch, highly imageable; their 
boundaries do not correspond to the clear-cut definitions of modern-
traditional dichotomy but consist of unlikely combinations that enforce the 
uniqueness of a particular space: for instance, the picture of Anatolian 
hustlers amidst the buzz of the tourism industry has a recognizable ring to 
anyone living in Istanbul for some time. The definitions cut across the 
division between the mahalle and the urban sphere and portray features – 
for Ridvan corruptions – of both. However, boundaries do not always 
concern districts situated close to one another but could extend over long 
stretches of space.
NAZLI – BOUNDARY AS A LONG BRIDGE
Beyoğlu attracts not only people who live in its vicinity but has many 
frequent visitors who hold it dear to their life in the city. I first met Nazlı, an 
English teacher originally from the Anatolian city of Kayseri, while she was 
studying at Erzurum University where I stopped on my first trip to Turkey in 
2002. We kept in touch irregularly but tried to meet every time we were in 
the same city. In 2008, we had not seen each other for years and I was 
curious of how her life in Istanbul had begun. She had sent me photos of her 
at Taksim Square with captions celebrating her new life. When we met, she 
told me that she did not feel comfortable in Istanbul. She had loved visiting 
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the city as a tourist but now she had difficulties of orientation. She had found 
her new home in Küçükçekmece, a rapidly expanding area close to the 
Atatürk airport with a long history, the older landmarks now mostly lost 
amidst the newly built housing, but with a very different feel to more middle 
and upper-class Bakırköy and Ataköy in the south. For Nazlı, the choice was 
expressed as a strong sense of belonging:
I love Beyoğlu and want to visit here often but I like to live with other Anatolian 
people in Küçükçekmece. What really bugs me is that traveling between home 
and Taksim takes so long time – soon I will buy a car so I can do the trip 
without anyone disturbing. Now I feel I am moving on one long bridge, changing 
from one bus to another in the middle, before I reach Taksim or home.37
At that point, I had mostly heard references to Anatolians from people who 
did not wish to identify with the group, using the label to signify the country 
folk lost in a big city, with positive qualities of the region reserved for 
traditional food and music from the Turkish heartlands, made safe as 
consumer items.38  For Nazlı, the issue was dead-serious. It also revealed a 
side of her that I had not encountered before. In our meetings before, she 
had referred to herself as a “child of Atatürk,” (“Atatürk’ün çocuğu”) but only 
in Istanbul had she started to pay more attention to the dangers Turkey was 
facing. What followed, to my surprise, was a combination of prominent 
conspiracy theories. She saw the problems of the country as the fault of 
Turkey’s inside enemies; Kurds, Jews and Islamists. Turkey was also attacked 
by its outside enemies, ruining the country’s economy and plotting against 
the military. Nevertheless, what I found extremely interesting, was her 
solution to limit her life into the spaces she preferred.
 In her everyday life, she had developed her own rhythm of carving the 
city into distinct spheres. Beyoğlu was a good place to visit, to enjoy its 
cosmopolitan atmosphere, do some shopping and stop for a meal, but to 
settle in she would prefer different environment, in her case, constructed 
around the notion of being Anatolian. For her, Beyoğlu was limited to 
Istiklal Street; she did not stray into its side-streets and had never set foot in 
Tophane or Tarlabaşı; the former name she recognized only vaguely and the 
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37 We had our discussions mostly in English.
38  This does not mean that these references to Anatolia do not have political dimension. Martin 
Stokes explores Anatolian identity through the music of Sezen Aksu, especially the album Işik 
Doğudan Yükserlir (Ex oriente lux), which includes references to the Anatolian mosaic, “Turks and 
Kurds, Byzantines and Ionians, Armenians and Hittites, northern Mesopotamians and Romans, Sunnis 
and Shiites, Laz and Zeybeks, Whirling dervishes and Bekstaşis, dancers and court musicians” (2010 
131–132). This idea of differently bounded Anatolia had raised furore among certain nationalist 
politicians and still divides the views. See also Iğsiz (2007) for discussion how the notion of 
Anatolia, with its different languages and religions retranslates individual Anatolians into 
geographic kin. To confuse matters of identification even further, the word Anatolia (Anadolu) 
derives from Greek ἀνατολή (anatole), referring to “East” (Papadakis 2005:29).
latter had connotations with just crime and social problems. The familiarity 
of home, associated with Anatolian morals and a tight sense of community, 
in contrast to the decadence and untrustworthiness of the urban centre, 
could be connected through shopping arrays and a cup of coffee, preferably 
by car as a means to connect these two spheres. She was crossing from what 
she considered an Anatolian town to Istiklal Street – to an atmosphere she 
once described as being abroad – on a regular basis and was struggling with 
the situation. Here, the symbolic boundary was not tied into a linear 
construct but consisted of twenty kilometres of journey by public transport, 
a space Nazlı did not want to relate to and avoided by concentrating on 
social media and text messages. In addition to Küçükçekmece and Beyoğlu, 
she told me, Istanbul had one more location that she would regularly go to – 
the bus terminal that would enable her to travel home to Kayseri in Central 
Anatolia.
 These cases show two very different ways to move in the city and 
occupy its spaces. The areas Ridvan and Nazlı frequented overlapped very 
rarely – they might bump into each other in the rush of Istiklal Street or wait 
for their friends at Taksim Square but they conceptualized and experienced 
the urban boundaries in very different ways. For Ridvan, the desired life 
consisted of moving between Tarlabaşı and the Istiklal area; the boundary 
north from Taksim Square symbolized unattainable wealth and 
inauthenticity while crossing the bridge to the Historical Peninsula and 
Sultanahmet meant entry to another community where he could not feel at 
home. In the case of Nazlı, life in Istanbul was also limited to two very 
different spaces, geographically far from one another with a sense of 
boundary separating them. The boundaries marked the different moral 
frameworks and standards of appropriate behaviour and appearance that 
needed to be integrated in the course of everyday life. A closer look into how 
boundaries and morality can be grasped theoretically helps to understand 
what are the stakes in carving one’s lived space in an urban environment.
Anthropology of Boundaries and Moral 
Frameworks
In my study, I use the concept of boundary in two distinct but interrelated 
ways: as a principle of representation and as an emerging sense of signification 
in an embodied practice. Boundaries can be seen in a totalizing perspective, 
as a transparent and readable formations of what Michel de Certeau calls 
“all-seeing-power,” in his example the view of Manhattan from the top of the 
World Trade Center. This is a mode of perception that derives its power, most 
of all, from being detached from the messy lives of the city’s inhabitants 
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(1988:91–93). In contrast to this, Barthes provides an illustration of  contextual 
boundaries in practice and emphasizes the distinction between objective data 
and signification. According to him, a map that has two neighbourhoods 
adjoining, can be in a complete opposition to their signification of radical 
separation in the image of the city and modern cartography “can be considered 
as a kind of obliteration, of censorship that objectivity has imposed on 
signification”39  (1997:159–160). Drawing of boundaries is also profoundly 
connected to issues of power: David Harvey argues that in modern societies 
“the power in the realms of representation may end up being as important as 
power over the materiality of spatial organization itself ” (1990:233). The 
influential consequences of the binary order of modernity, the tension between 
the structure and the practice, in establishing and controlling logics of 
representations (Mitchell 1988, 2002), has been studied in the previous 
chapter in relation to spatial orders of  the mahalle and the urban sphere. 
Here, I wish to connect these questions theoretically into contextual 
dynamics of boundaries and moral frameworks.
CREATIVE BOUNDARIES – MOTIVATION FOR RELATIONSHIPS
In the social sciences, the study of boundaries has expanded to numerous 
fields, sometimes sharing no common ground. It has been associated with 
research on “cognition, social and collective identity, commensuration, 
census categories, cultural capital, cultural membership, racial and ethnic 
group positioning, hegemonic masculinity, professional jurisdictions, 
scientific controversies, group rights, immigration, and contentious politics, 
to mention only some of the most visible examples” (Lamont and Molnár 
2002:167). At the most general level, the distinction can be made between 
symbolic boundaries; conceptual distinctions to categorize objects, people, 
practices, time and space; and, social boundaries; concentrating on 
objectified forms of social differences, dealing with unequal access and 
distribution of resources and social opportunities, usually in articulation 
with one another (168). These categories also reflect, respectively, a dialogue 
between the intersubjective level and the already formed groupings of the 
individuals (169). In my ethnographic examples, consisting largely of 
accounts of movement in the city, the reflections alternate between these 
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39  Interestingly, Barthes stresses the “modern” dimension of maps as objective geography in 
opposition to their predecessors. He argues that in the world of Herodotus maps were “constructed 
like a language, like a phrase, like a poem, on oppositions: hot lands and cold lands, known and 
unknown lands; then on the opposition between men on the one hand and monsters and 
chimaeras on the other etc.” (1997:159). Similar kinds of ideas of mapping in the seventeenth-
century Ottoman times have been presented in Robert Dankoff’s study of Evliya Çelebi (2006), 
who, arguably entered into the cartographic world of symbolic oppositions, especially at the outer 
reaches of the empire (2006:62–65).
two categories and the analytical distinction between practice and 
structure is realized in the spatial realm, influenced by Ira Bashkow’s 
definition of boundaries as “expressive, contrastive, constructive functions 
of culture” (2004:444). In the same vein, I consider the lines drawn onto 
maps as not so much blocking the things passing across them but, rather, 
marking the movement across them and creating motivation for 
relationships with what lies beyond (451). The question is more about how 
different moral significations are attached to boundaries and how crossings 
relate to experiential realities.
 However, in the practical examples throughout the study, the dominant 
properties of boundaries (sınır, hudut)40  signify separation and exclusion. 
Crossing of boundaries requires adjustment of behaviour and many of them 
are characterized by degrees of prohibition, either in concrete form such as 
police presence or in an ambiguous but deeply felt form like neighbourhood 
pressure. They reflect the practices of keeping the unwanted populations in 
their allocated areas and result in backlashes of the mahalles guarding their 
boundaries. On a larger scale, the concept refers to the national boundaries 
that are restricting the movement of people who lack the right connections 
and/or credentials to experience the world without boundaries. On the scale 
of supranational bodies such as the EU, the benefits of their protective reach 
are extended only to those who, by the virtue of their national citizenship in 
their place of residence, already enjoy their freedoms and rights while the 
non-citizen residents are forced into second-class legal status (Mandel 
2008:16, 230) In sum, the recognition of boundaries at different levels 
reflects a global hierarchy of value that reproduces classification of 
individuals and groups. Geraldine Pratt states correctly that both the denial 
of the reality of boundaries and their romanticization are luxuries 
experienced only by those who are not trapped by them (1998:27).
 Furthermore, boundaries have a temporal dimension and constitute a 
basis for a diverse kinds of connections, exchanges and transactions that 
simultaneously recognize and negate the distinctions through their 
relationship with history (Green 2010:272). They are not realized only in the 
present but contain the previous ways of how they have been thought and 
performed, thus generating novel kinds of connections and disconnections 
(272). Some of these histories can be clear-cut and relatively uniform, while 
others are precarious and subject to constant renegotiations. The 
understandings and performances of boundaries vary but reveal shared 
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40 Both of these terms have a rich variety of other semantic uses, often referring to limits and the 
lack of them. Breakfasts often include unlimited tea (sınırsız çay), and telephone operators 
advertise unlimited internet use (sınırsız internet). In fact, my informants only rarely referred to 
boundaries as such but talked about crossing or passing (geçmek, geçirmek) or described 
something as opposite or on the other side (karşı, taraf).
patterns – the quintessential boundary between the mahalle and the urban 
sphere provides an example of how historical properties of space contain 
traces from the past that create and reproduce moral landscapes. The 
individual relationship to spaces and boundaries evolves historically in 
everyday movement and participation, in gradually growing understanding 
of the cityscape and the embodiment of the appropriate practices in 
particular spaces. De Certeau likens the movement of the actors to writings 
and describes their practices of mental mapping, as a situated practice, in 
poetic terms: “the networks of these moving, intersecting writings compose 
a manifold story that has neither author nor spectator, shaped out of 
fragments of trajectories and alterations of spaces: in relation to 
representations, it remains daily and indefinitely other” (1988:93).
MORAL FRAMEWORKS AND EVERYDAY PRACTICES
Strong contrasts like the one between Tarlabaşı and the Istiklal area are first 
revealed in the form of a physical boundary, the wide and busy road slicing 
the previously unified area in half. The realization of the different moral 
frameworks, defining the standards of public and private, individual and 
community, moral and immoral, requires intimate knowledge and 
experience of the area. Boundary-crossing becomes an act of relating moral 
characteristics of spaces to one another – in the course of daily movement, 
the environment is perceived, reflected upon and reacted to in ways that 
combine individualized understandings – the awareness and knowledge of 
particular spaces – with familiar notions of the city, shared to a degree by 
different actors. Together these elements make up social morphology, “the 
structure of a town made up of interconnected or interdependent parts 
joined together in an urban community” (Dahlgren 2010:32).
 I wish to stress the flexibility and adaptability of the moral frameworks 
within Istanbul. They are defined by their situatedness, the interplay between 
space and context – not “wired in” or totally imposed by society. Rather, they 
consist on a quite unarticulated sense of things, that, however, allows us to 
formulate reasons and explanations when challenged (Taylor 1995:168). The 
embodied agency, largely unformulated understanding of the self and the 
world, is coupled with disengaged thought, the framed representations of the 
nature of the world, our aims and social dynamics (169–170). Several of my 
ethnographic examples stress this dimension: the steady and embodied flow 
of everyday life is interrupted at moments of reflection – sudden thoughts 
that one is out of place, cannot behave in a proper manner or read the signs 
of the city. Often the very act of becoming aware of something changes the 
way we feel about the environment we are in (Taylor 1985:261). 
Methodologically, I consider individual practices as situated within 
analytically distinguishable moral frameworks, emerging through practical 
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action in different contexts and open to transformation. However, instead of 
focussing on moral frameworks as tied to persons, I wish to emphasize their 
spatial qualities, and, following Dahlgren, consider their coexistence as a 
crucial feature in organizing social communication (2010:267). The 
coexistence of contesting ideologies is manifested in the everyday practices 
of social space, divided into fields controlled by sets of rules, designating the 
appropriate behaviour (Dahlgren 2007, 2010).
 The coexistence of spatially distinct moral frameworks is not realized 
just in the actual boundary-crossing but in the encounters and social 
interaction throughout the movement. An evenly distributed grid with equal 
spatial units does not explain the vivid experience of boundaries – they are 
not solely tied to geography as linear constructs separating measurable 
spaces from one another, but extend to sociocultural characteristics of the 
spatial orders and layers of historical consciousness. The geographically 
marked boundaries like Tarlabaşı Boulevard and the Galata Bridge 
correspond to the shared moral geographies of the city but to recognize the 
porous boundary marking the distinct moral frameworks in Tophane and 
the Istiklal area requires intimate knowledge of Istanbul, both as an 
abstraction and a lived environment.
SPATIALITY AND HABITATION
Before showing in more detail how boundaries and contextual moral 
frameworks crisscross the lived space in Beyoğlu, I wish to discuss briefly 
theories that consider their relationship to habitation, especially on how 
crossings are related to movement as a whole. The representational 
modernist geography, based on mapping, reflects a distinct classification of 
secular rationality and has dominated approaches to the urban space of 
modernity (Mitchell 1988, 2002). To approach this notion critically, Tim 
Ingold (2009) has argued provocatively against the preoccupation of space as 
simple locations and point-to-point connections of places. He would rather 
concentrate on the lineal character of habitation, as opposed to areal 
occupation (34) and calls for conceptualization of spaces as topics, joined in 
stories of journeys. Thus, occurrence is prioritized to existence. Walking is 
filled with surprises, unique encounters and possibilities of interaction with 
the environment. In this scheme, things are situated at the confluence of 
actions and responses – memories they call up are more important than 
their intrinsic attributes (41). In addition, the distinction between 
occupation and habitation is related to de Certeau’s analysis of strategies and 
tactics, employed throughout this study to relate dominant power structures 
into informal and culturally intimate activities of the inhabitants. For de 
Certeau, stories “traverse and organize places, they select and link them 
together: they make sentences and itineraries out of them” (1988:115). A city 
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of stories and memories is also a city of intensities; Ingold is right to claim 
that “every place, as a gathering of things is a knot of stories” (2009:41) This, 
in turn, is reflected on the different types of operations: strategies produce, 
tabulate and impose spaces, whereas tactics are restricted to using, 
manipulating and diverting them (30). In analytical terms, it is possible to 
distinguish between the practices of the urban sphere that follow widely 
shared criteria and ones that single out a particular formation and question 
its validity. While the former; typical greetings, gestures and figures of 
speech are learned quickly, often unconsciously, by just being exposed to the 
city; the latter are meaningful to smaller, often contextually defined groups 
and require tactical knowledge of the situation at hand.
 Ingold criticizes the “strategists’ architectonic world,” built to be 
occupied, and presents an alternative: “as inhabitant tacticians continue to 
thread their ways through the cracks and crevices of the built environment, 
they both contribute to its erosion and reincorporate its crumbling 
fragments into their own ways of life (2007:200). I understand the cracks as 
providing possibilities for largely unformulated practices, shaping and 
stretching the parameters of the modernist space. I argue that they contain 
potential for slight adjustments as well as revolutionary action, for rapidly 
escalating processes in the heterogeneous urban space, often resulting from 
the clash of spatial orders and moral frameworks. Ingold’s argument, while 
acting as an important reminder to avoid simplistic generalizations of space 
in the purely modernist or representational sense, pays less attention to 
numerous situations where people consciously refer to abstract features of 
spaces. Even mundane acts in the urban environment require abstract 
reflection: supporting the feeling of being at home by choosing different 
routes, avoiding some spaces, or, challenging the expected norms by entering 
to a space where access might compromised or problematic, are examples of 
the tactical operations that shape the city in informal terms. Daily life 
consists of combining both orientations to one’s environment; the spatial 
abstraction interacts with embodied knowledge.
Access and Safe Passage
During my fieldwork, I learned quickly how notions of access and safety 
were integral to the lives of my informants. I have discussed the qualities of 
different boundaries in the earlier sections and will conclude this chapter 
with an analysis of their dynamics on a very small and quotidian scale, 
focussing on practices that manipulate spaces and challenge their 
restrictions. I will analyze the sense of belonging and possibility of feeling at 
home in a particular space, often with boundaries that crisscross the 
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environment in very subtle ways – widespread understandings of spatiality 
merging with personal experiences and memories. In addition, I will show 
how boundaries are sensitive to time, with profound changes to how the 
crossings and spaces are experienced. Here, I will illustrate the contextual 
nature of boundaries through three examples: the daily practices of Ridvan 
in his constant negotiation of accessible routes, a case study of a crossing that 
threatens the safety of the inhabitants and a description of a weekly market 
that refashions a significant boundary on a regular basis.
CONVENIENT ROUTES TO AND FROM TARLABAŞI
Ridvan crossed Tarlabaşı Boulevard at least twice every day; on his way to work 
in the teahouse or his corner shop (bakkal) and, in the late evening, on his way 
back. In his case, life with a strong sense of community and religious 
participation in Tarlabaşı and a distinctively strong sense of freedom and 
urbanity on the other side of Tarlabaşı Boulevard were combined in the course 
of movement; part-time job as a waiter and irregular working hours at the bakkal 
often involved several daily crossings and adaption to very different 
environments. The geographic scope of his daily life was just a few streets but 
had a very rich social content. Friends would come and go, there would always 
be something happening in the surroundings to be worked out into stories, 
ranging from neighbourhood gossip into discussions of globally significant 
events. More than often, this involved reflection on the qualities of the boundary.
Map 6. Crossings of Tarlabaşı Boulevard.
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For Ridvan, the safe passage in Istanbul was defined as the absence rather 
than the presence of the state security apparatus. This was not limited to the 
boundary controls on the way to Nişantaşı, discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Rather, on his daily route between home and work, he was frequently 
reminded of his status as someone unwanted; of the few crossings of 
Tarlabaşı Boulevard (Map 6) the most convenient for him was at Kalyoncu 
Kulluğu Street, the third possible crossing, when coming from Tünel Square 
(left on the map). On the Tarlabaşı side, especially in the evenings, the street 
had a sinister reputation for it hosted a number of transsexual prostitutes 
and very forbidding nightclubs and pubs. At the same time, it provided a 
convenient way to the enter one section of the labyrinthine maze of the 
neighbourhood. The sense of boundary was, at the time, further enforced by 
the police station on the corner,41  with armed policemen – eager to check ID 
cards from the people crossing – and a permanently parked TOMA 
intervention vehicle.42  In both geographical and symbolic terms, the crossing 
marked a rupture, enforced with the arbitrary identity checks. Ridvan was 
extremely vocal about this, did not want to use the crossing and said that he 
felt intimidated when asked to prove his identity.
 Once we stood on the other side of the street and looked at the entry 
point. Two policemen were standing next to one another holding guns. They 
would point at people in a seemingly random fashion, sometimes waving 
their hands and at others by waving their guns, not specifically aiming at 
anyone but still conveying a powerful signal to stop. Some of the passers-by 
were questioned and demanded to show their ID cards. Ridvan reflected on 
the scene: “The policemen recognize me and know me but still want to check 
my ID,” he began, “it can happen when I go to work in the morning. It feels 
even worse when, after a long day at work, I have to show them my ID to go 
home. They are not protecting my neighbourhood – we, sure as hell, do not 
want them to – they are just trying to make us stay in Tarlabaşı.” He would 
occasionally see someone familiar and follow the person with his eyes, 
speculating whether they would be let through without an intervention. He 
continued on the absurdity of the situation. “Nobody really minds me when 
I am working as a waiter by Istiklal Street – the city would stop if tea would 
stop to flow – but except inside the teahouse or my home I am never in a 
right place. In the morning I go to serve people who otherwise intimidate 
me and I am supposedly doing something wrong even when I am going 
home the quickest way.” The controls did not make sense in practical terms 
either. The rush by the crossing is at most of the times immense, the area is 
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41  The police station building was later demolished and, according to my information, a new one 
will be built in its place.
42  TOMA is abbreviation of Toplumsal Olaylara Müdahale Araci (Intervention Vehicle to Social 
Events), a ubiquitous sight at demonstrations.
not illuminated too well after the dark and, most importantly, it is always 
easy to avoid the controls by a slight detour.
ALTERNATIVE CROSSING TO TARLABAŞI
Ridvan, just like Şivan in the previous chapter, felt like a sheep that is being 
herded in Beyoğlu. He lived closer to the Kalyoncu Kulluğu crossing but 
would rather cross Tarlabaşı Boulevard at a different place to avoid the 
intimidation by the police and navigate his way home in the backstreets. The 
crossing at Sakız Ağacı Street, the next one towards Taksim Square, was just 
a short walk away. This, in turn, had affected the boundary dynamics in the 
immediate vicinity. On the Istiklal side, Sakız Ağacı Street continues as Atıf 
Yılmaz Street that had developed a reputation as a gateway to Tarlabaşı – 
some of the cheapest eateries in Beyoğlu, with a steady stream of customers 
sharing tables and quickly eating platefuls of simple Turkish dishes, 
dominate the street with more upmarket restaurants and nightclubs closer to 
Istiklal Street. Its difference to the surrounding streets became clear, to a 
surprising degree, in the “virtual walk” interviews (see p.14) I conducted 
during my fieldwork. Here, the presence and movement of particular kinds 
of people altered the space that would architecturally be indistinguishable 
from the streets next to it.
 What for Ridvan was a direct route to the mahalle, was for many 
others, especially those who had never entered Tarlabaşı, an uninviting and 
vaguely dangerous border zone. Geographically, Atıf Yılmaz Street crosses 
Istiklal Street at a very busy spot but Istiklal’s ambience does not extend over 
it. The constant movement, the presence of traders selling cheap China-
produced clothing and toys and a large number of people standing on the 
street corners – instead of sitting in the cafes like in most of the other streets 
– made it different. On the corner of Istiklal Street is a mosque, the only one 
adjacent to Istiklal Street. On Fridays and religious holidays all the people 
did not fit in but some had to pray in the street. The mosque served as a 
significant landmark, symbolically connected to the ambivalence of the 
space, a corridor providing access to the neighbourhood and punctuating 
the space with a different quality. It did not separate two spaces like Tarlabaşı 
Boulevard but presented a gradual passage to a different spatial order before 
reaching the crossing to Tarlabaşı – at the same time, it did not mark the 
separation between two areas but acted as a separate zone, covering just one 
street but very different from its surroundings.
 Ridvan acknowledged the difference and liked to joke about it: “This is 
a street where I feel safe. I know that there are many people who would like 
to drive all of us away from it but I feel that we also need a place to hang out. 
In fact, I prefer to see my friends at Taksim Square but it makes me feel good 
that there are cheap places to eat or just street corners where I feel welcome 
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on this side of the city. One of the big differences is that there are almost no 
women, except for the ones going to Tarlabaşı. I think they are afraid of the 
poor Kurds.” He expressed this in the tone that addressed the social 
distinctions of class and gender in the area, considered them as important 
issues but laid them out with a dose of cynical humour. The street itself was 
not much to praise but it could be used to reflect upon the boundary 
dynamics of the area.
 The women that I talked to generally avoided the street, not as a 
definite no-go area but a slightly uncomfortable zone that can be easily 
avoided. Didem extended her idea of rural newcomers, expressed earlier in 
this chapter in relation to repopulation of the old Greek and Jewish 
neighbourhoods, to this space: “I just do not feel at home when I walk that 
street. First, there is the mosque at the corner. I can see the scorn in the eyes 
of the men at the yard, as if they would want to keep the area to themselves. 
There are also more and more of them. Before they would fit inside but now 
they are on small prayer mats all over the place.” She sighed, and proceeded 
to explain: “This does not mean that I am hostile to religion or the 
Anatolians and Kurds coming to Istanbul. I just feel they are not doing it in 
the right way. After you pass the mosque there are these gangs of youth who 
stare at you, call at you in rude ways and laugh afterwards. So much of 
Istanbul is already like that, you just do not feel comfortable as woman 
walking around there. We have to struggle to keep this area like it has been.” 
This account, repeated with slight changes in detail by many others, 
concentrated on the same themes as Ridvan’s – the quest to make the city 
safer and more accessible, in a word livable. However, Ridvan and Didem 
articulated the issue in an antagonistic manner.
 In the cases above, the boundary dynamics entered into a complex set 
of relations with the intimacy of home, its extension to the world of 
modernity, and the presence of the state safeguarding its values through 
policing particular spaces from intrusions. The daily rhythm of crossing 
Tarlabaşı Boulevard, possible identity checks and a resulting sense of 
exclusion, reproduced the divide between spaces, giving it a mundane 
signification that could be extended to other practices and employed as a 
model for other spatial relations. The dangers of Tarlabaşı were thus 
constantly reminded both to its residents and to the people who only saw the 
permanent police presence, with no apparent reason, as enforcing the sense 
of a dangerous world set apart. On the other hand, Atıf Yılmaz Street 
provided a safe gateway to Tarlabaşı for its residents but extended its 
mahalle-like features into the Istiklal area. It expressed and contrasted the 
difference between the two spaces in a gradual way and marked the norms 
associated with social class, gender and religion as a knot that had to be 
negotiated, often unsuccessfully and deepening the existing conflict.
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 Along these lines, Joel Migdal considers social boundaries as virtual 
checkpoints, where the markers between the identifiable features of familiar 
and strange are separated and the sense of security established (2006:10). 
The markers include daily practices, not limited to dress and language, but 
extending to other domains that have evolved into signifiers marking who is 
included in a group and who is not (6). Virtual checkpoints are also integral 
in establishing the shared sense of space, embodied knowledge of what to 
expect from the others. Migdal states that the need for checkpoints and 
markers lies in the recognization of the unfamiliarity with how things are 
done and how strangers behave, which, ultimately, leads to particular 
neighbourhoods developing reputation as dangerous (10). In my case, the 
familiarity and strangeness were directly connected to questions of access 
and safety. However, the relationship between inhabitants’ knowledge of 
boundaries and moral frameworks was asymmetrical. By the necessity of 
survival, a Kurdish migrant living in an impoverished neighbourhood had to 
think about contextual boundaries and moral frameworks, to cross between 
ambiguous spaces and adapt to their expected behaviour on a constant basis 
– more fortunate ones had much more freedom of choice. Didem (or Nazlı) 
had never set foot in Tarlabaşı: in fact, she had once planned to do a school 
project that that would have involved interviewing residents of Tarlabaşı but 
her parents had prohibited her from doing it. Even so, it is rare that the 
boundaries within a city deny access completely. Their contextual character 
is closely related to cycles of time.
RHYTHMS OF THE SAFE PASSAGE – UNDERPASS
The definition of the safe environment reflects a range of issues, from the 
feeling of comfortable surroundings to the absence of a physical threat. The 
standards of security, such as the density of streetlights in one particular 
street, the presence of other passers-by, the small police booths set at 
strategically important locations and the very different opening hours of 
shops, stalls and restaurants in different areas are all related to the embodied 
experience. A difference of just one hour can turn lively bazaars into ghost 
towns or bring previously deserted streets into life after bars and nightclubs 
start to attract clients. Thus, the uniform grid of the city transforms into 
diverse spatial relations that reflect appropriate practices at different 
rhythms. In a sense, the informal passage of social time is contrasted to the 
monumental time of the state, the latter being slower and more readily 
appropriated by the state machinery (Herzfeld in Byrne 2011:150). The 
recognition of how social time relates to the contextual boundaries is at the 
heart of being Istanbulite and knowledgeable of urban realities that cannot 
be formalized perfectly.
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 The spatial dynamics of safety are perhaps easiest to observe in daily 
cycles; which streets one should not cross after a certain hour and which 
districts change in character after the sunset. In my field data, the properties 
of social time rested on finely tuned reflections as a precondition for safe 
movement. As I mentioned above, Tarlabaşı Boulevard could be crossed by 
pedestrians only from a small number of points (map 6). Coming from the 
direction of Tünel Square, the first crossing is on the side of the adjoining 
quarter of Kasımpaşa, above Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Stadium. The next one 
further up  had developed into a significant feature of the cityscape for 
people with intimate knowledge of the area. Leading to Tarlabaşı directly 
from Galatasaray Square, along the towering walls of the British Consulate-
General, is an underpass that had become notorious, also among people who 
did not use it, and acquired a reputation as a location where one would risk 
almost certain robbery in the nighttime.43  My second home in Tarlabaşı was 
just a couple of steps from the underpass: immediately after moving in, my 
friend Osman told me to avoid the underpass, supported by the Serkan, the 
owner of the Star Tekel corner shop, who joined into our conversation. This 
was the first but definitely not the last time I was reminded of the danger. 
Osman, a financial analyst who took pride of living in Tarlabaşı before it had 
become increasingly popular among university students, middle-classes and 
foreigners,44  gave me clear instructions with a sense of pride over his 
knowledge of the area. 
 He also had experience of doing documentary photography in 
reputedly dangerous neighbourhoods and emphasized the importance of 
knowing one’s surroundings to find an escape route if necessary: “Especially 
as a foreigner you have to be more alert than others because you will be an 
easy target. It is also important for you to learn to know people in the 
neighbourhood that no one thinks that you are lost here.” Serkan joined in 
and told me that I was lucky to have his shop nearby: there would be more 
people around and he would keep it open until late in the night. They talked 
about how in some other quarters nearby one would enter into pitch-dark 
alleys straight from the Tarlabaşı Boulevard and how it would be impossible 
to guarantee my safety living there. Osman presented a detailed description 
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43  With the influx of wealthier people into the area its social dynamic had started to change. 
During my latest visit to Istanbul in January–April 2015 I inquired briefly about the situation 
concerning the underpass. The comments could be summarized as Tarlabaşı, especially the Aynalı 
Çeşme area bordering Kasımpaşa, becoming less dangerous.
44  My impression, based on discussions over the years, is that Tarlabaşı began to increase its 
popularity as a centrally located and cheap location to live among people from wealthier 
backgrounds around the time of my fieldwork 2008–2009. On this issue, I have not found reliable 
data, and doubt it could be collected. Many of the newcomers I know have rented their apartments 
without proper contracts and sublet rooms informally. Tarlabaşı’s gentrification will be discussed 
in detail in the last chapter of the study.
of my future route home late in the night: “It is much better that you cross 
Tarlabaşı Boulevard by the stadium, there are traffic lights next to the other 
side of the Consulate. That is good because there is a bus stop and taxis 
around all the time. Next, you follow the road by the car-repair shops that 
are also open until late and have very bright lights to the road. Then you are 
almost at home; there are luckily some shops, like this one, that are open. 
That is definitely your safest bet.” He carried on and contemplated the more 
abstract qualities of the boundary. “The underpass is a definite trap. When 
you enter, the muggers come from both directions and you cannot escape. 
When you come from the Kasımpaşa side you can always run if somebody 
starts harassing you. The underpass is completely lawless – also those who 
have lived in the area for a long time won’t be using it in the nighttime. In 
the daytime there are enough people around so you just need to be careful.” 
 It was slowly getting dark and we all looked at the direction of the 
underpass: Cesur, a teenager whom everyone in the mahalle knew, was 
sitting at the stairs next to it. He was one of glue-sniffers in the 
neighbourhood, begging money around the underpass for most of the days, 
someone who would not cause trouble despite his unappealing appearance 
and occasionally erratic behaviour. Serkan pointed to another difference that 
would help me to deal with dangers: “Cesur is ballyci,45  sniffing glue, and 
completely harmless. He is not one of the muggers but will ask for money 
from you. There is another variety that you have to watch out. We call them 
tinerci (thinner-sniffers) and they are much more violent and unpredictable 
bunch. We have both here in Tarlabaşı but with Cesur you are all right.” He 
laughed with Osman that soon I would be an expert on the various people in 
the Tarlabaşı side. I took this as a part of Istanbul’s urban grammar, a 
negotiation of the qualities of different areas, referring to standards of safety 
on both sides of the boundary.
 What was interesting in this case, the actual area constituting the 
boundary was perceived as more dangerous than its different sides. Being 
cornered in a narrow tunnel out of sight of the others, especially as a victim 
of professional criminals, demonstrated an intensification of the spatial 
characteristics of this location. Even being part of the community, prided as 
the inclusive sense of the mahalle, would not help here. Osman said that he 
would avoid the underpass late in the night and Serkan added that he does 
not have to think about the issue because he has nothing to do on the Istiklal 
side late in the night. When I discussed the underpass with Şivan and 
Ridvan, their view was that it was best to be avoided if it was late and, 
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45 The term consists of the brand Bally, a popular contact adhesive in the country, with the suffix 
-ci, used to denote persons who are professionally or habitually concerned with an object or quality 
denoted by the basic word.
practically, it was such a short detour to cross the boundary from the other 
direction that it was not worth taking the risk.
RHYTHMS OF THE SAFE PASSAGE – WEEKLY MARKET
The rhythms of social time were ticking in different tempos. The sense of 
security fluctuating between the day and night was combined with a longer, 
weekly rhythm, associated with the market spreading into the streets of 
Tarlabaşı every Sunday. Weekly markets are an institution in almost every 
district of the Istanbul and the one in Tarlabaşı was famous for its rock-
bottom prices. Every Sunday one could distinguish constant flow of people 
on the way to Tarlabaşı from early morning on. The first market stalls selling 
vegetables, fruit, toys, and snacks were located immediately after the crossing 
and the market extended into the streets of the neighbourhood and made it 
accessible for outsiders. Its busiest part was located further up north but 
small stalls were set up all around. 
 In this case, the boundary between the areas became less marked 
because the context enabled free access into the space, normally defined by 
intimate sets of loyalties and perceived as unwelcoming to strangers, either 
as a semiprivate space of mahalle, or the corrupted space of modernity, 
defined by drugs, crime and prostitution. During the market, the 
transformation was not complete; many of the visitors were slightly nervous, 
very few strayed into the streets that were not already crowded and it was 
easy to tell the difference between those who were occasional visitors looking 
for cheap bargains and the ones who would be around every Sunday, know 
many of the traders and stop to greet and exchange news with their 
neighbours. 
 On one bright April morning I joined Ridvan for a stroll around the 
market. Based on the discussions we had had on the accessibility of different 
spaces, he wanted tell what the market meant to him. “This is a very difficult 
topic and I do not know what to think about it. Of course, as I have told you 
many times, it is good that people come to Tarlabaşı and see that we are just 
like people elsewhere in Istanbul, not thieves and fanatics that they think we 
are.” He paused for a while and lit up a cigarette: “The foreigners and rich 
Istanbulites also bring money into the mahalle but I feel that they have 
something else in the mind. You live in a renovated house and pay much 
more than I could afford, I have friends who work in the construction and 
who are renovating luxurious apartments for people moving in here. Maybe 
the police and private security will come next and we will be chased out. We 
are not allowed these days to wander around the city without stress. 
Especially foreigners come here to take photos of living sheep sold at the 
market and the buildings that have almost collapsed. In a way, you are doing 
the same thing: you are asking me constantly how life is so different across 
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Tarlabaşı Boulevard and I have began to think about it more and more.” From 
Ridvan’s account, I gathered a real worry about the future developments. The 
opening of the mahalle signified potential transformation that had already 
begun and was accelerating. At the same time, he had developed a way of 
living that depended on movement across the boundary.
 For him, the question was not so much of manipulating situations and 
stakes within them, but consisted of the skill of managing in diverse 
situations (Dahlgren 2010:4). Most of the time he felt powerless. What 
bothered him the most, was how to live a good life in conditions where the 
moral norms, senses of community and the rights of the individual were 
constantly shifting. When I refer to managing in different spaces and 
contexts, I do not simply mean etiquette that people will learn to follow in 
specific situations, but an embodied way of negotiating one’s relationship 
within differently bounded contexts and groups, corresponding to various 
criteria and values. To live a satisfactory life in the city does not consist of 
uniform behaviour in recurring situations but of skillful adjustments of one’s 
everyday practices. In the next chapter, I will focus on how it is possible to 
bring together shifts between contextual moral frameworks and 
classifications they employ. I argue that this involves developing a specific 
sense of selfhood, capable of detailed reflection towards different strands of 
history, modernity and urbanity and masterly implementation of particular 
practices in different contexts. I will begin with accounts of how to establish 
a sense of belonging into the city.
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Chapter 3: 
Becoming an Istanbulite in a 
Fragmented City: Cultivation 
of the Modern Self
Istanbul is a unique city with an unmatched historical background and natural 
beauty, bringing distinct civilizations together and connecting the two 
continents. Yet, we have wasted this city; played with its identity. We have been 
pursuing a big battle in this city, a big fight. It is a battle for bringing this city 
back to its state of glory.
— Prime Minister Erdoğan, 2007 (in Aktar 2009:48)
The quote from Erdoğan’s speech uses several classifications and narratives 
of different courses of Istanbul’s development in clever ways. The first two 
juxtapositions play with references to human agency and natural conditions: 
the city’s uniqueness is a sum of “historical background” against a backdrop 
of “natural beauty” – this, in turn, is elaborated in cultural terms by 
connecting “distinct civilizations” (Christian and Islamic) with geographic 
divisions (continents of Europe and Asia). The unique location and history 
direct attention to human responsibility; according to this view, life in 
Istanbul has evolved in a dialogue with features of place and memory, not 
the model of tabula rasa, associated with modernist urban design that 
sacrifices existing substance in its quest making way for the new (Hebbert 
2005:591). The quote also emphasizes that the weight of historical layers 
cannot be ignored in the future development of the city. 
 Erdogan’s reference to “wasting this city” and a battle for bringing it 
“back to its state of glory” is also a narrative that reflects back to the 
achievements of the past as exemplary models for the future, a familiar 
tendency throughout the history among people with grandiose plans. What 
makes this rhetoric so intriguing in Istanbul is the variety of exemplary pasts 
to refer to, and their different senses of sociality and belonging. I argue that 
these are located at the intersections of reflective self-making and established 
group solidarities, often connecting seemingly unrelated epochs and events 
that nevertheless provide coherent continuums emerging at various points of 
history. 
 In this chapter, I will focus on historical consciousness as the 
hierarchical organization of the formal and informal attributes of the city 
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and its history, shaping the sense of belonging as an ongoing process. I 
suggest that belonging to the city is founded on the strategical and tactical 
uses of powerful narratives that reorganize history, find solutions to moral 
dilemmas and create new senses of agency. However, establishing a simple 
distinction between strategies and tactics is not enough. Instead, I wish to 
focus on chains of actions that form morally evaluated narratives. Single 
actions can be isolated and judged separately but life is not a sum of those 
actions, it is not based on avoiding negative consequences (see Dahlgren 
2010:10). Different actions might be considered appropriate or inappropriate 
quite uniformly but are very rarely considered individually. Rather, they 
relate to historical narratives and principles of classification that act as 
foundation for more complicated senses of belonging, consisting of 
quotidian practices, but not reducible to them. In order to study how one’s 
relationship to the urban environment develops, I will begin with a brief 
glimpse of how Istanbul has acquired different, often morally defined 
characteristics, and relate them to my informants’ experiences of becoming 
urbanites and Istanbulites. Next, I will move on to discuss how histories of 
particular spaces become reorganized and look in detail at Taksim Square as 
a space where contested historical narratives clash in complex ways. After 
that, I will return to the level of the individual experience and establish a 
framework, based in theories of James Faubion (1993), for an approach I will 
use in the following chapters to study the historical consciousness of 
modernity. To conclude, I will argue that reflection on different types of 
agency and cultivation of the modern self has become an essential quality 
that acts as a precondition for participation in Istanbul’s urbanity.
Expertise of the City
It often feels that Istanbulites are obsessed about their city and can discuss its 
peculiarities endlessly. While conducting my fieldwork, this quality proved 
to be a useful icebreaker when looking for new connections and helped me 
to gather the informal anecdotes presented throughout the study. 
Participating in these exchanges also deepened my sense of belonging in the 
city and made me crave for more. There is a long history of expertise of the 
city; a seventeenth-century Ottoman traveller Evliya Çelebi begins his 
massive ten-volume opus Book of Travels (Seyâhatnâmesi) with an exhaustive 
description of Istanbul that fills up the whole first volume (Dankoff 2006). 
Orhan Pamuk devotes several pages of Istanbul: Memories and the City, his 
autobiography and a memoir of the city, to Reşad Ekrem Koçu (1905–1975), 
an obsessed author of Istanbul Encyclopaedia (İstanbul Ansiklopedisi), whose 
unfinished project’s span of 11 volumes and 7076 pages had gotten him 
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alphabetically into a letter “g” before his death (Pamuk 2006b:191–199). In 
the twenty-first century, the most famous successor in this tradition is 
Pamuk himself: he has taken pride in his passion for Istanbul and assembled 
many famous anecdotes of the city in creative ways into the maze-like 
construction of Black Book (Kara Kitap) (2006a), a postmodern mystery tale 
mixing the formal and informal, digging through the layers of Istanbul’s 
seemingly insignificant and quotidian features. The novel is a showcase of 
Pamuk’s mastery of different facets of Istanbul’s history, often compared to 
James Joyce’s extremely detailed portraits of Dublin.46
 There is a very enthusiastic but tiny minority with a comprehensive 
understanding of the history of Beyoğlu – for most of the others, the area is 
shrouded in the multiple layers of an ambiguous past, constantly employed 
in discussions but impossible to order in a stable way. Orhan Pamuk’s 
insistence: “Istanbul is a place where, for the past 150 years, no one has been 
able to feel completely at home” (2006b:115), captures both the sense of 
anxiety, the haunting of the layers of history, and a celebratory tone of 
urbanity; to be not at home also hints at the chances of creating new 
connections and senses of belonging. Furthermore, in these narratives the 
city is not merely a collection of facts to be accumulated infinitely but, rather, 
consists of selective appropriation and exploration of its possibilities. This 
task is combined and complemented with the actual movement in the city, 
participation in the rhythm of various routinized episodes, connected to 
sociality as well as solitude (cf. Duneier 1992:34). It is also a question of the 
formal and the informal, abstraction and practice. In the parlance of De 
Certeau, one is constantly balancing between the totalizing perspectives that 
transform city into a transparent and readable text, and the power it derives 
from the very messiness of the operations and practices of its inhabitants 
(1988:91–93). Following this analytical current, I wish to examine 
ethnographically in which situations ideal structures and actual events are 
organized hierarchically (Herzfeld 1987:32) and how these hierarchies can 
be turned around or rejected altogether. In many of the narratives, the messy 
and informal features are seen to posses a life of their own that can lead even 
the most well-planned projects go astray. From time to time, my friends 
explicitly referred to the specific unexplainable atmosphere of Beyoğlu that 
allows different forms of sociality to arise. This idea of urbanity can be traced 
all the way back Simmel who divides the discourse of the city into two 
dimensions: its material fabric of buildings and institutions and the 
“crystallized spirit” that these spaces and structures seem to embody (in 
Mitchell 2002:97).
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46  See e.g. Brendemoen, Berndt. Iletism Publishing http://www.orhanpamuk.net/popup.aspx?
id=47&lng=eng, Pamuk, Orhan. BBC News 7.8.2003 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3131585.stm
LURE OF URBANITY
Şivan was not familiar with the learned historical accounts of Istanbul but 
the details of his surroundings fascinated him and he had developed an 
elaborate reading of the city that often resembled the classifications and 
narratives of the famous authors. He expressed a qualitative difference 
between being a villager (köylü) and an Istanbulite (İstanbullu) – he was 
proud of his humble origins but told me in clear terms that there would be 
no going back to the rural life. The ten years he had lived in Istanbul had 
changed him as a person and he felt, despite the discrimination he 
encountered on a daily basis, that he was on the right track. He would often 
refer to the change on a slightly cynical manner: “In this country it is clear 
that I will never become a Turk – the whole system would need to change for 
that to happen. However, I can be an Istanbulite just like anyone who lives in 
the city.” The prioritization of the urban identity over the national one is a 
tactical choice, found also in other countries,47  and has long historical roots 
in Turkey. Used as an adjective, Istanbul manners, Istanbul accent, Istanbul 
fashions, among others, denote excellence, especially when compared with 
the rest of the country (Mango 2003:198).48  Becoming an Istanbulite was 
also something Şivan had dreamed about earlier in his life.
 On an exceptionally warm day in February we had been drinking tea 
all around Beyoğlu and he suggested that we buy a couple of beers from the 
bakkal nearby and go to Tepebaşı49  to drink them. We managed to find a 
place to sit down a little bit out of sight, at the edge of the car park, and 
looked at the sun beginning its descent. Şivan began to contemplate his first 
days in Istanbul as combination of bewilderment and accomplishment. We 
had discussed his introduction to Istanbul several times before but these had 
been short exchanges dealing with his surprise of the big city. “I had just 
finished my military service and knew that I had to move on,” he began, in a 
slightly shy manner, “my home village was uninhabited, there was no work 
in Mardin, Diyarbakır or the other cities nearby, some of my older brothers 
had already moved to Istanbul. I felt that I had to follow them – if I would 
not do it now it would never happen.” He took a sip of his beer and looked at 
the city extending over the horizon on both sides of the Golden Horn. 
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47  See Mandel (2008) on how many Turks in Berlin have prioritized their identity as Berliners 
instead of Germans (73–77, 105–106, 182) and how some have even extended the identification to 
a smaller unit and claim to be Kreuzbergers (157).
48 Mandel (2008) notes that among immigrants from Turkey in Germany “the rural-urban divide 
commands such symbolic capital that those hailing form Anatolian villages often claim to be from 
Istanbul or Ankara. Children are instructed to declare they are from Istanbul, but when pressed, 
display complete unfamiliarity with the city” (92).
49 Tepebaşı is a quarter (semt), situated in Beyoğlu, very close to Istiklal Street. In everyday usage 
the name indicates the top of the hill with magnificent view over the Golden Horn.
“Istanbul was like in the pictures that I had seen; masses of people and cars 
everywhere. I knew in an instant that now I was one of them. I came here, to 
this exact location, and looked at the view to the Golden Horn and further. 
Here I was; I had not visited any of the places I saw, and had seen just 
pictures and some film clips of Istanbul. At the same time, I knew that this 
was my city just as much as anyone’s.” 
 On another occasion, he explained how even the most basic practical 
realities of life in the city had been shocking. I first thought Şivan was 
speaking metaphorically when he told me that he did not know what bread 
was in Turkish when he had left his home village as a teenager. He had first 
gone only to Kurdish-run stores and asked for nân50 instead of ekmek, bread 
in Turkish. He said solemnly that learning a completely new language was 
the next revelation to him after the electric light he had first seen in Mardin 
after his home-village was deserted during the conflict in the 1990s. From 
this account I understood both the radical transformation and new 
beginning that the city signified to him.
 For some, his celebratory tone might epitomize resurrection of the 
outdated descriptions and romantic metaphors – cliches circulated within 
and across different urban environments. Yet, they also expressed a sense of 
urbanity and modernity in the vein of Berman, of actively yearning for 
changes, positively demanding them, seeking them out and carrying them 
through (1982:95–96). My discussions with people who had moved to 
Istanbul revealed several coexisting motivations; the narrative of Istanbul 
with its streets paved with gold – a rational economic drive arguably 
diminished at the dawn of the global capitalist expansion of in the 1980s 
(Keyder 2008:514); the individual decision to migrate and take part in the 
global civilization as an equal participant; and aspiration for self-
development. These distinctions and divisions were also related to 
movement between different scales: from the village to the city, further 
across the national boundaries and ultimately in the global perspective. I will 
discuss these in detail in chapters 5–7 and link them to historically shifting 
emphases of Turkish modernity.
 Another recurrent theme was unpredictability. Life in Istanbul 
represented possibilities, rarely realized but nevertheless thrilling unlike in 
other places. Simultaneously, life in the city was rife with risks. After his 
initial encounter with the city, Şivan had begun to approach the city and the 
village through comparison and told me about the intensity of urban life: “If 
a building collapses in my home village near Mardin the whole place will 
talk about it for years. In Istanbul, I might wake up one day and see that the 
whole block next to me has disappeared overnight. Such is Istanbul [Böyle 
İstanbul].” He said this with a particular pride in his voice, singling out this 
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characteristic as something that separates his city from other cities, 
highlighting the ability to tolerate and even enjoy sudden transformations as 
a mark of a true urbanite. “At the same time,” he continued, “an argument 
between two people can lead to a deadly riot.” Here, it is important to point 
out the ambivalence and tension between two different notions of agency. A 
superficial reading of Şivan’s remarks could point to passivity over changing 
conditions, an Orientalist fantasy of the Eastern mentality illustrated 
perfectly in young Le Corbusier’s description of a fire in Istanbul.
It [the fire] seems like an intermission at a theater where a great, 
extraordinary spectacle is performed, but whose audience is blasé because 
they know it all and nothing more can interest them. For Stamboul has been 
burning like this for centuries. (1987:156)
This stereotype – misguided and ridiculed but nevertheless used regularly – 
works together with its opposite, the promise of increased agency and a wider 
range of possibilities over future. For people like Şivan and Ridvan, Istanbul was 
filled with potential, both in the entrepreneurial sense as well as a way to become 
an urbanite. They had both moved to Istanbul with very low education and 
elementary knowledge of Turkish but had secured jobs that provided for their 
livelihoods: Şivan’s position as an office attendant was relatively low-paid but still 
much better than working in the construction industries or as a waiter. Ridvan 
had managed to start a bakkal with a friend on one of the side-streets of Istiklal 
Street and ran the orders for nuts and dried fruit. Both of them stressed their 
positions as self-made men, ready to rise higher in the social hierarchy. This was 
coupled with a powerful sense of belonging, urbanity as something to be 
cherished, even addicting. Once, Ridvan summed up beautifully what he meant 
by this new sense of urban selfhood:
Now, when I am married, I would like to move to Bahçelievler [a lower middle­
class suburb on the old side of the city] but I feel that I need to keep my other 
foot in Beyoğlu to see what is happening in the world.51
What really struck me in these descriptions was the paradoxical sense of 
certainty, even a peculiar sense of harmony, that could be obtained from the 
unpredictability of the urban surroundings. On a closer look, many of the 
responses were influenced on persistent classifications and narratives 
established in the past.
THE LIMITS OF AGENCY – ISTANBUL AS AN ANTHROPOMORPHIC BEING 
The agency of the city itself has long historical roots in stories. Time and 
again, Istanbul acquires an anthropomorphic character, often of an ageing 
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woman – very beautiful yet promiscuous (Suner 2010:151), with its own will 
and erratic behaviour that can shake the established order vigorously. This 
unpredictability, however, contains a promise of cracks in the system and 
possibility to successfully alter the mercurial urban conditions. The accounts 
of its agency are unconsciously and consciously elaborated, debated and 
negotiated, and supported by intricate understandings of its urban dynamics. 
Moreover, they contain, reproduce and perhaps even enforce distinct ways to 
organize the city and its social orders. A quintessential illustration of this 
tendency is presented in the 2005 film Istanbul Tales (Anlat İstanbul), written 
by Ümit Ünal and consisting of five interweaving vignettes, each directed by 
a different person. The stories portray lives of Istanbul’s marginalized and 
downtrodden; petty gangsters, transsexuals, Kurdish migrants and alcoholics 
– all of them integral part of its informal urbanity. One by one they come 
across surprising circumstances and fail in love, or, in other aspects of their 
lives. In the final scene, they are all together walking on the now defunct Old 
Galata Bridge (Eski Galata Köprüsü) (Figure 1) towards the sea and cursing 
Istanbul for causing their demise. The antiquated narrative has not lost its 
ability to invoke powerful responses.
Figure 1. The characters of Istanbul Tales marching towards the sea cursing 
Istanbul. (screenshot)
It often felt that the assignment of agency to the city was a shortcut, a way to 
avoid complex analysis of its social dynamics. Even so, it also signified a new 
way of life, different from the predictability of the rural areas. While Şivan 
referred to sudden changes in the physical environment in his depiction of 
the disappearance of a whole block of flats in one night, the agency of the 
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city also extended to fantastical heights. For Ridvan, Istanbul was still very 
much a city with its streets paved with gold and he liked to illustrate this 
with dramatic examples: “There are many people who have become rich 
overnight, some by inventing something special, others by gambling or 
robbing. One day they wake up and Istanbul has taken everything away from 
them.” I found expressions of this orientation also from people with 
extensive knowledge of Istanbul’s history. When I started to prepare a map 
that would illustrate the most convenient walking routes and locations with 
contested histories in Beyoğlu, Veli pointed at the construction project just 
outside of his window in Tophane and told me that my attempt would be 
futile, even potentially dangerous: “You know, this city is changing much 
faster than you can track it down. If you start drawing maps or filling them 
up with additional information, you will have no time for anything else. I 
have met several people who have lost everything when coming too close to 
the city and it has made them insane.”
CONQUERING ISTANBUL
Istanbul Tales is, however, just one version in the long series of cultural 
products dealing with the same theme: the surge of anxieties arising from 
modernity and urban life by projecting them into a feminized image of the 
city. In cinematic history, the city mostly represents a “whore,” or, inversely 
the prostitute can act as a metaphor for the city52 (Dönmez-Colin 2014:294). 
According to Suner, promiscuity is related to the city’s long history and 
cosmopolitan culture and its deceitful nature with the presence of modern 
and independent women on its streets (2010:151). In Istanbul Tales, a film 
dealing with the most pressing issues of the twenty-first-century urbanity, 
the city seduces and destroys individuals from a wide spectrum of social 
underclass, from sexual to ethnic minorities. Another perspective, 
emphasizing the capability to transform, even conquer the city, is present in 
the earlier representations. In Birds of Exile (Gurbet Kuşları) (1964), the 
central theme is migration from the rural areas, and the film begins with a 
family of migrants crossing to the city from the Asian side amidst shouts 
“Whore Istanbul! I am coming to conquer you!” and “I will be your 
king!” (Figure 2) (Dönmez-Colin 2014:325). In this case, the family and its 
traditional values disintegrate in the urban environment despite their 
attempts to combine the best of rural and urban lives. Together with my 
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52  If Istanbul acquires its anthropomorphic character as a devious woman, alternating between a 
mother and a whore, there is another powerful trope of likening the Turkish Republic to a young 
woman, girl or virgin (kız) (Özyürek 2006:145). Thus, if the point of reference shifts from the city 
into the Republic, the moral problematic is seen in a very different light. In this case, the intimate 
sense of belonging is directed at protecting the anthropomorphic figure of the nation from an 
outside threat rather being seduced and destroyed by it.
ethnographic examples the films point at the limits of agency, of how the 
relationship towards the city has been expressed and experienced. They serve 
as illustrations of what specifically urban life in Istanbul consists of and how 
it fluctuates between the extremes of all-powerful city as an actor and the 
possibilities of radical reorganization of its cityscape by its inhabitants. Next, 
I wish to connect these abstract qualities to the actual spaces of the city, 
move deeper into the historical foundations of their organization and ask 
what happens when its history is contested on different grounds. 
Figure 2. The classic scene of the family crossing the Bosporus in Birds of Exile. 
(screenshot)
Taksim Square – Unifying Stories and Dividing 
Classifications
There are specific spaces in Istanbul where history becomes a site of an 
intense struggle. Their boundaries reorganize the mental maps of the 
inhabitants and help them to situate each other into the mix of rapidly 
changing groups and collectivities. Here, my aim is to explore how different 
senses of belonging develop in the course of everyday life, how groups with 
distinct solidarities are established, allow comparison to one another, react to 
contradictory situations and, especially, how they are built on the top of old 
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formations and related in moral terms to the past, present and future. I will 
discuss Taksim Square as a site of clashing histories, identifications and 
legitimizations, a space that encapsulates the twists and turns of the stormy 
history and remains extremely contested.
 I argue that historical classifications employ a wide set of categories; 
ranging from fundamental notions of belonging associated with religion, 
ethnicity and class to stylistic details and fleeting fashions, they create 
powerful shared understandings, producing dichotomies and essentialisms 
of the city. This line of reasoning highlights the pervasive presence of 
essentialism in everyday life, as a way to make sense of the urban chaos of 
different spaces. Of course, the ubiquity of essentialism in social life is very 
different from distrust of it in social theory (Herzfeld 1997:26, Mandel 
2008:84–85). In anecdotes, stories and figures of speech that portray 
classificatory patterns in systematic ways, essentialist categories routinely 
situate complex phenomena into clear frameworks, and produce common 
ground for debates.
 The classificatory geography of the city based on simple dichotomies is, 
however, insufficient for understanding the dynamics of belonging. I will 
explore here how attributes of spaces relate to historical understandings and 
produce senses of belonging and solidarity. Following Nancy Munn, I 
maintain that “the presence of the past is not grounded in either the subject 
or the place per se, but in the subject as always oriented, located, moving 
through or in ‘some place’ and equally, in the place as a concrete location and 
center orienting and surrounding the subject. The importance of places to 
memory is founded in this nexus of relations” (2004:13). I argue that 
establishing and severing these place­bound histories is an integral part of 
urbanity, of immersing oneself into the stories of the city and acquiring 
knowledge of its intricate classifications. While the previous chapter focussed 
on movement and boundary-crossing, here the centre of attention is the 
history of particular locations.
 Tim Ingold notes that “stories always, and inevitably, relate what 
classifications divide” (2007:205). I will apply this principle to broader 
construction of history as “the construction of a meaningful universe of events 
and narratives for an individual or collectively defined subject” (Friedman 
1994:118). In order to study the ordering and expression of historical 
consciousness within a specific cultural context (Faubion 1993), while 
acknowledging the connections established in different spaces, I will 
demonstrate here how different historical epochs are brought together and 
contrasted with one another, paying specific attention to the dichotomy 
between Republican and Ottoman histories, not solely as essentialized grand 
narratives, but related to culturally intimate senses of belonging, often 
ambiguous and half-formed associations of convoluted histories.
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TAKSIM SQUARE AND GEZİ PARK: REPUBLICAN AND OTTOMAN HISTORIES 
COLLIDE
Istanbul’s Republican space par excellence, Taksim Square (Taksim Meydanı), 
has a history of violent clashes of qualities with Republican and Ottoman 
connotations. Originally named after the reservoir for the water-distribution 
(taksim), built in 1732, its most important symbol nowadays is the Republic 
Monument, sculpted in 1928 by the Italian sculptor Canonica (Sumner-Boyd 
and Freely 2000:429). It has been the site of the Ottoman countercoup of 
1909 (31 Mart Vakası), Taksim Square Massacre in 1977 (Kanlı Bir Mayıs), 
the Gezi Park protests in 2013 and several other political events, often 
culminating in violence. Its surroundings have seen Ottoman military 
barracks, Turkey’s first football stadium and a public park that that became 
the centre of the Gezi protest movement. It also hosts Atatürk Cultural 
Center (Atatürk Kültür Merkezi), most famous as an opera house and a 
concert hall, but also a powerful symbol of the Republican Turkey.53  On the 
other hand, there have been frequent calls to build a mosque of a grand scale 
to the location, mostly as an initiative of the Islamic parties.
 In 1997, journalist Mehmet Akif Beki from Turkish Daily News 
(nowadays Hürriyet Daily News) summarized the rhetoric of the Welfare 
Party54  (RP)55, in favour of the mosque, as an interesting combination of 
arguments, alternating between representational power and rational analysis 
of the needs of Istanbulites. According to the newspaper56  article, the 
proponents of the mosque justified its existence on the basis of a former 
structure, a mosque as part of the Ottoman-era military barracks, torn down 
and substituted by Gezi Park, which was in 1997 a relatively insignificant 
space in the imaginations of the people.
 Beki questions whether the project is a response to the prayer needs of 
the area’s Muslim population or an attempt to symbolically reconquer the 
square, Istanbul and the whole nation. Catering for the needs of the people 
would fit into the rationalist framework of the secular state but with it arises 
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53  Atatürk Cultural Center was closed for renovation in 2008 and its future destiny remains 
uncertain.
54 The Islamist Welfare Party can arguably be seen as a predecessor of the Justice and Development 
party (Adelet ve Kalkınma Partisi/AKP). The current president Erdoğan was a former party 
member and the ex-president Gül its deputy leader until its dissolution.
55  I will generally refer to the biggest parties in present-day Turkey with their Turkish 
abbreviations (AKP, CHP), for those are the terms used most commonly also in English-language 
discussions. For the lesser-known parties, I will use their full English names. I will also refer to 
politicians with titles of the period I discuss. Find a summary of political parties in glossary (p.
218).
56  Beki, Mehmet Akif. Hürriyet Daily News 31.1.1997 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/why-a-
mosque-in-taksim.aspx?pageID=438&n=why-a-mosque-in-taksim-1997-01-31
the danger of shaking the delicate balance of Istanbul’s moral geography. In 
the other half of the article, Zeki Ayik cites Yıldız Uysal, the general secretary 
of the Istanbul Chamber of Architects, who opposes the mosque on symbolic 
grounds: "The symbol of secularism and democracy, Taksim Park, should be 
rearranged in accordance with its image." In another argument featured in 
the article, the former mayor of Beyoğlu, Huseyin Arslan, blames the Welfare 
Party for combining religion with the politics:
They only try to use religion for political goals […] the area across from 
Taksim Park where they plan to build the mosque is the tourists' favorite 
place. Building a mosque there will also effect the hotels around. In addition, 
they will kill off one of the few green areas in Beyoğlu by building it.
It is possible to capture many foundational debates of the nature of the 
Republic, religion and secularism in one relatively short newspaper article. It 
illustrates how the tendencies underlying contemporary issues are anchored 
into the essentialized Republican values. In the quote above, the symbol of 
secularism and democracy, is argued to be “rearranged in accordance with 
its image,” a vague but comprehensible statement for opposing the mosque 
on the grounds that it would disturb the spatial arrangement. Interestingly, 
the story also contains a reference to hierarchical organization of the spaces. 
Arslan suggests a compromise that, to my knowledge, has not resonated too 
well with the Islam-leaning parties: “But if they have to build a mosque, they 
can do it after demolishing a few of the old buildings in Tarlabaşı.” There is a 
huge difference in occupying one of the most significant spaces of the 
country in comparison to acquiring space from a residential area nearby.
 Moreover, the symbolic properties of the square are in stark contrast 
with everyday realities. Taksim Square is not the most comfortable place to 
spend time. There are no places to sit down, the traffic and especially the 
busy terminal57  for local busses makes the area noisy and restless. Of my 
friends, Ridvan preferred the square as a place for congregation but most of 
the others came there only for metro and bus connections or to meet 
someone at a convenient spot. Its symbolic significance was another matter. 
On one occasion, I met Veli at the Bambi Cafe, an Istanbul institution for fast 
food by the square and we begun to discuss the significance of the area. Veli 
was following the urban transformation of Istanbul very carefully, liked to 
question the changes in his artistic work and was active in the social 
movements, later one of the small group of people who initiated the Gezi  Park 
protests. The Taksim mosque had been on the news again and he began to 
contemplate the issue: “The mosque is a definite provocation (provokasyon). I 
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57 By the time of writing, the busses have been moved to the terminal underground and the square 
is nowadays a vast expanse that is very busy at its edges where all the establishments are, but 
mostly deserted in the middle.
know that it has been justified as answering the needs of the population; the 
small mosque by Istiklal Street is often full and people have to pray outdoors, 
and the neighbourhood mosques in Tarlabaşı, Tophane and Cihangir are 
mostly for people living in the areas. I understand this argument. However, 
there is more to the question.” He stopped for a long while and struggled to 
express himself in a balanced way. 
 He pointed at the mix of people at the cafe: youth who spoke Turkish 
with a thick Southeast accent; a pious family of four consisting of young boy 
in a Galatasaray football shirt, father going through the prayer beads, mother 
and a teenage daughter covered in simple headscarfs; a businessman in ill-
fitting suit shouting to his phone about something wrong with the schedules, 
another group of youth in a hip-hop gear and many others. “In this city 
everyone is afraid of one another, not as separate people you meet when 
walking down the street, but as people who can do and have done terrible 
things together. Another terrible thing is that I hate the military but I know 
that without their existence this country would fall apart with different 
groups attacking each other. Building a big mosque on Taksim Square or 
even reconverting Hagia Sophia to a mosque would be too much. That 
would lead into a total war. The most scary thing is that in the chaotic 
conditions the liberal (liberal) people would be the first ones killed.” The 
transformation of Taksim Square would alter the image of the whole city and 
country. In Veli’s view, it was the army, an institution that he despised and 
wanted not to be involved with, that he saw as the protector of the peace. 
This reflected a more general pattern: the army has intervened in the politics 
several times contrary to democratic principles but maintained its status as 
the most trustworthy institution in the country (Mango 2004:54), although 
this is less obvious in the light of the most recent changes, especially the 
lengthy Ergenekon trials and unsuccessful interventions to influence 
political sphere, discussed in Chapter 7 (Aydınlı 2011, White 2012:77–79). 
However, there have been times when the tensions have peaked and the 
history of the square has been reconsidered.
GEZİ PARK, ÇAPULCUS AND TACTICAL READINGS OF HISTORY
In Turkish politics, complex references to history are abundant but their 
significance is easily lost in international media presentations. A very recent 
case illuminates how the vast historical continuities are entangled 
dialectically in what first seems like simple opposition. The powerful 
ideological representations can be anchored to different historical epochs, 
often to singular events, and revitalized to new political significance in 
contemporary conditions. Often the rhetoric has a spatial dimension and the 
narratives travel through symbolically significant places like Taksim Square, 
known for its multi­layered and contested history, with great potential to 
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become an arena for new struggles. The Gezi Park protests, initially on 
environmental grounds against the urban development plans that would 
transform the area into a shopping mall and luxury flats, resonated with 
wider concerns over public space, personal and collective freedoms and the 
corruption of the political system, and brought together the vast historical 
potential of the place. 
 Complex histories can be captured in single words. When the protests 
at Gezi Park escalated towards the end of May 2013, Prime Minister Erdoğan 
began to use an obscure term, çapulcu, to describe the protesters. Its 
dictionary definition is “looter” or “marauder” but the term was rarely used 
and unknown to me before the events. However, the choice was not arbitrary 
but connected the unrest strategically to an unfolding chain of historical 
oppositions, linked to the spatial politics of Taksim Square. The name given 
to mostly secular protesters dates to the history of the Ottoman-era military 
barracks that were demolished in 1940 to establish Gezi Park next to the 
square. In 1909, the barracks were the site of mutiny by the pro­Islamic 
coalition against the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (İttihat ve 
Terakki Cemiyeti), the ideological predecessors of the nationalists who 
founded the Republic of Turkey. The people marching to support CUP were 
accompanied by Bulgarian irregulars, who were called çapulcus in the 
descriptions of the events.58 Connecting the same term to the heterogeneous 
group of protesters in 2013 is an example of the continuous work of relating 
historical occurrences into the past, present and future, as well as of creating 
new solidarities and loyalties that can be traced and evaluated in relation to 
their historical precedents. These narratives can be organized according to 
repetitions, ruptures or other temporal metaphors. The obscure reference to 
Bulgarian irregulars more than hundred years ago can burst into a new life 
in present-day Istanbul and acquire new meanings, reorganizing the 
historical palimpsest.
 In this case, Erdoğan’s reference to protesters as çapulcus did not 
remain an isolated incident of categorizing diverse group of people but 
developed into a new category of belonging. Very soon, protesters started to 
refer to themselves as çapulcus; the positive association with newly formed, 
though largely undefined, group spread through the social media and news 
channels. Political activists representing different historical eras were 
claimed to be çapulcus and renowned contemporary activists such as Noam 
Chomsky and Patti Smith sent their greetings to protesters saying that they 
were also çapulcus. The dictionary definition of a “looter” gave way to the 
more positive “rebel” with connotations to global social movements such as 
Occupy and its offshoots (Singer 2013). One could find people around the 
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58  Pope, Hugh. Dining with Al-Qaeda 14.6.2013 http://hughpope.com/2013/06/14/some-old-
battles-never-die-the-case-istanbuls-taksim-barracks/
world expressing their sympathy under slogans “every day I am chapulling” 
and “everywhere is Taksim, everywhere is resistance.”59  The events were no 
longer tied to a particular location: this became apparent in a fitting way 
when, just as writing these lines, I was distracted by a news report of a 
woman chanting the latter slogan while being forcefully removed from a 
meeting during Erdoğan’s visit to Finland.60  While the struggle for urban 
space in Gezi Park resonated with larger global concerns, the historical 
reference to the Ottoman defeat over hundred years ago was registered in 
spatially bounded, local and particular historical consciousness.
PALIMPSEST OF THE PAST
As illustrated by the Gezi Park protests, different layers of the past were 
available to be appropriated selectively in the course of social interaction. 
However, they were not just materials for conscious strategic elaboration but 
arose at unexpected moments, often associated with a sense of amazement or 
unease. The often simplified and essentialized images of the Ottoman city, 
Republican city and global metropolis were just some of the recognizable 
patterns to organize the historical consciousness of different spaces. Taksim 
Square was simultaneously a site of Sultan’s military barracks waiting to be 
reconquered and completed with the construction of a grand mosque;61  the 
Republican heart of the city built around the Republic Monument with 
depictions of Atatürk and his aides, and, in the everyday rhythms of the 
inhabitants, a place to arrange meetings and catch busses and metro from 
the adjacent terminals. The expected course of history had been altered so 
regularly that acknowledgement of its various trajectories had become a 
quotidian work of observing and ordering the city. It was also subject to 
strong emotional turmoil; the old meanings could shift with new 
information and transform the encountered reality. In the previous chapter I 
discussed how Volkan had learned to appreciate the historical complexity of 
the old quarters of Istanbul by photographing and studying them. The same 
was true of his relationship with Taksim Square.
 We had arranged to meet at the Republic Monument and discussed the 
site while leaning uncomfortably on the thin fences surrounding the statue. I 
asked casually what he thinks of Taksim Square, waiting to hear his view of 
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reach.
60 YLE 6.1.2013 http://yle.fi/uutiset/valikohtaus_keskeytti_turkin_paaministerin
_puheen_finlandia-talolla/6920499
61  The construction of the neo-Ottoman style shopping center next to the proposed mosque had 
even created a joke of a new attempt to build a contemporary mosque-market nexus, a disneyfied 
version of the earlier arrangement.
its transformation in the future, but he chose to deliberate on its changing 
meaning for him: “A couple of years ago I thought that I knew Beyoğlu very 
well but I have begun to question many things recently. It was quite shocking 
that I really learned about Taksim from the perspective of the foreigners. The 
Turks know their history only from school and cannot see the bigger picture. 
I did not know that there had been a mosque and imperial barracks by the 
Square [we had this discussion four years before the Gezi protests], I did not 
know that the Atatürk Cultural Center looks to foreigners like fascist 
architecture and the Republic Monument looks comical to them. Some 
might say these are small things but to me they have really changed the way I 
see the city.” However, the initial shock had increased his confidence in the 
possibility of positive change.
 He told me explicitly that one must be constantly alert where the 
conscious and unconscious observations point at, how references to different 
times and events are related to spaces within the city and how seemingly 
contradictory interpretations of historical developments can lead to very 
different understandings and possibilities for action. This manner of 
reasoning resembles Marshall Sahlins’ classic idea of the variation and 
reproduction of societies by submitting cultural categories to empirical risks 
(1985:ix). Reflecting on the rigid narratives of the dominant histories against 
their contradictions in the course of daily life means studying the dynamic 
between “the cultural order as constituted in the society and as lived by the 
people: structure in convention and in action, as virtual and as actual” (ix) 
and learning to make use of their inconsistencies. According to this view of 
historical change, all creative action has a potential to change the larger 
structure into which it is embedded, and even possibility to turn out to be 
revolutionary (Graeber 2001:249). In sum, everyday practices include testing 
and stretching the limits of the cultural order, reflection on its virtual and 
actual dimensions and exploration of its potential for change. Thus, the 
classification of the attributes of the city comes together with the personal 
histories of its inhabitants. In order to understand these processes better, I 
will next explore the different temporalities that define narratives of 
belonging, move into how individual and collective memory are related in 
meaningful ways and argue that among my informants there has emerged a 
powerful notion of a modern self, characterized by both its authenticity and 
ability to act appropriately in multiple contexts, organized according to 
spatially bounded moral frameworks.
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The Variety of Exemplary Pasts and Modern 
Selfhood
In the case of Taksim Square, the historical consciousness of the place is 
fashioned in the contrast between the Republican and Ottoman streams of 
history. However, this did not mean necessarily restricting one’s view to the 
one or the other but concentrated on their ongoing dialogue. Furthermore, 
for my informants the streams were not clearly defined nor did they 
correspond to contemporary realities: the mythical grand narrative of 
Republican history extended to the ancient origins of Turks in Central Asia 
and fluctuated ambiguously between different strands of secularism and 
laicism. Outside the small group of experts, the understanding of Ottoman 
history consisted mostly of anecdotes and legends, scattered pieces of 
information that could be combined into stories in the most imaginative 
ways.
 The question is also about formality and informality. It is possible to 
make analytical distinction between the national memory, in Turkey the 
extremely powerful Republican narrative of the schoolbooks and official 
histories, as a single plot of national identity, contrasted to the social 
memory, not so rigidly bound but, rather, consisting of collective 
frameworks that mark and influence but do not define individual memories 
(Boym 2001:xxviii). In Istanbul, historical narratives coexist alongside each 
other: their current positions do not fit neatly into the Republican/Ottoman 
divide but these labels have not disappeared nor lost their strength: 
especially in the case of the historically most distant examples, building a 
consistent narrative that would stretch all the way to the present day is 
serious work, full of crossroads and diversions that can compromise its 
authenticity.
 I have found Faubion’s (1993) theoretical approach, defining the sense 
of modernity in Athens, also productive in the study of Istanbul. Life in 
Istanbul shares the similar normativity of the metaleptic task; the need to 
come to terms with the multiplicity of pasts and the operation of bringing 
them into some informative rapport with the present and with the future 
(93). This is how the frozen representations of the past are brought to life 
through different rearrangements. Faubion contrasts cultural classicists, with 
their view of historical decline from the exemplary past, to historical 
constructivists, who reincorporate the elements of the past to the present 
and redetermine them in the light of the present (xxii). I argue that in 
Istanbul the multiplicity is ordered according to several exemplary pasts. In 
Turkey, even the classicists do not agree on what era to prioritize.
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METALEPTIC ACTS – OPERATIONS OF CULTURAL CLASSICISTS AND 
HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTIVISTS
A familiar story, spread across the population, illustrates the complexity of 
referring to authentic origins aptly. In it, two men meet in a bus, begin to 
talk about the most recent gossip of Istanbul and end up challenging each 
other on the grounds of their knowledge of the city. This leads to a contest on 
how many generations their families have lived in Istanbul. Both men start 
in unison to condemn the most recent arrivals to city as country bumpkins 
with no understanding of Istanbul’s history or urban life. They talk about the 
glorious days of Beyoğlu and how their families took part in the 
cosmopolitan atmosphere of the early twentieth century. Both make the 
strategic move and jump into their family histories in the Ottoman times. 
They boast that their families had long histories with the Sultan’s court but 
later associated with the nationalists and severed their ties with the Ottoman 
past. Their contest is not solved yet and both think what to say next; finally 
the other one begins: “Before that…” The other one interrupts him and says 
loudly: “I knew it all along that I am talking with a Greek (Rum)!”62
 To have the longest possible roots in Istanbul is to be a descendant of a 
Byzantine Greek or one of the Empire’s minorities but not a Turk. Until the 
nineteenth-century reforms in the Ottoman Empire, Muslim Turks did not 
inhabit the Pera (Beyoğlu) and Galata (Karaköy) districts and rarely visited 
them. The difficulty of constructing coherent narrative of the past can be 
illustrated through the act of metalepsis, a trope that “takes up the past, or an 
aspect of the past, or rather the enduring presence of something past, and 
makes it function within a different narratological milieu” (Rabinow 
2014:221), or, more figuratively, according to Harold Bloom “a return of the 
dead, but very much in the poet’s own dress, his own colours” (in Rabinow 
2014:222).
 Faubion distinguishes between two central metaleptic acts. Introjective 
metalepsis is a reversal of the prioritization of the future, or present, over the 
past. It also reverses the figuration of either the future or the present as the 
telos, the ultimate aim, of the past (1993:xxii). The longing for the glorious 
past is central to establishing these links. In contrast to this, projective 
metalepsis opposes any figuration of the past as the exclusive standard of the 
present or the future but organizes the concreta of the past into novel 
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62  Nowadays the word Rum refers to Greeks who hold Turkish citizenship, to differentiate them 
from Yunanli, Greek nationals. However, there is a further historical complication with the term 
that Yiannis Papadakis illustrates: “In Turkish I was Kibrisli Rum. Kibrisli meant Cypriot, no 
problem, but Rum? Where did that come from? I knew that during the Ottoman Empire, the 
Greeks called themselves Romii, meaning Romans, the people of the Eastern Roman Empire, as 
the Byzantine Empire was also known. The Ottomans called them Rum. The Greeks still living in 
Turkey were called Rum by Turks, while those in Greece were Yunanli. I did not like the 
implication of this, that we living in Cyprus were regarded as ex-Ottoman subjects” (2005:22).
formations (xxii). As a favourite trope of historical constructivists, it allows 
the convergence of histories. With these metaleptic acts, sometimes 
coexisting in a single narrative, it is possible to reorganize history and trace 
down its most significant turning points. As analytical devices, they also 
enable detailed scrutiny of the strategies and tactics at play in the course of 
daily life.
 In the following chapters, I will argue that in the historical 
consciousness of Turkish modernity, the mythical nomadic origins, the 
Ottoman conquest, the birth of the Kemalist Republic and the entry of 
Turkey into neoliberal globalization in the late 1980s, mark the greatest 
transformations. In the canonized histories, yet, surprisingly often also in the 
everyday discussions, different epochs are considered as leading to 
sociocultural dead­ends that are almost completely demolished by the new 
formations; Islam uniting the pagan tribes, the Republican values overriding 
the stagnant Empire, and, at the most recent stage, the rigid Kemalism being 
transformed into neoliberal Turkish nation where the Islamic principles 
coexist with the global competition over influence and economic gains. I will 
argue that the new beginnings and repetitions of the old are connected to 
principles of rebirth and regeneration, especially when brought in relation 
with contemporary moral dilemmas.
 Furthermore, Istanbulites share ideological narratives that connect the 
elements ordering history to particular events. In her analysis, Esra Özyürek 
(2006) emphasizes the “nostalgia for the modern” as the primary principle 
for the elderly Republicans, who have their historical consciousness centred 
around the formative years of the Republic. For them, this period acts as an 
exemplary model of the past that has deteriorated into decadent and corrupt 
globalization, ever further from the promises of their childhood. From 
another perspective, the Republican past can be considered as a facade, with 
another, largely neglected historical stream operating in the background. 
Popular Islamic intellectuals such as Mustafa Akyol have pointed out in 
sophisticated analyses (e.g. 2011) that Islamic movements and their guiding 
principles were preserved and cultivated also when they were suppressed by 
the state and left out of the official history. According to these views, many of 
the social and scientific innovations can be traced back to the Ottoman 
glories of the Islamic civilization and their dialectic relation to Republican 
modernity should be reconsidered.63 The abundance of historical materials is 
made to serve very different morally legitimized outcomes and futures.
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63  Of course, there are also elaborate academic studies that demonstrate the continuities between 
the Ottoman Empire and the Republic (e.g. Meeker 2002, Silverstein 2011). I will return the them 
in my periodization of Turkish modernity (Chapters 5–7). My aim here is to show how historical 
dynamics can be reorganized in numerous contradicting ways.
 In the contemporary context, establishing a coherent historical 
consciousness is (and is seen as) hard and serious work. On the one hand, 
one wrong strategic move, as in the discussion between two men in a bus, 
could rule out one’s Turkishness. On the other hand, the rigid categories of 
belonging, defined exclusively on ethnonationalistic terms (Turk, Kurd), or, 
on the basis of religion (Muslim, atheist), produce a narrow sense of 
selfhood, not sufficient for present-day conditions. Moreover, the practice of 
self-making from historical materials does not resemble playful 
postmodernism mixing superficial influences through consumption 
practices (although this can be part of it) but a responsible course of 
dignified life that would cultivate the valued characteristics and essences in 
appropriate ways. Among my informants, this capacity for heightened self-
reflection was intimately connected with modern selfhood.
CULTIVATION OF THE MODERN SELF
In the course of my fieldwork, the complexities of entangled streams of 
history often left me wondering, what the most important principles of self-
making in an urban environment were. Why was it that so many of my 
informants claimed life was so fundamentally different in the city? A 
recurring theme here was that Istanbul had also changed and its earlier 
social fabric had transformed considerably. At a first glance, the most 
dramatic change sprung from the introduction of laissez­faire capitalism, the 
rise of a new urban class with its carefully cultivated distinctions, based on 
consumption patterns, in opposition to the idealized picture of Istanbul’s 
urban sphere with clearly demarcated boundaries and senses of belonging, 
based on ethnicity and religious affiliation (Navaro­Yashin 2002b, Öncü 
2002). For people like Şivan and Ridvan, this transformation signified an 
entry to modernity, expansion of possibilities and a radically different idea of 
selfhood.
 However, the introduction of consumption-based identity politics had 
not led to disappearance of earlier loyalties and categories of belonging but 
enabled their elaboration in new ways. I have argued that qualities of 
different spaces and their corresponding moral frameworks foreground 
different senses of individuality and community, moral virtues and 
appropriate behaviour. Here, I will concentrate on the notion of the modern 
self, qualitatively distinguished from other configurations of personhood. 
Above all, it is a sense of self that demands tactical improvisation as its 
foundation and has been cultivated to respond to the shifts of moral 
frameworks in the midst of urban complexity. The emphasis is on adaptation 
to different situations rather than unbound individualism. Among my 
informants, both the ones living in impoverished areas and in wealthier 
districts, these distinctions were largely framed on the basis of their rigidity; 
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ranging from steadfast categories of ethnic and religious affiliations to 
slightly more adjustable senses of class, and further to ephemeral 
communities of taste that allow manipulation of markers of identification 
according to the occasion. 
 I have discussed above how historically grounded distinctions are 
categorized and combined as narratives; here, the focus is on the very 
acknowledgement of these categories and their limits. Cultivating modern 
self emphasizes the skill of identifying (and identifying with) particular 
groups or collectivities, understanding the limits of belonging into different 
groups, bringing together often seemingly incompatible classifications and 
narratives. According to this orientation, much of the lure of the city springs 
from the wide variety of senses of belonging, the possibility to change one’s 
association just by entering into a different space and interacting with 
different people. This involves sophisticated interplay between the widely 
shared markers of identity and more complex practices of signification that 
are not shared and understood by the whole population.
SELF-REFLECTION AS A FOUNDATION OF URBANITY
Ridvan was a master in analyzing the passers-by, telling where they come 
from and whether they are new to Istanbul. He often told me that this quality 
was a key to his survival in Istanbul and that it was something he had 
worked for. We were once drinking tea in one of Istiklal’s side-streets and he 
began to elaborate the development of this skill and how it had changed him. 
“When I moved to Istanbul,” he begun, “I was completely lost and very 
nervous all the time and did not know what to do. First, I was imitating my 
brother and asked him about everything, even the most stupid things, what 
to wear, where to drink tea, how to order it and how to look at people. I 
thought that I had learned this very well but now I can spot so many people 
in the crowd who are exactly like I was. They walk in Istiklal Street like kings 
and queens but forget to close their mouths and look like idiots.” He did a 
very good impression of exaggerated self-confidence that looked like an odd 
combination of aggression and nervous amazement. “In fact, the point is not 
to try to look like someone else but to be comfortable and relaxed.” He then 
moved on to say that the city had made him a different person, more open to 
the world and more tolerant. He referred to his relationship to Islam to 
illustrate the change he had experienced: “After living in Istanbul I know 
about these things. I know that Islam is the true religion but I have to have 
respect for the other religions. My parents would call all non-Muslims 
infidels (kâfir) and say they are like animals but that was because they did 
not know about the world outside their village. If they would have lived in 
Istanbul, they would have been different.” He paused to contemplate his 
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words for a while and finished by saying that he does not know if he would 
think the same had he not moved to Istanbul.
 Yet, cultivation of a modern self did not mean substituting former 
identifications with new ones but rested on balanced self-reflection. Ridvan 
was adamant that he had not compromised his authenticity as a pious Kurd 
after moving to Istanbul but had rather expanded his horizons and could 
now see the world in a more comprehensive manner. Finding the balance 
between coexisting moral frameworks of the mahalle and the urban sphere 
would enable effortless shifts between the locations, here thought as both 
physical positions and as a sense of variable spatial relations with other 
places (Munn 2013:141). In contrast to mastering the widest possible palette 
of religious and traditional practices, or signifiers associated with specific 
lifestyles, the sophisticated skill of assessing the different options was the 
critical solution to differentiate the modern self from the unreflective 
existence of the “others.” The centrality of the modern self was also reflected 
in the debates of the wider society: in contemporary Turkey, the failure to 
modernize is no longer seen as deriving from the “absence of mechanisms of 
incorporation, but of an inability to relinquish ‘traditional’ attitudes” (Keyder 
2005:133). Urban encounters expressed this variety: people could be 
categorized as products of specific cultural formations rather than of the 
culture at large and very different configurations of personhood were seen 
cohabit the same cultural and historical space (cf. Mahmood 2005:120). 
Consequently, there was no single exemplary model of modernity to follow 
but varying contexts and situations that demanded different kinds of 
practices and behaviour to reach the level of wholesome participation in life 
with all of its contradictions. Here, the wider society was not seen simply as a 
civilizing influence but as a vehicle to express one’s own civility (cf. Duneier 
1992:159). 
COMMUNICATION AS AN EXTENSION OF THE MODERN SELF
Cultivation of a modern self was not just something that was happening 
inside one’s head but needed to be communicated with the wider world. I 
conducted my fieldwork at the time when smartphones and social media 
applications like Facebook were spreading rapidly among wider segments of 
the society and had become a topic of daily conversations also among my 
friends living in Tarlabaşı and Tophane. Expensive mobile phones had been 
essential as symbols of modernity before but now the new channels of 
sociality and self-representation had become an integral part of everyday life. 
They stood for participation in globalized modernity and levelled the 
hierarchies associated with the earlier, costly and more challenging forms of 
participation, available only for small segments of the population. Most of 
my friends had at least distant family members living abroad, most 
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commonly in Germany or in the Netherlands. With the introduction of free 
or low-cost SMS-services, photo-sharing applications and Facebook status 
updates, my informants finally got a chance to extend their virtual selves to 
locations that had been out of their reach altogether, or too expensive to 
connect to. Possessing very little formal education, many did not master 
Turkish perfectly but this did not stop them using tools for sharing and 
commenting on various phenomena. I felt that some used chat-applications 
constantly, that there rarely was a break in the steady stream of greetings, 
names of localities and emoticons of ever-changing variations. Just like 
Turkish immigrants studied by Ruth Mandel, they accessed, and were of, 
“the global and local simultaneously and synergetically via a whole host of 
resources” (2008:84).
 When I asked Şivan about the importance of these new forms of 
communication, his initial thoughts echoed the general pattern with vague 
references to meeting the demands of modern life, upholding loyalties to 
family and friends, or simply, just staying in touch with people. He returned 
to the topic a couple of days later, and we drifted into a long discussion of 
how satisfactory life in a city with limited resources could be attained and 
how virtual and face-to-face communication contributed to this. Among the 
poor, he said, life consists of continuous struggle to uphold support 
networks, something that the rich do not have to think about, because they 
are not dependent on others and can just move elsewhere or live off their 
savings if they lose a job. He emphasized how the well-being of his mother and 
his seven brothers was always a priority. All were doing informal, often short-
term jobs in construction or renovation industries and as waiters or kitchen 
staff, or, if lucky like Şivan, sometimes found longer periods of employment at 
a specific place. In addition to the intrinsic value of a tightly knit community, it 
was extremely important to be in touch with what was happening in the 
neighbourhood, for this could result in job opportunities for the other 
members of the family. Irritating and uncertain underemployment was 
combined with pride related to upholding these solidarities. According to 
Şivan, the strength of his community in Tarlabaşı lay in its self­sufficiency and 
mutual help. The organization of people across families (aile), clans (aşiret) 
and places of origin (memleket) created a safety net that made life possible in 
difficult conditions. To be sure, this was more of a general organizing 
principle, for loyalties could shift quickly and tensions between fractions 
sometimes erupted in quarrels and fights. He differentiated these 
foundational solidarities from voluntary friendships and stressed that the 
former are established at birth and associated with the most intimate 
connections with home and family. Nonetheless, they could be extended into 
valuable assets in contemporary conditions and coexist with other 
solidarities, expressing the fluidity of the modern self.
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 In practice, cyberspace had not replaced the face-to-face encounters 
but had increased the possibilities to participate in global modernity. The 
underemployed young men in impoverished areas placed a strong emphasis 
on the personalized trust. Şivan referred to his earlier precarious job 
situation as constant balancing between upholding his dignity and securing 
his livelihood: “I am now very lucky; I am treated well at the office and I 
make enough money to take care of myself – there is even a little bit left for 
the family. It was not always like this and almost everyone in Tarlabaşı is in a 
very difficult situation.” He pointed at the street corner frequented by glue-
sniffing teenagers: “I understand perfectly why so many get involved in 
crime and drugs. It has been dozens of times in my earlier jobs that my 
bosses have told me to get lost if there is no need for me on a particular day. 
There are always others to do the work – you can employ the Uzbeks and the 
Turkmen for next to nothing and the paperless Africans for even less. If you 
protest against something the bosses will just tell you to leave.” Şivan waved 
his hands and shrugged: “In a way, it is all slightly criminal anyway: nobody 
pays their taxes and the shops buy stolen or faulty goods. You have to be 
really careful when choosing a job because you might end up being cheated 
and lose everything that you have. We tell the younger ones not to do dodgy 
deals but they do not believe us – for many, there just isn’t a choice and the 
system goes on and on.”
 With an unreliable labour market and informal contracts that could be 
annulled at any moment, the safety net was extremely important, and, as 
Şivan pointed out to me, best realized in close personal encounters, for then 
one would at least be able to ask around about what to expect – the virtual 
networks helped in spreading information but could not substitute the face-
to-face agreements. There were countless stories of dishonest deals and 
fraudulent companies taking advantage of unskilled and unorganized labour. 
Upholding dignity needed to be compromized with the practical realities 
and the standards of good life adjusted accordingly. The cultivation of the 
modern self meant learning to navigate between different realms of 
communication and to read the interactions in a sophisticated manner.
RELIGIOUS PRACTICES AND THE MODERN SELF
The tactical improvisation at the core of the modern self could also be 
applied to moral dilemmas concerning religion. The two following anecdotes 
illustrate how, alongside ethnicity and kinship, a sense of being a good 
Muslim brought up contradictions to be solved. Şivan told me once that 
praying regularly, preferably five times a day, would be desirable, that he had 
lots of respect for people who did so, but that it would impossible for him to 
combine regular prayers with work. He added that he did not want to cause 
any trouble and would rather adapt to the ways of the secular Turks and 
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foreigners that he worked with. When I asked, rather naively, would he pray 
during workday if given a chance, he said that he had not thought about it – 
he would definitely not insist on the right and did not want to stand out from 
the crowd. A couple of days later, he told me that they had laughed about the 
matter with his friends: “What would it look like if people in a modern office 
building would start praying in a middle of a meeting with foreign investors? 
They would think that we are in Saudi Arabia.” He did not see the situation 
as compromising his deeply held beliefs – we had intricate discussions of 
the compatibility of Islamic principles and practices with contemporary 
conditions – but as a reflection of the daily realities with an acute sense of 
comedy. The situation was just one of the practicalities to be dealt with. The 
sense of Islamic belonging was in this context not an obstacle and could be 
brushed aside: this type of office was not a place for religious expression and 
the ideological complexities could be expressed through humour.
 However, it was also possible that Islamic values became foregrounded 
in conflict situations. Ridvan called me one afternoon very disturbed and 
wanted to see me immediately. He insisted that we meet in bar Sultan, a 
cheap and somewhat nondescript establishment which primary attracted 
clientele with it happy hour beer promotions. I was surprised of his choice of 
place because it was early and did not remember him ever drinking beer in 
the afternoons. He wanted to buy me a pint and told me that he had lost his 
job as a waiter in the teahouse around the corner because he insisted on 
having his shifts organized according to the prayer times. This happened 
only a short time after I had discussed these issues with Şivan but there was 
no connection between the cases.
 I was surprised of what had happened; Ridvan had told me several 
times that he is a devout Muslim but that Islam is something that is in his 
heart, not a matter of strict rules and regulations, unlike the Islam of the 
conservative Anatolian folk who would not change anything in their lives 
when moving to Istanbul. I asked him if he had prayed during workdays 
before and added that I remember him telling me that he prays irregularly, 
whenever he feels like it. He admitted that his praying had been irregular 
and never an issue at work, but added that the owner of the place had said 
something insulting about him being a Kurd from the countryside, so he had 
decided to confront him and had referred to his human rights (ınsan 
hakları). In other words, he had countered the insult of being primitive with 
a demand for the human right to practice his religion, reversing the 
hierarchy of value with his claim for justice in the global framework. The 
owner had told him not to come back and Ridvan said that he wanted to 
celebrate his “victory” over a beer. At the same moment we heard the call for 
prayer from the only mosque lining Istiklal Street, almost drowned to other 
sounds of the city, and could not do anything else than laugh together.
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 These brief examples provide an introduction to how the modern self 
does not operate without constraints but rather adapts to situations with 
available means to uphold its authenticity and dignity. Nor does it mean that 
the desired subjectivity has “transcended culture” and embraced rationalistic 
secularism (Herzfeld 1987, 1997; Houston 2002:429; Navaro-Yashin 2002a:
23–24). Turkish history offers numerous examples of how “universal” 
identity has been connected to secular Turks and “cultural” to Islamists and 
Kurds (Navaro­Yashin 2002a:53). In Şivan’s and Ridvan’s experiences there is 
an evident refusal to play the game of modernity according to rules set by 
the former secular elites but, instead, an attempt to carve their own space 
into it. Even if the seemingly mundane act of drinking beer in the daytime, 
visible to the public passing by the bar, conveys intricate meanings of 
partaking in the global secular civilization, Ridvan did not want to claim that 
he is one of the secular Turks. Rather, he wanted to show that in his everyday 
life authentic cultural expression can consist of acting appropriately in 
different contextual moral frameworks, related to the spaces of the city. Next, 
I wish to extend these concerns and discuss what balancing between the 
universal and local conceptualizations of modernity involves and how it has 
developed in Turkey.
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Chapter 4:
Turkish Modernity
One could half-jokingly claim that if there is one distinctive feature of Turkish 
modernity, it is the fixation Turks have with their uniqueness vis-á-vis global 
developments. The familiar patterns of universal modernization – 
technological advancement and bureaucratization of daily lives – commonly 
contradict, but also occasionally complement the exclusive qualities of 
Turkishness. Moreover, tensions arise when homogenizing inclinations on the 
global scale are contrasted with the preeminent events of Turkish history. 
These seemingly opposed tendencies towards universalism and particularism 
can, however, coexist in different spaces; I argue that the modern condition of 
contemporary Istanbul should be defined as an entanglement of local, spatially 
situated modalities, that need to be brought together with the global models, 
both as concrete developments and as abstract principles. This involves a 
complex orientation towards history; its narratives become conglomerations of 
ends and beginnings, blind alleys of thought and revitalized sets of values, 
organized in practice through metaleptic operations, reflecting different 
hierarchies of value.
 In the previous chapters, I have mostly focussed on societal dynamics 
within Turkey. Here, I wish to extend my analysis to dynamics alternating 
between the local and the global and concentrate on the relationships 
between varieties of the modern, analytically divided into modernization, 
modernity and modernism, their definitions, uses and connotations. My 
focus is on how modernity is embraced as a distinct form of consciousness 
with possibilities and limitations. I will argue that the different senses of 
modern in Turkey are intimately associated with the notions of urbanity and 
civilization, conceptualized as ruptures and continuities in time and space. 
Modernization, modernity and modernism have emerged as different 
configurations at separate historical periods, often pointing at conflicts over 
different forms of sociality. These often refer to particular spaces, not defined 
as fixed places but as relative locations that bring together the specific 
relationships to the modern; encounters between the Ottoman and the 
Republican, the cosmopolite and the nationalist, the rural and the urban. 
They can consist of islands of cultural distinctiveness like the unique 
modernity of Istiklal Street or be defined as transnational or translocal 
cultural flows, interaction and interrelation of social units across real and 
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imagined boundaries, “agents, institutions, organizations, but also values, 
texts and concepts” (Reetz 2010:295–296).
 This relatively short chapter consists of a theoretical discussion on 
modernity and provides an introduction for the next part of the study, which 
examines the history of Turkish modernity in the light of ethnographic 
examples. Based on periodization into four eras, I will integrate the largely 
informal trajectories of my informants with the observations of researchers 
studying Turkish modernity. I will begin with a brief look of the social forces 
at play in the late Ottoman Empire, move on to how the modern was defined 
in the early Republican era, how the multiparty system introduced in 1950 
changed the ideals of the modern – especially how Istanbul’s urbanity has 
been transformed as a result of a great demographic shifts in the second half 
of the twentieth century, and conclude with an analysis of neoliberal 
modernity, a set of tendencies introduced already in the 1980s and 
strengthened in the following decades. This periodization, shared by my 
informants, should be seen as an established classification that nevertheless 
becomes questioned and even rejected in narratives connecting the eras and 
their guiding principles. The periods are related to specific themes and 
qualities: Ilhan Tekeli approaches Turkish modernity as movement from the 
idea of “shy modernity” from the second half of the nineteenth century until 
the proclamation of the Republic, towards “radical modernity” in 1923–
1950, “populist modernity” in 1950–1980 and “erosion of modernity” since 
the 1980s (2009:16). In the field of art and architecture, Sibel Bozdoğan 
associates the first period, starting in the 1910s, with the creation of modern 
artistic and architectural culture, the second period, after the 1930s as their 
subordination to the project of nation building and state ideology, third, 
from the 1950s on, as the more liberal, international and pluralist scene, and 
finally, after 1980, as “post-modern” or even “post-Kemalist” Turkey, “in 
which the forces of globalisation and political Islam continue to challenge 
the founding ideas of Republican modernity” (2008:420).64
Modernity, Modernism, Modernization
While modernity can be problematic as a category of empirical analysis, it 
has become a ubiquitous social fact. As an idea, it has a pervasive and 
powerful role in the popular imagination across the ethnographic spectrum 
(Keane 2007:48) and extends even to the most quotidian practices. Defining 
what it means to be modern has also been integral part of lives of those who 
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64  Jenny White (2013) suggests a closely related periodization, marked by military coups of 1960 
and 1980 as ruptures with wide-ranging consequences. Here, the First Republic covers the years 
1923–1960, Second Republic 1960–1980 and the Third Republic from 1980 until the present-day.
see themselves as moderns (Silverstein 2011:4). Following Daniel Miller, 
rather than defining a particular version of modernity and testing it out 
against the ethnography, I will concentrate on “which aspects of the modern 
condition may indeed be illuminated by this particular ethnographic 
inquiry” (1994:12). There is also confusion with terminology. According to 
Susan Stanford Friedman, perhaps the most applicable way to approach the 
triumvirate of modernity, modernism and modernization is to focus on their 
“different grammatical functions that carry semantic weight” (2001:498):
The -ity of modernity limits the word modern to a noun – a status as a thing 
or condition that is distinguishable from other things or conditions. The -ism 
of modernism turns the noun modern into an advocacy, a promotion, a 
movement presumably centred around a systematic philosophy, politics, 
ideology, or aesthetics. The -ization of modernization signifies a process, an 
evolution or revolution from one condition to another, with modernity as the 
condition achieved by modernization. (Friedman 2001:498)
These descriptive boundaries suggest the designation of the varieties of 
modern into different societal spheres and the possibility to analyze them 
using different methods. However, instead of being restricted to steadfast 
categories, they resonate with particular fields of life and have connotations 
with specific modalities and attitudes. While modernization is closely 
connected with economics and politics, modernism is associated with art, 
culture and sensibility (Berman 1982:88); modernism exhibits the air of 
certitude and arrogance, while modernity focuses on questioning and 
reflection (Lefebvre 1996:45), modernization is the supposed triumph of 
humankind over nature, while modernity is “the triumph of humankind 
over itself, or at least over oppressive forms of human privilege and authority, 
through successful resistance to political tyranny, clerical bigotry, and 
economic servitude” (Wallerstein in Woodside 2006:18). For the purposes of 
this study, I consider the common denominator of modern as combination 
of two separate tendencies; a sense of a break with the past, a subjective 
experience of becoming part of a new age and a new way of life, together, 
sometimes in a tense relationship, with the objective changes generally 
associated with modernity (Brenner 1998:10; Habermas 1987:5–7; 
Silverstein 2011:4). More than the other dimensions of the modern, this is a 
study of modernity; I will approach modernity as consciousness, 
significantly different from the other ways of experiencing the world, a 
qualitatively different outlook to life which can take a rich variety of forms 
but encompasses features and patterns that warrant the usage of the term. It 
is the modernity of self-reflection and questioning as an integral quality of 
urban life.
 Yet, the deepest senses of experiencing modernity can be at odds with 
modernism and/or modernization. For Marshall Berman (1982, 2006), the 
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celebrated contradictions of urbanism and modernity, from Parisian arcades of 
Baudelaire and Benjamin, to Dostoevsky’s St.Petersburg, and, further, to Jane 
Jacobs’ and Robert Moses’ New York, complicate the teleological trajectory of 
technological advancement of modernization. As another example, he points 
at Chernyshevsky’s claim that the integrality of urban and modern can be 
compromised. The cities with long histories are not contrasted just with the 
primitive countryside but also with the “highly developed, super-
technological, self-contained exurban world, comprehensibly planned and 
organized – because created ex nihilo on virgin soil – more thoroughly 
controlled and administered, and hence ‘more pleasant and advantageous,’ 
than any modern metropolis could be” (1982:244). All the adjectives 
(including “modern” at the end of the quote) point at different frames of 
reference towards modernity, modernism and modernization. In the Turkish 
context, a similar point can be made about the juxtaposition between Istanbul 
and Ankara, the incomprehensible social mosaic bastardized throughout 
history and the clean slate wherein to install the core values of the modern 
Republic (Keyder 2008:509–510, Papadakis 2005:26), seen even as the 
conquest of the Ottomans by the Republican Turks (Lewis 1968:10), realized 
in the German architectural and technological expertise (Kezer 2010:41, 
Duben 2011). However, the top-down modernist projects are never complete 
and the sanitized monumental architecture of Ankara has not succeed in 
protecting it from disruptions arising from everyday practices (Nalbantoğlu 
1997:199).
 The relationship of modern to spatial and temporal frames is at the 
heart of my study. If the evolutionary teleology and inevitable geographical 
spread characterize the ethos of modernization, modernism treats time and 
space in a more complex way. It combines effortlessly ancient roots with 
present-day realities and experiments with histories of particular spaces. The 
thoughts of Le Corbusier provide an illuminating example of the tensions 
between modernism and modernization: in 1933, he approached Atatürk to 
design Istanbul’s reconstruction for free and provided a plan that would 
leave the Historical Peninsula untouched and situate new structures outside 
the Theodosian walls. One could argue that this was done in a true 
modernist spirit, juxtaposing the ancient with the contemporary according 
to a distinct spatial organization – the problem was that it did not express 
the hierarchy of spaces that would run smoothly with the historical 
consciousness of modernity in the new Republic. Later, in 1948, Le 
Corbusier described his plan as the “most strategic mistake of my life… I 
foolishly suggested to the greatest revolutionary hero of the new nation to 
leave Istanbul as it was, in the dirt and dust of the centuries” (in Gül 
2006:95). The winning proposal by Henri Prost was based much more in 
modernization and efficiency than the aesthetic sensibilities of modernism.
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THEORIES AND FACTS OF MODERNITY
If the concept of modernization establishes a strong connection with 
technological advancement and modernism with aesthetic sensibilities, my 
definition of modernity brings together two domains: the phenomenological 
dimensions of the everyday experience and the abstract organizational 
categories of the sociocultural sphere. I follow Charles Taylor’s (1995) 
definition of the culture of modernity, with a strong emphasis on the last 
sentence, focussing on the imagination of society:
The intuition behind this is that modern society is different from those of 
preceding ages not just in the novel institutions and practices of representative 
democracy, the market economy, institutionalized scientific discovery, and 
steady technological advance; it is different not just in moral and political 
principles, in authenticity, rights, democratic legitimacy, equality, non-
discrimination. The notion is that alongside these changes, connected with 
them and in a relationship of mutual support, is a set of changes in the way we 
have come to imagine society. (Taylor 1995:x)
The definition and conceptualization of modernity is itself a social and 
cultural phenomenon, one aspect of it as an ongoing process (Faubion 
1993:114). The reflective work of defining modernity in conjunction with 
performing its contradictions is an integral feature of the modern self. In the 
previous chapter, I argued for the centrality of the normative endeavour that 
compels one to reflect on the surroundings by relating them to history. Often 
this very reflection reduces complex social practices into a binary order of 
modernity, defined by Timothy Mitchell as the coexistence of individuals 
and their embodied activities together with reflection on “an inert structure 
that somehow stands apart from individuals, pre-exists them, and contains 
and gives framework to their lives” (1988:xii). I consider the imaginative 
framework of modernity in Maussian terms, as new groups and institutions 
built on the top of the old (in Hart, Laville, and Cattani 2010:14), a balancing 
act between vernacular globalization and concession to large-scale national 
and international policies (Appadurai 1996:10), accompanied by a powerful 
spatial dimension – modernity as influences spreading across spaces, islands 
and pockets of modernity, and boundaries it cannot cross.
 In addition, the ethical dimension of modernity, as a desire for full, 
authentic and meaningful life, is extremely significant in the urban context. 
In Istanbul, the world that is not modern is not situated just far back in 
history but coeval with ongoing life across urban boundaries. The 
coexistence of different senses of personhood inhabiting the urban sphere 
allows for a range of selves, not restricted to the archetypal division between 
traditional and modern, to exist. According to Faubion, the paradigmatically 
“primitive” and “traditional” can be opposed to paradigmatically “modern” 
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but the traditional can also be classical, medieval and “countermodern” 
while the “modern” includes possibilities for “countermythological,” 
“counterclassical,” or, as a degree of development, for inchoately modern or 
“protomodern” (1993:160). In Istanbul, all these varieties occupy spaces 
within the city, some tucked into the mystery of its mahalles, others found in 
the constant face-to-face encounters in modernist boulevards like Istiklal 
Street, shifting constantly between moral frameworks while moving in the 
city. Together they demonstrate a culturally sensitive understanding of 
modernity, alternating between spectacular triumphs of a developing world 
culture and the fragmentation and incapacity of giving meaning (Berman 
1982:17).
 The understanding of modernity is subject to historical changes. The 
radical modernity of the late Ottoman and early Republican times was 
acutely different from the neoliberal principles of the present times. For 
example, Atatürk’s model of a progressive nation was based on universal 
values of civilization, a shared model with different nationally appropriate 
manifestations:
The Turks are the friends of all civilized nations. Countries vary, but 
civilization is one, and for a nation to progress it must take part in this single 
civilization. (Atatürk’s speech in 1924, in Lewis 1968:292)
In Turkey, variations of modernity are also expressed in terminology. The 
introduction of progressive modernity termed çağdaş (of age, contemporary) 
with strong connections to Kemalism and civilizational difference, is different 
from the more fluid, and globally associated term modern (White 2013:48). 
The terminology of civilization is even more ambiguous; civilization 
(medeniyet) can be posited against çağdaş and associated with Muslim values 
of covering and cleanliness (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 92) or be used as a referring 
to both Islamic civilization and modern Western civilization (White 2013:48). 
White cites two studies by Hakan Yilmaz that show how only 9% of Muslims 
in contemporary Turkey associate with the laic connotations of çağdaş but 63% 
would choose identity of “modern Muslim,” designated with the term modern, 
over “traditional Muslim” (2013:21).
 As I will argue below, the modern rationality associated with the birth 
of the Republic is still powerful idea, especially among the staunch defenders 
of Kemalism. According to this widely spread vision, “everything could be 
understood as the development of this universal principle of reason, or 
reaction against it, or its failure, delay, or absence” (Mitchell 2002:1) and it 
endorsed belief in “continuous process of accumulation of self, in the form of 
wealth, knowledge, experience” (Friedman 1994:91). The sense of the 
modern self I encountered among my informants, based on sensitivity to the 
context and successful balancing between differently ordered spaces, rejected 
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this unilinear view. For them, it represented fantasies, not appropriate for the 
contemporary conditions. This did not mean that categories such as 
rationality or progress would have lost their significance, rather that the 
affirmative modernity of the early twentieth century had become questioned 
on many fronts, often based on quotidian experiences. This questioning of 
modernity’s master narratives does not, however, necessarily lead to 
meaninglessness and fragmentation. The fragility of self-creation, defined by 
Daniel Miller as increased consciousness of the principles and criteria by 
which life is judged (1994:293), was closer to my experience. It is also closely 
related to Habermas’ definition of modernity no longer being able to borrow 
the criteria from other epochs, but having to “create its normativity out of 
itself” (1987:7, italics in the original). The fragility of self-creation also means 
growing consciousness of the possibilities of modernity and its alternative 
trajectories in different contexts. Consequently, the principles of progress 
and shared civilization as quintessential components of the Kemalist 
modernity need to be evaluated as normative questions, in ways that help to 
situate the Turkish experience into the global one.
The Spread of Modernity
After we acknowledge the multiple forms of modernity and concentrate on 
people’s engagement with them in their daily lives, an interest in their 
boundaries and amalgamations arises. If the Republican history of Turkish 
modernity is based on the opposition between essentialized Republican and 
Ottoman epochs, Turkey’s relationship to the world-historical trajectory of 
modernity is also patterned in distinctive ways. In addition to the temporal 
dimension, there are specific spatial patterns intrinsic to the concept. 
Globalization, together with the spatial understandings of the West and the 
former dominions of the Ottoman Empire, has produced new ways to 
approach modernity. In Turkey, discussions of globalization are loaded with 
questions of authenticity and hierarchy of value in the global scale; often 
alternating between routinely repeated clichés enforcing the stereotypes of 
Turkey’s global positioning, deliberate stretching of sociocultural boundaries 
and critical examination of the contemporary situation, not just as a frozen 
point in time but filled with expectations. The common theme, examined 
obsessively in Turkish literature, from Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s slowly 
modernizing Turkey of the early twentieth century to Orhan Pamuk’s 
description of incomplete or delayed attempts to modernize, points at the 
continuous urge to apply different criteria to measure modernity – as a 
relative quality within the global scale.
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 In the dominant Republican historical narratives, the advancement of 
Turkey is hindered by real enemies, both outside and inside the country 
(Altınay 2004, White 2013) but there is also a sense of ambiguity and 
confusion that cannot be expressed in such a straightforward manner. A 
specific kind of backwardness and helplessness has evolved into a banality, 
but also influenced truly modernist masterpieces like the works of the 
authors mentioned above. It postulates Turkey’s relationship with the outside 
world as fragile and somehow out of sync; a bit like the case of Tanpınar’s 
novel The Time Regulation Institute (2013 [1962]) that describes the 
Republican reforms using a metaphor of synchronization, not just of clocks 
but of mentalities and languages. Moreover, it provides a classic example of 
globalization suggesting simultaneous homogenization and diversification of 
lives – and the West as an exemplary model as well as “a mass of soulless, 
decadent, money-grubbing, rootless, faithless, unfeeling parasites” (Buruma 
and Margalit 2004:10).
GLOBALIZATION, THE WEST AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
For the study of globalization I follow John and Jean Comaroff and consider “the 
local” and “the global” not as received empirical realities, but rather as “analytic 
constructs whose heuristic utility depends entirely on the way in which they are 
deployed to illuminate historically specific phenomena” (1999:294). There are, 
however, some general principles that need to be taken to account for a 
comparative perspective. At the most general level, Roland Robertson has 
defined globalization as referring “both to the compression of the world and to 
the intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole” (1992:7) and 
Anthony Giddens as “intensification of worldwide social relations which link 
distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events 
occurring many miles away and vice versa” (1990:64). What remains interesting 
in these familiar definitions is the emphasis on the processual character of 
globalization; the intensification presumes the prior existence of “worldwide 
social relations,” an existing condition of globality (Nederveen Pieterse 1997:48). 
The processual nature of globalization is closely related to the various boundaries 
shaped by globally imagined forces; the invention of localities that globalization 
supposedly links into different configurations is a quintessentially modern idea 
of imagining the world consisting of these units (Robertson 1997:35). For the 
purposes of this study, I will consider the vernacular uses and meanings my 
informants have given to the dynamics of globalization more important than 
evaluation of the massive literature on the topic.
 Many of the themes related to Turkey’s relationship with the West also 
seem to consist of endless debates locked into predictable lines, repeated 
over and over in various contexts. Having said that, the West is also a very 
flexible concept that brings together categories integral to the experience of 
Turkish Modernity
110
modernity. Traces of the West can be found everywhere; generalized from 
geographical and temporal entity to a psychological category, it can be 
recognized in structures and in minds (Nandy 1983:xi). Laden with 
tendencies bordering on blind imitation of Western societies and 
challenging them in various ways, Turkey is definitely not done with its 
relationship with the amorphous West. Alastair Bonnett points out wittily, 
that the contradictory things said about the West do not imply the 
redundancy of the concept but, rather, point at its extraordinary intellectual 
and political utility (2004:6). In the following periodization, I will discuss 
globalization as formation of differently structured networks, intersecting 
the local and the global, that point at Turkey’s changing relative location 
within the global hierarchy of value. In this context, globalization as a 
process is intimately tied with the category of the West: as an agent of change 
and a physical or psychological influence; something that can be imitated, 
borrowed, adopted or rejected; something that is unevenly spread at 
different intensities over Turkey, or, an outdated and faulty category that 
should have become redundant long time ago.
 Another more recent current in Turkish spatial politics, discussed at 
length in Chapter 7, rests on the prioritization of the Ottoman Empire as the 
frame of reference, labelled under the umbrella term neo-Ottomanism. Here, 
the imperial past is not framed only as an epoch with a different social order 
but something that extends spatially to reorganization of Turkey’s relative 
location and alliances in contemporary modernity. This does not mean 
abandoning the West but emphasizes greater political engagement with the 
regions formerly belonging to the Empire. According to the neo-Ottoman 
position favoured by the AKP,65  the largest party in Turkey since 2002, 
Turkey’s alliance with the Middle East has been rediscovered in terms of 
politics and trade and situated within the framework of former Ottoman 
dominions rather than ummah (ümmet), the global community of believers 
(White 2013:10). Burak Bekdil, a popular columnist for Hürriyet Daily News, 
demonstrates the shift of geographic focus by quoting AKP’s Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs since 2009 and Prime Minister since 
August 2014. 
In a speech in Sarajevo in October 2009 Davutoğlu explained:
As in the 16th Century, when the Ottoman Balkans were rising, we will once 
again make the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East, together with 
Turkey, the centre of world politics in the future. That is the goal of Turkish 
foreign policy and we will achieve it.
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65 Of course, the most recent developments, especially in Iraq and Syria, could not be anticipated 
when writing this section. The text reflects the earlier situation when the view of the party 
emphasized closer integration of the region, with Turkey in the leading position.
In April 2012 there was a clearer rhetoric of loss of the parts of the Empire 
and reference to predestination:
On the historic march of our holy nation, the AK Party signals the birth of a 
global power and the mission for a new world order. This is the centenary of 
our exit from the Middle East […] whatever we lost between 1911 and 1923, 
whatever lands we withdrew from, from 2011 to 2023 we shall once again 
meet our brothers in those lands. This is a bounden historic mission.66
RUPTURES AND GRADUAL PROCESSES – THE DYNAMICS OF MODERNITY
Modernity encompasses effortlessly wide stretches of time, from ancient 
origins into barely imaginable futures, it can accommodate radical shifts in 
perspective and form unlikely combinations of cultural elements in the quest 
for desirable modern selfhood. Nonetheless, its patterns are not arbitrary but 
based on layers of historical consciousness. The everyday realities of my 
informants that I have discussed in the previous chapters point at their far-
reaching influence; Şivan pondering over what to wear in Istiklal Street, Veli 
expressing his irritation over the appropriate standards of behaviour in the 
mahalle, Nazlı and Didem restricting their lives to spheres of desired 
modernity and Ridvan worrying about the transformation of his 
surroundings, all show that modernity was far from a taken-for-granted 
concept in Istanbul but, instead, its defining features were heatedly debated. 
In Turkey, the extremely powerful official reading of history, accompanied by 
the efficient state machinery that has used its power time and again to 
suppress deviant elements, has kept the definitions of modernity and 
Turkey’s relative location central questions for its inhabitants.
 The coexistence of different attitudes towards modernity also shapes 
the encounters between Istanbulites. In the following attempt to cover the 
stormy period from the late days of the Ottoman Empire into the present 
day, I have had my field data to guide the selection of the relevant themes, to 
provide a glimpse into how people living in Beyoğlu reflected on Turkish 
modernity in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The stress is on the 
hierarchical relationship between the formal and informal building blocks of 
historical consciousness. I follow Michael Herzfeld in his critique of 
Benedict Anderson’s (2006) and Ernst Gellner’s (1997) views of modern 
nation as invented from above (1997), as well as Eric Hobsbawn’s and 
Terence Ranger’s (2012) theories of invention of tradition for “failing to 
recognize the role of the ordinary person in taking the grand images 
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66 Bekdil, Burak. Hürriyet Daily News 16.11.2012 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/
Default.aspx?pageID=549&nID=34757&NewsCatID=398
presented by the leadership and recasting them in the more familiar terms of 
local experience, and influencing their public evolution in turn” (1993:49).
 I maintain that the dynamics of modernity are understood either as 
sudden ruptures, shaking the foundations of life in irreparable ways, or, as 
gradual developments that can grow in scale, multiply, be sidetracked or 
retreat under changing conditions. The emergence of modernity has been 
problematized in social sciences; Arjun Appadurai notes that the sense of a 
“modern moment” that would create a dramatic and unprecedented break 
within society has been steadily reinforced in conceptualizations of history 
(1996:3). However, the very idea of rupture can be problematized as an 
implication of the present global hierarchy of value, instead of the “scaled-up 
negotiation of the tension between shared rules and strategic 
practices” (Herzfeld 2007:320–321). As I will argue in the following chapters, 
the logic of the “clean slate” and an absolute break with the past have been 
powerful ways to transform systems of representation, categories of 
belonging and spatial arrangements. Despite the central role of ruptures of 
twentieth-century Turkish history as “points of no return,” or “thresholds of 
new eras” (Kasaba 2008:1), there are other dynamics at play.
 Sudden ruptures can be contrasted with a gradual spread of 
modernization and civilization but they also come together in complementary 
ways; for instance, what started with the initial push exemplified by the 
personality of Atatürk, continued as slower processes radiating from the 
centres to peripheries; from metropolitan centres of Istanbul, Ankara and 
Izmir to their gecekondu settlements and adjacent villages; from the provincial 
towns into their own peripheries (Keyder 2005, 2010; Mardin 1973). 
Modernity can be seen as bursting into life too rapidly and forcefully, delayed 
and degenerated, fake and inauthentic; in Turkey often connected to the 
patronizing narrative, according to which the masses are too innocent to look 
after their interests, and thus need guidance in the attainment of the collective 
goal (Mardin 1997, Özyürek 2006:48).
 In practice, these historical narratives are related to specific contexts 
and their logical inconsistencies go easily unnoticed if not specifically 
questioned. This resembles closely Berman’s (1982) idea of modernity as a 
condition, capable of taking countless forms and hiding its internal 
dynamics – pulling itself to several directions at once, in opposition to 
modernization as an orderly series of developments that can be assessed and 
distinguished easily. Thus, the principles of rupture and gradual spread can 
coexist effortlessly in varieties of the modern. In order to study these 
dynamics in detail, I wish to combine concrete historical transformations with 
contemporary understandings, wishes and disappointments. In the following 
chapters, I will question the spread of modernity as a straightforward 
development gradually encompassing Turkey and concentrate on its deviant 
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characteristics, battles over origins and influences, and the relationship of 
various competing centres over peripheral spaces near and far.
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Chapter 5:
Late Ottoman Empire and
the Republican Revolution
The late stages of the Ottoman Empire are still capable of arousing heated 
debates among both historians and general population. In addition to 
attempts by various historians (e.g. Findley 2008; Kasaba 1988; Tokatli and 
Boyaci 1999) to assess critically the complex reasons and events that lead 
into the disintegration of the Empire,67  the explanations I regularly 
encountered, whether from the educated urbanites or the impoverished 
people living in Tarlabaşı and Tophane, shared a commonality; they referred 
to the inevitability of the events as a race where the winner was already 
known. In the dominant narrative, Ottoman policies responded to emerging 
global modernity in both its Janus-like faces: “the threatening aspect 
(separatist nationalism in the Balkans, imperialism in Asia and Africa) and 
the attractive aspect (the hope of overcoming Ottoman backwardness by 
emulating European progress)” (Findley 2008:14). In this chapter, I will 
argue that many of the powerful narratives and classificatory principles of 
today have their origins in the crucial debates of the late Ottoman Empire 
and the Republican revolution, brought to the present with the aid of 
different metaleptic operations. I will discuss here the themes that arose 
most frequently in my fieldwork and relate the quotidian reflections into the 
established historical narratives.
 However impartial and half-understood, the distant events carry 
remarkable weight in moral terms and form trajectories of modernity that 
have potential to challenge the dominant understandings. In my field data, 
the questions of ethnicity and national belonging were the most central 
themes of the Ottoman past in the light of today. Şivan, like several of my 
other informants, liked to study history from popular history books, many of 
which concentrated on complex conspiracies related to the traumatic events 
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67  A thorough historical analysis of these dynamics is outside the scope of this study. A concise 
summary of the most usual explanations is provided by Charles Issawi as: “the increasing cost of 
armaments and war; population changes; the great inflation of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries and the continuing rise in prices in the eighteenth; technological stagnation in 
agriculture, transport, and the handicrafts; […] an unfavorable balance of trade with, and outflow 
of bullion to, Iran and India; and the effects on the Ottoman economy and society of increasing 
contacts with Europe” (in Tokatli and Boyaci 1999:184).
concerning Armenians Kurds, Jews and Greeks.68  His alternative view of 
history emphasized the inclusion of the minorities and reversal of the 
dominant hierarchy of value, an issue that become clear when I asked him 
casually how Turkish modernity had become sidetracked:
The history taught at schools is not real but nationalist fabrication. It is written 
by the people who think that everything in the West is great and who want to 
blame everyone who thinks the other way. There have been many Kurds in high 
positions during the struggles but they were deceived and written out of history. 
Many of the people who did this were fascists [faşist] and did whatever they 
could to stay in power. Throughout the modern [modern]69 history, only Atatürk 
had a real vision of the future but that also became corrupted.
According to him, in the Ottoman past there had been no need for 
recognition of people as Kurds for they had been a self-governing group with 
their linguistic and cultural rights. He pointed out that the past in the 
Southeast had been oppressive in many ways with the clans, loyalties and 
hierarchies but the Republican era had been even worse. In his view, there 
was no going back to the Ottoman times but he felt betrayed by the selective 
emphases of the following periods. He referred to the same themes and 
categories present in the dominant histories but evaluated them differently. 
Şivan saw the Republican modernity as an exclusive çağdaş that left him out, 
no matter how hard he would try. For him, the globally defined modern was 
more inclusive and inviting.
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68  İhsan Dağı summarizes the historical development of prominent conspiracy theories in Tukey 
perfectly in his column for Today’s Zaman: “Previously conspiracy theories were used mainly by 
Kemalist-nationalists to explain whatever happened in Turkey. For them, the Justice and 
Development Party (AK Party) was brought to power by the US to carry out its “Greater Middle 
East Project”; Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül were in fact Jews hiding their true 
identities; the AKP stands for the American-Kurdish-Party designed to create a Kurdish state with 
the help of the US; EU membership aims to finish off the independence of the Turkish Republic 
and its secular regime; the ruling AK Party is just a lackey of the US and the EU, etc. Nowadays, we 
do not hear such “theories” any more. Instead there are those circulated by “the other side,” the 
government and its supporters. Those who used to be portrayed as traitors in earlier conspiracy 
theories by Kemalists-nationalists have now resorted to using conspiracy theories. In their 
“theories” too are lots of references to foreign plots, outside forces and their domestic partners, the 
Jews and the Israelis, Turkey's independence, the West and its inherent anti-Turkey nature. From 
the “interest rate lobby” to killing the prime minister by “telekinesis,” conspiracies are everywhere 
and their target is obvious…” http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/ihsan-dagi/why-turkey-
needs-conspiracy-theories_329931.html
69  I have chosen to point out when my informants used the Turkish terms modern and çağdaş, 
because of their different connotations.
Late Ottoman Empire – Inevitable Disintegration 
and the Threshold of Modernity
The beginning of modern Ottoman history is commonly traced to the Treaty 
of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, a major defeat of the Empire to Russia that 
pushed the sultans toward reforms (Davison 1990:xi). There are several other 
dates, military treaties, parliamentary reforms and constitutions that mark 
the advancement of the late Ottoman era. The textbook histories identify the 
edict of Gülhane (Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerifi) in 1839 that guaranteed the equality 
before the law for all the subjects of the Empire, regardless of their ethnicity 
and religion, as the first push towards genuinely modern institutions.70 
According to the developmentalist view of history, this was the beginning of 
Ottoman modernization, periodized as the era of Tanzimât (literally 
“reforms”) in 1839–1876 (Findley 2008). On a closer look, the era was 
characterized by fluctuation of reforms, not always associated with the West: 
the institutional changes were passed down gradually but, for example, 
Sultan Abdülhamid’s rule (1876–1909) was markedly less enthusiastic about 
the West (Kasaba 2008:4). Interestingly, his stance was increasingly opposed 
by the Islamic scholarly establishment (Silverstein 2011:49). Brian Silverstein 
suggests that the Ottoman Islamists of the era were aware of and explicitly 
grappling with the “issues of the commensurability of (‘modern’ and 
‘Muslim’) life-worlds while at the same time having to deal with extremely 
urgent, pressing concerns regarding the form that their state and institutions 
should take, the kinds of knowledge that would allow them to survive in the 
world around them, and the nature of just and ‘good’ governance” (2011:8). 
Especially in its vernacular form, the essentialized dichotomy between the 
“Ottoman” and the “modern” has been subject to complex debates taking 
different shapes in the course of history.
 Another widespread periodization, taught in detail as part of the 
general education, concentrates on the critical years between 1908 and 1923: 
“Ikinci Meşrutiyet” (Second Constitutional Period) (1908–1918), “Milli 
Mücadele” (National Struggle) (1919–1923) and “Cumhuriyet” (Republic) 
(after 1923) (Zürcher 1992:239). In contrast to this, Erik J. Zürcher (2004) 
has influentially suggested that the whole period between 1908 and 1950 
should be labelled as the Young Turk Era and several other researchers stress 
the continuities across the major periods (Kasaba 2008; Mardin 2002; 
Silverstein 2011) In fact, Silverstein considers the history of the late Ottoman 
Empire and Republican Turkey today “as an extended and ongoing 
experiment in the chain of events entailed by the engagement of a sovereign 
Muslim polity located on the near margin of the heartland of industrial 
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70 See Silverstein (2011) for a more detailed history of the reforms and their foundations.
capitalism with specifically modern forms of power and their attendant 
modes of subjection” (2011:47). However, rather than the correct 
periodization, my focus is on how references to complex histories resurface 
in the present-day conditions. For example, the historical emergence of the 
terms above also resonates strongly with the lived environment of today; 
while there is Gülhane Park and Tanzimat Museum by Topkapı Palace in the 
Historical Peninsula, the modernity of the Republican çağdaş is alive in the 
names of the streets in Beyoğlu: one finds İstiklal (independence), Meşrutiyet 
(constitution) and Cumhuriyet (Republic) streets, telling about the Kemalist 
influence over the area (Kezer 2009:518). These three are probably also the 
best known streets in Beyoğlu, in addition to Atatürk Boulevard (although 
this continues officially as Tarlabaşı Boulevard in Beyoğlu) and İnönü Street, 
reminding of the revered founders of the Republic. Representing not just 
series of abstract principles or historical facts, the political dynamics of the 
era are intimately linked into the experience of walking the streets in 
twenty-first-century Istanbul.
THE YOUNG TURKS AND NEW CATEGORIES OF BELONGING
It is important to stress that the intellectual foundations and networks of the 
Young Turk leaders, responsible for many of the developments leading to the 
Republic, had shaped their outlook on modernity in significant ways. They 
were almost exclusively military officials, politicians and intellectuals of the 
Ottoman Empire who grouped together with the goal of saving it (Kasaba 
2008:3). They were urbanites and their cosmopolitan connections played a 
significant role; many of the leaders were exiled in Paris, used French as a 
medium of intellectual communication and were affected by the French 
nationalism rising around them (Hanioğlu 2006:10). Furthermore, the very 
name Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) was adopted by the Young 
Turks after the Turkish movement merged with the Paris-based one in 1907 
(Zürcher 1992:248). In addition to their urbanity and cosmopolitanism, the 
worldview of the leaders was based on their education, namely the Western-
type schools, established in the nineteenth century for the training of the 
bureaucracy and the military (242). They were products of “government 
through the rationalization of administration and normalization of the 
objects of governance […] [that] was well elaborated in the empire long 
before there was any talk of a republic” (Silverstein 2011:18). In sum, the 
Unionist and Kemalist movements were the work of some two hundred men 
who were in close interaction with one another and who had served together 
in the almost continuous wars of 1912–1922 (Zürcher 1992:243). Their aim 
was to strengthen the Muslim polity rather than to “Westernize” the Empire 
or replace Islamic norms with the non-Muslim ones (Silverstein 2011:32). 
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 In the current times, the nationalist narrative of the Young Turk 
revolutionaries was taught at schools but the people from the peripheries of 
Turkey felt completely left out of this strain of modernity and found it 
difficult to reconcile with their everyday realities. According to the dominant 
ethos, the Republican modernity emanating from the global centres like 
Paris via Istanbul would reach their home-villages in the Southeast last and 
would be doubly distanced from them by two foreign languages, French and 
Turkish. Much of the resentment had to do with their modern categories of 
national belonging. The category of Republican citizenship was very different 
from the assumed solidarities of the Ottoman past.
 For the Young Turks, Türklük (Turkishness) referred to Muslim 
Turkish identity, for Kemalists, after the birth of the Republic, it was directly 
connected with the ethnoracial identity (Kieser 2006:x). What Şivan saw 
above as a radical shift from self-governing Kurdish communities, only 
nominally ruled by the Sultan, to the arbitrary and unequal citizenship of the 
Republic, concealed many historical debates of belonging. Before the 
Republican revolution, the tensions were already rife between the Young 
Turk/CUP-controlled centre and the various ethnoreligious groups of the 
empire (Hanioğlu 2006:18) and the conflicts between the centralized 
administration and groups defined in ethnic and/or religious terms have re-
emerged in Turkey until today. There have also been interesting explorations 
that reveal the distinctively modern possibilities of both welcoming the 
universal standards and redrawing the national boundaries. From the time of 
the Young Turk leaders, there has been a significant movement calling for 
“Panturkism,” the unification of all Turkic peoples in Central Asia under 
leadership of Turkey which, during the Republican era, has declined into an 
extremist fringe position (Zürcher 1992:45). Another, differently bounded 
notion of belonging is formed around the category of Pan-Turanism which 
“seeks the unification of the “Turanian race” which includes the Magyars and 
the Finns as well as the Turks” (Çağlar 1990:81). Nowadays, the debated 
term is Türkiyelilik (being from Turkey) that would not limit the national 
belonging into the religious or ethnoracial terms (Kieser 2006:x). These 
principles, subject to metaleptic operations reorganizing history in wide-
ranging ways, are still highly influential but have taken very different forms 
to those in the past. 
 Despite its association with disadvantages, the ambivalent rupture 
marking the beginning of the Republican era signified to Şivan crossing of 
the threshold of modernity that would alter fundamentally the senses of 
sociocultural belonging (see Faubion 1993:7). For him, it designated the 
emergence of a modern self and potential to imagine society in a new way, as 
individuals who would be simultaneously equal citizens of Turkey and 
representatives of their ethnic and religious groups. This, in fact, this was the 
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opposite of the goal of the reformers, strongly influenced by the ideas of the 
Enlightenment, whose project in social engineering, a secular homo 
Ottomanicus, “designed to weaken clerical communitarianism and enhance 
equality between communities ended up cementing a bond between 
ethnicity and religion, thereby reinforcing the very centrifugal 
ethnonationalist forces it was meant to suppress” (Hanioğlu 2006:5). Şivan 
held his identity as a Kurd and Sunni Muslim as something vital to counter 
the discriminatory practices of the Kemalist nation-state. He felt that for him 
it would be impossible to survive in Istanbul without the support of the 
mahalle and the deeply held relationships with his kin. This was yet another 
reference to the more authentic solidarities of the Ottoman times (and 
beyond). He did not want to return to the past but to appropriate its 
materials selectively.
 These categories of belonging were at the heart of the urbanity of the 
late Ottoman era. According to the reformers, the Ottoman social order – 
unlike the Republican notion of citizenship – had its basis in the spatial 
distribution of communities into a complex mosaic of context-dependent 
rights and loyalties, with different principles of government. In this 
powerfully reified view, the millet71  (confessional community) system of the 
Empire allowed extensive self-governance in particular areas and separate 
legal courts for the religious minority groups. The order was based on the 
authority of their religious leaders responsible for the community affairs 
under the rule of the Sultan, who, in practice, rarely interfered in their 
business. Until the Tanzimât era, the people of different millets could also be 
distinguished by their prescribed clothing.72 
 However, the widely spread understanding of residential exclusivity by 
community in the late Ottoman Empire has also been questioned: Donald 
Quataert claims that the families chose their home according to a multiple 
criteria – often economic status – not simply religion (2005:180–181). The 
distinctions were finely tuned and the communities would not be isolated 
from one another; the diverse borrowings in the Ottoman language 
demonstrate considerable overlap and the principle of the separate legal 
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71 The meaning of the millet has changed considerably throughout the Ottoman centuries. Before 
the reign of Mahmut II, in the early nineteenth century, it simply referred to Muslims in the 
Empire and Christians outside its boundaries (Quataert 2005:176). See Göcek (2006) for a concise 
history of the changing position of the minorities in the Empire. In addition, Findley (2008) argues 
in a detailed way, how the Ottoman rulers made far-reaching changes into the millet system to 
achieve particular political aims.
72  Goodwin sums up the dress codes in his not strictly academic history of the Ottoman Empire 
adeptly: “Greeks wore black trousers and slippers; the Armenians violet slippers and purple 
trousers; the Jews sky-blue trousers and slippers, and certain very privileged non-believers were 
allowed to wear yellow slippers and red trousers, like a Turk” (1998:96). For a comprehensive 
academic perspective, see Faroqhi & Neumann (2004).
courts was not absolute (Quataert 2005:174–186, Riedler 2009). In fact, the 
reforms in the sphere of economic activity had the most far-reaching impact 
for the social relations: the social mosaic of the Empire was radically altered 
with the introduction of uniform rules for different communities who ended 
up establishing free markets together and, as a result, produced new kinds 
economic and social inequalities and political demands (Keyder 2008:505). 
Şivan was clearly influenced by these historical principles but brought them 
into the present day mixed with ethnic categories of Republican Turkey. He 
would sometimes refer to Kurds as a millet, simultaneously a group willing to 
establish a nation-state and a category of belonging in Istanbul. The fact that 
in the late Ottoman times Kurds would be designated under the more 
inclusive category of Muslims, not a separate millet, did not stop him from 
using the concept.73
SURPRISING CONNECTIONS BETWEEN AMORPHOUS CATEGORIES
The Republican rupture produced ambiguous categories of belonging that 
could be contradictory but nevertheless deeply felt. In Reşat Kasaba’s 
illustrative study of the epic poems and vernacular stories of peasants in the 
early twentieth century, the heroes, when pressurized, “end up declaring 
their loyalty to an entity that had no fixed temporal point of reference 
whatsoever. In their speech, the Sultan-Caliph, Young Turk leaders, Mustafa 
Kemal, the Prophet Muhammed, and his nephew Ali often melt into one 
amorphous being who claims their allegiance” (1997:30). In the political 
climate of today, some of the categories remain but they are organized in a 
very different manner.
 After Ridvan had lost his job at the teahouse, on a basis of what he 
saw as unfair treatment of Kurdish people in Istanbul, we discussed the 
issue on almost daily basis. In his initial outburst he had claimed that the 
owner hates all the Kurds and everyone with a rural background but he 
had begun to analyze the situation later with detailed historical references 
to ethnicity, language and religion. One evening we had gathered to 
Taksim Square with Ridvan and his friends and he wanted to raise the 
issue to all of us. I was already used to his style of presenting his political 
views in the form of lengthy monologues, during which he did not like to 
be interrupted:
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73 Nowadays, the word “millet” is used colloquially to refer all kinds of groups of people, e.g. kadin 
milleti = womankind. However, Şivan liked to elaborate the differences between citizenship 
(vatandaşlık) and other categories of belonging – the term millet provided a possibility to play with 
its connotations in relation to the nation-state, an ethnic category in Turkey and the historical 
Ottoman solidarities.
I have read about the Ottoman History and how the times before The War of 
Independence were full of plotting between different factions. Where do the 
Kurds belong in all this? We have been ruling much of this country and building 
Istanbul for centuries. The school system feeds us these lies and they are repeated 
everywhere – I still see angry faces when I speak Kurdish in the street. That is 
why I keep doing that. I want to establish my presence here because this is my 
city just as much as theirs. We have been pulled into the sidelines but we will 
find our place; I have been thinking of this one thing: I have read that 
Kurmanji74  Kurdish is related to English and French: it is actually us who are 
much closer to the West in this sense. If we would get proper education we would 
learn the languages so much better than the Turks. We are the Europeans here! 
[laughter all around]
On another occasion, just a few days later, he told me that he had thought 
the issue further and finally understood what the source of the problem was. 
It was all about Islam. According to him, the Kurds had been following the 
true Islam in the late Ottoman era when so many others, including the 
Sultan, had begun to compromise its central tenets. The Young Turks with 
their ideas of making Turkey like France had been afraid of this and had 
concluded that the oppression of the true Muslims was the only way to 
secure Republican rule. This was how we had gotten to the contemporary 
situation – by restricting the agency of the population that was erased from 
the history, truly Islamic and at the same time closer to the West because of 
their linguistic kinship. According to Ridvan, if the obstacles would be 
removed, all the Kurds would cross the threshold of modernity as authentic 
modern subjects.
 In this case, his understanding of the past was shrouded in mystery but 
what I found extremely interesting was the fluidity of categories and the 
apparent ease of making connections between them. In Ridvan’s speech, the 
metaleptic acts conceptualized the features of the Ottoman era as both 
exemplary origins and as building blocks for the future to be approved or 
rejected. In addition, they offered a very wide scope of imagination for the 
possible senses of selfhood, fascinating in its experimental character. The 
elements for the formation of historical consciousness included multiethnic 
and multidenominational communities, senses of linguistic variety 
extending across unexpected boundaries and an ambiguous feeling of 
religious authenticity that had supposedly been corrupted by the modernist 
stream of Republican history.
 Within the context of Turkey’s official history, the threshold of 
modernity is positioned at the birth of the Republic but this does not mean 
that everyone has crossed it, nor does it imply that the crossing has been 
complete. Faubion, following Weber, defines the threshold not as a “Great 
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74  There are several Kurdish languages and dialects. Kurmanji is the most spoken of them in 
Turkey and an Indo-European language.
Divide” but argues for a great difference “between those doubts, those 
problems, and those problematics that coherent cosmogonies and 
cosmologies can go some way toward assuaging and those doubts, those 
problems, and those problematics that arise only once the cosmos has been 
declared ethically and morally neutral, God declared dead, and men and 
women declared […] to have nothing from which to proceed but their own 
devices (1993:6). The great difference is rather in the “vague and extended 
juncture at which values began to lose their self-evident facticity and world 
views devolve into ‘ideological perspectives’”(7). Moreover, in Ridvan’s and 
Şivan’s interpretations, the entry into modernity that would acknowledge 
them as equal citizens of the nation had been compromized by the 
Republican revolution – turning its most integral aspect of equality into 
discrimination of those who do not qualify as Turks.
Republican Revolution – Radical Encounter with 
Modernity
It was not a surprise for me that someone else had already done a Google 
search for “How many statues of Atatürk in Turkey?” for the country is 
overwhelmed with reminders of the revolutionary hero. In an interview,75 
Aylin Tekiner, an artist who has written a book on the statues, connects the 
almost one thousand monuments, in addition to innumerable more modest 
representations, with the emergence of the modern state. She notes that the 
Ottomans did not install monuments of people in public spaces but the 
emergent state took this as a new tool to expand its presence. The 
monuments gradually covered the whole country and their construction has 
sped up considerably after the 1980 military coup, entering into a realm of 
mass-production and resulting some truly bizarre incidents. In the interview, 
Tekiner points out an anthropologically interesting case:
In an incident in 2001, an Atatürk monument in Mersin, Turkey’s south, was 
caught in a flood and drifted out to sea. A few days later, the same monument 
was found in neighboring Antalya – but had lost its feet. Since it is against the 
law to destroy an Atatürk monument, the officials did not know what to do 
with it so they decided to place it in a village school, mounting it at its ankles. 
And thus a village school without a library or even a computer has an Atatürk 
monument.
I consider the statue of Atatürk as a perfect emblem of the tendencies of 
the Republic; simultaneously a radical rupture in qualitative sense and a 
Late Ottoman Empire and the Republican Revolution
123
75  Eğrikavuk, Işıl. Hürriyet Daily News 9.1.2011 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?
pageid=438&n=unastethic-ataturk-monuments-remains-taboo-in-turkey-2011-01-09
gradual expansion in the quantitative, an artistic representation in 
modernist terms and an object available through mass-production – father 
and an ambiguous being that is always more than the sum of its parts. In 
this section, I will  focus on Kemalism’s relationship with modernity, 
especially during the  period from the birth of the Republic in 1923 to the 
victory of the Democrat Party in the second multiparty elections in 1950. I 
argue that the period signals substantive changes to the foundational 
categories of belonging, extending to diverse realms of ethnicity, religion 
and gender while relating to intertwined standards of secularism, 
cosmopolitanism and civilization. Just like the representations of Atatürk, 
ranging from monumental scale to tiny lapel pins, discernible only to those 
who can read their significance, the values of the early Republic reappear 
in unanticipated ways and their particular take on modernity remains 
crucial feature of everyday life.
TURKISH ESSENCE AND REBIRTH OF THE NATION
The birth of the Turkish Republic in 1923 is commonly presented as a point 
of an epoch-making rupture, signifying a break between two distinct 
civilizations, a quintessential beginning of the progressive future, a genuine 
cultural rebirth that would alter the course of history in decisive ways 
(Altınay 2004; Mardin 2002; Meeker 2002). According to the Republican 
understanding, there was a distinct “Turkish essence” that had been realized 
in various forms throughout the history. It had been crystallized in the 
authentic origins of the Central Asian Turks and was recovered in the 
foundation of the Republic (Mardin 2002). In this view, the Ottoman 
Empire, lumped together as a whole despite its variety, was a cultural 
corruption rather than a glorious chapter in the history of the Turks (e.g. 
Kandiyoti 2002:10, Özyürek 2006). In the global hierarchy of value, the 
Republic transformed the Turks from a people in a need of civilization to the 
bringers of the civilization to the others (Bozarslan 2006:33), but an 
important, perhaps even constitutive principle in their civilization, has been 
the element of threat, both from the inside and outside enemies (Altınay 
2004; White 2013). That is why the elements in opposition to the authentic 
essence needed to be neutralized. This is in stark contrast to the Ridvan’s and 
Şivan’s view of the Ottoman Empire as an inclusive and just society that 
allowed Islam and Kurdishness to flourish.
 Republican modernizers emphasized the rationality of their choices, in 
contrast to the whimsies of the society consisting of several semi-
independent communities under the rule of the Sultan-Caliph. Even in the 
context of Atatürk’s autocratic rule, the emphasis was on the difference 
between sultanate supposedly ruled by force and Atatürk’s rule as a natural 
representation of the whole nation (Özyürek 2006:50). Timothy Mitchell 
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summarizes this dynamic of modernity in Egypt in a way that fits perfectly 
into the Turkish context (of course, with the replacement of non-European 
by Ottoman and European by Republican):
In non-European [Ottoman] government the exceptional was the rule; power 
gained its strength from its arbitrariness. Modern government, like modern 
science, the European [Republican] believed, was based upon principles true 
in every country. Its strength lay in its universalism. (Mitchell 2002:54)
The rupture also marked a new relationship to Islam. The abolition of the 
Caliphate in 1924 transformed Istanbul’s position vis-á-vis Muslim world 
radically; it ceased to hold any particular interest among Muslims and was 
no longer the site of cultural and political pilgrimage among Islamic 
intellectuals (Keyder 2008:508). In the reformist rhetoric, belonging to 
ummah (ümmet), gave way to collective love towards the ruler by the 
national subjects.
 Throughout the world, modern nationalism on the rise at the time 
found the ancient origins and traditions as important building blocks 
(Özkırımlı 2010: chapters 3, 4 for an overview). The ancient past of the Turks 
is traced to the nomadic Turkic tribes in the Central Asian steppes, with the 
first mention of Tujue (T’u-chüe) in the Chinese literary sources in 600 C.E. 
(Findley 2005:21), and the beginning of the history of Turkey to the Seljuk 
ruler Alp Aslan’s (Alparslan) defeat of the Byzantine emperor Romanos IV 
Diogenes at Manzikert (Malazgirt), north of Lake Van in 1071 (Mango 
2004:16). Even though these might at first seem obscure references to the 
distant past, the narratives are transferred into the contemporary times and 
carry with them ideas of social organization and moral qualities, also 
adopted by people who are not historians.
 The ancient past extends effortlessly into the realm of the everyday 
representations. In the popular image below (Figure 3), the continuum 
stretches from the Turkic forefathers, Oğuz Khan and Dede Korkut, directly 
into Atatürk, leaving centuries of Ottoman rule out. Furthermore, the 
representation is not limited to the national heroes: at the lower half of the 
picture the Central Asian nomads gathered outside their yurts are connected 
in time to the rich musical tradition of the Turks and to their Republican 
military glories.
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Figure 3. A popular illustration frequently used in schools to represent the 
continuities of Turkish history.76
Culturally, the nationalistic history has been selective in its appropriation of 
elements. The Republican ideology came to see Alevis, a heterodox religious 
group forming a significant minority77  in the country, as representative of the 
original Turkish nation settled within its borders, before it had been spoiled 
by the Ottomans. Alevis were suitable for the strategic aims of the reformers 
especially well because they had retained beliefs and practices of the Central 
Asian origin and as “remote forest or mountain peoples relatively untouched 
by imperial institutions […] free of the stigma of the Empire, and also of the 
stigma of Sunni Islam” (Meeker 2002:xiv). The egalitarian and democratic 
ethos associated with the nomadic populations (Arat 1997:99, Papadakis 
2005:29) fit well with the idea of newly recovered and intrinsically modern 
Turkish essence – in contrast to practices of gender segregation associated 
with the Ottomans and Islam. In the case of Alevis, these were exemplified in 
the participation women in the cem religious ceremony that features music, 
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76 http://dedemkorkut.tr.gg/Galeri/pic-1000002.htm
77  In the countrywide censuses conducted every ten years, information on religious affiliation is 
not requested (except for Muslim, Christian or atheist (dinsiz)). David Shankland, in his extensive 
study of Alevism, estimates their number to be 15 percent of the population, around 10 million 
(2003:20–21). See Mandel for an excellent summary of principles and history of Alevism 
(2008:251–255).
singing and dancing as well as in their voluntary use of headscarf – feature 
that distinguishes them from Sunnis until this day (see Mandel 2008 and 
Shankland 2003 for an in-depth discussion of these aspects in both rural and 
urban communities). The principle was also incorporated into legal matters: 
the extension of suffrage to women in 1934 was defended with appeals to the 
egalitarian origins of the Central Asian Turks that provided an occasion to 
reinforce the nationalist myth (Aram 1997:99). In addition to establishing 
continuum across temporal distance, the logic of the rupture separated the 
nomadic and the Ottoman epochs: Murat I (1362–89), the first Ottoman 
ruler to take royal title (hünkarı), was seen as replacing the relatively 
egalitarian administration with accountability and revenue management 
(Findley 2005:111). While not always historically accurate, these parallels 
and juxtapositions are extremely seductive and often fit surprisingly well into 
the contemporary conditions.
 In defining the course of historical currents, laden with evaluations 
situated at different junctures, the modernist logic considers myths as 
products of invention; history awaiting its discovery (Herzfeld 1985:181). 
Republican nationalism has been able to employ the apparent paradox of the 
mythical Turkish origins in an interesting way. The view is based on what 
Ayşegül Altınay, following Etienne Copeaux, defines as “dual geographic 
framework” whereby “Central Asia is the ‘main’ homeland, while 
simultaneously the current location of Turkey (Anatolia) is claimed to have 
Turkish origins long before the Ottoman Empire” (Altınay 2004:22). The 
logical contradiction of the two homelands has developed mythical qualities 
(cf. Levi-Strauss 1986:216); the unresolvable conflict of autochthonous 
origins and descent from migrants conquering the land operates as a master 
narrative, combining the authentic origins in both Anatolia and Central 
Asia. The strength of the myth derives from the parading of these internal 
contradictions, serving the ideology of a specifically Turkish variant of 
nationalism (cf. Herzfeld 1985:198–199).
NOVEL SYSTEMS OF REPRESENTATION
The new Republic expressed its abstract values and strategies of 
representation through significant changes to the daily routines. Again, the 
superficial characteristics associated with modernization feature strongly in 
the policies of many of the late Ottoman, Young Turk and Kemalist leaders; 
regulation of the outward appearances, standards of cleanliness and nature of 
institutions consumed an inordinate amount of their time and energy 
(Kasaba: 1997:24). Especially the perceptual environment, representations 
associated with the Empire and the role of its significant buildings were 
subject to radical transformations. Murat Gül summarizes some of these 
changes in the following way:
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Removal of all Ottoman coat-of-arms and insignia from official and public 
buildings; the sale of Ottoman archival documents to Bulgaria as recycled 
paper; the proposal of Sultanahmet Mosque as an art gallery for young artists 
of the Republic […] the conversion of Hagia Sophia into a museum; the 
removal of classical Turkish music from primary and secondary school 
curricula; the closure of the Turkish section of the Istanbul Conservatorium; 
and the temporary banning of Turkish music on radio in the 1930s. (Gül 
2006:75)
The best known changes in the formative years of the Republic have been 
those in direct opposition to the Ottoman times and Islamic practices. The 
abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate as well as the Sufi orders, the reform 
of the alphabet from the Arabic into Latin and the substitution of the Islamic 
calendar with the Gregorian are characteristic examples of the rupture-like 
qualities of the new nation (e.g. Mango 2002; Silverstein 2011; Zürcher 
2004).
 The reforms altered the urban mosaic of Istanbul and resulted in far-
reaching consequences for social relations. The Republican dress regulations 
– the prohibition of the fez headgear and preference for a black suit – were 
not just attempts to imitate appearances associated with the Western 
modernity but put an end to a public sphere where a person’s ethnicity, 
religion and sometimes position in social hierarchy could be distinguished 
immediately from clothing they were prescribed to wear. Reorganization 
extended even to soundscapes – implementation of Turkish language for the 
call for prayer (ezan) for 18 years (1932–1950) at the height of nationalist 
fervour presents a good example of a change that for some can be a trivial 
matter and for others a grave affair.
 In the present day, the organizational principles of the Republican 
revolution often come to light unexpectedly in ways that make good stories. 
The abstract principles of nationalism and modernism transform into 
culturally intimate narratives of everyday practices and, in some cases, help 
to identify with the past and to feel the confusion of people going through 
the changes of organizing time, modes of representation as well as relating to 
one another. The introduction of surnames is a fitting example where ideas 
and practices of governance with the specific aims of standardization and 
legibility (Scott 1998:64–71) are embedded in the sense of self and one’s 
relationships. In the Ottoman times, Jews and Christians had surnames but 
Muslims did not. On June 21, 1934, a law was passed compelling all citizens 
to adopt one (Mango 2002:498–499), sometimes with consequences that 
provide material for memorable anecdotes. 
 A friend of mine had a distinctive but not very uncommon surname 
Dilsiz (deaf – literally “without tongue”) and a great story of how his family 
had been designated it. He told me that the surname originated in a meeting 
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his great-grandfather had had with the officials. He belonged into the 
military corps and had thought that in his case a fitting surname would have 
been the number of his regiment, 59 (ellidokuz). The beginning of the story 
already sets the stage ready for a radical transformation, the introduction to 
a world where people would not choose a number for their surname. He 
went to suggest this to the officials who then informed him that the name 
was not appropriate, could not be chosen and asked him for another name. 
He could not come up with a new idea, and just stood still for a long time. 
The officials waited patiently for a while and decided to give the silent man a 
name Dilsiz. The name stuck and made a good story because it comments on 
the rigidity of the official rhetoric of modernization as a leap to the new era, 
as well as the cultural intimacy of actual people going through actual 
changes. It also provides material for further reflection: my friend said that it 
would have been interesting, perhaps even beneficial, to have unusual name 
like ellidokuz to mark oneself out in contemporary society. In fact, there are 
several people whose relatives have received approval for their regiment 
numbers as surnames and who still use these names, perhaps also spreading 
captivating stories of their grandparents’ adaptation to this specific form of 
modernity. Yiannis Papadakis provides another example of how the rigid 
system of classification of the citizens could be used in creative and culturally 
intimate way: “My friends gave me an easy book of stories by a 
contemporary Turkish writer they liked. His surname was Nesin, meaning 
‘What are you?’ He had chosen this surname in order to have this 
philosophical question posed each time he was addressed” (2005:21).
FANTASTIC CHARACTER OF THE REFORMS
In the 1920s, the war-torn nation was energized with the new spirit of 
reformation and the resulting modernism produced a fantastic combination of 
ancient origins and modern urban atmosphere. In his study of multifaceted 
modernity, Berman suggests a relationship between modernization and 
modernism as a dynamic that seems to be borrowed directly from the Turkish 
experience:
In relatively backward countries, where the process of modernization has not 
yet come into its own, modernism, where it develops, takes on a fantastic 
character, because it is forced to nourish itself not on social reality but on 
fantasies, mirages, dreams. (Berman 1982:235)
In the early Republic, the decline of the Empire and definition of Turkey as 
the “sick man of the Europe” in the global hierarchy of value resulted a 
powerful backlash that attacked the assumed inferiority of the Turks in 
extreme ways. The Republican understanding of history has been selectively 
appropriated through intense – sometimes obsessive – gathering of folklore 
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and anthropomorphic data (Özyürek 2006:112) to legitimate the existence of 
a Turkish nation as a novel category of belonging.
 The ethnoracial component developed alongside other reforms and 
culminated in the Turkish History Thesis and its linguistic counterpart, the 
Sun-Language Thesis, that have formed the basis for the school textbooks 
and population policies from the 1930s onward (Altınay 2004:22–23). 
According to Altınay, their content can be summarized in following 
propositions:
Neolithic civilization was first created in Central Asia by the Turks.
Due to climactic changes (mainly drought) Turks of Central Asia migrated to 
different parts of the world and introduced Neolithic civilization to Asia, 
Europe, and America.
The Turks developed the early civilization in Mesopotamia and Egypt.
Early civilizations in Anatolia (Asia Minor) such as those of the Hittites were 
also of Turkish origin.
Turkish language is the oldest language of high culture and is the origin of 
Sumerian and Hittite languages.
The Turks have formed many states in history.
(Altınay 2004: 22–23, see also Papadakis 2005:28)
Nowadays, reactions to these fantastic assertions are filled with wonder 
about their extravagance but occasionally turn awkward. The sense of 
desired modernity requires not just thorough reflection of the self but also of 
shared history. During my time in Turkey, I have occasionally met 
individuals who have been promoting, or at least subscribing to these views, 
usually with undertones of global conspiracies. Others take more pragmatic 
view of the period. 
 The range of these interpretations became clear to me when visiting 
Veli after we had barely gotten to know each other. His meticulously 
organized bookshelf had one whole section of books dealing with Turkish 
mythology; between numerous academic volumes there were wildly fantastic 
books on the past glories of the Turks. When I asked what he thought about 
them, he endorsed a thoughtful reading of this very complex phase in 
history. According to him, the times were stormy, there were many ideas 
floating around and the reformers made understandable mistakes when 
surrounded with diverse materials. Rather than taking the theories at the 
face value, he suggested focussing on the whole picture to understand the 
position of Turkey in those times. Veli also reasoned that Atatürk did not 
believe in the legends but had thought that they were good for raising the 
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morale of the nation during the turbulent period. He had a clear goal of 
establishing a clearly bounded national unity out of the complex solidarities 
of the Empire – millets, Sufi orders and hereditary systems – and needed to 
exaggerate or invent some features to join the dots. Veli finished in a light-
hearted manner by saying that most of the Turks like books only for 
decorative purposes and will present their interpretations without reading 
the texts – he joked that he had all the books just to make an impression on 
women.
 From his reflections, I gathered a stimulating constellation of dominant 
narratives and cultural intimacy. The self-deprecating jibes acted together 
with a very careful analysis of the historical developments. They also allowed 
him to laugh at the absurdities that stretch deep into history – to express his 
sense of modern selfhood that can distance itself from the past that is 
accentuated in different ways. This was different from someone who would 
convolute the genres and be offended by questioning and experimentation 
with history. He was different from the die-hard Kemalists who would 
consider criticism of Turkishness or Atatürk, even in the tongue-in-cheek 
manner, a treason, or the pre-modern masses who would lack the critical 
faculty altogether. This was just another occasion of the multifaceted 
modernity presenting a challenge to metaleptic operations: how to look back 
at the ancient glories and bring them into the present day.
Restructuring the Principles of Belonging in the 
Early Republican Era
At the birth of the Republic, the reformist views had wide-ranging 
consequences for the organization of solidarities. Initially, the categories of 
identification and loyalty were in flux and consisted of “multi-ethnic 
Ottoman patriotism, Islamic solidarism or Turkish nationalism” (Zürcher 
1992:244). The aim of the Republican reformers was a thorough 
reorganization of the old matrix of power, largely based on context-
dependent solidarities where the power would reside largely in the hands of 
imams, Sufi sheiks, clan leaders, or, in the case of minorities, their religious 
leaders. According to their view of egalitarian and uniform modern 
citizenship, individuals belonging into several hierarchically ordered 
groupings would hinder modernization and concentrate power in the hands 
of the reactionary segments (Gül 2006:79–80). On the other hand, the 
uniform sets of rules would increase the risk of social polarization among 
different ethnic groups and could eventually give way to independence 
movements, a situation familiar from the last decades of the Ottoman 
Empire (Keyder 2008:505). To break the earlier religious hierarchies, the 
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abolition of the Caliphate was followed with the establishment of the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Işleri Başkanlığı), a public 
institution located within the state organization that took control of the 
issues concerning Islam; the Sufi orders were outlawed and many of their 
leaders executed in the initial years of the Republic and the religious leaders 
of the minority communities were stripped of their judiciary powers. The 
legal status and position of religion within the society was altered in 
fundamental ways, with new categories of belonging replacing the earlier 
ones. Through radical transformation, often accompanied by the threat of 
force, there arose a need for new ideologically established solidarities.
 In addition, the classificatory basis for ethnicity was fundamentally 
restructured. As stated in the previous section, the Republican narrative of 
origins was based on the logic of a myth but could also be used strategically 
to advance political aims. Here, the origins in Central Asia marginalized the 
Ottoman and Islamic influences and the claims of an Anatolian past served 
to counter Armenian and Greek land claims over Turkey (Copeaux in 
Altınay 2004:22). The reformers also stressed the unity of the Turkish 
essence with clear boundaries and disregarded other senses of belonging. 
Muslim minorities of Turkey, particularly the Kurds, Laz and Circassians 
could not be easily accommodated into the new framework the nation-state. 
The shift was very rapid. In the Erzurum congress of the Republican 
revolutionaries in 1919, Atatürk addressed the other Muslim elements of the 
nation as “sibling” (“kardeş”) nations that have unified their goals in 
preserving and defending their nation (Altınay 2004:18). This sense of 
common Muslim identity, consisting of mixed influences and separate 
groups was, however, soon to be abandoned. Just ten years later, the War of 
Independence had been re-conceived with addition of the term “Turkish” in 
the front and the existence of Muslim elements as distinct ethnic groups was 
denied – they were now seen as “Turks who had ‘forgotten’ their Turkishness 
or were in ‘denial of their Turkish origins’” (22–23). The split tendency of 
nationalist history to narrate nation as both eternal and novel subject still 
dominates the Turkish understandings of the modern nation.
RURAL AND URBAN ENVIRONMENTS – TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN
In 1923, despite its continuities with the Empire, Istanbul was a very different 
city. Its population had risen above the one million mark during the war but 
had shrunk to 500,000 in 1924 and was still below 700,000 in 1927. All the 
foreigners and almost half of the Christians had moved away and two-thirds of 
the population consisted of Muslims (Keyder 2008:506). In the Ottoman era, 
the classic minorities of the Empire; Greeks, Armenians and Jews had 
outnumbered the Muslims in Istanbul and had mostly been its merchants, 
bankers and industrialists. Without them the state had to create a new 
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bourgeoisie through its nationalist modernization policies (Keyder 1997:39). 
The changes were supported by the military and bureaucratic elites who had to 
force their policies on “an economically largely pre-capitalist and culturally 
conservative and religious society of peasants and craftsmen” (Zürcher 
1992:251). Zürcher estimates that the creation of an indigenous Turkish 
bourgeoisie took a generation (251).
 In this new demographic environment, the task of constructing an 
idealized form of Turkishness depended on the meticulous reorganization of 
rural and urban components. Turkish language, associated with the peasant 
or folkic background of the Ottoman society, in opposition to the Ottoman 
Turkish of the court, riddled with Arabic and Persian influences, provided an 
integral building block for a new identity (Mardin 2002:119–121, Papadakis 
2005:27). This also gave rise to a conception of the peasantry as a source of 
the authentic Turkish essence. Şerif Mardin summarizes the development in 
1920s and 1930s aptly: “The image of a Turk as the country bumpkin was 
transformed into that of the bronze-bodied, strong, serene and silent farmer 
carrying his load of grapes door-to-door in the stifling heat of the summer 
(2002:122).”
 For the modernizers, the boundary between the rural and the urban 
was not just a matter of simple geography, between the town and the 
countryside, but extended into a variety of contexts and became intertwined 
with ambiguous spaces, sometimes forming new kinds of boundaries. The 
desirable characteristics of the peasant background were to be assimilated 
into urban environments and urban models into the rural settings, to find a 
centre, a nationalist core. This symbolized a moment of transcendence when 
“the nostalgia for lost origins and the demand to civilize reveal themselves as 
two sides of the same coin” (Nalbantoğlu 1997:200). This idealistic 
understanding of the young Republic has been reshaped considerably 
throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries but the paradox at its 
core is still evident.
 These principles of belonging are still heatedly debated: even a cursory 
look at newspaper columns or a visit to a teahouse renowned for political 
debates will prove that emphasis on authentic Turkishness is exercised to 
categorize people in very detailed ways. During my fieldwork, it just seemed 
that, compared to the categories of the early Republican modernity, new 
significant dimensions had been introduced to the debates. As my discussion 
above with Veli showed, the fantastic legends of the Turkishness could be 
approached with a sense of humour – the categories that were involved in 
the immediate experiences of the everyday were much more serious 
business.
 The incorporation of the rural and urban communities had not been 
successful. Despite her suspicion towards the Anatolian migrants taking over 
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Istanbul, Didem was a committed supporter for the Kurdish cause and the 
stories of “mountain Turks” or “Turks who have forgotten their Turkishness” 
filled her with scorn and shame. We were once on our way to meet friends 
and overheard a couple speaking Kurdish. We could not understand what 
they were saying but I could identify the language as Kurmanji based on the 
words that I had learned. Didem commented on the language question in an 
angry way but nevertheless acknowledged the confusion in the past, in a 
manner similar to Veli: “It really is amazing that there still are people who 
honestly believe that the Kurdish language does not exist. I can imagine that 
in the Ottoman times when Istanbul was full of people speaking weird-
sounding languages, some people might become confused. Even in Atatürk’s 
times it would be possible; so many things had changed so quickly that 
people could be manipulated easily to believe that the enemies of Turkey are 
turning people against each other.” She stopped to wonder for a moment and 
looked at me in a very serious way: “But nowadays there are TV channels, in 
Turkey and abroad, broadcasting in Kurdish language, songs in Kurdish and 
in Istanbul you hear Kurdish, you hear these distinct sounds [imitates the 
guttural sounds], in the street. You really need to be brainwashed [uses the 
English word] to believe that the language does not exist.” In other words, 
she was saying that early modernity was introduced to people with limited 
capabilities and a different kind of self-reflection would be required in 
contemporary Turkey. From her global viewpoint, many of the Turks were 
still backward in their understanding what of is happening in their country 
and stuck with the ethos of the past.
 The complicated issues related to minorities and Turkey’s relative 
location had created new relationships towards the desired historical 
consciousness of modernity. It is perplexing how the Republican notion of 
Turkishness can be contextually very flexible and result extravagant fantasies 
but also create rigid boundaries to delineate inclusions and exclusions. They 
are influenced by the widespread theories of the modern nation-state but 
complement them with specifically Turkish realities. For example, Kurd is 
potentially a nationalistic category, but it is also situated in the experienced 
reality as self-reflexive understanding of ethnicity, culture and language. 
According to my informants, being able to understand wider historical 
dynamics was related to crossing the threshold of modernity as an abstract 
principle but also deeply situated in daily life, where encounters with others 
were constantly evaluated with regard to degrees and accentuations of the 
modern sense of self. This can lead to a celebrated sense of diversity, ability 
to take part in multifaceted modernity, or, in the words of Herzfeld, produce 
histories that “do not serve the national entity, but, on the contrary, 
treacherously reveal its internal fragmentation” (1987:43). If ethnicity and 
religion are the cornerstones of the Republican definitions of Turkishness, 
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the ideas of secularism, cosmopolitanism and civilization connect the 
formative years of the nation even more tightly to global reach of modernity.
SECULARISM AND EXCLUSION
The historical roots of Turkish secularism are heterogeneous; in Turkish, 
secularism is referred to as laiklik that suggests a connection with laicism, 
strongly influenced by a specifically French Jacobin tradition (see Bowen 
2007). I have chosen to adopt the term secularism, in its broad definition, 
“referring to the doctrine that morality, national education, and the state 
itself should not be based on religious principles, a doctrine which can gain 
specific meanings in different political and historical contexts” (Azak 2010:8) 
and will focus on its uses rather than its complex history (see Altınay 2004; 
Azak 2010).
 In everyday life, secularism is not so much tied to abstract principles 
but acts as a social dividing line. This was at the heart of Ahmet’s anxiety for 
going to Istiklal Street, for him the centre of secularist Turkey. I saw him at 
the family teahouse, next to where I lived, almost every day and would often 
stop by for a glass of tea. At first, he mostly joked about being new to 
Istanbul, how, after two years, he was still a religious young man from the 
other side of the country. When we got to know each other better, I began to 
realize that the geographic boundary separating Tarlabaşı from the Istiklal 
area corresponded closely to the boundary that excluded him from secular 
Turkey. Once, he let his feelings to burst out in a confrontational manner:
What irritates me most in this city is that you are never good enough. I do not 
want to pass as one of these Beyoğlu idiots, I am proud of what I am, but I 
clearly sense that I am not welcome to many of the places around Istiklal Street. 
Perhaps it is this pullover, it is not Levi’s or Diesel brand. Even that does not 
matter; they see me as a religious idiot and themselves as secular people, 
Western and full of contempt to anyone who is different from them. They are not 
followers of Atatürk, they would not do anything for this country, they do not 
even go to do military service but pay money to avoid it.
For Ahmet, secularism signified a lifestyle of privilege; even military service, 
an institution that he otherwise recalled with horror, became positively 
evaluated. The moral framework of the mahalle reflected the hierarchy 
between the elites and the masses, equating secularism with modernity 
(çağdaş) and its values radiating from the centres to the peripheries. Ahmet’s 
dignity consisted of balancing between his valued authenticity as a devout 
Kurd from the Southeast, a citizen of the Republic who has fulfilled his 
military duties, and an individual advocating a more just social order. From 
the opposite perspective, he was a country bumpkin controlled by religious 
impulses, cannon fodder to be expended in war and someone with no real 
knowledge of the workings of the society. Furthermore, Ahmet’s account 
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referred to global hierarchy of value: how people he despised claimed to take 
part in the purportedly superior cosmopolitan civilization associated with 
the West. It mirrored the troubled relationship that the Republic has had 
with global modernity.
COSMOPOLITANISM AND CIVILIZATION
In Republican modernity, the idea of cosmopolitanism has had a very 
ambivalent character. On the one hand, it has connotations with the valued 
diversity of the Western metropolises: on the other hand, it signifies the 
supposed decadence of the Ottoman era and compromises Turkey’s 
ethnonational character. In Istanbul, cosmopolitanism has been historically 
bounded to certain spaces and its relationship to the district of Beyoğlu has 
been paradoxically both celebrated and traumatized. Rıfat Bali presents an 
example that connects cosmopolitanism with urbanity, minority status and 
the global hierarchy of value. According to him, the Turkish elites 
“remembered how the minorities cheered the Allied forces when they 
occupied Istanbul and the Greek army when it occupied Izmir. They could 
not forget the famous Grande rue de Péra [Istiklal Street] in Istanbul, where 
one could hear Ladino, Greek, Armenian and French, but practically not one 
word of Turkish” (2006:49). 
 These debates have not been limited to the formative years of the 
Republic. The characteristically Turkish inferiority complex is ridiculed and 
considered outmoded but is regularly brought up with real concerns. What I 
find most intriguing in the following quote is the very serious approach 
popular newspaper columnist and writer Mustafa Akyol takes to tackle the 
issue:
What all this means is that if we Turks don’t want to remain as European 
wannabes that people joke about, we have to get rid of this 80-year inferiority 
complex. There are many things in the West to admire, to be sure, but 
adopting them should not mean denying ourselves. There is nothing 
admirable about that.78
The discussion of adopting cosmopolitan influences without compromising 
cultural authenticity reaches to numerous fields of life. Thomas Turino 
defines modernist reformism as careful balancing between the “threats 
inherent in both localism and cosmopolitanism” (1996:16). He argues that 
“the reformism typically objectifies, recontextualizes, and alters indigenous 
forms for emblematic purposes in light of cosmopolitan dispositions and 
social contexts and programs” (16). In Turkey, the highly selective 
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78 Akyol, Mustafa. Hürriyet Daily News 12.2.2010 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/
default.aspx?pageid=438&n=unraveling-the-turkish-inferiority-complex-2010-02-12
appropriation of historical representations, discussed in the previous section, 
has resulted a precarious balance between local and cosmopolitan 
influences. The problems arise when participation in cosmopolitan 
modernity becomes imitation, inferior to the example it is based on. Ahmet 
saw the Turks wearing Western clothing brands as inauthentic caricatures 
embodying the worst elements of the contemporary cosmopolitanism, but 
hastened to add that for me they would be suitable. Likewise, the early 
Republic influenced by the West tried to find a balance in its cultural 
appropriation; the unsuccessful introduction of contemporary music and 
benches into the mosques to follow the “civilized” Western practice of 
churches (Azak 2010:53)79 is a fitting example of the incommensurability of 
the local and the global hierarchies of value. These entanglements have often 
been intensified depending on the historically prominent global discourses 
of civilization and modernity.
 From Mustafa Reşid Paşa, the primary architect of the Tanzimat 
reforms indicating Turkey’s introduction to the modern era, to Atatürk and 
further, Turkish reforms have followed closely the twists and turns of the 
Western European history. Şerif Mardin summarizes their broad tendencies 
as intellectual shifts, first from Comte’s positivism, to the late nineteenth-
century disillusionment with parliamentary government, and, further, to 
Durkheim’s solidarism (1997:68). The last phase has been extremely 
significant in crafting the modern notion of Turkish civilization. Most of my 
informants had never heard the name Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924), referred to 
as the leading ideologue of Turkish nationalism (Bozdoğan 2008:422), or, 
recalled him distantly as someone mentioned during their school years. 
Nevertheless, many of his ideas about culture and civilization radiate still 
strongly, despite the nearly hundred years of distance.
 In Turkey, the tension between local and cosmopolitan influences is 
reminiscent of the division between the Enlightenment idea of the 
universalistic and unilinear civilizational progress and the Herderian 
assertion of a “rich variety of cultures whose contrasted interplay makes up 
the history of mankind” (Dumont 1994:9; also Kadioğlu 1996; Taylor 
1992:210–215). Gökalp’s nationalism is a unique mix of both. He established 
a division between international civilization (medeniyet)80  and national 
culture (hars) that could be reconciled in an appropriate manner (Bozdoğan 
2008:422). The model of civilization was seen as freely floating, consisted of 
theology, philosophy, science and technology and could be encompassed by 
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79  These reforms were not backed by Atatürk but have remained in circulation as powerful 
anecdotes of the times. See Bein (2011:127–128) on how the leaked report of propositions had a 
significant global impact.
80  As discussed above, (p.108) medeniyet can be used in a variety of ways and is used by the 
Islamic actors with an emphasis on purity and modesty.
different cultures. In contrast, national culture, the authentic but variable 
spirit, included everyday language, customs and creative arts. Gökalp’s 
intellectual project consisted of entering the Western civilization but not 
importing Western culture (Bonnett 2004:73; Stokes 1992:26). The caution 
against imitating the West and losing one’s authentic Turkishness is 
expressed in very similar terms by both Ahmet and Mustafa Akyol above. 
 In some domains, the categories are organized in relatively simple and 
straightforward ways. The adamant secularism of the early Republic relied 
on the strict rules of appearances and specific forms of cultural expression; it 
associated Turkey firmly with the Western civilization and its regulated 
cosmopolitanism selected the superficial features of cultural expression to be 
appropriated into “high culture.” The boundaries become much fuzzier when 
one takes more complex issues, such as dynamics of gender, and examines 
them according to the Republican understanding.
AMBIVALENT DYNAMICS OF GENDER
One of the most complex balancing acts of the Republican reformers was the 
reorganization of the gender relations into the rubric of desired modernity. 
In the sociocultural realities of the young nation, the various categories of 
modern life, some referring primarily to spatially bounded wholes (Europe, 
Turkey), others to notions of progress (modern [çağdaş]), still others to 
supposedly shared standards (civilized [medeniyetli]), decent [terbiyeli]) were 
evaluated very differently in the arguments pointing at the direction the 
country should take. Many of the solutions on questions of gender were 
based on another sets of distinctions, namely those between the elites and 
the masses as well as the public and private realms. 
 Strongly influenced by the Republican reforms, the spatial attributes 
assigned to expected gender roles, together with the teleological perspective 
of Turkey’s gradual encounter with modernity, still play crucial role in how 
gender is conceptualized. The message the reformers sent was twofold: the 
state encouraged the elite women to be involved in the public life as 
professionals but the modernization of the perceived masses was tied to the 
private realm. Yeşim Arat argues that the reforms were pushing forward a 
form of Taylorist modernity – in the private realm, the women were 
expected to bring “order,” “discipline” and “rationality” to homemaking 
(1997:100). In the public realm, at the time restricted to a few spaces of 
urban egalitarianism, the aims and their targets were different. The emphasis 
was on strong representations of equality between the sexes and on iconic 
examples that would show how Turkey had reached a higher level of 
civilization. There were famous examples such as Sabiha Gökçen, Atatürk’s 
adopted daughter and world’s first female combat pilot, who was presented 
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to the world as an emblem of the rapid modernization of the country (see 
Tuominen 2013:45).
 However, these were isolated cases and rare examples in a country that 
was mostly conservative and where the reforms had had only a minor effect 
on gender relations. The understanding of equality that stressed the 
sameness between men and women could be created in the limited public 
realm artificially but it transformed into a hierarchical relationship when the 
differences between sexes were acknowledged in the private domain (Arat 
1997:101). Ayşe Kadioğlu (1996) argues that for the women of the early 
Republic combining the expectations between officially constructed 
identities and the sociocultural realities were impossible to fulfil. Their 
appearances were expected to be modern but simultaneously the traditional 
virtues such as modesty were supposed to be kept at guard. This involved 
constant balancing between the undesirable extremes: “the former are 
usually portrayed as too ambitious, and promiscuous ‘loose women’ while 
the latter as old-fashioned and outmoded types” (177).
 These dynamics still had an influence in present-day Istanbul. For 
women, this meant constant surveillance of the surroundings and 
adjustment of behaviour to conform to the appropriate standards. This 
became apparent when I had a walk with Didem in Beyoğlu, concentrating 
on her characterizations of the attributes of specific streets, squares and 
other spaces. The discussion moved effortlessly from larger wholes, districts 
epitomizing specific ambience, into smaller entities, sometimes consisting of 
just one notable street or apartment block. The combination of different 
scales presented a sophisticated understanding of the dynamics of the urban 
environment.
 I discussed earlier how she was interested in the history of the old 
quarters but said that she mostly limited her movements to Beyoğlu and her 
home in Ataköy because she did not feel comfortable in other parts of the 
city. She did not consider the wealthy quarter of Nişantaşı, with its French-
style cafes and luxurious fashion boutiques, north from Taksim Square, 
welcoming or exciting, and the new business centres, with their skyscrapers 
and shopping malls, further away in the north, were to her soulless – 
modern,81  but simultaneously an antithesis of the modernity she loved. 
However, those two spaces were considered safe to her in gender terms; 
there would usually be no harassment but there would be nothing of interest 
either. She continued by saying that consumption, buying things at the chain 
stores and drinking coffee at the multinational coffee chains, were not the 
ways she would want to spend her time. This modernity represented 
Westernization gone wrong; even though she did not subscribe to the strict 
Kemalist principles, especially its ethnoracial understandings, her models of 
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81 Didem used the Turkish term modern throughout our discussion.
proper taste were associated with high culture, in opposition to 
consumerism. In an interesting way, she saw the absence of problems 
associated with gender often being substituted by artificial equality, a corrupt 
display of “American” modernity expressed in the semi-public realm of the 
shopping mall. In a similar manner, she clumped the numerous gated 
communities further away from the city centre into the same category, not 
really as part of her city, and considered them as an offence to urban life.
 She avoided the affluent northern parts of Istanbul because she saw 
them as boring, but also felt that many areas of Istanbul were out of bounds 
to her. Their gender dynamics could be traced to Republican imaginations of 
urban space. For Didem, the city was clearly divided into spaces of freedom 
(özgürlük) where at least the minimal standards of equality could be met, 
and areas that were governed according to unchallengeable conservative 
norms. Again, the symbolic battles were being played in relation to the few 
imageable parts of the city that had significant roles in history, defining 
Turkey’s relation towards modernity. Didem expressed clearly that she was 
not interested in the vast stretches of newly built housing, homes of the rural 
migrants who had clustered together with others from their areas of origin. 
There would be nothing to see, but, more importantly, she would not feel 
safe as a woman in those surroundings. Her explanation for this was very 
pragmatic; because there was nothing to see, visitors would be treated with 
suspicion by both men and women. However, her line of reasoning extended 
quickly to other categories of Turkish modernity. She told me, restating the 
early Republican narrative of the spread of modernity, that people in the 
peripheries did not have bad character but needed to be instructed to the 
modern ways of life gradually. Too rapid or intense encounters with the 
modern world would disrupt them and make them confused. She linked this 
especially to men who could not control their sexuality: again, not because 
they would be predators who have decided to abuse women but because they 
operated instinctively, not being able to restrain themselves. According to 
Didem, their entry to contemporary civilization would be possible, perhaps 
unavoidable, as in the teleological visions of the new nation, but she added 
that it was not up to her to change the world in this way. 
 What bothered her more was the destiny of the areas she considered 
significant. She said that the atmosphere in Istanbul had changed after the 
AKP had gotten into power in 2002 and that this had had consequences even 
in Beyoğlu. Sexual harassment had become more common and some spaces, 
formerly associated with freedom and tolerance, had become intimidating. 
The battle was fought over the control of these spaces and had become a 
matter of life and death. The change was related to the physical makeup and 
the functions of spaces. Didem mentioned the construction of a mosque into 
Taksim Square and the reconversion of Hagia Sophia back into a mosque as 
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examples of planned initiatives that would have dramatic outcomes, not just 
for their immediate surroundings but for the whole city. Moreover, she 
echoed the understanding expressed throughout the social spectrum, 
sometimes in the form of elaborate analyses, more often with fitting 
anecdotes: the biggest changes happen gradually through dynamics that can 
be consolidated under ambiguous terms such as gentrification or 
authoritarianism, while in reality they consist of series of seemingly 
insignificant social interventions. The constant cat-and-mouse game over the 
number of chairs outside Beyoğlu’s bars (that later culminated into a ban on 
serving alcoholic drinks outdoors in most of the streets), the prevalence of 
religious symbols, such as the expanding Ramadan markets or mosques 
displaying religious slogans composed of LED lights, as well as the age-old 
complaint of foreign junk foods (the unholy union of Arabic Lahmacun 
pizzas and American Coca-Cola) invading the streetscape were examples 
Didem had in mind of the gradual changes that could produce remarkable 
outcomes. What I found fascinating, was that even the specifically religious 
themes were connected to present-day politics rather than to Islam as such. 
 In general terms, for Didem, the radical modernity of the Republican 
reformers had become outdated. It was incommensurable with the 
modernity of today that allowed gathering of desirable features from 
different periods, not just as superficial representations: for her, the Ottoman 
era contained many features that were not on a collision course with 
modernity. She held the idea of multicultural and tolerant imperial Istanbul 
in high esteem, not as a decadent deviation from the authentic Turkishness 
but a societal model, closer to a mindset, with some aspects that could be 
adapted to present-day conditions. She felt sorry for the disappearance of the 
old religious minorities and hoped that they would some day return to the 
social mosaic of Istanbul. Introjective metalepsis, prioritizing the Ottoman 
Empire as an exemplary model, was overshadowed by projective metalepsis 
that acknowledged the work of interpretation in bringing its features into the 
present day. She was aiming at a more accurate construction of historical 
consciousness that would prioritize the desired forms of modernity and 
civilization. Same applied to the core values of the Republican revolution. The 
goal of the early Republican period can be summarized as “closing the gap 
with civilized countries” (Ahiska and Yenal 2006:160). In the terms of 
technological and bureaucratic modernization, the early twentieth-century 
Republic was advancing fast but the whole population did not follow the lead 
of the reformers. Didem saw the problem resulting from a wrong kind of 
integration between the urban and the rural, societal transformation that 
had its roots in the birth of the Republic but that had intensified from the 
1950s onwards. Looking back at the early Republic would be futile because 
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the centres of power had shifted considerably and the old models did not 
correspond to contemporary realities.
***
In addition to abstract ideals, concrete transformations occurred during the 
period of “radical” modernity between 1923 and 1950. The population of 
Istanbul rose at a steady pace (under 10 percent yearly) but did not reach the 
pre-war numbers before the early 1950s. The dynamics between the urban and 
the rural were extremely significant; the city was “the principal transmission 
mechanism for the ‘modernization’ of the peasantry” (Keyder 2010:25) while 
the peripheries were held suspect by the national elites as areas of potential 
disaffection (Mardin 1973:182). There were several rebellions, easily 
interpreted as Islamist or ethnoracial uprisings, but in reality constituting of 
much complex dissent against the Republic,82  that kept the authorities alert 
and reminded everyone that the encounter with modernity had several 
potential complications. Republican modernity spread throughout the country 
in the form of better transport connections, a growing electricity grid and the 
establishment of village institutes, expected to spread modern skills and global 
outlook to the rural communities (Mango 2004:35). On the other hand, some 
of the more radical reforms were pulled back. Religious education was 
reintroduced in primary schools on a voluntary basis in 1949 and the faculty 
of theology was reopened in Ankara the same year (43); the Sufi orders 
(tarikat) were officially banned but continued to exercise their influence 
underground and reasserted themselves after 1950 (Ahmad 2008:229), 
functioning in a somewhat “public secret” fashion throughout the Republican 
era (Silverstein 2011:17). The composition of society, especially in the 
cosmopolitan centre of Istanbul, changed again considerably with the 
introduction of the Varlık Vergisi (“wealth tax”) in 1942, imposing heavy taxes 
on the non-Muslim minorities and restrictions on their property ownership 
and schools (Keyder 2008:508), forcing many to leave the country. The year 
1950 can be considered a significant watershed in Turkish politics because it 
marks the landslide victory of the Democrat Party (DP) and the end of the 
single-party period. DP’s presentation of itself as a champion of the Turkish 
people, a voice against the Western-minded elites of the Republican People’s 
Party (CHP), provides a good introduction to the most significant dynamic of 
the following decades.
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Chapter 6:
Populist Modernity
The period beginning in 1950 saw changes that created a more liberal 
country with a multiparty system, increased freedom of religion and 
continuing modernization. It also marks a shift in influence in Turkey 
overwhelmingly towards Istanbul, instead of the Republican centre of 
Ankara. The first decade of Democrat Party rule was also the period of 
massive urban restructuring in Istanbul; the redevelopment programme of 
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes (1950–1960) led to the demolition of 
thousands of buildings, the construction of gigantic boulevards and the 
outward expansion of the urban area (Gül 2006:3). On the more quotidian 
level, the changes were intimately tied to novel encounters that became a 
constant reality in Istanbul. The age-old binaries of modernity; rural and 
urban, traditional and modern, had not merged according to the teleological 
logic of Kemalist developmentalism but had begun to intermix and create 
hybrid outcomes. In the urban sphere, rural Turkey was no longer limited to 
series of imaginations and representations but something that was 
encountered face-to-face, as the migrants from the countryside settled into 
the city in large numbers. A widely known phrase attributed to Atatürk, “The 
villager is the lord of the nation” (“Köylü milletin efendisidir”), changed from 
a polite gesture into a real possibility of transformation of power relations. 
Albeit expressed in a humorous manner, the following quote from columnist 
Nazlan Ertan serves as an illustration of the ambiguity between the 
nationalistic ideals and the new urban realities.
It is not up to me to dispute the words of Atatürk, but if the villagers are rulers 
of the country, can they not simply rule in their villages without having to 
come here?” said one politician, who shall not be named, after a drink too 
many.83
 
It goes without saying that it was not just the elites who were disturbed by 
the newcomers but there was suspicion on both sides. The villagers located 
in the gecekondu settlements in the outskirts of the city felt resentment at the 
privileged classes and saw their status as based on linguistic competence and 
emulation of European lifestyles (Markoff 1994:228–229). In this chapter, I 
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will focus on how this new form of modernity developed and how it has 
clashed with the other understandings. I suggest that it also marks the 
emergence of another set of possibilities for metaleptic acts: new beginnings, 
reassemblies of the concreta of the past and adjustment of historical 
consciousness. I will argue that the predominant concerns of the period 
between the DP victory of 1950 and the military coup of 1980 are far from 
forgotten in the neoliberal atmosphere of twenty-first-century Istanbul – the 
dynamics that animated the era continue to re-emerge in new contexts and 
influence myriad encounters with modernity.
 If the radical modernity of Atatürk’s times rested on the gradual 
coming together of authentic Turkishness and the universal standard of 
modernity, it depended largely on the condition that the elites and the 
masses were kept spatially separate, of course to be united in the future. In 
my introductory discussion of Turkish modernity, I referred to Ilhan Tekeli’s 
term “populist modernity” for the years between 1950 and 1980 (2009:16); I 
believe the term captures very well the increasingly liberal country that had 
abandoned many of its most utopian ideas of modernity and had to reckon 
with the actual encounters that had come to define not just its urbanity but 
the rearrangement of its most fundamental societal hierarchies.
Migration and the Urban Mosaic
The increasing migration to the city, beginning around 1950, occurred in the 
midst of significant changes. The shrinking of Istanbul’s long-established 
minorities of Greeks, Armenians and Jews culminated in 1955 with the 
“Istanbul pogrom” (6–7 Eylül Olayları), a mob attack principally against the 
Greek population, after which only small fragments of their communities 
remained in the city. Many of their accommodations were taken by the 
migrants and the social composition of several districts transformed almost 
completely. In general, the rural migrants did not settle into the city in an 
organized way but had to rely on a wide variety of possibilities available to 
them. The outcome consisted of “a jigsaw pattern of established private 
property, abandoned non-Muslim holdings, vakıf84  land without claimants, 
former agricultural holdings and, above all, various kinds of publicly owned 
land, translated to a similarly unpredictable intertwining of zoned and 
gecekondu settlements, resulting in a surprising juxtaposition of villas and 
expensive blocks of flats with shacks, even in the wealthiest neighbourhoods 
of the city” (Keyder 2008:512). The urban development of the time had 
informal character and the administration’s role was in guaranteeing the 
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implicit policy of permitting land occupation and construction of informal 
housing for the new migrants (Keyder 2005:131). The reconciliation between 
informal housing and planning regulations has been expressed in a series of 
amnesty laws that have retroactively legitimized some previously illegal 
gecekondus (Tekeli 2009:16).
 This did not, however, mean a free-for-all land guarantee, a familiar 
story of a city with its streets paved with gold: the newcomers did not spread 
within the city limits in a random way but relied largely on solidarities based 
in place of origin and Islamic identity. Colocal (hemşehri) identity, referring 
to belonging based on the place of origin, is still a significant factor shaping 
political struggles in the squatter areas (Tuğal 2009:428) and many residents 
highly valued the bonded set of relationships instead of the anonymity 
associated with urban life (Büker 2002:155). Squatting practices were also 
subject to change. Ayşe Yönder argues that by the mid-1960s, access, even for 
public land, was in the control of the local strongmen. In the mid-1970s, the 
public land in some parts of Istanbul was controlled by entrepreneurs with 
underground connections who could sell the land and have a monopoly over 
the construction activities (in Davis 2006:42).
 The themes related to migration are encountered daily in present-day 
Istanbul. When strangers meet, one of the first questions is usually about 
one’s place of origin – “nerelisiniz?” (“Where are you from?”). If it rarely 
happens that the answer is Istanbul, the discussion will move onto parents’ 
and even grandparents’ origins. It is remarkably uncommon to meet people 
who have roots of several generations in Istanbul; a fact regularly 
emphasized by those who have had their predecessors living in the city. The 
situation with migrants outnumbering those born in Istanbul, exemplified by 
the population increase from less than one million in 1950 to 2 million in 
1970, passing the 5 million mark around 1985, 10 million around 2000 and 
officially reaching the figure of 14 million in 2014, has redefined its urbanity. 
 Migrants have consolidated all the regions of Turkey into Istanbul. 
Cihan Tuğal presents an illustration of the migrant experience through a 
fragment of speech given by Recai Kutan, a leader of the Islamist Virtue 
Party (FP), addressing the crowd in the Şişli district of Istanbul in 2001: 
“Istanbul is the mirror of Turkey. Istanbul is also Rize, Gumushane, Artvin 
and Kars (some provincial Anatolian cities). This magnificent crowd is the 
voice of the sacred millet.” (2009:429). According to Tuğal, these three 
sentences combine following elements: “coming from a certain provincial 
place, living in a big city, and being religious” (429). I would go a step further 
and argue that, rather than a set of properties, the nature of urban encounter 
should be emphasized. The encounters between the elites and the masses, 
the rural and urban populations, the traditionals and the moderns have had 
various labels and been anchored to several features of speech, dress and 
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behaviour; after the mass migration they have become an essential part of 
daily life, creating and reproducing contextual boundaries between different 
groups.
 My brief account of how migrants have been perceived in Istanbul is by 
no means complete but concentrates on the most pressing issues I observed 
during my fieldwork – the variety of encounters, from awkward to 
productive, in the Beyoğlu district where they cannot be avoided. I will relate 
them to the principal themes of the topic in the research literature and media 
representations, to examine how various components of the earlier debates 
have influenced contemporary historical consciousness. What differentiates 
the discussion of this period from the previous ones is the focus on a 
specifically modern sense of hybridity, a series of encounters that produce 
unexpected outcomes, as opposed to rigid modernism where the boundaries 
between the spaces were still intact. This dynamic has also led to 
diversification of the desirable characteristics of modernity. As I will show, 
many of the migrants questioned the Republican narrative very soon after 
their arrival.
STORIES OF INVASION AND HARMONY
An iconic, even stereotypical but very fitting example the spirit of the times 
is the figure of the Haydarpaşa train station (Figure 4). Located at the shores 
of the Bosporus, it is the final destination for the trains from the East and has 
been widely depicted as a point of entry in numerous films of the era, as a 
metaphor for those who have just arrived into Istanbul (Altınsay in Sumer 
2010:142). In the early films, the newcomers were depicted sympathetically 
through their struggle to survive in a new environment (Sumer 2010:142). 
Similar to the early Republican ideology, the populist political imaginary of 
the times stressed the gradual integration of the migrants into urbanity and 
modernity, (Mardin 1973; Öncü 2002:185), of course, according to the 
standards of the people welcoming their peripheral cousins. This was to 
change very soon. Ayşe Öncü points at the lengthy history of the terms 
“invasion” (“istila”), “siege” (“kusatma”) and “assault” (“saldiri”) that have 
been used to describe the waves of “outsiders,” defined in historically 
contingent and variable labels (2002:184). In the 1960s, the divisions had 
been largely solidified with the urbanites residing in the central 
neighbourhoods and the migrants in the colocally organized gecekondu 
settlements in the outskirts of the city (Öncü 2002:185). In this chapter, I 
wish to emphasize the contextual character of how migration is perceived in 
present-day Istanbul. There are situations where the cultural authenticity of 
rural Turkey becomes foregrounded and evaluated positively, but also many 
others where the migrants turn into metaphors of malice, resembling 
Didem’s thoughts at the end of the previous chapter. 
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Figure 4. Haydarpaşa train station is an enduring symbol of Turkish migration 
– its image is enforced by the necessity of crossing the Bosporus to reach the 
European side of Istanbul.85
The idealized openness of the city towards the migrants, the still untainted 
stage where both sides expect things to turn out in a harmonious way, has 
not disappeared completely. Authentic rural Turks, not corrupted by the 
urban environment are cherished in stories of these rare encounters. Once, 
walking down the street towards the Bosporus from Taksim Square with 
Osman, I came across a telling example. Despite Osman’s emphasis on 
himself as a true urbanite who participated in global modernity in an 
effortless manner, he also took pride of being familiar with the other side of 
Istanbul, the reality of the mahalles and their connection to rural Turkey. He 
preferred living in Tarlabaşı to other parts of Istanbul and had developed an 
easy-going relationship with his neighbours, most of whom had no idea of 
his well-paid job in the financial sector. We passed on a busy crossing and he 
suddenly pointed out to me one of the small food-carts selling rice pilaf with 
chick peas (nohutlu pilav). The young man in charge caught his attention: “I 
can see in a second that this guy does not know how to cook and the food he 
sells is awful. He gets it from someone who does not know either, he does 
not even know how to keep it warm – you would definitely end up with food 
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poisoning if you buy anything from him.” As it had already become clear to 
me, this modest but delicious dish occupies a special place in Turkish 
imagination and represents the kind of honest food that can be perfected 
with skilful preparation. 
 Next, Osman referred to a counterexample that represented the values 
associated with the dish: “You should come with me to this place in the shore 
some Saturday evening when this famous guy comes to serve his nohutlu 
pilav. The food is prepared overnight in a wood-fired oven by his 
grandmother and the taste is just perfect. There is always a long queue 
waiting for him to arrive and all the food disappears in a blink of an eye. 
That is real village food; you can see a real mix of people queuing, young and 
old, rich and poor. You were asking me before what unites people in a big 
city like Istanbul, I would say that this is a perfect case.” I went with him to 
the shore next week and the situation was just as described. A large crowd 
had arrived for this specific occasion: there were groups of young men, 
families and older men who, according to Osman, would come every week 
and later continue to the teahouse nearby to discuss politics. There was a 
powerful presence of mutual belonging, an ephemeral community brought 
together for this purpose: while queuing and eating, there was almost no 
talking between people and the occasion was over after a very short time. 
The tiny food-cart had established a temporary pocket into the space of the 
city that would disappear soon after the food was gone. In these moments, 
the rural and the urban can be brought together in a safe way, if only for a 
limited time. Having said that, the other portrayal of the rural migrant is 
nowadays much more common.
Arabesk Urbanity
The idealized encounter between the rural and urban populations can also 
be challenged on historical grounds. Erik Zürcher considers the Republican 
model of societal dynamics as faulty from the beginning. He argues that the 
developments after 1950 should not be seen as a counterrevolution following 
the Kemalist revolution, for Kemalism had largely been an attempt by the 
military and bureaucratic elites to reshape the society from above 
(1992:252). The targets of modernization were expected to take part in urban 
life and leave behind their rural traits but they often countered the demand 
by emphasizing their rural identities and participating in public life through 
communal ties (Tuğal 2009:434). The migrants were not against modernity 
as such but their pride expressed the urge to be active participants in its 
formation. I see the backlash as a constitutive factor of Istanbul’s urbanity 
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rather than a reactionary impulse to deny the modern realities. The 
exemplary past can be imagined somewhere between the rigid categories.
 The 1970s saw the amalgam of the the rural and the urban producing 
new forms that did not fit comfortably into either category. For the elites, it 
seemed that the migrants had lost the purity and authenticity of their origins 
in Istanbul but had remained ignorant and developed their own half-breed 
pseudo-urbanity that threatened to pollute the entire city. To sum up the 
process, Öncü claims that “in the language of Istanbul’s mainstream middle-
classes, arabesk culture had invaded Istanbul” (2002:185). Within this 
particular formation of historical consciousness, arabesk should be seen as 
an umbrella term, a shorthand for urban hybridity that changes its form 
according to circumstances. According to Irene Markoff, arabesk was seen as 
“an ‘alien cultural artefact’ that represented an overt expression of the 
suppressed orientalism in the Turkish psyche” (1994:227) and Martin Stokes 
associates it with “the domain of morbid emotion and sensitivity (duygu), a 
domain entirely separable from that of ‘culture’ (kültür)” (1992:12). Both of 
the definitions point at the deeply felt cultural intimacy, celebrating in the 
imperfections of life, of not belonging into either the category of the 
culturally pure peasants, nor the educated urbanites. It also reflects the 
historically specific social and demographic imbalance of the period, the 
urban transition expressed in the language of alienation and fatalism (Stokes 
1992:99). Stokes summarizes the spirit of arabesk brilliantly in his 
description of the films of the genre:
Films assert that the gap between image and reality, isolated self and society, 
“Turkish” honour and “modern” morality, the rural and the urban, is 
ultimately unbridgeable. Through the attempt to bridge the gap, the 
protagonist is reduced to his lowest level: his own honour is dragged through 
the mud, cutting him off from society, forcing him into a series of moral 
conundrums involving theft, alcohol, and acts of violence which drive him 
ultimately to self-destruction. (Stokes 1992:145)
These attributes are very closely related to the lack of self-reflection and too 
rapid entry to modernity. They also relate to the change in the channels of 
cultural appropriation. This is especially potent in the field of mass-
consumption, an imperfect sense of modernity’s material culture, where the 
established hierarchies can be violated relatively easily (Öncü 2002:185). The 
great cultural debates, stretching to abstract qualities of selfhood, have 
mostly very quotidian origins; the choices of food, clothing and 
entertainment, together with the learned standards associated with the 
urban way of life. I follow Öncü’s (2002) use of the term arabesk to refer to 
this in-betweenness in a general way, not the more specific definition that 
emphasizes the masculinity of the dolmuş and taxi drivers, the world of 
cassettes where the arabesk music is situated. She argues that the 
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connotations with the term have expanded in the 1980s to the newly 
emergent wealth in Istanbul, and that in the 1990s it has become an all-
encompassing metaphor to describe and identify “a general malaise which 
seemed to plague every aspect of life in Turkish society” (2002:185–186). 
Furthermore, the dominant definitions of arabesk have changed 
considerably. Perhaps the distinction between “black Turks” (siyah or kara 
Türkler) and “white Turks” (beyaz Türkler), discussed in the following 
chapter on neoliberal Turkey, is the latest sway (see Ferguson 2014; White 
2013:47), characteristic of the specific conditions of the 1990s. Ultimately, 
the masses and the elites, the rural migrants and the self-confessed urbanites, 
arabesk and high culture, black and white Turks form a continuum of 
oppositions that refer to the hierarchy of value, to the formal and culturally 
intimate understandings of modernity. Often the tone and the context are 
enough to condense complex meanings into simple oppositions – everybody 
will understand who are “us” and “them” when the sociocultural divisions 
arise in the course of daily life.
RULES OF THE PICNIC
One of the best examples of the debates that have carried on through 
decades concerns appropriate dress and behaviour in public spaces, 
especially in parks and public beaches. The stereotypes are so strong that 
they have acquired a life of their own and cannot be dissolved easily. Mine 
Kırıkkanat, a well-known columnist and writer, sparked the debate once 
again after her derogatory column, titled Halkımız eğleniyor (“Our People/
Folk Are Having a Good Time”) in the mainstream newspaper Radikal in 
2005. In the piece, she describes the scene of a picnic on a beach in a way 
that brings up the opposed sections of Turkish society in a brutal way:
Men in their underwear rest ruminating, women wearing black chadors or 
headscarves are brewing tea, swinging their babies, fanning the barbecue […] 
our dark people cooking meat by the sea that they turn their [behinds] toward 
[…] Here it is impossible to find one single family grilling fish. Well, if they 
liked fish, and if they knew how to grill it, they would not be just lying there 
in their dirty undershirts, underpants and long johns; they would not 
ruminate and belch; and they would not in any case be this chubby, short-
legged, long-armed, and this hairy!86 (translation in Ozkan 2008:101)
The column caused uproar and has also been discussed in academic settings 
(Özkan 2008, Stoetzer 2014),87  perhaps because it exposes a side of Turkey 
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that is ubiquitous in daily life but difficult to discuss in a sensible way. The 
column, in all of its intended nastiness, has clearly hit on a nerve of a public 
debate as a dimension of cultural intimacy, dark secret of the divided nation, 
ready to resurface at times when the tensions boil over. The quote above 
reads like recapitulation of the binary opposites of the country, many dating 
back to the birth of the Republic but ultimately finding their expressive 
power in the encounter of the rural and the urban in the antagonistic spaces 
of Istanbul. The following are the archetypal characteristics of the divisions, 
recognized by everyone very soon after moving into Istanbul. Here, I will 
briefly clarify the dichotomies as a foundation for my own ethnographic 
examples. 
 First, there is reference to dress: men not sufficiently clad (wearing 
underwear – not swimming trunks – in public), women dressed 
inappropriately at the other end of the spectrum (covered in chadors or at 
least wearing headscarves). Next, Kırıkkanat moves to an age-old distinction 
in the city; the preference of the urbanites for fish, implicitly understood to 
be eaten accompanied with rakı, an alcoholic drink representing the urban 
sphere. The skillful grilling of fish is compared to fanning of the barbecue in 
“Carnivore Islamistan” (Etobur İslamistan), Anatolian anti-urbanity that has 
invaded the limits of the city (cf. Stoetzer 2014:81). The last sentences of the 
column extend the argument, the perceived failure of the migrants to adapt 
as their own fault, (“if they knew how to grill it [fish], they would not be just 
lying there”), a combination of negligence (wearing dirty clothes), inability to 
control their bodily movements (belching, ruminating [geviş getirmek means 
ruminating in the sense of chewing the cud, not ruminating on the nature of 
existence]), and, as being ill-formed, resembling monkeys, in the first place 
(“chubby, short-legged, long-armed and hairy!”). 
 I have come across people who have been just as rude with their 
depictions, arguing that all urbanites ultimately agree with them, but codes 
of cultural permissiveness prevent many from speaking their minds. This 
corresponded to a wider pattern that I encountered regularly: a view of 
contemporary urbanity as a compromise between irreconcilable elements, an 
abandonment of the Republican promise of incorporation. The result is a 
fragmented city where tension, suspicion and discrimination mark the 
encounters between different groups (see Ayata 2002:25). At the same time, 
it is widely acknowledged that there are really no alternatives. The situation 
is summarized very well in a commentary on public beach by Ali Çarkoğlu, a 
political scientist at the Sabancı University, following the debate initiated in 
Kırıkkanat’s column and picked up by Washington Post: "The people who 
were baking there were the prime establishment of Istanbul, imitating 
perhaps the French Riviera at the time, and they did not have to worry about 
the Anatolian newcomers […] but times have changed. Now they don't own 
Populist Modernity
151
this place. They don't even own the intellectual space. So they're going to 
have to live with this, I'm afraid.”88 
 A similar dynamic of invasion, in this case concerning not just a 
particular location but more complex flows of people, characterized a brief 
discussion I had with Veli about the changing geography of the city. We were 
talking about the expansion of Istanbul’s public transportation system and 
how some of the destinations would thus be easier to reach. I told him that I 
was happy about the planned connection across the Golden Horn that would 
make travel from the Atatürk Airport to Beyoğlu a much smoother 
experience. He agreed with me about the travel time but was slightly 
reserved about the news. He pointed out that this will also make it easier for 
people living in the massive housing projects to come to Istiklal Street, 
especially in the evenings. It was clear to me that he was referring 
particularly to groups of young men who were blamed for all kinds 
misbehaviour in the area. “What I am saying,” Veli begun in a slightly 
hesitant manner, “is that in the future people can jump directly from a seedy 
bar in Aksaray to Istiklal Street. There will be much more harassment of 
women and street fights.” He paused for a while and contemplated the right 
words: “I mean, of course everyone has a right to come here. We cannot stop 
people from coming – I just think that this will lead into problems and I 
have no idea what would be the solution.” Afterwards, he said that he had 
brought up the issue because his friend had been harassed by this kind of 
group but that this, naturally, should not have been basis for wider 
generalization.
 In these cases, arabesk identity was assigned to large groups of people 
whose presence in specific spaces pointed at a potential problem. They were 
lumped into a uniform category that represented the menacing side of 
Turkish modernity, an ever-present danger of corrupting its course. Next, I 
wish to discuss how these distinctions operate in the actual encounters 
between people in Beyoğlu. The following examples from my fieldwork stress 
the everyday realities of identifying the societal divisions and acting on their 
basis. As will be clear, occasionally the outcomes might be surprising for all 
the participants.
APPEARANCE AND LINGUISTIC COMPETENCE
At a very basic level, linguistic competence is one of the most significant 
ways to show one’s urbanity. Many of my informants, especially from the 
lower-income neighbourhoods, were very good at imitating different 
accents, a surprising feat especially for those who had learned Turkish 
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during their military service or after moving to Istanbul at an adult age. Of 
course, my accent with its idiosyncrasies was a constant source for jokes. 
Linguistic competence was, however, also a much more serious matter. The 
seriousness was related to how linguistic hierarchies were realized in the 
daily conduct of life in a socioculturally mixed area like Beyoğlu. I was once 
waiting for an interviewee in one of the more stylish cafes in the backstreets 
of Beyoğlu when an approximately fifty-year old man with a large moustache 
and a thick eastern accent walked in and asked for directions to a place 
nearby. A waitress by the bar answered to him very loudly in unintelligible 
murmur and stared at him in an aggressive way. The man left in an abrupt 
manner without saying anything. Later, I overheard the waitress complaining 
to the others working in the place: “What do we need to do to stop them 
coming here? It should be clear from the door that we do not sell kebab or 
kokoreç.” If nohutlu pilav represents the untainted rural Turkey, kokoreç, a 
spicy dish made of lamb intestines, captures the cultural intimacy of arabesk 
better than any other. Again, the food as a signifier of origins, values and 
mentalities repeats itself in practices of inclusion and exclusion. 
 I came across a similar, albeit a more ambiguous situation about 
linguistic proficiency a couple of months later when I thought I had learned 
these distinctions pretty well. This time I was with Okan, a recent friend of 
mine who had just graduated from a university-level engineering course. My 
attempts of mixing circles of friends, by no means an easy task in any 
country, had not always worked too harmoniously and I had learned to be 
cautious when introducing people from different backgrounds to each other. 
Okan did not fit very well into the stereotypical definitions of the elites and 
the masses; he came from a relatively wealthy family in Izmir, spoke very 
good English and had travelled widely. A couple of years younger than me, 
he had participated in the emerging, nowadays very prominent, Erasmus89 
student activities in the city. He often told me in very pragmatic terms that 
the Erasmus connections enabled him to build networks throughout Europe 
but had also helped him to find some of his best friends. Always dressed very 
stylishly, he, nonetheless, did not look like people identifying with Beyoğlu’s 
subcultural elites. He preferred to live in recently renovated house in the 
district of Eyüp, famous mostly as a centre for historical Islamic sites, but 
also catering for the middle-classes. At the same time, he enjoyed the bars 
around the Istiklal area and one was guaranteed to came across new 
acquaintances when spending time with him.
 We had just climbed up the hill to Istiklal Street from the seashore 
when Didem called me and asked me to come to pick up a CD she had 
compiled. She was drinking beer with friends in a nearby club, famous of its 
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uncompromising indie rock performances and a variety of DJs, from the 
outside not too different from the adjacent establishments, but one that had 
acquired a status of a subcultural hub for a group of Istanbulites. At first, 
Okan was happy to meet some of my friends; we had gotten to know each 
other only a few days ago when he sat in the same table while I was writing 
field notes in a bar nearby. When he heard the name of the place we were 
going to, he began to hesitate, told me that he has to make some phone calls 
and that we could meet after I come back. We started to discuss the matter – 
the exchange about the calls was just a polite way of checking if both are 
happy to talk about the real issues – and Okan told me that the bouncer had 
not let him in when he had gone to the club with some foreign women. I told 
him that I was surprised to hear this for he did not correspond to the 
stereotype of a troublemaker. He said that he could not care less about the 
people running the place and suggested that we go to check out what 
happens.
 We went to the door and to my surprise the doorman stopped Okan 
and asked him bluntly where he wants to go. I felt the need to interfere as the 
doorman also recognized me and looked at me for an explanation. I told him 
that Okan was a friend of mine and we will go upstairs to meet my friends. 
He let us in but the atmosphere had changed. We continued upstairs and sat 
at the table with Didem and two of her friends. The encounter began in a 
friendly way but I could sense some sort of caution on both sides. To my 
surprise, Okan switched to English immediately after sitting down (we 
generally spoke Turkish with each other). Didem knew English but her two 
artist friends, Batuhan and Neşe, knew only the basics. I tried to lighten up 
the mood by saying that I will be happy to speak the worst Turkish in the 
room but this did not alter the state of affairs. Neşe, in turn visibly disturbed 
by the situation, asked Okan what he does for living. He told her that he had 
just graduated and would work as an engineer for a big Turkish company. 
Okan followed by asking about her work and she answered very politely that 
she is an artist, specializing in multimedia installations. Okan interrupted 
the exchange at once and declared in a relatively aggressive way that I had 
not encountered before, nor ever after this occasion, that he had absolutely 
no idea what her words meant, nor interest to learn. It was clearly the time to 
pick up my CD and leave with Okan. 
 What surprised me the most was that there was almost no aftermath 
subsequent to the encounter. Once we had walked out, Okan said laughing 
that I should never take him back to this place and that I should be careful 
not to become like my friends inside. The next time I met Didem, she was 
rather amused about what happened and surprised of my new acquaintance 
and his behaviour. She interpreted Okan’s choice of speaking English as rude 
towards me, as offence against my Turkish, by no means perfect but 
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relatively fluent. For her, Okan was just in a wrong place and did not know 
how to behave. Not a big deal (bir şey değil).
 These two examples point at the centrality of appearance and linguistic 
competence as related to modernity and the limits of urban diversity. The 
use of regional accents and different languages acts as a tactical way to 
establish solidarities across the whole spectrum of groups, ranging from 
those created in ephemeral encounters to ones that reflect the strongest 
sentiments of belonging. The examples are ultimately about the global 
hierarchy of value. The local and global hierarchies have clashed before, their 
clashes have taken different shapes, situated in the framework of shifting 
power relations, but also reflected the tactics of the everyday, realized in 
occurrences that utilize the classifications in unpredictable ways. The 
diversity has also a spatial dimension; both Okan and Didem told me that 
they found the heterogeneity of the Western cities exciting and fascinating 
(see Ayata 2002 for similar reactions in a middle-class housing estate [site]) 
while in Istanbul the surprise encounters between different elements were 
associated with unpredictability and tension. 
 When I discussed the incident at the club later with other people, they 
unanimously agreed that the most probable cause for the doorman’s 
behaviour was based on gender dynamics. The idea of someone unalike the 
other customers, no matter how well-dressed and well-behaved, coming to 
the place would need to have predatory intentions. On Okan’s side, the 
prejudices were on the side of the patrons and clientele, who did not 
recognize him as an equal because he did not conform to a particular 
subcultural type. Misunderstandings like this are very common and have 
made a sense of urban belonging problematic. The waitress mumbling 
pejoratively to someone who she thinks is lower class is a blow below the 
belt, a gesture of humiliation on one’s own turf, that sets a clear boundary, in 
the manner of the times of the early Anatolian migration, of the separate 
worlds that the migrants and the urbanites inhabited. Okan’s case portrays 
many of the same themes but includes much more complex dynamics of 
power, drawing from the same principles, but getting lost from the 
paramount trajectories in the midst of intricate dividing lines. 
 It is correct to identify the key symbols of Republican urban sphere as 
alcohol and open display of women’s hair, in contrast to abstention and 
covering, that serve as markers of the lower-class or village origin (White 
2009:5). We can also define the culture of the uncouth masculinity 
(maganda) as a hybrid formation born in the interaction between the 
gecekondus and the urban centre (Öncü 2002). Most of the Turks 
acknowledge the generalized nature and redundancy of these categories but, 
nonetheless, keep using them to make sense of urban diversity. I consider 
them as reflecting a specific historical consciousness of modernity, 
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influenced by different periods and re-emerging in varied contexts. The ideas 
of the era of “populist modernity” influence the urban encounters in 
significant ways but they are nowadays located in the world that is very 
different from the conditions of their initial development. Next, I will discuss 
the qualities of what can be called the emergence of neoliberal Turkey, the 
period covering years from the military coup of 1980 until this day.
Populist Modernity
156
Chapter 7:
The Emergence of 
Neoliberalism and
Post-Kemalist Turkey
The time after the military coup of 1980 has been described as “casting aside 
a period” and a “beginning of a new age” (Ahiska and Yenal 2006:8), a 
period of economic restructuring that made Istanbul the “capitalist” capital 
of the country (Tokatli and Boyaci 1999:187), and an era of “epochal and 
totalizing transformation” (Öncü 2002:173), but many of the radical changes 
reflect back on the fundamental concerns that have resurfaced at different 
points of history. In the 1980s, Turgut Özal, Prime Minister of Turkey (1983–
1989), would declare that the country had “skipped an epoch” (çağ atlamak) 
in its modernization, “implying that the reforms that were implemented 
were irreversible and that Turkey had been firmly placed on the path of 
continuing liberalisation and progress” (Kasaba 2008:1). In their emphasis 
on novelty, the expressions, nevertheless, resemble considerably the rhetoric 
of the early Republic, especially its goal of “closing the gap with civilized 
countries” (Ahiska and Yenal 2006:160).
 The flood of foreign influences in the form of commodities, images and 
sounds gave birth to increased differentiation through consumption, saw the 
emergence of a concept of lifestyle (yaşam tarzı, yaşam stili) and transformed 
many of the established boundaries and hierarchies of the city (Ahiska and 
Yenal 2006:5, Öncü 2002:173). The typically postmodern emphasis on 
consumption choices as the prime matter of identity politics, out of which 
the real political changes will derive, has become increasingly criticized (see 
especially Graeber 2001:x–xii), but, in my view, it cannot be ignored 
completely. More than anything, it represents consciousness of a new era 
with its different practices of self-creation, perhaps masking ideological 
processes but nevertheless experienced as real. Öncü describes the shift as 
diversification on several grounds, not restricted to the foreign imports:
In the 1980s, when the inhabitants of Istanbul were introduced to McDonald 
hamburgers, Toblerone chocolate and Italian pizzas, they also got to know 
hamsili kebap, the taste of Kayseri mantı, red cabbage, and the distinct 
flavours of Urfa, Antep and Bursa kebaps. They adopted the image of an 
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Istanbul that linked past and present, opening its arms to the various cultures 
of the last 1500 years. (in Robins and Aksoy 1995:228)
While conducting my fieldwork, the common experience of the 
impoverished precariat and the middle-class urbanites was of increased 
fragmentation of their life-worlds, unpredictable future with shifting senses 
of belonging, combined with constant insecurity of the achievements 
disappearing into thin air.
 In my analysis, the emphasis is on the awareness of the value assigned 
to urbanity, not defined as a singular concept, but an array of sociocultural 
dimensions specific to a life in a megalopolis. It shares foundations with 
Simmel’s Metropolis and Mental Life (1976 [1903]); combination of blasé and 
relentless eye for detail; Berman’s strange mixture of reality and fantasy, the 
message of the street as a whole (1982:196), the shared experience of being 
together, even if only stuck in an endless traffic jam (2006:xxii), or, as my 
friend Ridvan put it, having one foot in the city centre to know what’s 
happening in the world. In the manner of my analysis of the previous 
periodizations, the focus here is not on the properties of an isolated subject, 
but on encounters, both with the abstract principles of modernity and the 
actual encounters of people in the city, involving persistent traits of 
cultural intimacy, reactions to “relocation of Istanbul in the national 
imaginary” (Stokes 2010:151), organized again and again through 
metaleptic acts of communication. In order to understand the specificities 
of this period, it is best to begin with a discussion of societal changes and 
definitions associated with neoliberalism. I will discuss them in the light 
the AKP’s rise to power, new social fault lines created by neo-Ottomanism 
and the shift in the role of the military in twenty-first century Turkey.
Neoliberal Configuration in Istanbul and Turkey
In many ways, Istanbul has followed the course of de-industrialized global 
cities around the world. Its service sectors and culture industries have 
become increasingly prominent, albeit employing less people than in New 
York or London (Keyder 2010:26), and there are ambitious plans to create 
new urban centres, often involving radical restructuring, both to the east and 
west of the city centre (Sudjic 2009:4). At the same time, Istanbul’s urban 
space remains polarized: its central area is becoming unattainable for poorer 
segments of society and its peripheries resemble small Anatolian towns 
(Keyder 2008:521). In the political sphere, Republican modernity has 
become increasingly challenged by political Islam and global currents of 
capitalism, not necessarily hostile to one another, but, as I will suggest, 
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presenting together an exemplary case to understand Turkey’s neoliberal 
configuration. 
 In its most widely spread usage, the term neoliberalism (neoliberalizm) 
refers to free-market capitalism, “belief in the ontological primacy of market 
economic frames of reference as a way of acting within the economy and the 
state” (Atasöy 2009:19), or, on a more concrete level, “liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free 
trade” (Harvey 2005:2). In Turkey, the term is usually used with reference to 
global questions of the directions capitalism has taken. At the time of my 
fieldwork, its use was restricted mostly to discussions in the social sciences 
but it has later gained prominence in other contexts, especially after the Gezi 
Park protests. I wish to ask here how neoliberalism, as a set of historically 
emerging tendencies, a distinct sense of self and a set of attitudes towards 
modernity, redefines historical narratives and shifts Turkey’s relative 
location.
 Helga Leitner’s characterization of neoliberalism at the level of the 
subject summarizes these tendencies excellently: “logics of individualism 
and entrepreneurialism, equating individual freedom with self-interested 
choices, making individuals responsible for their own well-being, and 
redefining citizens as consumers and clients” (2007:1–2). These 
transformations are, of course, closely tied to macro-economic policies but 
have also surprising connections with culturally intimate sociocultural 
categories. The change from a state-dominated and protectionist model of 
modernization to the market-led one has brought up new conceptual 
frameworks of belonging, related especially to religion, often adopted 
enthusiastically by people who have been in power during both periods 
(Atasöy 2009, Özyürek 2006). In addition to new rules and regulations, 
neoliberal attitudes have altered senses of nostalgia and relationships 
towards history (Özyürek 2006:8), social hierarchies related to consumption 
patterns and, most importantly with regard to this study, produced new 
kinds of encounters that have redrawn the urban boundaries and redefined 
modernity and Turkey’s position in the global scale. 
AFTER THE 1980 COUP – THE RISE OF ISLAMIC POLITICS 
If the birth of the Republic in 1923 symbolically marked the boundary 
between two epochs, and the victory of the Democrat Party in the 1950 
parliamentary elections was another important watershed between the old 
and the new, the 1980 military coup defines the rupture in another novel 
way. In brief, the violence between left-wing and right-wing factions had left 
over 5,000 dead and nearly 20,000 wounded in the two years before the coup 
d’état, initiated by the military (Çağlar 1990:79). It is noteworthy that the 
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Chief of the General Staff, General Kenan Evren, used the metaphor of a sick 
body in relation to Turkey to describe the crisis: “If sickness is not 
diagnosed, proper medication cannot be prescribed. Because proper 
medication had not been administered, sickness spread through the entire 
body. At this point, the Turkish Armed Forces, with the power delegated by 
the people, had to intervene once again to initiate medical treatment” (in 
Ahiska and Yenal 2006:43). The nation as a living body, subject to operations 
to keep it healthy, is a recurrent theme in the Republican narrative – still 
very prominent among nationalists (see especially White 2013). I will argue 
below that this sense of unity has given way to fragmentation and 
unbridgeable divisions, associated with neoliberal politics.
 The coup was followed by three years of military rule and a new 
constitution in 1982, before Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party (ANAP) won a 
majority in the election and he became the Prime Minister in 1983. This 
marked a change in the political culture of the nation. The simultaneously 
neoliberal and conservative strain of the new government is summarized by 
Andrew Mango as a change in the paramount values of the Republic: “to 
serve the state as a soldier or an administrator was the proper career for a 
gentleman. Özal gave social status to moneymaking” (2004:86). The new 
administration was at first increasingly critical of religious sensibilities: for 
example, in line with the Republican tradition of micro-politics through 
control of appearances, government employees were ordered to remove all 
facial hair (Kandiyoti 1997:124). However, the radical varieties of the politics 
at the left–right spectrum were the principal concern and gradually the 
administration allowed more room for religious expression. This had an 
impact on the position of the Anatolian segments within the urban sphere; 
first transformed from authentic peasants to corrupt hybrids, contaminated 
by the arabesk culture, the cultural hierarchy was about change again. The 
Anatolians, previously forcefully separated from their histories, institutions, 
beliefs, identities and cultures, started to concentrate on them with a 
renewed vigour (Kasaba 1997:16). The increasingly wealthy pious 
populations expressed their values, formerly restricted into the privacy of 
their homes, in the form of newly established hotels with sex-segregated 
pools, restaurants which did not serve alcohol and through Islamic media 
and fashion (Özyürek 2006:97–98). This signified yet another sense of 
modernity, the prerogative to participate in its global reach from an Islamic 
position.
 The changed atmosphere reached also the impoverished and squatter 
neighbourhoods where the Republican People’s Party (CHP), associated with 
the values of Atatürk, secular Republic and social democracy, began to lose 
hold for the Islamic parties such as the Welfare Party (RP) and its successor 
The Emergence of Neoliberalism and Post-Kemalist Turkey
160
the Virtue Party (FP),90  whose political preferences were closer to those of 
the migrants (Kirişci 2008:189). The neoliberal reforms of the Özal 
government would, however, be abandoned shortly after a spirited entry into 
a new epoch. Kasaba summarizes the 1990s as a “a decade of protracted 
paralysis, prompting at least one analyst to describe the 1990s as ‘the years 
that the locust hath eaten’” (2008:1). The instability of the governments, 
widespread corruption and dependency on foreign investment ultimately led 
into an economic crisis in 2001, a year that also signalled a profound change 
in the political sphere.
THE AKP AND THE BLACK TURKS
????Justice and Development Party (AKP), founded in 2001, won the 2002 
elections with over one third of the national vote and has maintained its 
position as the largest party for the following 13 years with a very successful 
combination emphasizing its Islamic roots and populist orientation to 
politics. The values promoted by the AKP highlight the themes that have 
been at the heart of Turkish politics throughout the modern period but the 
party has shifted some of their emphases in crucial ways. A quote outlining 
the aims of the party, from Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the founder of the AKP, 
the Prime Minister of Turkey from 2003 to 2014, the leader of the party until 
2014, and currently the President of Turkey, illustrates the closeness of its 
values to those promoted by Atatürk:
The reproduction of our own authentic value systems on the basis of our 
deeply rooted ideational tradition, along with the universal standards adopted 
within a conservative political orientation. (Akdoğan in Atasöy 2009:10, 
translation by Atasöy, italics in the original)
On a surface level, the emphasis on authenticity and universal standards 
could be from an early Republican speech, stressing the glorious past of the 
Turks and the universal criteria of civilization to be achieved. However, on a 
closer look, the categories of belonging are reorganized according to a very 
different, distinctively post-Kemalist sense of modernity. 
 I use the term post-Kemalism to refer to a country that is increasingly 
questioning its Kemalist heritage: the strict secularism, preeminence of 
military and strong ideology of nationalism. The shift is expressed in the 
rhetoric of the quote above. First, there is ambiguity over the “deeply rooted 
ideational tradition” and “universal standards”: in Kemalist terms, the first 
would refer to Turkic origins in Central Asia and the second to Western, 
Enlightenment-influenced modernity. While the AKP is not strictly opposed 
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to these definitions of authenticity and modernity, its focus has been more 
selective. Jenny White outlines the AKP’s projected values with an aim to 
establish “an idealized Muslim community set within democratic, secular 
(but not laicist) system of governance” (2013:176). This sense of belonging is 
based on taking part in the Muslim community (ümmet) while still being 
ethnic Turk and embracing modernity as democracy and secularism – but 
opposing the Republican administration’s elitism and antidemocratic 
practices. Erdoğan has himself referred to the relationship between Islam 
and democracy in a way that highlights his pragmatist populism: “Islam is a 
religion; democracy is a way of ruling. You can’t compare the two. We just 
want to increase the happiness of the people” (in Pope 2012).
 The AKP has reshuffled the hierarchies of value in Turkey on different 
levels. On a macro-level, its identification with the borders of the Ottoman 
Empire and aspiration to play more substantial role as leader in regional 
developments has marked a shift in the relative location of the country. 
While this orientation has become more pronounced in the later years of its 
rule, it is also important to remember that the AKP started with a very 
strong pro-EU stance. The neo-Ottoman current of its politics has been 
balanced vis-á-vis Turkey’s integration with Europe. On a smaller scale, 
referring to Istanbul’s spatial relations, Erdoğan has emphasized his origins 
in its mahalles, and, thus, himself as natural protector of their inhabitants. Of 
the four pre-eminent politicians to rule Turkey after the World War II, only 
Adnan Menderes came from a relatively wealthy family of landowners. 
While his successors, Süleyman Demirel and Turgut Özal came from modest 
provincial backgrounds, Erdoğan was the first one born in Istanbul, in 1954, 
in an impoverished neighbourhood of Kasımpaşa, next to Tarlabaşı and 
almost across the road from the Istiklal area. This has allowed him to tie his 
politics intimately to the classificatory practices of urban Istanbul.
 The rift between the elites and the masses has been revitalized in 
Erdoğan’s politics but he no longer addresses the separate communities of 
Anatolian villagers or the recently arrived peasants on their way to urbanity 
and modernity in gecekondu settlements. The division between arabesk and 
high culture has shifted into Black Turks (siyah or kara Türkler) and White 
Turks (beyaz Türkler), with Erdoğan associating himself and his party on the 
side of an “average Turk.” Michael Ferguson describes this strategy as “a 
staple of his self-branding as the great outsider, disinterested and removed 
from the politics of twentieth-century single-party rule and corruption, just 
a simple man trying to get things done for Turkey” (2014:79). According to 
Erdoğan, Black Turks have been suffering from discrimination in a society 
characterized by unequal opportunities but now, as his own example would 
show, the time for change has come and the upward social mobility would be 
determined by anyone’s own actions, not by the circumstances of their birth 
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(79). This has led to populist divisive politics instead of coalition-building, 
perhaps a strategic move by the party to secure electoral victories, 
summarized simply but very effectively by Erdoğan: “In this country there 
are White Turks, as well as Black Turks. Your Brother Tayyip [Erdoğan] is 
from the Black Turks” (in Ferguson 2014:79). However, not everyone felt 
included into this new category. My informants living in the impoverished 
mahalles connected his proposed revival of more authentic and just Turkey 
into the chain of betrayals and unfulfilled political promises.
FOOLING THE POPULACE – THE CASE OF ELECTIONS AND REFRIGERATORS
Ridvan was particularly disturbed by the recent events before the local 
elections in March 2009. Like most of my friends, he experienced party 
politics as somewhat distant from his everyday life, in his own words as 
“something that you could relate to only when you have an adequate salary 
and possessions.” He was not too interested in differences between the 
political parties and had developed a distrustful attitude towards the 
promises of the politicians. He had seen the discussions of reforms and 
improvements resurfacing consistently before the elections but being 
forgotten soon afterwards. Most of all, he was angry and disappointed of the 
false promises of modernity, for him a cynical game carried out to fool the 
ignorant voters.
 There had just been news of the AKP’s aggressive campaigning in the 
Eastern Anatolian province of Tunceli that caught the attention of the media. 
The government had initiated a campaign to distribute household appliances 
worth millions of dollars to its inhabitants, on the basis of providing access 
to basic necessities.91  The items consisted of a wide variety but the campaign 
became quickly identified with refrigerators, often donated to households cut 
off from the electric grid. For Ridvan, this was an insult, intricately tied to his 
sense of modernity. Interestingly, he saw the act as redrawing the societal 
fault lines. The people who had managed to rise into power were now 
abusing their privilege by buying votes, repeating the populist patterns of the 
dominant parties before, only to secure their re-election. Despite the 
criticism, he said that the scheme would probably work because the villagers 
and the small-town folk would not understand the meaning of politics. He 
also stated that before the AKP other parties had only had a minimal contact 
with people outside the cities. Our discussion in front of my home was 
interrupted by an Islamist Felicity Party (SAADET) campaign van, circling 
around Tophane with a catchy tune blaring from its speakers. Ridvan was 
just as cynical of their promises: he claimed angrily that this was another 
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example of a party that used religion to acquire high societal positions: if 
they would ever win, they would retreat back to their own networks and 
secure favours for one another.
 We carried on the discussion that soon extended outside the 
boundaries of villages and mahalles. According to Ridvan, the European 
Union accession talks were part of the same plot to buy votes with false 
promises. Everyone who would stop to think for a moment would know that 
the plan was unrealistic, and the politicians knew it too. He used the example 
of the Ottoman army at the Gates of Vienna, still a very common trope in 
Turkey, as an event from which Europe had still not recovered. For Ridvan, it 
was this narrative that still constructed Turkey as an enemy among the 
globally dominant powers. The promises of membership were giving false 
hope for people who dreamed about moving to Western Europe. If handing 
out fridges was pure corruption, the promise of EU accession was just 
another slightly more sophisticated way of fooling the people. He said that 
the AKP had thus constructed its own Black Turks while claiming to be their 
brothers and representatives. Ridvan finished by saying that this was not 
modern (modern) politics – urbanites would be aware of these contradictions. 
 For people like Ridvan, despite their humble backgrounds and low 
levels of education, support for a political party would not be defined by 
straightforward identification with its declared values, nor on self-interested 
individual choices. The question was about recognition and dignity. Even if 
the actions of the parties were not identified as explicitly neoliberal, the 
perceived ethos of selfishness and constant competition for profits in the 
short term were very close to definitions of neoliberal governance. Living in 
Istanbul had enabled him to see behind the empty rhetoric, unlike people 
who lived in small villages, out of touch with what is happening in the wider 
world. Nonetheless, what kept him feeling even more alienated from politics 
was the lack of alternatives – the authoritarian modernity of the Kemalist 
military-state was even worse than the deceptive populism of the AKP. He 
saw Kemalists largely through their connection with the military, an 
institution whose position had altered significantly in recent times.
A CHOICE BETWEEN THE AKP AND THE MILITARY
The increased freedom of religious practices in the 1990s was countered by 
the military on February 28, 1997, in what has been labelled “Postmodern 
coup” (“post-modern darbe”), a bloodless campaign concerted by the military 
with an aim to penalize businesses financing political Islam and restrict its 
role in society, especially in education (Mango 2004:96). The action led to 
resignation of the Welfare Party Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan (1996–
1997), paving the way for the victories of the AKP in 2002. For many of my 
informants, when conducting my fieldwork in 2008–2009, the postmodern 
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coup marked the last successful intervention by the military; after that the 
scales had turned for the AKP’s favour. The clashes between the military and 
the AKP government continued over the “e-memorandum” (“e-muhtıra”) 
controversy over the presidential election of Abdullah Gül in 2007. In this 
occasion, the age-old pattern over the control of appearances in public space, 
showcasing Turkey’s relationship to modernity, was raised again. 
 The attention focussed on the türban-style headscarf worn by Gül’s 
wife, a choice (and a statement) that the military objected to by publishing a 
note on its website. The wording gave clear suggestion that the boundaries of 
secularist modernity had been crossed: “Loyalty to the Republican regime 
must be demonstrated through action, not on the surface but in 
essence” (Genelkurmay Baskanlığı 27 April 2007, in Atasöy 2009:4, 
translated by Atasöy). Ersel Aydınlı identifies a different attitude towards  the 
military after the 1997 coup, suggesting decreasing trust towards the 
institution and its increased non-hierarchical initiatives, in comparison to 
the powerful homogeneous force that organized the 1980 coup (2011:228). 
The e-memorandum, regarded by large segments of Turkish society as 
excessive and inappropriate, contributed negatively to the military’s image 
(230–231). This was followed shortly by series of trials associated with the 
clandestine organization named Ergenekon, with a supposed aim to bring 
down the AKP government. Many of the military officers were put on trial 
and received lengthy prison sentences in 2013. At the time of writing, the 
latest development in the relations between the AKP and the military has 
been the sentencing of Kenan Evren, the leader of the 1980 military coup, to 
life imprisonment in June 2014. Here, I am summarizing very complex 
historical developments in a few sentences because the focus of my study is 
not on the assessment of politics per se, but on how the changes are 
entangled with the formation of a specific historical consciousness of the 
everyday. The latest developments signified a sense of the beginning of a new 
era, another break with the past, perhaps even more volatile but no longer 
dominated by the threat of military dictatorship.
EXPERIENCES OF MILITARY SERVICE
Before moving on to assess in detail how the neo-Ottoman position has 
challenged the dominant Republican understanding of Turkish modernity, I 
want to show how different attitudes towards the military in present-day 
Turkey utilize metaleptic operations to comment on its role. The following 
experiences of Osman and Şivan take several principles of Turkish 
modernity from different times together and provide yet another way to 
combine them. They point at the persistence of the early Republican 
narrative of the military as the champion of secular Turkey.
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 At the time of my fieldwork, Osman was struggling with the inevitable 
reality of compulsory military service, a duty for all Turkish males. Like 
many others with higher education and lucrative job prospects, he had 
managed to deter his military service for years, but now he had no 
alternatives left. He was most afraid of the uncertainty and had no idea 
where he would be drafted to. In Turkey, the military has adopted a practice 
of often making those from the big cities to serve in the peripheral outposts 
and, vice versa, assigning rural Turks to urban environments. I asked him 
whether he was afraid and was somewhat surprised by his reaction. Instead 
of reflecting on his feelings, he brought up his ethnic origins as an important 
quality. “I have told you several times that I come from a Tartar family. We 
are the true Turkic nomads, not like the sedentary Turks who now control 
this country.” He then connected his origins to personal characteristics: “We 
are also different from the majority in that we still act like nomads; we are 
not frightened easily and we adapt fluently to constantly changing 
environments. We are the original Turkish warriors that have now been 
sidelined by people who claim to be authentic Turks. I would be happy to 
serve in a real Turkish army but not in one ruled by these idiots.” 
 Following this, Osman pointed out how the nomadic past is used 
“politically” – “Every Turk is born a soldier” (“her Türk asker doğar”) is a 
common phrase, found in everyday discussions, school textbooks and used as 
a drill slogan in military service (Altınay 2004:13; White 2013:3). He uttered 
these words full of contempt in reference to his own situation. They were 
usually associated with courage and self-reliance when facing threat or 
opposition, but could also be used to communicate disappointment at a nation 
that would cling to its corrupt stereotypes and send its men to inhospitable 
locations for what, in the opinion of many, was waste of time. At the same 
time, he connected the exemplary origins of his ancient roots with qualities of 
quick adaptation and individual daring necessary in the contemporary world. 
The narrative rested on the modernist principles of Republican Turkey but, 
simultaneously, accused the people in power of corrupting the Turkish 
essence. This was very different from Şivan’s understanding of the military, an 
institution he related to in more practical terms.
 Şivan expressed his relationship towards the military by balancing 
between personal experiences and widely shared narratives of the most 
fundamental categories of belonging. He shared stories of the violent acts 
committed by the military in his youth, culminating in the evacuation of his 
village. After having been humiliated by its soldiers, he was called for 
military service. On one of our first ever discussions, he raised the issue of 
military service. Usually calm and a bit reserved, especially when expected to 
talk about himself, Şivan became very agitated, called military service a form 
of slavery and said that the period, in his case over a year of service, had 
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been the worst of his life. In his group, there were clear divisions; some 
people were getting preferential treatment and the others, especially the 
Kurds, were being treated like animals. He pointed at the fundamental 
division that became apparent on his first day of service. Most of the Kurds 
in his group could only speak basic Turkish and Şivan thought that they had 
been intentionally grouped together. They would then be shouted at by the 
officers and allocated menial tasks, to remind them, as well as the others, 
constantly of their status.
 According to Şivan, the experience had made him to lose his faith in 
the Turkish nation; all the promises of the politicians would not make any 
difference if this kind of behaviour was allowed. After telling me of the 
inhumane conditions, he said that he did not want to carry on talking about 
the matter; he was now done with it and wanted to have as little as possible 
to do with the military, or the state for that matter. He was deservedly proud 
for landing on a job at the real estate agency, with good (and later attained) 
prospects for a better position, of learning relatively good Turkish and basic 
English and cultivating his streetwise personality, feeling at home within the 
community-oriented life in Tarlabaşı, as well as in the urban bustle of the 
Istiklal area. In the neoliberal spirit of contemporary Istanbul, he considered 
himself close to an entrepreneur who had achieved his position despite the 
antagonistic policies of the Turkish state, symbolized by its military, without 
compromising his authentic sense of self.
 The cases of Osman and Şivan point at the metaleptic operations 
combining the culturally intimate understandings of history with the grand 
narratives of Republican Turkey. In the previous sections I have argued that 
the historical consciousness of modernity does not consist of a uniform set 
of practices, values and appearances that could be tested against an ideal 
model. Turkish modernity can be divided into different periods, each 
redefining societal boundaries with their distinct spheres of influence, 
hierarchies and promises. However, the influence of its previous 
configurations does not stop when a new era begins and they do not form a 
coherent evolutionary continuum. In the next section, I wish to conclude my 
discussion on Turkish modernity by showing how the dominant Republican 
narrative has been challenged with another one that prioritizes the Ottoman 
period as the authentic and exemplary sociocultural reality.
Neo-Ottomanism and New Forms of Islam as 
Challenges to Dominant Hierarchies
In the last sections, I have traced the themes of Turkish modernity mostly 
from the Republican viewpoint because both my informants and majority of 
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historical studies frame it according to the dominant reading. Even the most 
critical accounts of the topic have to deal with this authoritative position. 
However, the picture becomes richer with a look at the stances that prioritize 
the Ottoman and Islamic readings of history. I have referred to them in the 
previous chapters of the study in several different forms: the spatial order of 
the mahalles obstructing the modernization of the country, the plans to 
“reconquer” Taksim Square by building a new mosque and restoring the 
Ottoman-era military barracks, the shift of Turkey’s relative location with an 
emphasis on alliances with the former Ottoman dominions, and, how the 
sociocultural principles of the Ottoman era have been preserved and 
cultivated despite their forceful suppression by the state. 
 Here, I will examine the relatively new formation of neo-Ottomanism 
(Yeni Osmanlıcılık) as a case that sheds light on these dynamics. It 
emphasizes conscious appropriation of particular features and elements of 
the Ottoman times into the present-day conditions and is thus deeply 
integrated into the metaleptic operations of the modern self. Arguably, it 
rose into wider public recognition through Islamic politics, such as 
Necmettin Erbakan’s Millî Görüş (National View) movement, based on 
universalistic Islamic aspirations in the 1970s, and inspired several Islamic 
parties, often banned quickly after their foundation by the secular 
authorities. In the recent years, the emphasis on the formerly downplayed 
glories of the Ottoman Empire has been on the rise in imaginative ways, 
enforced especially by the political calls of the current President Erdoğan 
and Prime Minister Davutoğlu from the AKP. Neo-Ottomanism has brought 
together policy makers, intellectuals and popular movements looking for 
alternatives to what they see as the authoritarian and elitist character of the 
Kemalist values. It is important to note here, that the neo-Ottoman 
paradigm in the political sphere, distinct from its everyday understandings, 
should be seen as “essentially about projecting Turkey's ‘soft power’ – a 
bridge between East and West, a Muslim nation, a secular state, a democratic 
political system, and a capitalistic economic force” (Taşpınar 2008:3) – not a 
straightforward “denial of achievements of Ataturk, but as a sign of 
reconciliation, normalization, and correction of excesses associated with 
radical Kemalism” (3). White summarizes the novel formation of Muslim 
nationalism as a distinctively post-imperial sensitivity acted out by a “pious 
Muslim Turk whose subjectivity and vision for the future is shaped by an 
imperial Ottoman past overlaid onto republican state framework, but 
divorced from the Kemalist state project” (2013:9). In my analysis, I will 
continue with the juxtaposition of official narratives with culturally intimate 
understandings. 
 I argue that the resurgent neo-Ottoman principles have challenged the 
official histories and reshaped the categories of Muslimhood. Jenny White 
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summarizes this theme excellently in an interview for the newspaper Today’s 
Zaman:
Muslimhood implies a different understanding of personhood. If you are a 
pious Muslim and you enter politics, the assumption is that you become an 
Islamist. But the theologians behind the Muslimhood model ask: ‘Why should 
that be so? Do Christian politicians become Christianists when they enter 
politics?’92
According to this view, the category of pious Muslim has been extended to 
cover a wider sense of personhood, including novel connections to 
traditions. The past can be evaluated in a new light if it can be connected 
with the present in morally appropriate ways. The ideology of neo-
Ottomanism has been popular among large segments of society, offering a 
desirable category of identification compatible with the contemporary 
conditions (Walton 2010).
REBIRTH OF THE EMPIRE
In everyday life, it is easy to fall under the charm of the grandeur of the 
Ottoman era. In Istanbul, its legacy is encountered on a daily basis: the 
monumental Ottoman mosques dominate the skyline, numerous fountains 
and tombs are scattered around the city, often in unexpected places, 
signifying the past era with descriptions in Ottoman Arabic script, 
indecipherable for the great majority of the inhabitants. There are also novel 
contexts that bring culturally intimate understandings of the past into the 
present: architectural styles with references to the Ottoman period have 
become increasingly popular (Walton 2010), there are fashion houses whose 
collections are influenced heavily by the Ottoman legacy, catering for both 
pious and secular publics (Gökariksel and Secor 2010, White 2002) and 
Ottoman-style food, especially in luxury settings and complemented with 
stories reflecting the bygone era, has hit Istanbul by the storm 
(Karaosmanoğlu 2009). It is often difficult to distinguish, especially in a 
country where the outward appearances have been strictly regulated and 
employ complex significations, where the boundary between superficial 
decoration and a moral or political message is drawn. Representations 
influenced by the Ottoman era cater for very different communities; some 
are drawn to them as ephemeral styles and fashions, others with archival 
interest of the period disregarded in Kemalist Turkey, and there is a group of 
people who take the social structure based on the Ottoman era and its 
Islamic principles much more seriously, as models for the creation of a better 
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society. As a moral issue, connected to the qualities of the modern self, the 
question is largely about the rediscovery of an authentic tradition or, 
conversely, a sign of cultural decadence which can only bring forth “the 
simulacra of a dead past” (cf. Sahlins 2000:479). 
 Furthermore, the practices and appearances associated with the 
Ottoman Empire are not based on a uniform tradition of thought but 
combine and reinterpret Islamic and Ottoman histories, making use of 
categories that are without clear boundaries and subject to ferocious debates, 
especially when projected on realities of the present day. Among the people 
with just a little formal education, many ideas of Ottoman social fabric were 
based on vernacular accounts, popular newspapers and the rhetoric of the 
political parties advocating these positions. Their principles often resonated 
with moral qualities of dignified life. Of my key informants, Ahmet 
subscribed to many of these views but found it difficult to express them in a 
coherent manner. He aimed at more pious life in the city but both the 
exemplary past and the progressive future felt elusive to him: “The problem 
here is that so many people use Islam to advocate corrupt aims. We would 
need to establish a society that is law-abiding and just – I know it has never 
existed after the times of the prophet, but we would need to make it happen. 
The Ottomans tried but did not succeed.” I asked him what was wrong with 
the Ottoman model and he called it imperialist. He also felt that the epochs 
of the past cannot be replicated but would need to be updated to something 
completely new. Thus, the introjective and projective metaleptic operations 
worked hand in hand but did not result in a satisfying historical 
consciousness. 
 Ahmet added that he wants to live in an Islamic society but that does 
not mean Afghanistan’s Taliban regime nor the Islamic Republic of Iran. Our 
discussion ended with Ahmet saying that he is just a village-boy in a big city 
– these things are too complicated for him and Turkey would need new 
leadership that knows how to take care of them. He would prefer several 
features associated with the Ottoman epoch, entangled in the folk histories 
of the era, but could not come up with a comprehensive model of a society. 
He, like my other informants living in impoverished conditions, associated 
Republican rule with the arbitrary power of the military and the police,93 
democracy as restricted to the upper echelons of the society and the others’ 
complete entry to modernity still prevented by these constraints. To counter 
this, he saw the politics of the Ottoman era as more flexible in relation to 
minority identities and diversity within society. The notion of millet 
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provided a fitting way to illustrate the relationship between written history 
and its tactical application to societal realities.
SOLIDARITY AND COMMUNITY IN THE OTTOMAN REALM
In Chapter 2, I described how Ahmet was perplexed by the Ottoman social 
mosaic he still imagined inhabiting the Greek and Jewish neighbourhoods of 
Fener and Balat. This millet system, as an abstract principle, has been 
embraced in contemporary times as a way to relate to the problems of 
coexistence, pluralism and democracy (see e.g. Akyol 2011). In the popular 
understandings that I encountered, it was the almost disappeared non-
Muslim millets that especially influenced the present-day readings. The 
estimates94 suggest that by the 1980s the number of Armenians was down to 
50,000, Jews to 25,000 and Greeks to between 2,000 and 3,000 (Keyder 
2008:509) and the numbers have remained close to those levels (Kirişci 
2008:183). According to the contemporary neo-Ottoman view, found in 
everyday discussions, political programs and academic discussions (see 
Taşpınar 2008 for an analysis of different positions), the millets represent the 
harmonious multiculturalism of the Ottoman times, as the solution to 
contemporary problems of cultural difference despite the fact that most 
people from the model communities have left long ago. 
 In addition to religious communities, Ahmet connected the millet 
solidarities to regional specialization. He would often refer to these 
stereotypical qualities to make his point about someone. The Thracians had 
the best sense of humour in Turkey and were closer to the West in their 
manners; the Laz of the Black Sea coast had shrewd business instincts and 
dominated the construction industries, the Kurds were strict about questions 
of honour. In a similar manner, Mango traces the occupational specialization 
as continuum from the Ottoman era:
This [Ottoman] mosaic was gradually destroyed by nationalists in the 
nineteenth century. Almost all Christians are gone, but there are still traces of 
ethnic and regional specialization: sailors come predominantly from the Black 
Sea coast; the central Anatolian town of Kayseri keeps alive Armenian skills in 
trade; people of Caucasian origin are prominent in senior military ranks; 
heavy manual labour often falls to the lot of the Kurds. (Mango 2004:18)
It goes without saying that most countries have powerful stereotypes of their 
different regions. However, in Turkey, this was a constant fact encountered in 
everyday life. Just as many buildings – even whole blocks or streets – in 
neighbourhoods like Tarlabaşı accommodated people originating from same 
region, many of the jobs were also organized to a large degree according 
regional principles. For example, a stereotype that corresponds to reality is 
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that people selling stuffed mussels (midiye dolma) in the streets of Istanbul 
are from Mardin (Ahiska and Yenal 2006:134). Most of the smaller 
enterprises dealing with construction and renovation consist, based in my 
experience, from people originating from the same area and many other 
businesses would pay attention to regional origins when employing people – 
resulting in practices of inclusion as well as exclusion. When I once asked 
Ahmet what he thinks about the future of Istanbul in these terms, whether 
the long-established categories of belonging are going to wither away in 
increasingly globalized Turkey, he denied the possibility: “I have relatives 
living in Germany and the Kurds there are united like a family, it is 
something you cannot take away. Without my family and friends in the 
mahalle I would be scared to death of Istanbul. I just could not live here and 
I do not understand why you come here alone. I understand that you can 
keep in contact with your relatives using the Internet but for me that would 
be impossible way of life.”
 For Ahmet, just like to many others in the earlier examples of cultural 
intimacy, these were inescapable realities: the categories from ethnicity to 
religion, from clan (aşiret) to village, formed important classifications that 
resulted in loyalties. Ahmet associated them with his ambiguous notion of 
the Ottoman Empire and explicitly opposed them to the Republican category 
of citizenship to distance himself from modernist uniformity. What made 
the situation difficult was the necessity to be included in both: modern 
citizenship was not clear-cut from the other categories but they emerged in 
different situations and spaces. Ultimately, they were based on different 
moral frameworks, resting on often contradictory conceptualizations of 
community and agency.
 The rights associated with citizenship could be claimed on individual, 
ethnic or class-based grounds, often in the course of the same discussion. To 
observe these contextual shifts, I have chosen to present my ethnographic 
material in this section mostly as individual narratives that combine 
different orientations towards history and deal with the apparent confusion. 
In one particularly illuminating case, Ridvan, after telling me of the 
difficulties of opening his store in Istanbul, explained how he saw the 
treacherous nature of his position, by referring to individuals, ethnic 
categories as well as class positions, and contrasted these to what he saw as 
the Ottoman order:
As a Kurd you do not have a chance in Turkey. When I say this somebody 
always points out that there are successful Kurdish people in politics, culture, 
sports, everywhere. This is true but it also means that if these people would 
defend Kurdish rights like I do they would not be successful anymore. We should 
stick together because that is the only way to succeed in Turkey. It does not help 
if just some people become rich and famous. In the Ottoman times, when the 
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Southeast was Kurdish territory, we did great things and nobody would interfere 
with us because we were united. This is no longer the case.
The strive for social justice can be presented as a critique of elitist Kemalism 
by emphasizing the Ottoman multiculturalism as well as its standards of 
fairness and just behaviour towards others. The early neo-Ottoman political 
position, advanced by the Welfare Party in the 1980s and 1990s, extolled 
Islam as a system of statecraft and emphasized the Islamic state as the 
protector of peaceful coexistence of cultural multiplicity (Houston 2002; 
Navaro-Yashin 2002a:140–141). On a more practical level, not requiring a 
comprehensive Islamic state, the neo-Ottoman ideals can be extended to 
business practices; while partaking in the competitive environment of 
contemporary capitalism, the companies can present themselves as 
distinctively Islamic by claiming higher values: “following the dietary 
prescriptions of Islam, not investing in interest, not serving food to 
employees during the month of fasting, reserving money for charity (zekat), 
producing good quality products, and making ‘just’ profits” (Navaro-Yashin 
2002b:224). On the level of the individual, the cleanliness and piety can be 
valued as higher moral norms of Islamic civilization (Navaro-Yashin 2002a:
93) and the practices of communal assistance and just treatment between 
neighbours and employees can be seen as Islamic responsibilities and 
obligations (White 2013:41). In sum, the position emphasizes qualities of 
people as good Muslims within the specific historically developed 
framework of Muslimhood in Turkey. Both Ahmet and Ridvan stressed this 
dimension of justice as related to being a good Muslim, anchored into values 
of what they saw as a bygone era that would need to be revitalized – but not 
imitated – in the present day. What would this Muslimhood consist of?
THE MODERN SELF AND ISLAM
In Turkey, 99.8 percent of the inhabitants are Muslim.95  However, this is not 
a uniform category but includes people whose Muslimhood others might 
deny as well as those who do not identify as Muslims but are labelled as such. 
I have encountered these positions among atheists, staunch secularists and 
members of the Alevi faith. Another significant fault line is located not just 
between Muslims and non-Muslims but between conscious (şuurlu, also 
modern) and “traditional96” Muslims (e.g. Navaro-Yashin 2002b; White 
2013). What can be labelled as the Islamic movement in Turkey is comprised 
of networks of individuals who participate in activities taken by a broad 
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coalition of Islamic actors. This multifaceted grouping consists of “political 
parties, religious sects and orders, Islamic educational and welfare 
foundations, Islamic financial and investment institutions, minuscule 
clandestine organizations, Islamic publishing houses, and free-floating 
intellectuals” (Sayari 1994:214). Both the secular and religious actors 
acknowledge the diversity and have to find ways to relate to its 
manifestations. It is also important to note here that approaches to Islam do 
not originate from any universal point of view but their outlook has been 
decisively shaped by the secularist institutions of the Republic, unalike their 
foundation in other countries (Arat 2004, Meeker 1994:162). 
 Even the terminology has changed and many of the old labels have 
become rejected as tainted by their former histories. Ayşe Saktanber presents 
an example of changing terms of identification. She argues that the term 
dinci, used interchangeably with “Islamist,” would have been perfectly 
acceptable before but nowadays religious young people would prefer dindar 
signifying “pious” or “devout,” to dissociate themselves from the Islamist 
label (2007:419). The former term with its suffix -ci suggests a more tightly 
bound group identifying under the religious banner while the latter has 
much wider connotations and more room for reflection. This is an example 
of terms of identification escaping the rigid definitions, people refusing their 
objectification by the others, and, instead, emphasizes their attempts to 
define themselves and their everyday lives in their own terms (see Navaro-
Yashin 2002a:35). In this tradition of thought, Islam and modernity are not 
contrasted but “Islam has been transformed into a religion on the liberal 
model in Turkey, that is, as a phenomenon having primarily to do with 
personal choice and private belief ” (Silverstein 2011:2–3).
 My informants shared a very pragmatic and relaxed outlook towards 
Islam, to the extent that I initially felt that I had not concentrated on the 
question sufficiently. Among those living in Tarlabaşı, being a devout 
Muslim was a taken-for-granted category of belonging that was brought up 
in some contexts but usually not pronounced. It was closely connected to the 
modern self, careful adjustment of appropriate behaviour in different 
contexts. Most of the other people I spent time with identified themselves 
either as non-observant Muslims or atheists, liked to discuss religion in 
politics and culture but did not relate to religious questions themselves. 
When dealing with Islam, I found that even the most pious of my informants 
would very rarely refer to theological principles without connecting them to 
the ancient origins, the Ottoman society, birth of the Republic or some other 
historical anchoring point. This finely tuned historical consciousness, 
referring to a variety of traditions and pasts, governed the negotiation of 
values associated with being a good Muslim. As I will show below, it meant 
identifying with a distinct tradition, not to be confused with “Arab Islam.” 
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The neo-Ottoman approach emphasizes the distinctiveness and superiority 
of Turkish Islam as its central value which, interestingly, resembles the 
common Kemalist position, according to which being Turkish means to be 
Muslim and Turkish Islam is seen as the better form of Islam (White 
2013:19). Again, the Kurds do not fit neatly into this definition but have to 
reflect on the relationship differently.
 Some of my friends had been to Koranic schools (medrese) when 
younger, many prayed daily but only a very few showed interest in studying 
the Koran or theology extensively. Especially towards the end of my 
fieldwork, I had extensive discussions with Şivan about possibilities to be a 
good Muslim and feel at home in Istanbul. His views focussed on the 
demanding task of combining desirable moral positions with the 
requirements of modern life and of cultivating his faith despite the 
limitations on his expertise:
I am, of course, Muslim and try to live as a good Muslim in the city. At the same 
time I do not want to be associated with the Islamists living in Fatih, or, even 
less with the Arabs here that just bring to mind Taleban, fanatics and lunatics. 
Kurdish Islam is very different from this; you might meet some Kurds who are 
Islamist but they are usually young men and it will be over with them soon. 
Kurds are proud of their religion but they also tolerate other people – we have 
our own tradition and we need to be careful not to compromise or destroy it. I 
see that there can be several kinds of good Islam: for different times, different 
countries, to the village and to the city. Still it is the same religion. I have heard 
some say that we are ignorant and do not know our religion; it is true that I 
cannot recite the Koran but I know it by my heart, and I know it from my 
parents and family. Poor people like us cannot go to study Islam in universities. 
[quotes from two separate discussions]
On closer inspection, Şivan’s account of desired religious belonging brings 
together many of the most important themes of Turkish modernity in 
contemporary Istanbul. Firstly, there is the spatial dimension that allows 
different forms of Islam to be practiced, here mentioned in a vague sense of 
different Islam in the city, further differentiated into its conservative quarters 
and geographically distinct and ambiguous “Arab Islam.” Secondly, Şivan 
distinguishes Kurdish Islam from other varieties and emphasizes the need to 
preserve the tradition. The stress is on reflection: the ability to find a right 
balance between tradition and modernity, and to understand what type of 
Islam would be appropriate in different conditions. Thirdly, he refers to 
discrimination he has encountered on the basis of his low level of education 
and how his comprehension of Islam, handed down from his family, is just as 
valuable as the more educated variety. In sum, he underlines his reflective 
understanding of religion that is connected with the most important themes 
of Turkish modernity but does not subscribe fully to any one of them. 
Throughout my study, my fieldwork observations point to a tendency to 
The Emergence of Neoliberalism and Post-Kemalist Turkey
175
escape altogether the uncompromising labels and instead to selectively 
appropriate their specific connotations in varying situations. My informants 
did not express straightforward acceptance of the grand narratives. The sense 
of selective neo-Ottomanism did not intend to return to the institutions of 
the Ottoman era but provided an alternative way of exploring a period that 
had been judged as decadent and inauthentic by the Kemalists. In turn, the 
radical Kemalists were allocated to the same category with fanatic Islamists, 
being incapable of interpreting the past in a neutral or balanced manner. The 
position outside the polar extremes was based on the ability to recognize 
different shades of history and question the logic of ruptures and 
continuities in novel ways. It was an absolute prerequisite for participating in 
contemporary modernity. 
Contemporary Categories of Belonging and the 
Personal Quest for Dignity
I wish to conclude my discussion on Turkish modernity with an exploration 
of senses of belonging in present-day Turkey. I suggest that, especially in the 
urban sphere, characterized by the coexistence of radically different senses of 
self, their range and flexibility are crucial in the formation of groups and 
solidarities, representing a “bewildering variety of choices of values, 
practices and modes of affiliation” (White 2014:187). However, the former 
categories of identification have not lost their significance. Even when 
restricting the criteria to religious, nationalist and long-standing political 
values, White presents a very broad list of multiple forms of being a Turk 
that expresses the fluidity and overlap of different positions, with 
possibilities for unity and antagonism:
Kemalist (broadly, follower of the principles of the nation’s founder Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk, secularist, laicist), the related and equally potent Atatürkçü 
(Atatürk admirer, secularist), İslamcı (adherent of politicized Islam), 
milliyetçi (rightist nationalist), ülkücü (right-wing ultra-nationalist with 
Islamist or pan-Turkist tendencies), ulusalcı (left-wing or neo-nationalist, 
secularist, supporter of a strong state and military, anti-West), liberal 
(supporter of cosmopolitanism and freedom of speech), and Türkiyeli, a 
recent neologism that aims to circumvent the ethnic assumptions inherent in 
the term Turk, without bleaching it of communal identity altogether. (White: 
2009:7)
Moreover, the increasingly complex senses of political affiliation and 
solidarity have altered life in thorough ways. The divisive utopian politics of 
the extremist leftist and rightist groups in the 1960s and 1970s, culminating 
in the 1980 military coup, have given way to novel configurations of political 
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issues, permitting a more diverse spectrum of participants. Nilüfer Göle 
brings up especially women, ecologists, veiled students, homosexuals and 
transsexuals as new groups, and environmental protection, female identity 
and individual freedom as the new issues (in Navaro-Yashin 2002a:131). The 
values associated with urbanity and modernity cut across a spectrum of 
communities that do not always agree on the criteria of belonging among 
themselves. They should rather be seen as arising in particular contexts, 
often defined by spatial boundaries and their corresponding moral 
frameworks.
 I have discussed above the fluidity and selective appropriation of 
history – in conjunction with the refusal of the extreme positions – among 
my informants. This development has also led to the marginalization of the 
formerly dominant senses of belonging across society; the “children of the 
Republic,” embodiments of Atatürk’s future-oriented project in the 
foundational years of the Republic, cultural classicists whose historical 
consciousness is based strongly on the trope of introjective metalepsis, have 
found it difficult to relate what they see as the “self-interest-seeking 
mentality of neoliberal era” (Özyürek 2006:31–32). The position of these 
former elites, militant laic actors identifying with the core values of the 
Republic, has crumbled down so significantly with the success of the 
populist-liberal tendencies of the AKP, that they resemble, in an ironic 
manner, radical Muslims, who would also require a revolution and a top-
down program to govern the plural society (Houston 2013:341). Their 
previously cherished values, aiming at the collective national identity, have 
become for many markers of an antidemocratic tendency bordering fascism.
 These themes were illustrated exceptionally well in an evolutionary 
view of Turkish history that Ridvan presented to me once, being very 
anxious of the direction his country had taken:
There have been so many mistakes in Turkey for the last hundred years, or more. 
Turkey has had all the possibilities for success but failed miserably. It was clear 
that the Sultanate could not rule a modern [modern] country and Turkey 
needed to move forward. We needed Atatürk. He was a heroic military 
commander (Gazi) and did many good things but could not give freedom to 
everyone in Turkey. After him, things have only gone downhill. For the Kurds, 
the whole Southeastern situation has been a catastrophe. Istanbul is not any 
better – life in Tarlabaşı is often like hell. In the Ottoman times, we had our 
rights and were not forced to be Turks – we were recognized as human beings. 
This country could be at the top of the world if the nationalists would have left 
people freedom to be themselves.
Ridvan’s account echoes the flexible relationship towards history that is at the 
heart of neo-Ottomanism and modern Muslimhood. Even the Republican 
revolution, taught at schools as a massive break with the past, a victory over 
the stagnant mindset of the Empire, could be interpreted positively. For 
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Muslim intellectuals the problem has not necessarily been the Kemalist 
Republic – many observant and sophisticated Muslims supported many or 
even the most of the reforms (Silverstein 2011:13) – but because the country 
has stayed with it for too long. Kasaba argues that they see Turkey’s future in 
rejoining the Islamic world and creating a society which is technologically 
modern and more “just” than the one created by the Kemalist elites after the 
Western image (1997:17). In the quote above, Ridvan emphasizes Atatürk’s 
positive role in providing the push to modernize the country but blames his 
followers and successors for the suppression of religious and ethnic 
identities. What is important about the new Muslimhood is its flexibility, its 
potential to evoke diverse possibilities for self-making, solidarities and 
boundaries. 
CONSTANT REJECTION –  A WALK WITH RİDVAN
In the mahalles that I studied, the narratives of belonging were dominated by 
a powerful sense of exclusion and rejection. Of my friends, Ridvan was 
especially vocal about his undeserved series of disappointments and 
commented on them with his very sophisticated understanding of the 
historical dynamics. On one of our aimless walks, we were talking about 
changes in Beyoğlu and their effects on the quality of life. The 
unpredictability of developments, together with the lack of institutional 
support, became quickly the focus of our discussion. He told me that what 
bothered him most, especially now after his marriage, was constant 
insecurity and feeling of not belonging into the city. He had been working in 
several restaurants and was running a small bakkal with a friend but could 
never be sure what would happen the next day. If he would be mistreated at 
work, there would be no point to complain – who could he even complain 
to? – he wondered. For him, at the heart of the matter was his background as 
a rural Kurd, speaking Turkish with an accent and dressing differently from 
Istiklal’s urbanites. In a way, the increased freedom of a big city had turned 
against him. When we walked past a new coffee shop, part of a multinational 
chain, he said that he could, of course, enter but would not feel welcome in 
the place. He added that foreigners do not recognize the unfriendly stares 
and tiny changes in behaviour but these are constantly present when moving 
in the city. The natural reaction would be to resist but it also felt futile; the 
capacity to change the situation was in the hands of the more powerful and 
wealthy people. At this point he interrupted his narrative of powerlessness in 
a tactical way and shifted his attention to his earlier attempts to strive for 
approval in the eyes of the others. 
 He said that when younger he had gone through several phases. As a 
teenager, he had supported the PKK in several demonstrations, not really 
sympathetic to, or even familiar with the ideology of its leader Abdullah 
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Öcalan, but out of frustration. A couple of years later, he had been involved 
in a political Islamic movement; according to him, not really an organized 
section but rather a group of friends who prayed together, cursed the world 
and dreamed of a new kind of society: Islamic, just and equal. He added 
quickly that he had not really believed in their aims either but the group had 
given him self-confidence, at the time new to Istanbul and hating the city. He 
felt that these were the only political movements where he was accepted, a 
fact that now amused him. One could simplistically argue that this was 
another familiar narrative of personal growth, commentary on the 
misguided radicalism at younger age. However, when we discussed the issue 
further, he told me that he had grown out of his views gradually and noticed 
by observing his friends that successful life in Istanbul was possible only by 
learning the rules of the city, very different from any other place he had been 
to. The acknowledgement of the qualities of lived environment, the 
characteristics of the other people and understanding of the best ways to 
interact with them were essential; especially in the absence of other means, 
they were the only possible way to live a satisfactory life in Istanbul. For 
Ridvan, these rules were subject to change and negotiation, not based on just 
securing rewards but cultivating a sense of dignity and self-respect.
 Even more important was the critical attitude towards classifications of 
the urban sphere, intimately tied to particular spaces in the city. While the 
enjoyment of the urban bustle was appreciated in the romanticized 
descriptions of life in Istanbul, another significant theme was a wish for a 
space where one could be at home and at peace. Of course, this does not 
relate to just the physical characteristics of a space: peaceful and quiet, or 
safe and comfortable – the exact opposites could constitute a feeling of 
homeliness, the safety of the crowds and the joy of partaking in the urban 
excitement. Ridvan concluded our discussion by saying that freedom 
(özgürlük) is the most essential goal he is aiming at. When I asked him to 
explicate, he replied that he was talking about liberal (liberal) and modern 
(modern) societies, just like those in the West. He gave me an ironic smile 
and said that his freedom could not reside in the mountains of the Southeast, 
nor in the Kurdish village where he came from. He was now an urbanite and 
could not go back. He said that in Turkey he had exhausted his possibilities; 
he would not be taken seriously no matter what he did – as long as there was 
no equality there could be no freedom. He continued that he would prefer a 
new beginning in Finland, thought for a bit and said that he would, in fact, 
even move to Israel the next day if he would be given a chance. At the same 
time, he acknowledged, based on the stories of his relatives living in 
Germany, that his background would play a major role also in other 
countries.97  In Turkey, he was either stuck in Tarlabaşı, cut off from the 
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surrounding society or participating in modernity across its boundaries as 
an unwanted and unrecognized subject. For him, the district of Beyoğlu was 
far from neutral space but consisted of different boundaries and intensities 
that were extremely significant for his daily conduct.
***
In these three chapters, I have discussed Turkish modernity as an interplay 
of several pasts that come to light in different contexts. They do not fit 
wholly into the teleological model of sociocultural advancement, nor to the 
trajectory of deterioration from the glorious past. In Turkey, both the 
cultural classicists and historical constructivists are struggling in their efforts 
to relate to the past, present and future successfully. My aim has been to 
describe the sense of in-betweenness, defining the life-worlds of Istanbul’s 
inhabitants, balancing between the grand narratives and culturally intimate 
understandings of historical dimensions of modernity. I have also connected 
the senses of modernity and modern self to questions of spatiality; how 
historical developments have related to spatial relations on the levels of the 
city, country and Turkey’s relative location globally. In the last chapter of the 
study, I will combine these issues with the experience of boundaries and 
moral frameworks in the streets and squares of Beyoğlu, together with the 
most recent developments of Turkish modernity: the radical transformations 
of the cityscape, associated with redefinition of public space, gentrification 
and their new possibilities for solidarity.
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Chapter 8:
Morality, Public Space and 
Urban Transformation:
New Solidarities in Beyoğlu
There is a revealing anecdote of how the notion of the public has been 
understood in Turkey. Bülent Tanju presents it in a provocative manner that 
hints at the cultural intimacy of the issue: “According to the definition of a 
‘great’ state official in the very recent past, public sphere is the place where the 
police can ask you for identification documents, therefore the publicity in 
Istanbul is the police demanding identification and the citizen presenting 
it” (2008:233). However, the absurdity of the definition uncloaks a sense of 
familiarity, the awkward recognition of the massive police presence in public 
spaces of Turkey. 
 The sense of belonging, based on practices of inclusion and exclusion, 
has been a prominent theme throughout my study. It is also at the heart of 
the spatial politics of Istanbul: a city divided into spaces that call for different 
standards of behaviour. They can be central to national identification like 
Taksim Square, with its troubled relationship with different shades of 
Republican and Ottoman histories, or, emerge in quotidian locations where 
inhabitants from all walks of life share a modest meal of chick peas and rice, 
as described in the previous chapter. In the urban environment, the variety 
of reference points, anchored to specific periods and different spaces, creates 
multiplicity but not chaos. With its pluralization of lifeworlds, the city acts, in 
the words of David Harvey, “as a theatre, a series of stages upon which 
individuals could work their own distinctive magic while performing a 
multiplicity of roles” (1990:5). What caught my attention early on during my 
fieldwork, was the remarkable ease that many of my informants expressed 
when adapting to new situations, a detailed knowledge of the moral 
environment, and how the range of appropriate practices could be analyzed. In 
this chapter, I will discuss the moral qualities of Istanbul’s spaces from 
perspectives that can be summarized under Henri Lefebvre’s influential idea 
of “right to the city,” not conceived as a “simple visiting right or as a return to 
traditional cities. It can only be formulated as a transformed and renewed 
right to urban life” (Lefebvre 1996:158, italics in the original). My focus will 
be on diverse phenomena that illustrate the most recent transformations of 
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urban Istanbul: reconfigurations of public and private spaces, encounters 
with the state power, commodification of the urban sphere, and 
gentrification as redrawing the boundaries of Beyoğlu.
Public and Private Spaces
In the social sciences, discussion of “publicness” has centred around the 
remarkably influential theory of the modern public sphere by Habermas 
(1989) and its critiques or reinterpretations (e.g. Mitchell 1988; 2002; Taylor 
1989; Warner 2002). In the historical context of Turkey, its application poses 
several problems. These range from very different ideas of privacy in the 
Ottoman times98  (Murphey 1990), to the Republican ideologies of public 
space, regulated by the extremely detailed control of the state (Altınay 2004; 
Özyürek 2006). I prefer to use the term “public space” over “public sphere” 
because of the latter’s close connections with the specifically Western 
European liberal modernity but I acknowledge the overlap between the 
terms. For public space, I follow Charles Taylor’s definition of the public 
sphere as “a common space in which the members of society are deemed to 
meet through a variety of media: print, electronic, and also face-to-face 
encounters; to discuss matters of common interest; and thus to be able to 
form a common mind about these (1992:220). I emphasize the lived 
character of public space, bringing together the historical formation of 
mediated encounters, civil society and gendered space with the pragmatic 
realities, ongoing life and commentary of what publicness means (Dahlgren 
2010:4). For the purposes of this study, perhaps the most fitting definition of 
the publics and public space is Martin Stokes’ cautious note, following 
Richard Sennett, of them being “yet to be understood” and considering them 
as “positive opportunities for group life” (2010:5 fn.9).
 As a theoretical or political concept, public space/sphere (kamu alanı, 
kamusal alan) was not as regularly used in public debates at the time of my 
fieldwork, as it is increasingly now, after the Gezi Park protests. Yet, many of its 
integral principles have been central for the cases that I have examined 
ethnographically: the different notions of rights and responsibilities in the 
mahalle and the urban sphere, the boundaries regulating movement in the city 
and the right to occupy particular locations. To provide a comprehensive 
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different stages of the Empire, is outside the scope of this study. Murphey suggests that the 
principles of Islamic law played a major role in designating the character of spaces: “Because of the 
strongly developed sense of social welfare expressed in concepts such as mashala or ‘public benefit,’ 
the spheres in which private and individual rights could prevail were strictly delimited. 
Nonetheless, the sanctity of those spheres was all the more jealously guarded precisely because it 
was so exceptional” (Murphey 1990:119).
framework, Setha Low (2002) distinguishes between five principles to analyze 
the publicness of spaces, ordered according to different degrees of agency:
Access – right to enter and remain in a public space
Freedom of action – the ability to carry on activities in the public space
Claim – the ability to take over the space and resources in it
Change – the ability to modify the environment
Ownership – the ultimate form of control 
(Low 2000:241)
I will return to these principles throughout the chapter in my discussion of 
the extensive changes in the spatiality of Beyoğlu in the most recent times. 
During my fieldwork, there was a clear and growing feeling that public space 
was becoming increasingly restricted for several reasons, not always 
originating from the same sources of power.
ARBITRARY ARRESTS AND THE ATMOSPHERE OF FEAR
Above all, in Istanbul the power of the state reveals itself in an arbitrary 
manner. In conflict situations, the final word is on the state actors, often 
manifests in the actions of the police, and there is very little that can be done 
to counter the commands of the state. In Beyoğlu, the massive police 
presence in Istiklal Street had become a normal state of affairs (Navaro-
Yashin 2002a:5), represented by the number of police busses and TOMA 
intervention vehicles parked very visibly at Galatasaray Square, together with 
high numbers of police officers at Taksim Square, sometimes rising up to 
hundreds without an immediately evident reason.
 The arbitrariness of power in public space sparked countless stories. 
One of the most widely shared narratives concerned the police arresting 
people on arbitrary grounds. This was happening regularly in public space, 
changing its rules considerably – according to my informants, the arrest 
could happen at any time and for whatever reason. I came across a few of 
these occasions myself. On one Saturday evening, I was walking in jam-
packed Istiklal Street to meet friends in a bar close to Taksim Square when 
the atmosphere suddenly electrified. A man next to me began an individual 
political protest by chanting the name of the PKK very loudly, instantly 
filling the air with nervous expectation. People close to him tried to move 
away from his wild gesticulations, while those further away came curiously 
closer to see what was happening. The state intervention was amazingly fast. 
An unmarked white lorry van appeared from a side-street where it had been 
waiting, drove a few metres to the street, next to the man, now screaming his 
allegiance to “Apo.”99  He probably knew what to expect for his protest had 
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erupted in just a few seconds and already culminated into violent screams. 
Two men jumped out from the back of the lorry, took the protester forcefully 
inside and the van drove off with its doors half-closed. The intervention was 
so fast and smooth that it took me a while to understand what had just 
happened. People in the incredibly busy street occupied the empty space 
within seconds and all the traces of the encounter were gone.
 I happened to see a slightly similar incident the next day, this time in 
broad daylight. I was crossing the Galata Bridge, filled with fishermen and 
casual strollers in the morning hours. This time no provocation was needed. 
A police car slowed on the curb, two policemen got out and took one of the 
men walking, around fifty years of age in a suit and moustache, inside the 
car, not in a violent but in a very determined manner. Again, the scene was 
over in just a few seconds. Most of the people in the immediate proximity 
turned to see what was happening but returned very soon to their activities. I 
asked a man selling tea for the fishermen what had just happened and he 
told me that this is nothing new or special, ordinary life in Istanbul. He did 
not want to speculate on the suspect, saying that the police can take anyone 
and they often make mistakes. His comments echoed those of my friends: 
everyone had a story, if not him/herself having problems with the law, 
definitely knowing someone who has had. The sense of normalcy of these 
events and the lack of means to react to them changed the character of 
public space considerably. The five principles set out by Low above could be 
elaborated and their boundaries debated in different contexts, but they could 
just as well be side-stepped in an arbitrary manner, without explanations or 
justifications. The unpredictability of the state power had changed the whole 
conception of public space into a very specific Turkish configuration.
 This related directly to questions of freedom and dignity. In the end of 
the previous chapter, Ridvan referred to Western societies as examples of 
freedom, characterized by liberal modernity. In another discussion, he 
extended this notion to desired qualities of urban space. He saw the West as a 
qualitatively different space of freedom, where access and freedom of action 
within public space would be self-evident rights and its modification or even 
ownership negotiable. He mentioned that he had seen in the news people 
occupying empty buildings, making unused spaces into urban gardens and 
holding festivals spontaneously in central locations, without any kind of state 
intervention. Of course, similar things happened in Turkey, but they were 
overshadowed by a constant danger of a violent encounter with the state. 
Ridvan summed up his perspective: “It does not help at all to talk about new 
cultural rights: the right to speak Kurdish freely, to publish and advertise in 
different languages, to hold demonstrations and cultural events in the streets 
and squares, if all these rights can be taken away in the blink of an eye.”
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 Interestingly, the present-day reality reiterated the earlier problematic. 
For Ridvan and many others, Republican modernity, with its emphasis on 
rationality in the arrangement of public space, had become arbitrary. The 
justification for Republican rule, in contrast to supposedly decadent 
Ottoman governance, had, in many ways, come full circle into a reality 
where power gained its strength from its arbitrariness, contrary to widely 
shared understanding of public space in relation to civil society. Charles 
Taylor defines another dimension of the modern public sphere as “a space of 
discussion which is self-consciously seen as being outside power. It is 
supposed to be listened to by power, but it is not itself an exercise of 
power” (1992:232). This was not the case in present-day Istanbul: public 
space had become increasingly politicized and guarded by the unpredictable 
state actors. Before my discussion of how group action in Beyoğlu has taken 
new political forms to counter the state, I wish to analyze a parallel stream of 
urban development in the recent times, the impact of market forces in the 
urban sphere, to discuss another kind of regulation of public space.
SİMİT – COMMODIFICATION OF PUBLIC SPACE IN BEYOĞLU
The history of a famous simit bagel tells a story of the changing geography 
and the reconfiguration of boundaries in Beyoğlu. The much prided simit 
carts, selling fresh bagels at a low cost to passers-by, have been subject to 
regulations on their appearance, in a way that reflects the wider trends of 
urban development. For many Istanbulites, these were not trivial matters but 
integral features of Beyoğlu’s urbanity, ways to establish intimate connections 
to particular spaces. The comparison of different bakeries and the perfect 
consistency of their products, the crunch and freshness of the bagel, usually 
served plain, is one of the definitive Istanbul experiences, something that can 
be elaborated into great heights. Many of the simit salesmen were also 
distinctive personalities who got to know customers across class boundaries 
and provided news and gossip of the area. The encounters were usually brief 
but became meaningful when repeated over the years, in some cases decades.
 At the first glance, the most recent transformation of Beyoğlu is 
characterized by large-scale renovation of the buildings lining Istiklal Street 
and the march of international retail chains. However, on a closer look, there 
are other forces at work over the change of its historically defined ambience. 
The local municipality has been active in initiating new policies, referring to 
yet another “golden age” of the area. In the beginning of the 2000s, the simit 
carts were re-designed to fit into the new nostalgic image of the street, 
(Figure 5) and all the stores were instructed to change their signs into ones 
with brass lettering on a wooden background (Ertep 2009; Esen 2008:267) 
(Figure 6). This change, again, is deeply ingrained with history. The glorious 
Istiklal Street of the post-war era had been lost in the 1980s and the early 
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1990s to an environment plagued by derelicts and drug addicts with many of 
businesses leaving the area (Ertep 2009). The following aesthetic 
interventions were part of “The Beautiful Beyoğlu Project” (“Güzel Beyoğlu 
Projesi”), initiated to bring back the former glory of the area (Adanalı 2011). 
It is noteworthy that the 1980s, generally depicted as the rebirth of more 
open, international and liberal Turkey, were in Beyoğlu experienced as the 
loss of its status as the apex of modernity and urbanity.
Figure 5. The uniform appearance of the simit carts reflects the desired 
historical markers of the municipal beautification project.100
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10190604@N06/2279635943/
Figure 6. Some multinational chains have adopted the classic presentation of 
brass lettering on a wooden surface. (Photo by the author)
When I talked about the uniform appearance of the carts with the simit-
sellers, they were initially cautious with their choices of the words and 
mentioned the changes as “the signs of times” but, after a couple of 
introductions to the topic, unvaryingly felt offended of the intrusion and 
regulation of something they had established and developed, and which had 
now become homogeneous and regulated. Of course, many of the younger 
had only worked with the new carts but they also acknowledged the change 
for it reflected the wider considerations of the cityscape and the role of the 
simit-sellers as unique individuals, commentators on the neighbourhood’s 
news and wider issues concerning Turkey and the world. 
 Ümit had been working close to Galatasaray Square, halfway between 
Taksim and Tünel squares, for decades, and was increasingly renting out his 
simit cart to his brother’s grandson, blaming his old age and frail health 
especially on hot summer days. He was very proud of his personal history 
connected to Istanbul’s changes and explained in detail how he had seen 
several demonstrations around the square, many of them culminating in 
violence, and the character of the area changing into a run-down and even 
dangerous enclave before it started to attract great masses of people again. 
Back then, he said, you would not see families strolling in the street and, 
especially in the evenings, the space was exclusively male, except for the 
prostitutes. Following the narrative of populist modernity, he associated the 
deterioration of Beyoğlu with the influx of Anatolian migrants, bringing the 
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arabesk culture to the area with dreadful consequences. Now, according to 
him, the area had become cultured (kültürlü) again, and people were 
behaving in a more sophisticated manner.
 This transformation is the latest in the series of urban developments in 
Beyoğlu that I have been discussing. It also shows how the transformation of 
urban space is linked to collective memory in a double sense, from above 
and below. It is expressed from above “through architectural order, 
monuments and symbols, commemorative sites, street names, civic spaces, 
and historic conservation” (Hebbert 2005:592) that interact with the 
accumulation of memories from below, “through the physical and associative 
traces left by interweaving patterns of everyday life” (592). The top-down 
modernization of public space in the years of the early Republic is still visible 
in the street and square names: Istiklal (Independence), Meşrutiyet 
(Constitution) and Tünel (Tunnel – from the world’s third oldest 
subterranean urban rail line connecting the square with the northern shore 
of the Golden Horn) and its populist modernity is associated with the 
informal arabesk culture of the area. Now the goal is to combine the 
hypermodern centre of shopping malls and cinema multiplexes with the 
nostalgic past. 
 The revival of the nostalgic age of Istiklal Street has been strictly 
regulated except for some distinctive exceptions. Adanalı criticizes the 
campaign by Vodafone that transformed the simit carts into mobile 
advertising stands as “leaving no room for breathing in public 
spaces” (2011:6). The intimate connection between simit as food anyone can 
afford and a monthly deal with Vodafone for the price of a bagel suggests the 
inclusivity the future of Turkish modernity. Despite the strict orders of the 
appearances in the environment, the campaign was allowed, perhaps 
reflecting the global standards of neoliberal urbanity, something outside the 
frame of reference of the beautification project. In the locally framed context, 
the diverse designs of the carts, still possible to find in the other areas of 
Istanbul, were seen as a distraction to the uniform image of the nostalgic 
depiction. The same applies to the regulations of the shop signs. It seems that 
the regulation of wood-and-brass signs applies only the companies that are 
somehow connected to Turkey or the supposed spirit of the street. 
Nowadays, the international brands are allowed to have their own signs with 
no clear rules and many of the global Turkish brands, not specifically 
associated with the nostalgic spirit of Beyoğlu, also seem to operate without 
restrictions. However, the commodification of public space was not 
restricted to appearances but also had an effect on the everyday practices of 
the inhabitants.
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NO PLACE TO SIT
Istiklal Street, all the way from Tünel to Taksim Square has no public 
benches. The nearest ones are at Gezi Park, during my fieldwork an 
insignificant and abandoned place101 behind Taksim Square, with just a few 
lonely characters spending their days in the grey park. For a place to sit 
down for free one could go down the hill to the seafront of Karaköy, to the 
squares of the Historical Peninsula, or, alternatively, to Kadıköy, a substantial 
urban centre in the Asian side of Istanbul. In the Istiklal area, you either paid 
for a seat in a commercial establishment or occupied a street corner.102  This 
left people to choose between various kinds of teahouses, cafes, bars and 
restaurants; the preferences here varied considerably, often with overtones 
that were directly related to what Low connects to degrees of publicness of 
space, the access and claims over activities. They were semi-public spaces 
that had an important role in establishing social links.
 I found it interesting, how people in Beyoğlu would discuss their 
choice of a teahouse or a bar at length, employing ideas of sociality and 
solidarity, in addition to the looks of the place and the quality of its products. 
In these descriptions, notions of urbanity, class and differently framed senses 
of belonging distinguished Beyoğlu from the other districts of Istanbul. The 
variety of establishments corresponded to the variety of people found in the 
area, a microcosm of Turkey’s social relations. The establishments were also 
ordered spatially – many cafes along Istiklal Street were decorated in the 
classic French style, reminding of the Golden Age of the cosmopolitan 
urbanity of the area, but they were rapidly giving way to multinational coffee 
chains and fast-food joints. To complement these, there were a few simple 
teahouses that catered mostly for people who wanted to sit down for a quick 
glass of tea on their way somewhere else. In the side-streets the situation 
changed considerably; the number of multinational branches diminished 
radically, and the cafes and bars expressed much wider variety in narrow but 
busy streets with many of the establishments tucked into the upper floors of 
the buildings and extending to their roof terraces. This classification 
provided a framework for solidarities, a cherished mosaic of variable senses 
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101 In light of the recent events, the isolation of Gezi Park might seem odd. It was, nonetheless, 
confirmed to me in many occasions. When applying my “virtual walks” methodology it became 
clear that the park carried next to no connotations before it became a focus of the massive protest 
movement.
102 Interesting exceptions to this pattern were some staircases where people would congregate to 
sit. At the time of my fieldwork, the one behind Galatasaray Lycée attracted slightly sinister crowd, 
with some groups sniffing glue. The other famous one, in the middle of the Cihangir 
neighbourhood with a beautiful view to the sea from the hill, pulled a crowd of people drinking 
beer and wine bought from the shops nearby.
of belonging, a solution in an environment where truly public space was not 
a permanent condition.
 In addition to tea and coffee, the establishments provided different 
kinds of encounters. In a city where the supposedly different configurations 
of selfhood could be found in the shared space of Beyoğlu, encounters with 
others were often marked by suspicion. The globally familiar branches lining 
Istiklal Street offered a sense of anonymity and much of the clientele 
consisted of irregular visitors and tourists. Sometimes the anonymity could 
be made to serve a purpose; many wanted to have a snack or a drink with 
minimal social interaction and these places were perfect for that. On the 
other extreme, there were places where the entry was restricted. In Chapter 6 
I discussed at length how my friend Okan faced problems in entering a club 
favoured by Beyoğlu’s subcultural elites. In my understanding, based on 
numerous discussions on the topic, these situations did not occur too 
frequently because people did not want to push the boundaries. The question 
had much more to do with nuances of recognition and acceptance: the 
degree to which places were welcoming played a huge role. At the same time, 
the city was seductive in its possibilities to establish a wide range of contacts 
in different spaces.
 Most of the teahouses (çay evi, çay bahçesi), reading cafes (kıraathane), 
modest cafes (kahve) and European-style cafes (cafe) had strong 
connotations with different senses of sociality, intimately interwoven with 
the notions of modernity and publicness, forming spaces within the area that 
connected – as well as excluded – people in various ways. Here, it is 
important to remember the integral quality of the urban sphere as providing 
unexpected encounters; there are, of course, cafes and teahouses in mahalles 
as well, but they retain very private character and are only extremely rarely 
visited by people not part of the daily clientele.
 If Şivan was not spending his evenings in the Istiklal area, he went to 
play tavla103  into Özdemir kıraathanesi in Tarlabaşı. The place was filled with 
people from the neighbourhood, all of them male, some playing games and 
others reading newspapers. At first, I felt somewhat hesitant at entering to 
this place, almost next door to where I lived, and wanted to have Şivan to 
accompany me. As usual, he seemed to know everyone present and wanted 
me to shake hands with them on our first visit. That was enough to make me 
welcome to a space that before felt extremely private. It was frequented 
mostly by Kurds and acted as an extension to their homes, with the same 
faces at their regular tables every day. Şivan joked to me that everybody 
came to read the papers also in the daytime during the Ramadan fast, even 
though tea was not served, a fact that I had encountered in teahouses during 
my earlier trips to rural Turkey. Now cigarette smoke filled the air and 
Morality, Public Space and Urban Transformation
190
103 A game very similar to backgammon.
people were discussing politics and the latest gossip freely across the tables. 
This was a perfect combination of homeliness and acceptance Istanbul had to 
offer to Şivan. At the same time, he was drawn to another kind of space 
across the boundary, filled with chance encounters and the possibility to 
meet women. The establishments around Istiklal Street represented different 
kinds of solidarities.
 One of my first friends in Istanbul, Ozan, was a true connoisseur of 
cafe culture of Istanbul. He was working in a gallery exhibiting the work of 
Turkey’s upcoming artists and often moved to work with his laptop into the 
coffee houses nearby. For him, Istanbul’s cafes were a unique phenomenon, 
something that he had not come across elsewhere. The finely tuned 
distinctions were important: he loathed the coffee chains lining Istiklal Street 
and preferred kahves. This is a general name for modest coffee houses, 
known for their informal atmosphere and sometimes heated debates on 
politics and other matters. There were several of them in the side-streets of 
Istiklal and he liked to alternate between a couple of favourites. When I 
joined him, I entered to a sphere very close to Habermas’ definition of the 
public sphere (1989) in the early eighteenth century, taken into present-day 
Istanbul. Our kahve attracted a wide variety of people, men and women; 
construction workers on a coffee break, retired academics who spent most of 
their days around the same table, students preparing for exams and people 
working in media industries. No one was obliged to take part in discussions 
– some concentrated on their books and others just smoked cigarettes and 
listened to the others. The discussions were not centred on one topic but 
flowed from one to another with constantly changing groups of participants. 
This was a pocket in Istanbul’s urbanity that Ozan cherished the most: he 
said with pride that it was only here you could meet people from all walks of 
life in an atmosphere of a mutual respect. After my first visit, I asked about 
this kahve from Şivan who said that it was a good place, he would sometimes 
stop by, but he felt too shy to talk with all the educated people around.
 The publicness of cafes and teahouses was a highly valued 
characteristic especially for those who lived in crammed conditions with 
extended families and felt sometimes suffocated by the watchful atmosphere 
of their mahalles. In addition, they provided possibilities to test the 
boundaries of conservative culture and to try out new ways to participate in 
urbanity and modernity. Some of my friends did not believe that I had been 
drinking beer with friends living in Tarlabaşı and Tophane in Nevizade and 
Asmalı Mescit, popular areas lined with bars and meyhanes just around 
Istiklal Street. They could not associate people from the impoverished 
mahalles in the hip centre and justified their doubt rationally: “Why would 
people doing badly paid and unreliable jobs spend their income buying 
expensive drinks in the heart of the city?” I claim that these practices, 
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crossing of boundaries and testing of the degrees of access, are intimately 
associated with redrawing the boundaries of Istanbul through everyday 
practices. They provide a way to participate in its urbanity and modernity 
and to extend social relations in public space. However, they portray just one 
variant of sociality. With the lack of truly public space, squares have become 
extremely important and resonate with the central questions of publicness 
and participation.
Moral Qualities of the Town Square
The units that make up a city range from those found throughout the 
country, such as bridge (köprü) or cemetery (mezarlık), to ones that are 
exclusive to urbanity. Boulevards (bulvar) and squares (meydan) carry with 
them strong political overtones that the purely descriptive terms lack. Their 
meanings are also at the heart of the practices of urbanity and city planning. 
Open boulevards have been seen as moral projects from the times of Baron 
von Haussmann, eliminating the filth and the squalor of the inaccessible 
slums in the nineteenth-century Paris (Mitchell 1988:65). In turn, squares 
have even more connotations with political action, often related to their 
specific histories. Especially in the case of political protests, these meanings 
are embodied into the space itself, placing demands on the symbolic centres 
of society and capturing larger national attention (Low 2000:184). 
 The concept of the square in the Ottoman city was very different from 
its modern sense. The spaces where public and private would intersect were 
not emphasized in the architecture of the times; open spaces, if they existed, 
were used for pitching tents or for sports (Goodwin 1998:111). The large 
public squares in Turkey are a specifically modern phenomenon with strong 
connections to Republican history. They are also intimately tied into the 
international developments of the times; the opening of large spaces in the 
master plan of Henri Prost, an enormous project after an invitation by 
Atatürk in 1936 and implementation beginning in 1939, was in line with the 
modernist planning principles of the times – the ideas of conserving the 
vernacular heritage were not valued, not just in Turkey, but also more widely 
(Gül 2006:174). Prost saw the future of Istanbul as “a city of public 
squares” (in Yıldırım 2012:1). It is important to note that this history has not 
consisted of straightforward movement: Prost’s original idea of the square for 
the Republic Day celebrations was not located at Taksim, but at 
Sultanahmet’s Hippodrome and squares were established throughout the 
city, often by clearing the buildings next to the monuments, “parasites” 
according to Prost. These actions created a new kind of spatial order, 
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destroying the Ottoman arrangement of the mosque-market nexus as the 
centre for public life (Yıldırım 2012).
 The squares also act as catalysts for establishing solidarities: people 
who would otherwise have little to do with each other and whose encounters 
are limited to short exchanges, have found common points of interest 
through participating in politics in the shared space of a square. The 
principle can be summarized, following Hannah Arendt, as “space of 
appearance,” a minimal requirement for political action. However, rather 
than just occupying a physical location, the basis for life in urban condition 
arises from the organization of people acting and speaking together (Butler 
2011). If Taksim Square is the apex of the politicized spaces in Turkey, 
intensifying the questions of freedom, liberalism and democracy, there are 
other squares that present different constellations.
GALATASARAY SQUARE
The events that sometimes explode in Taksim Square are repeated at a 
smaller scale in Galatasaray Square. Taking its name from Galatasaray Lycée, 
a revered institution that has had a crucial role in educating many of 
Turkey’s intellectuals and political leaders (Sumner-Boyd and Freely 
2000:431), its massive gates still dominate the location and create a 
discernible ambience. It is no wonder, that Ümit, selling simit bagels outside 
the gates, emphasized his location as the best to observe all kinds of changes 
in Beyoğlu. The square is a location to arrange meetings and to find a quick 
snack around the clock, but also a space for political action. Most of the 
activities have only a few participants, reflecting a wide spectrum of political 
actors: alongside the LGBT, animal rights and environmental protection 
activists, the trade unions and small leftist parties are often present in the 
almost daily demonstrations. Sometimes the political events of the day bring 
spontaneously people from different groups to the square to protest or to 
celebrate.
 Galatasaray Square has no public benches and the nearby cafes also 
work chiefly as takeaways. As a result, most of the people stand around in 
groups, lean against the walls or sit on the ground. The atmosphere is 
generally very relaxed and informal, with a diverse mix of people. This was 
where I often came to spend time with Şivan. He and his friends frequented 
a street corner next to a bakkal close to the square. The group would not 
have precise composition; people would come, say hello to others and take 
part in the current discussions; some would buy a small glass of tea from a 
vendor nearby, often to drink it standing, and continue somewhere else, only 
to come back soon to repeat the pattern. Most of the participants were males 
between twenty and thirty years of age but often their friends and relatives, 
Morality, Public Space and Urban Transformation
193
or women married to or dating the regulars, would stop by, exchange the 
latest gossip and move on.
 They described this activity by using spatially defined terms. It was 
referred to as going to Istiklal or Taksim; many of the evenings would consist 
of wandering around the area, with the bakkal as the focal point. Şivan styled 
this as life in a big city, a quintessentially urban way to spend time for those 
who claimed the area as theirs. Şivan and his friends distinguished 
themselves from tourists and casual visitors in harsh terms. According to 
them, these were the ones who would walk Istiklal Street from one end to 
another like a flock of sheep, with their mouths open from the amazement. 
Here, the criteria was based in streetwise knowledge, shared by people from 
all social classes but not tied to them. It was a specific quality possessed by 
the Istanbulites spending their time in the streets, in constant interaction 
with very different people. A quick wit, a self-confident demeanour and an 
avid eye for even the tiniest markers in the urban sphere were the celebrated 
features of life in Istiklal Street for people who would, at the first glimpse, be 
unlikely candidates to promote contemporary urbanity in the metropolis. 
Mostly originating from from remote villages in the Southeast, many of 
them had a poor command of formal Turkish and no foundation for 
sophisticated manners conventionally associated with modern life in 
metropolitan centres. Nonetheless, despite the discriminating practices I 
have described throughout the study, they felt at home in the area and 
explicitly claimed to belong within its boundaries just as much as anyone 
else. In addition, in a manner reminiscent of the higher-class urbanites, they 
shared the pride of having in-depth knowledge of the city and situated their 
discussions into very familiar sociopolitical frameworks, the dynamics that 
have animated discussions of modernity and urbanity in Istanbul for over a 
century. These combined the ideological notions of particular spaces and 
boundaries with historical knowledge and abilities to read the rhythms of the 
city in a masterly way.
UNEQUAL BALANCE OF POWER
On one very uneventful evening on the street corner, I heard from Şivan that 
a small demonstration for Kurdish language rights would begin at Tünel 
Square with an intention to march to Taksim. This, he said, was what all the 
organizers always declared, knowing that the police would stop the 
demonstrations coming from the Tünel direction latest at Galatasaray 
Square. Even though Şivan was a firm supporter of the Kurdish cause, he did 
not feel it necessary to join the demonstration. For him, it was just another 
small-scale political squabble, organized by people with leftist solidarities. 
When I later asked around who had organized the demonstration, I came 
across individual names that were associated with the left-wing parties. Şivan 
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said that it was waste of time to join with the people of the past, mostly 
arguing with each other about historical details, especially when it was so 
few of them. I told him that I wanted to see what the demonstration was 
about and he agreed to walk with me a few hundred meters to Tünel Square. 
We had not even left Galatasaray Square when he told me that the 
demonstration was over. He saw a large animated group of people walking 
towards Tarlabaşı just at the intersection of Meşrutiyet Street and Hamalbaşı 
Street, visible from the square. The police had stopped the demonstration at 
its beginning and the participants were on their way home. Şivan stated 
dryly: “They want to have a separate state but they will never win it like this. 
They have good intentions but they cannot achieve their goals this way. 
Nobody will even know that there had been a demonstration today.”
 After stating this, he began to analyze the precarious balance of power 
in everyday politics. In Istanbul, Galatasaray Square functions as a scene for 
encounters between the police and people who want to raise awareness over 
political issues. The presence of the state is always overpowering; the police 
are wearing helmets and shields and carrying automatic weapons with water 
cannon-equipped TOMA intervention vehicles in the immediate vicinity. 
Sometimes this led to comical situations. Şivan told me that he had 
witnessed a demonstration on behalf of the rights of the blind at the square 
some time ago. There had been a group protesters, mostly blind and elderly, 
carrying white canes, distributing leaflets and occupying the square in very 
small numbers. All the same, in front of the giant doors of Galatasaray Lycée, 
they were met by the police in full riot gear. Şivan said that he felt that even 
some of the police officers were rather ashamed about the situation. 
Unsurprisingly, the sympathies had turned on the side of the blind. For the 
Kurds, he noted, the situation would be completely different; most of the 
Turks saw them as primitive people, responsible for violence and terrorism; 
it would be very difficult to make their concerns, especially those associated 
with Kurdish self-governance, accepted by means of demonstrations. 
 Alongside the individual pre-planned demonstrations, there are 
spontaneous political actions in Galatasaray Square; I was just recently, in 
January 2015, at the square following the cheerful dancing of the participants 
after the victory of the Kurdish fighters in Kobane. It also fills up for wild 
celebrations after the victories of Istanbul’s three big football teams. There is, 
however, another spatial pattern for activism, one that aims at leaving a more 
permanent mark on the location. It aspires to freedom of action, claims over 
a location, and even ownership of public space and rests on the possibility of 
occupying a particular space in a repeated manner, forming solidarities that 
are not limited to a single event but have become an integral part of everyday 
life, a reminder of the passing of time and the persistence of societal 
problems. They can be recurring every week, such as the demonstration 
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demanding justice for the people who have disappeared in the hands of the 
state by Saturday Mothers (Cumartesi Anneleri), a group inspired by the 
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina. In Istanbul, the group, carrying 
pictures of the victims, has occupied Galatasaray Square every Saturday from 
the mid-1990s and celebrated their 500th gathering in October 25, 2014.104 
However, even before the Gezi Park protests, there have been moments when 
the forces could be united, albeit momentarily, with a promise – if not of a 
revolution – of something that carried on for a whole year to reoccur and 
confront the authorities in public space. The events of May Day (bir mayıs) 
show how history and space become entangled in distinctive ways.
MAY DAY – TAKSİM SQUARE AND ITS ARTERIES
The yearly event of May Day transformed urban space of Istanbul in a 
radical manner and was especially interesting in how it altered the 
production of solidarities that deviated from everyday life and demonstrated 
cracks in the order of symbolic spaces, normally reproducing and enforcing 
widely shared stereotypes. In Istanbul, May Day has strong connotations to 
what is referred to as the Taksim Square Massacre of 1977. The 
Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (DİSK) had organized the 
first big rally in Taksim Square in 1976 and the bloody events of the 
following year were anticipated in Turkey amidst the violent confrontations 
along politically divided lines, culminating in the military coup of 1980. It is 
still uncertain who opened the fire from the roof of the Intercontinental 
Hotel, now called Marmara, killing four people and resulting in a chaos that 
caused the death of 34 people and injured hundreds (Baykan and Hatuka 
2010). Here, I will focus on how the present-day protests manage to create 
solidarities among people from different backgrounds – I consider the May 
Day protests as extracting material from historical events and utilizing their 
significance creatively in the yearly reproduction of ephemeral solidarities. 
The rhythms of the May Day activities redraw boundaries of the city in 
unusual ways and provide an outlet to express tensions in public space, 
especially in relation to Istanbul’s most politicized sites.
 In 2009, there was again nervous expectation of what was going to 
happen; May Day had been declared as a holiday in April but people had not 
been allowed to gather into Taksim Square the year before. Now different 
leftist parties had received permission to allow 5,000 people to march into 
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disappeared-in-turkey-gather-for-500th-time-in-istanbul.aspx?
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the square under a heavy police presence.105  In local bakkals, cafes and 
teahouses there was a fair amount of speculation on the security situation; 
how the security forces would be positioned and whether people would be 
allowed to Istiklal Street or Taksim Square freely. The preparations were 
already underway with an increased police presence in the streets and people 
were discussing the different signals in the cityscape.
 While much of the speculation was done in a curious, even joking 
manner, there were instances that portrayed tension over the spatial order of 
the city. Ridvan came to visit me furious at what had happened to him two 
days before May Day. As usual, he had been spending time with his friends 
around Taksim Square, when a policeman had approached them. The officer 
had told the group of five to go back to Tarlabaşı (see also Secor 2004:358 on 
regular ID checks at Taksim). I could not be sure if this was just a way to 
offend them by designating their place in a derogatory way but in this case 
the words had really hit their target. He told me that one of his friends had 
argued for their right to be in the public space of the square as citizens 
(vatandaş) and this had led to policeman slapping him, arresting the whole 
group and taking them to be verbally disciplined by the nearby police van. 
The message from the police had been that they were prohibited to be near 
the square on May Day and should do their rioting in their own 
neighbourhood. It was hard to estimate which was more offensive to him: to 
deprive him of his right to be in public space as a Turkish citizen or to 
alienate him from urban space by suggesting he should rather cause trouble 
in his own neighbourhood, a space that the police would not be interested 
in. His version of what had happened fluctuated between contempt for the 
state that would discriminate against the poor and the Kurds, and the pride 
of supporting himself financially and contributing to Turkish society with 
his bakkal and job as a waiter. The reoccurring confrontations with the 
police seemed like repetitions of the same pattern; constant regulatory work 
to remind the undesirable elements of their place in society.
 My actual observations of the May Day demonstrations in Beyoğlu 
ended up being limited to the view from my window in Tophane and rapidly 
updated news on several internet sites and social media. Back then, Twitter 
and other real-time social media applications had not yet reached the 
popularity they nowadays enjoy in political activism. My flatmate Veli had a 
history of participating in the May Day demonstrations and thought this 
time of combining art with activism by throwing balloons filled with paint to 
colour the security forces and “to make them look like a rainbow.” However, 
he had to leave the town to visit his relatives and he wanted me to look after 
the house, in case rocks or Molotov cocktails would hit our windows and 
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break or set something on fire. He had been vehemently against us going to 
the square together and kept repeating that May Day was different from 
other demonstrations we had participated in, that the police could do 
anything to the protesters, and that as a foreigner I did not know the rules of 
this particular game. Of course, there are foreigners taking part in the 
demonstrations as well as old trade union activists and people just curious to 
know what is happening. In the following years, May Day had started to 
attract larger and larger crowds reaching up to half a million in 2011 with a 
more carnivalesque atmosphere but in 2009 the atmosphere was tense 
because of the tragic events of the years before. 
 On that morning, the police cordon blocking the way to Istiklal Street 
was located just outside our window, signifying the boundary between 
Tophane and the urban sphere of Istiklal Street. I visited the bakkal across 
the street and started to talk about the day with the owner. There were no 
other customers at the moment and Bülent, the usually very talkative patron 
seemed bored. He started complaining about the bad business of the day but 
quickly moved into its political significance. In his opinion, the workers’ 
celebrations were a good, albeit a bit old-fashioned thing: the world had 
become more dynamic and Turkey needed entrepreneurs rather than factory 
workers. He also told me that as a foreigner, I should not go to Istiklal Street 
or Taksim Square – the police would not let me anyway, he marked 
sardonically. Our discussion moved back to politics: he argued, that trade-
unionists were people with courage and dignity but the strong police 
presence was necessary to prevent the angry mobs, especially the politically 
radical Kurds from Tophane and Tarlabaşı, from entering Taksim Square. He 
said that Tarlabaşı would be burning again and that the rioting would need 
to be contained there. He expressed no sympathy for political protest from 
those segments of Turkish society, but, instead, reasoned that every May Day 
is proof and a reminder that those people should not be allowed to 
participate in urban life. He added, referring to the Republican idea of the 
gradual spread of modernity, that they were not yet ready to take part in 
responsible politics. When I was about to leave, he noted dryly, that after two 
o’clock everything would be calm again, making the whole day seem like a 
repeated performance with set duration.
 I also exchanged some words with the police who seemed bored  
patrolling the street in a group of ten on hot day carrying full riot gear. They 
would let through some people after asking about their business and told me 
clearly – I thought there would no longer be danger of the flat burning 
because of their presence – that it would be too dangerous for me to go up 
the street. I should only wait for a couple of hours and things would be back 
to normal. They also stated in clear terms that their job was not to let the 
dangerous people up the street. Again, it felt like a staged drama; there was 
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no need for us to elaborate why the police cordons were encircling the 
symbolically significant spaces of Istiklal Street and Taksim Square and 
protecting them from undesirable elements, or, who those elements were. 
The intrusion of dangerous people causing mayhem in the city centre was 
not specified but followed the familiar spatial logic of the egalitarian centre 
of responsible citizens and their incommensurability with the inner-city 
populations who could only be controlled by the strong state. 
 From my window I could see only one occasion when the police used 
force to stop a group of young men trying to push their way through – after a 
couple of seconds the situation was calm again with one of them arrested and 
others running back down the road; however, I could follow news reports 
showing violent confrontations, tear gas and Molotov cocktails around 
Tarlabaşı Boulevard with large numbers of police and military forces securing 
the boundary between the two areas. I met Ridvan later in the day – he said 
that their demonstrations had been useless and that he would want to move 
abroad as soon as possible. The yearly occurring drama seemed to yield the 
same results and remind the people of the boundaries in the area. Having said 
that, the political significance of town squares in Istanbul is not stable and new 
forms of possibilities, altering the spatial makeup of the city, have emerged.
THE YENİKAPI RALLY SQUARE PROJECT – THE POSTMODERN SENSIBILITY 
OF A SQUARE
In addition to Galatasaray and Taksim Squares, there are other significant 
public squares in Istanbul. For example, demonstrations in the in the 
Historical Peninsula are commonly situated at Beyazıt Square,106  in the heart 
of the Fatih district. However, to illustrate how the idea of a town square 
relates to the grand narratives of modernity and the individual senses of 
agency and belonging at this stage of history, I will discuss briefly the 
Yenikapı Rally Square Project (Yenikapı Meydan Projesi)107 as an example of 
how the concept of a public square as a site for political activism can be 
stretched. Situated on the underside of the peninsula, by the new Marmaray 
railway link connecting the European and Asian sides of the city, this 
approximately 1,4 kilometres long and 500 meters wide construction (in 
total 715,000 m2 out of which the staging area consists 270,000 m2) was 
planned to accommodate gatherings of various sorts108  (Figure 7). Even 
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though it did not exist at the time of my fieldwork, it captures perfectly the 
logic of the spatial order I am sketching here, as a combination of 
neoliberalism, majoritarian democracy and a discourse of safety and security 
as the radical reorganizational principles of Istanbul’s new urbanity.
Figure 7. The Yenikapı Rally Square Project, constructed on a land reclaimed 
from the Sea of Marmara.
Opened in 2013, the square is larger than all of Istanbul’s public spaces 
combined, a massive concrete ground, surrounded by water from all the 
sides except the north. Accommodating a maximum of 1,250,000 people,109
with gigantic parking places, the government has offered it as a well-
facilitated alternative for demonstrations, not disturbing people in the other 
locations. Prime Minister Erdoğan made this clear in his speech on April 22, 
2014, during a group meeting about the May Day protests:
I am now requesting, saying it again as the prime minister of the Republic of 
Turkey: First, give up on Taksim. Please do not engage in tension here with the 
state. Please do not disturb the peace of our people, our tradesmen there.110
For understandable reasons, the new rallying ground has been popular 
among the supporters of the current government but attracted very little 
users from the other segments of society. On May Day 2014 it was deserted. 
The construction might seem like an absurd joke but should be taken 
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seriously as continuation of the new topographies of Istanbul, an 
arrangement that operates on massive scales and offers a very different 
conception of the relationship between private and public, the state and civil 
society and the present and the future of the country. Justin McGuirk 
illustrates this tendency very well in his description of how students of Bilgi 
University approached the square:
Charged with creating a public awareness campaign about Yenikapi City Park 
[The Yenikapı Rally Square Project], the students gave it a new name based on 
its suggestive shape: Üçüncü Billur, the third testicle. Aside from its satirical, 
schoolboy humour, the nickname fits an official narrative of Istanbul in which 
progress is measured in thirds: a third airport, a third bridge across the 
Bosphorus (an obtuse solution to the city’s gridlock) and a third child (to keep 
the Turkish state young and burgeoning).111
Together with the spatial orders of the mahalle and the urban sphere, squares 
play a central function in channeling senses of belonging, sociality and agency. 
At the heart of these definitions are the changes in public and private spaces. 
My ethnographic examples point at the serious work of redetermining the 
“right to the city” through Low’s categories of access, freedom of action, taking 
over space, ability to modify the environment and ownership of public space. 
In Istanbul, the definition of public resides within a rich semantic network, 
consisting of a number of oppositions and complementary relations with 
concepts such as “privacy, secrecy, domesticity, isolation, individualism, 
sectarianism, market, state” (Starrett 2008:1036), all built on the top of earlier 
historical formations. I maintain that different definitions of publicness play a 
very significant role in the geographical, conceptual and symbolic reworking 
of the urban topography of present-day Istanbul. Lastly, I want to draw 
attention to another scale of urban transformation, that, together with 
changing approaches to public space, is currently redrawing the boundaries 
between the moral frameworks of the city.
Urban Transformation: Spatial Orders Collide
The spatially bounded notion of mahalle, subject to reconditioning by 
different means throughout history, has retained many of its historically 
persistent characteristics and social dynamics. They have been 
conceptualized predominantly as dichotomies between public and private 
space, modernity and tradition, and secularism and religion. In the inner-
city neighbourhoods of my study, many of the responsibilities, formally 
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assigned to the state, were in practice in the hands of the residents. Similar 
informality characterized the lack of official information about the areas: the 
correct data of the residents was difficult to come by, a fact that has been 
used by the state as a justification to tear down the labyrinth of alleyways and 
complex networks of solidarities. In the early Republican period, the aim was 
to restrict the powers associated with the religious order (Gül 2006:79–80): 
nowadays, the key term is “urban transformation” (“kentsel dönüşüm”), used 
rarely with positive connotations but almost interchangeably with the more 
value-laden term “gentrification.”112 
 The dictionary definition of gentrification as transformation towards the 
middle-class taste does not mean that the markers of the taste are universally 
shared. The analysis is severely limited if it is restricted to the expansion of the 
multinational chains of coffee shops and bohemian bourgeoisie taking over the 
apartments – pointed to as examples of the process in countless popular 
articles. In this final section of my study, I will compare the dynamics of urban 
transformation in Tarlabaşı and Tophane districts, especially from the 
perspective historical legitimization of boundaries and morality. I will suggest 
that Istanbul’s urban transformation since the 1980s, together with Turkey’s 
opening to the global economy after the 1980 military coup, has produced new 
dynamics but these are intertwined with much earlier formations of historical 
consciousness and qualities of urban space. For the purposes of my study, I 
will outline the general developments very briefly, in a couple of paragraphs 
focussing on the areas that I have studied, and move on to an ethnographic 
description of the dynamics on the ground.
VARIETIES OF URBAN TRANSFORMATION IN ISTANBUL
Compared to the totalizing discourses of modernist architecture, gentrification 
in the urban sphere is influenced by the historical characteristics of the areas. 
The peak of radical modernism was perhaps demonstrated in the thoughts of 
Cemil Topuzlu, former mayor of Istanbul, in 1937:
In my opinion, in order to transform Istanbul into a contemporary city, there 
is no solution but total demolition, with the exception of Istanbul’s 
monuments, and gradual reconstruction. (in Gül 2006:80)
Contrary to this, gentrification efforts consist of gradual processes that pay 
attention to, or, are sometimes founded upon, the qualities of particular periods. 
In the early 1980s, Istanbul’s gentrification began with a few neighbourhoods on 
the shores of the Bosphorus, such as Kuzguncuk and Arnavutköy, and in 
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Beyoğlu, such as Galata and Cihangir (Islam 2008:90).113  Especially in Beyoğlu, 
the scale of transformation was modest and mostly relied on the wave of artists 
moving into the districts. However, the processes were aided by the 
aforementioned pedestrianization and beautification of Istiklal Street, decayed 
from its glory days and associated mostly with poverty and crime (Adanalı 
2011:3). 
 The shift from relatively spontaneous processes by individual actors to 
forced gentrification based on institutional investment started to occur in the 
1990s, when renewal on the scale of whole buildings – as opposed to 
individual flats – in the historical districts of Fener and Balat, increased into 
systematic purchases of buildings by the wealthy real estate investors in 
Beyoğlu, especially in the Galata district, and has reached an even larger 
scale with the renovation of whole blocks (Islam 2008:90). The present-day 
acquisitions can be broadly divided into two types: public/public 
partnerships between the municipalities and the TOKİ housing development 
administration114  and private/public partnerships between the private 
businesses and the municipalities (90). In general terms, the former are 
gigantic construction projects, replacing the squatter settlements on the 
outskirts of the city with mass-housing, while the latter are famous for 
providing flats of a higher caliber. The difference can be seen in the 
representations of two projects (Figures 8 and 9 below).
Figure 8. An aerial photograph promoting the Kayaşehir development.115
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Figure 9. An illustration of urban transformation in Tarlabaşı from the website 
of the central planning agency.116
The first picture is of Kayaşehir, a huge satellite city development, located 
approximately 30 kilometres north-west from Beyoğlu. In Istanbul, the word 
TOKİ has come to signify a typology of construction, repetitious stretches of 
high-rises, often in isolated locations. They stand for the amorphous mass 
surrounding the urban core, homes to Istanbul’s newcomers and relocated 
people. Often very difficult to reach with public transport, they have come to 
signify the excess population of the city, the gecekondu squatters of the 
booming migration in the 1950s and 1960s taken up to the current day. They 
are separated from the central areas not just by symbolic boundaries but by a 
passage that takes a long time, approximately two hours from Kayaşehir to 
Taksim Square, and costs several liras, even with the cheapest public 
transport options. For people like Şivan, TOKİ housing signified the most 
unfortunate destiny: “Moving into these new housing areas would be the 
worst thing to occur to me,” he said, while we were looking at a magazine 
with an advert of the new middle-class government housing project, “In 
these pictures everything is clean and the sun is shining but the reality, I have 
heard, is completely different. There is nothing to do and it takes hours to 
travel to work. They are just a way to relocate poor people into remote areas 
– out of sight, out of mind.”
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 In Beyoğlu, the gentrification of historical neighbourhoods rests on 
their imageability, on their historical layers that resist complete demolition. 
What in radical modernism would be a necessary rupture through complete 
demolition, creation of a clean slate to reassemble society, has found subtler 
form in the Turkey of today. In the picture above, the future of Tarlabaşı is 
not transformed into the brutal repetition of living containers in the manner 
of the TOKİ construction projects. The atmosphere is closer to new leafy 
suburbs in Western European towns; modern, albeit not experimental 
architecture, big windows and wooden surfaces. Some elements of the old 
Greek and Armenian buildings have been preserved, as surfaces protruding 
from the newly built background. The end result is an absurd juxtaposition 
of elements, a simulation of artificial ruins blending into upper-middle-class 
taste in a haphazard way. 
 This reshuffling of historical categories is one of the most prominent 
ways of re-imaging the environment in contemporary Istanbul. Another recent 
example is found in Sulukule, a centuries-old Roma settlement adjacent to the 
ancient city walls. The large-scale transformation has forced many of the Roma 
inhabitants to distant TOKİ projects and now the area is rebuilt in what has 
been presented as neo-Ottoman style (see Uysal 2011) (Figure 10). From these 
examples, it is easy to distinguish the different currents of modernity and how 
different epochs are foregrounded in urban planning.
Figure 10. Neo-Ottoman architecture in Sulukule117
Morality, Public Space and Urban Transformation
205
117 John Lubbock, Creative Commons, https://www.flickr.com/photos/
130535894@N08/16581014925/
In the impoverished quarters of Beyoğlu, the dynamic of gentrification was 
present on different scales; on the one hand, there was the informal process 
of newcomers renting apartments through local real estate agencies or 
through internet sites listing local classifieds, such as craigslist.com, popular 
especially among foreigners. On the other hand, there were the medium-size 
real estate companies that would buy buildings and renovate them 
thoroughly. On the top of these were the large-scale projects, in Tarlabaşı still 
at a planning stage. Şivan was already prepared for a change and the districts 
on the belt surrounding the centre had begun to seem his next destination. 
He, like several young men that I spent most of my time with, had wishes to 
start a family soon and hoped to have more living space in the areas like 
Bahçelieveler, Zeytinburnu or Ümraniye. My friends had visited the areas 
very rarely, if ever, but they had developed the air of preferable destinations, 
if moving out of Tarlabaşı would be unavoidable. Living there would still 
allow travelling into Beyoğlu and the areas would have at least some 
identifiable features, or, “their names would be recognized by others than 
people living there,” as Şivan said half-jokingly. Clearly the worst choice 
would be life in a nondescript TOKİ settlement, with no services, work, 
character or even access to other places.
 Keyder (2010) suggests that in comparison to other global models of 
urban transformation, Istanbul’s future might conform to the European 
model, with central areas as the tourist showcase, consisting of 
entertainment facilities and upscale residential neighbourhoods, and the 
poor districts close to the city centre being gentrified. Circumscribing the 
central areas would be the old peripheral neighbourhoods, the early 
gecekondu-settlements that now accommodate middle- and lower-income 
segments. Outside these, there would be a third belt, where the old industrial 
zones are turned into both affluent gated communities and high-rise 
complexes for the poor and lower-middle-classes under auspices of TOKİ. 
My data also confirms these developments as cultural categories that have 
been adopted by the residents. With the rapid rise of the rents in central 
Beyoğlu and the beginning of the influx of mostly artists, students and 
foreigners into Tarlabaşı and Tophane neighbourhoods – Galata and 
Cihangir being already outside their budget – the direction of the 
development was understood in clear terms. 
TARLABAŞI IS BEING RENEWED
I conducted my fieldwork at the time when there was a lot of nervous 
excitement around. The following five years have seen monumental changes 
in the area; I will concentrate here on issues that I have field data to support 
and my analysis of the later stages of urban transformation is based on 
discussions using social media and stories on the websites, newspapers and 
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magazines. Rather than presenting a detailed study of different phases, 
causes and consequences, I will continue to focus on how the change was 
understood and anticipated in relation to boundaries and moral frameworks.
 The profound changes in Tarlabaşı are associated with the renewal of 
an urban area of around 20,000 m2, consisting of 9 blocks and 278 plots in 
the middle of the district, presenting a clear-cut transformation of its spatial 
arrangement (Map 7). The decision was made in 2006 but the work had not 
yet begun at the time of my fieldwork. Unlike in earlier decades, the 
possibility of transformation on this scale had been guaranteed by Law 5366, 
for the Protection of Deteriorated Historic and Cultural Heritage through 
Renewal and Re-use, which gave the authorities powers to implement 
renewal projects without the consent of the property owners (Islam 2009:51). 
The same legislation formed a basis for forced renewal projects in other 
districts, including Sulukule. In Tarlabaşı, a private development company 
GAP İnşaat, part of the Çalik Holding Group employing around 20,000 
people in 17 countries,118  won the bid for the preparation and 
implementation of the redevelopment. The plans were initiated with seven 
local architecture firms to transform the area into a mixed-use development, 
combining residential units, shopping centres, cafes, restaurants and hotels 
(51). The future of this part of the district corresponded very closely to the 
view of the centre proposed by Keyder above.
Map 7. The area of urban renewal in Tarlabaşı.119
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During my latest visit to Istanbul in 2015 the outcomes of the redevelopment 
were far from clear. The area for renewal was surrounded by high fences with 
only a few shapes of the old buildings visible (see the cover of the study). 
However, the area towards Kasımpaşa and the Golden Horn from the 
boundary of the renewal area did not have a very different feel. According to 
my friends, the biggest differences were in the increasing number of 
foreigners and renovated apartments for tourists, available through internet 
sites such as airbnb.com. The area towards Taksim from the fenced renewal 
space seemed to have developed in a similar direction. The latest changes 
during my fieldwork and the anticipation of a troubled future suggested that 
different elements of the urban sphere had coalesced in an unexpected 
manner. In Tarlabaşı, busy Tarlabaşı Boulevard maintained a powerful sense 
of separation between the districts but the sociocultural dynamics of the 
mahalle were changing. Tarlabaşı was becoming more diverse, punctuated by 
people representing different social classes. However, the massive renewal 
project would be of a radically different kind: erasing the earlier social fabric 
in its entirety – wild rumours of digging a massive hole into the ground and 
filling the space with a huge hotel or a shopping mall circulated among my 
friends. This was very different to what was happening in Tophane, on the 
other side of Istiklal Street. 
POROUS BOUNDARIES AND GRADUAL GENTRIFICATION IN TOPHANE
In Tophane, shifts of boundary dynamics and processes of gentrification 
resulted in practices that demonstrated small-scale adjustments and creative 
solutions. One could sense the change in atmosphere when walking down 
the hill towards the shore of the Bosporus. The chic boutiques close to 
Istiklal Street decreased in number, the buildings began to look more worn-
out and the all-male neighbourhood teahouses would become the norm, 
instead of the mixed-gender European-style cafes. The boundary was not as 
clear as in Tarlabaşı and more open to negotiation in the course of daily life. 
The change was also present in the stereotypical features of the mahalle. The 
lines of drying laundry started to appear gradually when descending but 
there was no real geographic boundary.
 Yet, Tophane was gentrifying rapidly. The central Boğazkesen Street, 
the lower part of the passage from Galatasaray Square to the Bosporus, saw a 
succession of newly opened galleries and stores selling designer artefacts. In 
addition, the other main passageways from the top of the hill, Kumbaracı 
Yokuşu (Kumbaracı Hill) and Lüleci Hendek Street, were spaces where the 
urban transformation was most obvious, the entanglement of narrower 
streets between them still being relatively intact. There had also been 
responses to the development from the inhabitants. I discussed the changes 
with my friends living in the district, the shopkeepers and the teahouse 
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patrons. Mustafa was a young man, originally from Erzurum in eastern 
Turkey, but had settled in Istanbul after graduating from an engineering 
college. He had had difficulties in finding a job in the city and had decided to 
start a bakkal with a friend, selling mostly cigarettes, beer and snacks. The 
store was located at the ambiguous zone between the mahalle and the urban 
sphere, close to where I lived sharing a flat with Veli towards the end of my 
fieldwork, and Mustafa would often refer to the changes over the last few 
years in our regular conversations.
 He felt that he was being pressurized from both sides of the boundary. 
The more conservative section down the road did not appreciate him selling 
alcohol and he felt that his bakkal was not good enough for the wealthier 
people moving into the neighbourhood. His overall mood was of worried 
expectation: “In a way, the decision to start a bakkal was to find a reliable 
source of income. We are selling things that people will always buy and I 
thought that this would be enough. I have education for a much better-paid 
job but I wanted to have certainty and security in my life. Now that seems to 
be gone – Istanbul is changing too fast and it might be that I will have to 
move away.” This feeling was echoed in many other commentaries. In 
general, the issues concerning urban transformation were expressed in a 
very pragmatic manner – the biggest worry was the increase in rents, already 
going on for some time and there was a strong feeling of powerlessness 
within a system that did not provide reasonable alternatives. The inhabitants 
had the same fears as people living in Tarlabaşı, of having no other choice 
than the TOKİ housing on the peripheries of Istanbul.
 This had already brought some tension in the air and the urban 
transformation of the area had acquired moral characteristics. Soon after my 
fieldwork, the strained relations burst out in the form of attacks on two 
gallery openings on September 22, 2010, mostly explained as a result of the 
attendees breaking the moral standards of the mahalle by drinking alcohol in 
front of the galleries (see Tuominen 2013). These have not been isolated 
occasions – just at the time of editing this chapter, there was another 
incident at the opening of an exhibition on February 21, 2015, a threatening 
encounter that became a police matter between the inhabitants and the 
visitors after a couple kissing outside the gallery door had been instructed 
not to act like that, because that is “not how things are done in our 
culture” (“bizim kültürümüzde böyle şeyler olmaz”).120  In the claim, “our” 
covers a wide spectrum of differently bounded identities and the boundaries of 
the mahalle represent moral standards associated with its foundational senses 
of belonging. The news article of the incident was titled “Reactionaries 
assaulted a gallery in Tophane” (“Tophane’de gericiler galeriye saldırdı”), a 
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repetition of the historical dynamic associated with the spatial order of 
mahalle. However, the encounter was further complicated when the residents 
explained that their reaction was not against art, but against the behaviour of 
the visitors.121  The moral frameworks and conceptions of public and private 
space in Tophane were different from the surrounding areas and its 
inhabitants wanted to defend their values. In the recent years there have 
been various attempts to redraw the boundaries of the mahalle. Because they 
are not always supported by clear geographic markers people have carved 
them into the cityscape by informal means. The solutions vary and create 
further distinctions.
MARKING THE BOUNDARIES
As names, both Tarlabaşı and Tophane carried strong connotations of 
poverty, dilapidation and crime but were also, especially among their 
inhabitants, associated with positive qualities of community and 
authenticity. In Tophane, this had manifested in the form of slogan “Burası 
Tophane”122  (“Here is Tophane”) (Figure 11), a marker crafting a boundary 
into urban space. I took the photo below in the corner of Kumbaraci Yokuşu 
and Serdar-ı Ekrem Street, just one hundred metres downhill from Istiklal 
Street. Across the boundary, the physical characteristics of the mahalle 
increase in density, one can see the difference in the condition of the 
buildings and there are no establishments selling alcohol. Moreover, the 
relationship between the consumption of alcohol and public space has been 
at the heart of numerous conflicts in Istanbul and symbolizes the 
incommensurability of different moral frameworks.
 There is a famous culture centre, Depo,123  located at the old tobacco 
factory at the end of the Kumbaraci Yokuşu, another one hundred meters 
down the street, an example of an institution that is trying to integrate into 
the mahalle environment. In addition to exhibitions, the centre arranges 
debates and workshops, also involving the residents nearby in some of the 
projects. In one case, the demands of the moral framework of the mahalle 
had led into alternative spatial arrangements. The exhibition openings in 
Istanbul usually involve wine being served. This had, at least symbolically, 
led to confrontations with neighbourhood’s inhabitants, so Depo had come 
up with a solution. Serving wine inside the gallery had not presented a 
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problem, but difficulties arose when visitors went outside to the front for a 
cigarette with their wine glasses. To solve them, the centre had installed 
mobile walls by the door that restricted the visibility of the alcohol 
consumption (Figure 12).
Figure 11. Graffiti designating the boundary of Tophane. (Photo by the author)
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Figure 12. Depo: Mobile walls that restrict visibility during the exhibition 
openings. (Photo by the author)
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In these small-scale actions, establishing boundaries presents an example of 
their contextual character; movement between the spatial orders consists of 
strategic and tactical maneuvers, attempts to retain the desirable qualities of 
urban space through reflection and cultivation of desired selfhood. Moral 
frameworks are not restricted to the consciousness of individual actors but 
operate in relation to the qualities of the spaces. Furthermore, the categories 
of urban space are sensitive to layers of historical consciousness and easily 
modifiable. Dissimilar to strict categories of ethnicity, origins and blood, 
urbanity, at once alienating and exhilarating, prioritizes the urban 
environment that is rooted in a man-made place (Boym 2001:76). The 
examples above show ways to mark the moral qualities of spaces by initiating 
boundaries that can be easily altered.
 Consequently, the struggle for defining desirable moral characteristics 
of urban space was following dynamics in very different scales, from huge 
interventions that combined municipal and private actors, into the cultural 
centre adjusting the boundaries between public and private, and, at the other 
extreme, kisses in the streets escalating into police matters. In all of these 
cases, different senses of belonging and encounters with modernity were 
constructing coherent narratives from the spatial classification. However, 
their coherence does not mean that the actors would be represented in an 
equal and democratic manner.
BOUNDARY AS A FRONTIER
Neil Smith likens the processes of gentrification to the frontier imagery, and 
inner-city populations to Native Americans in the wilderness, a natural 
element of their physical surroundings (1996:xiv). These designations of 
discriminatory processes travel effortlessly from Smith’s examples in the US 
into the contemporary realities of Istanbul. He suggests that gentrification is 
likely to produce a city of sharpened bipolarity, with a very narrow 
conception of civil society. This would also lead into a deepening 
villainization of the poorer segments of society through narratives of 
violence, drugs and crime (230). My findings support this line of 
development in Istanbul. The language of urban transformation is highly 
dependent on the markers of cultural distinction. This, in turn, is directly 
related to access, claims and ownership of the urban space. Michael 
Herzfeld’s analysis of urban transformation in Rome presents another aspect 
of the larger dynamic, similar to my study; the presence of the poor in the 
areas undergoing gentrification is incompatible with the pretensions of the 
new arrivals (2009:22). The terms might vary in different cities but the 
governing principles are very similar. The questions are ultimately about the 
limits of tolerance and diversity. Smith summarizes the basis of these criteria 
brilliantly:
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The pursuit of difference, diversity and distinction forms the basis of the new 
urban ideology but it is not without contradiction. It embodies a search for 
diversity as long as it is highly ordered, and a glorification of the past as long 
as it is safely brought into the present. (1996:114)
In Istanbul, the dangers posed by the residents of mahalles are rationalized as 
the qualities of their non-modernity or anti-modernity. They might be seen 
as ignorant and uneducated (cahil) or reactionaries (gerici), having different 
sense of selfhood, worlds apart from the ones with whom they are supposed 
to share the same space. Mitchell Duneier comments on the ideal of urban 
life through dry, almost cynical sense, as “having superficial contact with all 
these people whose eyes and ears bode security without getting too involved 
with them” (1999:192, italics in the original). The spatial order of the mahalle 
presents a paradox in a gentrified city; the global hierarchy of value in the 
urban sphere equates variety, diversity of colour and disparity of opinions 
with the expression of freedom, presenting a mix of international and 
indigenous cultures (Öncü in Robins and Aksoy 1995:229). It, nonetheless, 
looks like the spatial order of the mahalle cannot be contained within the 
highly imageable central districts of Istanbul. According to the values 
dominating the current urban transformation, its historically developed 
senses of community, belonging and morality cannot be brought safely into 
the present day.
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Conclusion:
Contextual Moral Frameworks
Over the course of this study, I have discussed the fluidity of practices in the 
urbanity of Istanbul, seemingly random occurrences that, on a closer look, 
portray intricate patterns relating to historical narratives and spatial 
arrangements. Life falling short of grand schemes forms an integral part of 
urbanity, invites curiosity and even celebratory attitudes towards the 
ambiguous and the unexpected. The existence of shared moral frameworks, 
conscious practices referring to the past and to powerful notions of 
belonging, does not mean that people would reduce their daily lives to the 
task of acting out or imitating these modalities. In the words of Charles 
Taylor, “rather than representations being the primary locus of 
understanding, they are only islands in the sea of our unformulated practical 
grasp on the world.” (1995:170). Embodied practices, realized as elements of 
sociality through encounters, connect supposedly trivial actions into larger 
discussions with several reflective dimensions. They originate from 
expressions, gestures, styles of walking, greetings and idioms and extend 
over the most crucial categories ordering the historical palimpsest. The 
capability to distinguish between appropriate practices and, especially, to 
spot inconsistencies in someone’s actions, is at the heart of urbanity; the 
ability to navigate between different registers and to improvise successfully 
in different social contexts, while retaining a coherent sense of one’s actions, 
is essentially important.
 In Istanbul, the multiplicity is not restricted to just one exemplary past 
but operates at several registers, combining the strategies of the powerful 
with the constant tactical work of locating the cracks within the system. 
Historical narratives coexist alongside one another and even the self-
confessed classicists or modernists do not always agree on which era to 
prioritize. The ancient roots of the nomadic Turks in the Central Asian 
steppes are effortlessly transferred into the present as carriers of the Turkish 
essence and over six hundred years of the Ottoman Empire are either 
cherished as a glorious chapter in history or cast away as foreign corruption 
sidetracking the teleological destiny of the country. The entanglement of 
these narratives is present even in the most quotidian operations of the 
everyday, often with far-reaching potential for social interventions. The 
history is also intertwined with spatial attributes; social orders experienced 
in the movement across the city, illuminating the historically established 
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dynamics, often referring to distant epochs, specific to imagined senses of 
belonging and sociality.
 During my fieldwork in the Beyoğlu district, this relationship to history 
was not restricted to abstract reasoning but had very real consequences, for the 
friction characteristic to the lives of my informants was rooted in these 
polarities and juxtapositions. The questions resurfaced at spaces dense with 
poetic intimacies: Taksim Square, for a casual visitor the symbolic centre of 
Republican Istanbul, concealed a complex arrangement of historical layers, 
referring to variously accentuated pasts and dynamics. I have argued that their 
most recent culmination in the form of the Gezi Park protests was not an 
unexpected eruption but an anticipated result of the patient building of new 
kinds of historical connections and solidarities. They were realized previously 
in interventions to the sociospatial composition of the area and in instances 
such as the May Day protests, uniting actors across the social spectrum, from 
the Kurds of Tarlabaşı to activists grouped under human rights and 
environmental protection, aiming at what academic and journalist Ahmet 
İnsel terms “revolt for self-respect” (“haysiyet ayaklanması”).124  My aim 
throughout the study has been to explore the limits and boundaries of the uses 
of histories and social orders of specific spaces.
MASTERY OF THE URBAN SPHERE
I have studied these phenomena on various scales; examining parallels and 
divergencies between the dynamics operating within the confines of the 
mahalle, as well as in immensely larger wholes, the clashes breaking down 
ideas of urbanity within the nation and tactical manoeuvres combining 
different registers in creative ways; not based on actors reaching for 
predetermined goals but, instead, mastering shifts between different 
situations and contexts to reach morally appropriate solutions and thus 
cultivating their senses of the modern self. Much of this has to do with 
notions of dignity; being able to act in an appropriate manner in encounters 
with people who share the same space but not necessarily the same values, 
without compromising one’s most significant loyalties. I have tried to find a 
balance between the joys and the anxieties of everyday life and to approach 
urbanity as a specific constellation of overlapping values, extremely sensitive 
to the context. The lack of rigid moral codes, or, rather, their ambiguity when 
moving in across sociospatial boundaries, has became a treasured quality of 
life in Istanbul.
 Many of these issues are brought together under the rubric of 
modernity, a quintessential designator of ruptures and gradual degrees of 
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separation in Turkey since the late Ottoman era. Its ubiquity in different 
contexts has led me to consider life in contemporary Istanbul through an 
underlying narrative of the histories of young men, living in inner-city 
neighbourhoods in close proximity to Taksim Square and the entertainment 
district around Istiklal Street. Concentrating on people, who according to 
the dominant developmentalist narrative represented those being left out of 
modernity, has revealed a very interesting configuration of its reach. Their 
mastery of urbanity was realized in the constant crossing of boundaries 
designating different moral frameworks, bringing together their mahalles 
with the urban sphere of Istanbul.
 In their lives, modernity was not seen as a teleological development 
radiating from centres to peripheries and spreading alongside modernization 
of society, but as unevenly distributed into different pockets, defined through 
notions of publicness, freedom and tolerance. Furthermore, the narrative of 
progress, in both national and universal terms, revealed compromises, 
limitations and contestations, intersecting differently bounded spatial wholes 
in the search for a combination that would enable dignified life within the 
urban mosaic. The coexistence of different moral frameworks was not without 
contradictions: they were tied to specific spaces and urban transformation in 
Istanbul was intimately connected to their qualities and shifts in their 
boundaries.
 The spatial reach of moral frameworks has several real-life 
consequences, crisscrossing political, religious and communal concerns. In 
contemporary Istanbul, the boundaries emerging on a moral basis reproduce 
the spatial logic of the egalitarian centre of responsible citizens and the 
inner-city populations of its mahalles. The struggle over defining the moral 
qualities of urban space extends to dynamics on various levels; from the 
grand schemes of urban transformation, bulldozing whole quarters to be 
gentrified, to tactical operations redrawing boundaries on a smaller scale, 
occupying spaces and establishing new kinds of solidarities. In these 
processes, the boundaries between public and private become blurred but 
enable a powerful sense of belonging to urbanity, attraction to the 
transformative potential of the city, the essential condition that makes life 
worth living in Istanbul.
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Glossary of Commonly Used 
Turkish Terms
Alevi – Heterodox branch of Islam, with elements from Twelver Shia Islam 
and Bektaşi order. There are approximately 10 million Alevis in Turkey.
Arabesk – Popular style of music with influences from the Arabic-pop genre 
with wider connotations of the lifestyle of the rural migrants – not to be 
confused with the style of ornamental design. 
Bakkal – Modest grocery store.
Çağdaş – Term for “contemporary” and “modern” with strong Republican 
connotations.
Çapulcu – Literally “looter” or “pillager,” the term was adopted by protesters 
in the Gezi Park protests as a shared identity. 
Çarşaf – Full body veil leaving only part of woman’s face visible.
Dolmuş – Shared taxi operating on fixed routes.
Gecekondu – Informal housing constructed without proper permissions by 
the rural migrants. 
Hemşehri (or hemşeri) – “Colocal” identity, based on origins in the same part 
of the country.
Kâfir – “Infidel” or “non-Muslim,” with strong pejorative connotations. 
Mahalle – “Neighbourhood,” with diverse connotations from an administrative 
unit to culturally intimate locality. 
Mevlevi – Follower of the teachings of Rumi (Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî).
Meyhane – Tavern serving traditional foods, usually accompanied by rakı or 
beer. 
Millet – Historically a system of governance in the Ottoman times that 
allowed confessional communities extensive self-governance and separate 
legal courts. Nowadays the term is used for a nation or any specific group of 
people, e.g. kadin milleti – womankind.
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Muhtar – The elected head of a village or of a neighbourhood with an office 
in the area.
Rakı – Popular aniseed-flavoured alcoholic drink.
Ramazan – Ramadan, the holy month of fasting for Muslims.
Rum – Term for Greeks in the Ottoman Empire and now for those who hold 
Turkish citizenship.
Simit – Crispy, ring-shaped bagel covered with sesame seeds.
Site – Housing development consisting of apartment blocks.
Tanzimat – Term referring to the period of reforms in the Ottoman Empire 
beginning in 1839.
TOKİ (Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı) – Institution that provides social 
housing, a non-profit government organization.
TOMA (Toplumsal Olaylara Müdahale Araci) – Armored Intervention 
Vehicle used regularly in demonstrations.
Türban – Type of headscarf, usually referring to brightly coloured silk 
fabrics.
Ümmet – “Ummah,” community of Muslims bound together by ties of 
religion.
Vakıf – Religious or charitable foundation.
Political Parties Mentioned in the Text
AKP – (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) (2001–) Justice and Development Party, 
a conservative party with an emphasis on Islamic values, built on the legacy 
of earlier Islamic parties. The party won the general election in 2002 and has 
remained the largest party in Turkey for 13 years. Its current leader is the 
current Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu while the former leader Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan has been the President of Turkey since August 2014.
ANAP – (Anavatan Partisi) (1983–2009) Motherland Party, a centre-right 
nationalist party, strongly associated with it leader Turgut Özal, Prime 
minister from 1983 to 1989, the prime architect of Turkey’s liberalization 
after the 1980 military coup. Also abbreviated as ANAVATAN.
CHP – (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) (1923–) Republican People’s Party, the 
oldest political party in Turkey, organized around Kemalist and social-
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democratic lines. It is currently the main opposition party in Turkey and 
prides itself as continuing the national project initiated by Atatürk.
CUP – (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) (1889–1918) Committee of Union and 
Progress, a liberal reform movement in the late Ottoman Empire that paved 
the way for many initiatives of the Republic.
DP – (Demokrat Parti) (1946–1961) Democrat Party, a centre-right reform 
party that won the elections of 1950 with a landslide victory that marked 
Turkey’s effective entry into the multiparty era.
FP – (Fazilet Partisi) (1998–2001) Virtue Party, an Islamist political party 
that succeeded the Welfare Party (RP) and preceded the AKP and SAADET, 
split into separate factions. The party was banned in 2001 for violating the 
secularist articles of the Constitution by the Constitutional court.
PKK – (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê) (1978–) Kurdistan Worker’s Party, a 
radical organization, listed as a terrorist group by the US and the EU, has 
shifted its political agenda from Marxist-Leninism to one based on the 
anarchist principles of Bookchin. Led by imprisoned Abdullah Öcalan, the 
party remains very important component of the Turkish political field.
RP – (Refah Partisi) (1983–1998) Welfare Party, an Islamist party led by 
Necmettin Erbakan (Prime Minister 1996–1997) that became the largest 
party in Turkey in 1996. The party was banned from politics by the 
Constitutional Court in 1998 for violating the separation between religion 
and state. AKP and SAADET parties succeeded RP in the Islamic-leaning 
politics of Turkey.
SAADET – (Saadet Partisi) (2001–) Felicity Party, an Islamist party founded 
by conservative Muslims after the ban on RP and formation of AKP, which 
they considered too reformist and liberal. Currently occupying no seats in 
the parliament, it nevertheless has an active organization with branches all 
over the country.
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